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ABSTRACT 
The 'capital ship controversy' of the interwar Royal 
Navy has been the subject of much discussion and previous 
research primarily focused on the grand strategic level of 
warfare and on the internecine debate between the Royal Air 
Force and the Senior Service. Singularly lacking from 
these earlier studies has been an assessment of how wedded 
the Navy actually was to the capital ship based on an 
evaluation of the Service's operational experience during 
the 1919-1939 period and the development of fleet tactical 
doctrine as revealed in its exercise programme. This 
dissertation evaluates the capital ship within the interwar 
Royal Navy by examining its place of prominence at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. 
The Introduction establishes the context of the 
capital ship controversy and reviews the many strands of 
the argument. Chapter I examines the operational 
experience of World War One and the state of Royal Navy 
tactical doctrine to 1919. Chapter II discusses the 
period's regime of naval arms control including the 
Washington Naval Agreement, the naval conferences of 1927, 
1930 and 1935, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and 
the role of finance as major determinants of the capital 
ship. Chapter III reviews the technical evolution of the 
capital ship during the 1919-1939 era, the offensive and 
defensive capabilities of heavy ships, and the several 
threats that challenged the supremacy of battleships and 
battle cruisers. Chapter IV offers a general review of 
naval strategy, discusses the several strands of British 
interwar naval strategy, considers the estimate of the 
naval threat, surveys the war plans developed and the place 
of the capital ship in the several plans developed. 
Chapter V evaluates the capital ship against a continuum 
defining the distinct phases of naval operations. Chapter 
VI reviews the sources of naval tactical doctrine, the 
8 
development of torpedo and gunnery concentration and the 
lessons drawn from the Service's exercise programme. The 
final chapter concludes that the Service's commitment to 
the capital ship was, by 1939, lukewarm at best, and that 
the type operated and under construction was tactically 





THE NATURE OF THE POSTWAR 
CAPITAL SHIP CONTROVERSY 
The question whether aircraft can sink 
battleships is but a small part of the 
greater issue whether the battle-fleet can 
fulfil the strategic role. Under the 
conditions now developing, has a rebuilt 
battle-fleet the promise of contributing in 
a way commensurate with its cost to the 
security of our sea communications and the 
flow of supplies upon which the nation's 
life depends? ' 
B. H. Liddell Hart 
Introduction. The armoured line-of-battle has long 
ceased to form a part of the Royal Navy. The very purpose 
of its existence reminds one of another age, as modern 
naval forces no longer exist primarily for fleet action, 
but are an integrated component of a combined arms force 
designed to exercise dominance over land and air no less 
than over the seas. Controversy was never far from the 
capital ship, the collective term that covered both the 
battleship and the battle cruiser. The fact that such 
vessels formed the core of the fleet for as long as they 
did is surely a testament to the persistence of the naval 
dogma of the late nineteenth century and the slow process 
by which naval thought evolved in an essentially inward- 
looking and conservative Service. Much has been written 
about the capital ship controversy. Bernard Brodie has 
shown that a debate of sorts existed within the Royal Navy 
as early as 1882 over one of the strands of the 
1B. H. Liddell Hart, 'Air, Land, and Sea, ' The Times, 
10 February 1936, Liddell Hart Papers, Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King's College, London, Section 10 
1936/35. 
10 
controversy, namely the acceptable size of a warship, 2 while 
the very concept behind the construction of Dreadnought3 and 
the purported revolution that it heralded was the subject 
of contemporary disagreement. 4 Professor Kennedy has 
claimed that the 'end of the battleship was in sight when 
it was no longer able to command the seas without a bevy of 
escorts. ... i5 And yet whilst it is true that with the rise 
of the submarine, the torpedo boat destroyer, the naval 
mine, and the aeroplane, capital ships required a host of 
supporting auxiliary vessels, the same argument applies 
equally to the aircraft carrier, the inheritor of the 
capital ship mantle. Professor Kennedy's assertion is not 
therefore sufficient in itself to explain why the 
battleship and battle cruiser no longer form the backbone 
of-naval power. 
Fundamentally, though, the nature of the controversy 
surrounding the capital ship changed with the arrival of 
the aeroplane. Previously, the controversy was very much 
an intra-Service affair surrounding the relative merits of 
different classes of warships whose ultimate import would 
be confined to the Royal Navy. The introduction of the 
aeroplane and the establishment of a separate air service 
altered the equation, and it is well to remember that the 
capital ship controversy of the 1919-1939 period was 
2Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 236-237. 
3Commissioned 11 December 1906, armed with ten 12-inch 
guns, and of 18,000 tons displacement. See John Roberts, 
The Battleship Dreadnought (London: Conway Maritime Press, 
Ltd., 1992), p. 16. (n. b., the details of described ships 
are appropriate for the time under discussion. ) 
4Jon Tetsuro Sumida, 'The Historian as Contemporary 
Analyst: Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir John Fisher, ' 
James Goldrick and John Hattendorf, eds., Mahan is not 
Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir 
Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport: 
Naval War College Press, 1993), p. 127. 
5Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval 
Mastery (London: The Ashfield Press, 1990), p. 249. 
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essentially a multifaceted debate with the protagonists 
divided upon the future of not only the capital ship but of 
the surface navy itself. This last point is frequently 
ignored. At times, the debate was as much over finance and 
cost effectiveness, ' organisational survival (particularly 
for the nascent Royal Air Force)' and strategic assumptions 
of the highest order regarding possible adversaries of the 
British Empire, as it was over the likely nature of a 
future naval war, the technical performance of differing 
weapons, and how best to maintain Britain's maritime 
security. 
Still, whilst this writer accepts the broader 
strategic dimensions of the controversy, it must be 
remarked that singularly missing from any previous 
investigation has been a systematic analysis of the Royal 
Navy's operational experience with the capital ship and the 
development of its fleet tactics during the interwar 
period. That this has been the case is all the more 
surprising as the controversy was fundamentally an argument 
over the operational value of heavy ships and their ability 
to support Britain's declared naval strategy. Accepting 
that capital ships were at risk from the submarine, the 
naval mine, flotilla forces, and the air, what lessons were 
drawn by the Royal Navy regarding the capital ship's 
continuing utility and survivability from the many fleet 
exercises of the period, from the controlled technical 
experiments carried out against warships, and from the 
experience of its operational commitments? Further, it 
must be remarked that the degree to which the period's 
6The 'Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Vulnerability of Capital Ships to 
Air Attack, ' CMD 5301, November 1936, determined that '43 
twin-engined medium bombers as the nearest approximation 
possible to the equivalent in cost of one capital ship... ', 
p. 13, Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1936/91. 
'See Geoffrey Till, 'Airpower and the Battleship in the 
1920's, ' Bryan Ranft, ed., Technical Change and British 
Naval Policy 1860-1939 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1977), p. 109. 
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regime of naval arms control and of strict financial 
stringency affected the operational role of the capital 
ship and the development of fleet tactics has never been 
adequately assessed. Finally, much of the present 
historiography is based upon the official Departmental 
papers lodged at the Public Record Office, Kew. Invaluable 
and essential as these records are, they are also 
incomplete. The vast majority of Admiralty files held at 
the Public Record Office (PRO) consist primarily of 
administrative and technical data. The conventional view 
is that any void in the official record is the result of 
files having been weeded or simply lost over time. 8 This 
explanation is inadequate, as it fails to acknowledge that 
certain files are still being withheld for security 
reasons, ' whilst other files released represent only partial 
collections. 10 The number of such files in question, and 
their bearing on the controversy is unknown to this writer, 
yet the absence of records dealing with specific war plans, 
and the Service's assessment of how it planned to fight a 
fleet action against certain naval powers renders a 
definitive judgement on the capital ship controversy 
impossible. In the absence of the missing official records 
discussed in Appendix I, this writer will rely heavily on 
contemporary accounts of fleet exercises as summarised in 
surviving midshipmen journals, on the unofficial 
correspondence of naval officers, and on a scrutiny of the 
8Robert Jackson, Strike from the Sea: A Survey of 
British of Naval Air Operations, 1909-1969 (London: Arthur 
Barker, Limited, 1970), pp. 49-50. Two examples of 
Admiralty documents not held at the PRO but, nevertheless, 
surviving include 'O. U. 6118(8), War Vessels Silhouette 
Identification Book, Atlantic and Pacific, ' November 1938 
and 'O. U. 6118(9), War Vessels Silhouette Identification 
Book, Soviet Union, ' dated September 1938. Both are 
retained privately by the author. 
9Letter from I. D. Goode, Ministry of Defence, to J. A. 
Moretz dated 24 April 1998. 
'°For example, ADM 223/488, 'Mediterranean, ' by Charles 
Morgan, omits the first 93 pages of this internal history. 
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official records that have been released in order to 
evaluate the capital ship. This study investigates the 
capital ship within the Royal Navy at the operational and 
tactical levels of warfare. It examines the impact of 
finance and naval arms control on the interwar Royal Navy 
and assesses their impact on the operational employment and 
tactical development of battleships and battle cruisers. 
Further, British naval policy of the 1919-1939 period is 
explored in order that the operational employment and 
tactical development of the capital ship can be understood 
within the overall strategic context of the period. 
Innovation has been a hallmark of the Royal Navy. it 
readily accepted the aeroplane, adopted it for use on its 
surface ships, and took the lead in developing the aircraft 
carrier. Often criticised for its belated recognition of 
the submarine threat during the 1914-1918 war, it is 
frequently forgotten that the Royal Navy enjoyed a marked 
numerical superiority in that type of vessel at the 
outbreak of the war over her primary Central Power rival: 
73 to 31.11 If, therefore, successive Boards of Admiralty 
during the interwar period argued for retention of the 
capital ship (to the chagrin of officers such as Admiral 
Sir Herbert Richmond" and Captain Russell Grenfell)13 it is 
right to question the extent to which such differences of 
opinion were the result of differing strategic visions, 
"Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 8. 
12Admiral Sir Herbert K. Richmond (1871-1946). 
Commanding Officer, Dreadnought (1909); Assistant Director 
of Plans, Admiralty (1913-15); Commanding Officer, HMS 
Conqueror (1917); Commanding Officer, HMS Erin (1919); 
President, Royal Naval War College, Greenwich (1920-23); 
first Commandant of the Imperial Defence College (1927-28); 
retired 1931. 
"Author, inter alia, of ea Power in the Next War 
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1938) and 'Our- Our Naval Needs, ' 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, August 
1939, pp. 492-507. Commissioned in 1916 and present at the 
Battle of Jutland in HMS Revenge. 
14 
operational experience, and tactical understanding. 
Richmond was certainly versed in tactical thinking, if not 
necessarily in the details of weapon system performance; he 
lectured in tactics as well as in strategy and policy at 
the Royal Naval War College. Yet, a review of his papers 
reveals that while he accepted the primacy of the 
battleship at the tactical level, he doubted its role at 
the strategic level. It is worth quoting Richmond at some 
length on this dichotomy in his thinking. Addressing the 
battleship at the tactical level, the Admiral argued that: 
It is a principle to which reference has 
been made earlier that the attack should be 
made upon the vital part of the enemy. Which 
of these bodies is the most important? This 
question admits of one answer only - the 
battleships. They carry the heavy artillery, 
the dominant weapon of a naval force: without 
their protection the smaller craft cannot 
offer combat. They are the support of all 
other vessels in all the theatres of 
operations - at any rate for the present. 
This admits no argument. It then follows that 
the attack should be made upon the 
battleships, and the efforts of our fleet 
should be concentrated upon their 
destruction. 14 
Yet, when addressing the issue of the battleship during a 
discussion on strategy, Richmond noted: 
Recently, the following has been put 
forward as reasons why battleships should 
continue to be built. First, that they are 
the most powerful units afloat. Second, 
that we have always had battleships. Third, 
that the French Navy suffered shipwreck 
under the influence of the school of Admiral 
Aube which aimed at substituting the torpedo 
boat for the battleship, and we shall do the 
same if we continue building the type. 
Fourth, that a prophylactic to every form of 
attack is discoverable and that even now we 
have mastered the submarine. 
To my mind none of these amounts to a 
logical reason. I do not call them 
14 'Lectures at Royal Naval War College, Greenwich, 
Spring Session 1920, Volume V, Tactics, ' p. 22, Admiral Sir 
Herbert Richmond Papers, National Maritime Museum, 
Greenwich, NMM/RIC/10/2. Original emphasis. 
15 
arguments, but affirmations. The statement 
that battleships are the most powerful units 
afloat means nothing unless you say what you 
mean by "powerful". If power is your aim, 
you might say that a floating fort like the 
"Livadia" is more powerful than a 
destroyer. Power is purely a question of 
adaptability to function. If the 
battleship is the type that can most 
effectually fulfil the function that your 
strategy demands of her, she is powerful: if 
she does not, she is a waste of money. We 
must therefore make our minds. absolutely 
clear as to the functions of the battleship, 
and of the different units of the fleet, 
which derive naturally from the functions of 
the Navy, which in turn derive from the 
object of war. '5 
One can view Richmond's latter statement as a refutation of 
everything argued in his first declaration regarding naval 
tactics and the battleship. No grounds are offered by 
Richmond as to whether the battleship at the tactical level 
is capable of fulfilling the strategic function for which 
it was conceived, and his argument that battleships, 
endowed as they are with the fleet's heavy artillery, are, 
therefore, the dominant arm is a tautological affirmation 
at best. Whether Richmond was aware of the contradictions 
in his argument is unknown. Baugh observes that as a 
serving officer, Richmond probably compromised his views at 
times in order not to offend colleagues. 16 That may be the 
case, particularly in the immediate aftermath of war when 
future naval employment was uncertain. " It is just as 
likely, however, that Richmond addressed the tactical 
issues surrounding the capital ship independent of 
'5'Lectures given at R. N. War College, Greenwich during 
Autumn Session 1920, Volume 1, Strategy II, ' p. 20, 
Richmond Papers, NMM/RIC/10/4. Original emphasis. 
16Daniel A. Baugh, 
the Objects of Sea Pow 
Mahan is not Enough, pp. 
17D. M. Schurman, 
Development of British 
Cassell, 1965), p. 115. 
'Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and 
er, Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds., 
33-34. 
The Education of a Nav : The 
Naval Thought, 1867-1914 (London: 
16 
strategic issues, although he was philosophically disposed 
to argue for an integrated approach to naval thought. 
Ultimately, Richmond was a macro, and not a micro, naval 
thinker, and his surviving tactical discourses are void of 
any reference to the progress made in the gunnery and 
torpedo arms as recorded in the confidential book series 
issued by the Naval Staff. 
The Elements of the Controversy. Many arguments were 
raised by the detractors of the capital ship in doubting 
its continuing efficacy, and these arguments addressed 
strategic, operational, and tactical considerations. 
Previous examinations of the issue have focused most 
prominently on the strategic level between the advocates of 
airpower and seapower. Of the many issues raised, the 
following were the more salient: 
What attributes defined a capital ship? 18 
To what extent was the capital ship at risk 
from the air threat? " 
To what extent were the submarine and the 
torpedo a threat to the capital ship? " 
What was the proper role of the battle 
cruiser? 21 
What was the proper balance between 
armament, protection, and speed to be aimed 
"Richmond lecture, 'Policy I, ' delivered 2 May 1922, 
Royal Naval College, Greenwich, Richmond Papers, 
NMM/RIC/11/2. 
19Draft report 'Committee of Imperial Defence Sub- 
Committee to Take Evidence on the Question of the Capital 
Ship in the Royal Navy, ' p. 8, Admiral of the Fleet Earl 
Beatty Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
NMM/BTY/8/4/1. 
20ADM 1/8658/61, Commanding Officer, HMS Conquest 
letter No. 028/147 dated 2 April 1924 to Commander-in-Chief, 
Atlantic Fleet. 
"Chatfield letter dated 11 May 1934 to Admiral Sir 
William Fisher, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiral 
of the Fleet Lord Chatfield Papers, National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich, NMM/CHT/4/5. 
17 
at in a capital ship? " 
What was it that dictated the size of a 
capital ship? " 
What was the purpose of the capital ship? 24 
What was the function of a capital ship? 25 
Can the functions of the capital ship be 
performed by aircraft? 26 
What was to be the priority of capital ship 
construction in relation to other defence 
requirements ? 27 
What type of capital ships could the Royal 
Navy expect to face in a future war? 28 
Could a fleet without capital ships be 
expected to prevail against a fleet with 
capital ships? 29 
How efficient was a modern capital ship? 30 
"Chatfield speech to the Institute of Naval 
Architects, May 1933, NMM/CHT/3/6. 
"Admiral Sir William H. Henderson, 'What is it that 
Dictates the Size of the Fighting Ship? ' Naval Review, 
Volume XVIII, 1930, pp. 1-56. 
"Richmond lecture on Strategy, pp. 2-3, Royal Naval 
College, Greenwich, Autumn Session 1920, Richmond Papers, 
NMM/RIC/10/4. 
ZSIbid. 
, p. 20. 
26' Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, CMD 5301, November 1936, On the 
Vulnerability of Capital Ships to Air Attack, ' Richmond 
Papers, NMM/RIC/6/3. 
27Roger M. Bellairs letter to Richmond dated 16 
December 1920, Richmond Papers, NMM/RIC/6/4. 
28ADM 1/8580/22, Jellicoe 'Report of Visit to U. S. A. ' 
letter No. 61/P. 230 dated 20 January 1920 to Admiralty. 
29ADM 1/8597/9, 'The Capital Ship, ' Commander-in-Chief, 
Atlantic Fleet to Admiralty letter No. 36/A. H. 0013 dated 10 
January 1921. 
30'Teeoh, ' 'The Battleship Question, ' Naval Review, 
Volume XXIV, 1936, p. 234. 
18 
Still, the controversy was always more than just the 
relative value of the battleship and battle cruiser and 
their technical attributes. The heart of the controversy 
struck at the operational doctrine of the Royal Navy and 
the tactics to be employed by the battlefleet. 31 To this 
end, the capital ship controversy raised the additional 
questions of: 
Should capital ships still operate as a 
battlefleet? 32 
Under what conditions should divisional 
tactics be adopted? 33 
In light of war experience, what 
characteristics should be adopted in any new 
capital ship built? 34 
How effective was capital ship anti-aircraft 
fire likely to be? 35 
The advocates for and against the capital ship were 
rarely as dogmatic in their views as their critics and 
interpreters have commonly asserted, and Sir Basil Liddell 
31The term 'battlefleet' is frequently used, but rarely 
defined. Frequently, it appears as a synonym for the fleet 
as a tactical entity. Officially, to the Royal Navy, the 
battlefleet was the tactical union of two or more battle 
squadrons. The battle squadron, in turn, was the tactical 
union of two or more battleships. The battlefleet did not 
include battle cruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, 
destroyers, submarines, or auxiliary forces operating with 
the fleet. 
32Undated and unsigned paper, Admiral Sir William 
Fisher Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
NMM/FHR/11. 
33H. G. Thursfield lecture 'Development of Tactics in 
the Grand Fleet, ' delivered 7 February 1922, Royal Naval 
College, Greenwich, Rear Admiral Henry George Thursfield 
Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/THU/107. 
34ADM 1/8586/70, T. B. 01557. Final Report of the 
Post-War Questions Committee' dated 27 March 1920. 
35Tizard letter to Professor R. H. Fowler dated 17 
December 1936, Sir Henry H. Tizard Papers, Imperial War 
Museum, London, IWM/HHT/103. 
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Hart's assertion that a 'battleship had long been to an 
admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop' is not only wide 
of the mark, but pernicious in its implication. 36 Given a 
debate that was to span the interwar period, that an 
officer could modify his views on such a fundamental naval 
issue may be regarded as a natural evolution. Moreover, in 
claiming a continuing role for capital ships, the corollary 
did not necessarily imply that the other naval arms were 
redundant; thus, an officer such as Admiral of the Fleet 
Sir Ernle Chatfield" could press with equal vigour for 
control of the Fleet Air Arm and for new capital ship 
construction. That such an experienced officer could be 
equally committed to improving both the surface and air 
arms of the Navy was frequently overlooked by his 
contemporary detractors. Nor was Chatfield, a renowned 
gunnery enthusiast, an exception in being an officer who 
recognised the value of the other naval arms. During his 
naval mission to Canada, Admiral of the Fleet Viscount 
Jellicoe3S advocated a balanced naval force for the Dominion 
including battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, 
36Arthur J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: 
Studies of the Royal Navy in War and peace 1915-1940 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 85-86. 
37Alfred Ernle Montacute Chatfield (1873-1967). Flag 
Captain in HMS Lion, (1914-1916); Flag Captain and Fleet Gunnery Officer, Grand Fleet (1917-1919); Fourth Sea Lord 
(1919-1920); Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (1920-1922); 
Third Sea Lord and Controller (1925-1928); Commander-in- 
Chief, Atlantic Fleet (1929-1930); Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean (1930-1932); First Sea Lord (1933-1938); 
Minister for Coordination of Defence (1939-1940); created Baron Chatfield (1937). It is difficult to minimise the 
enormity of his presence on the interwar Royal Navy. 
38John Rushworth, First Earl Jellicoe (1859-1935). 
Director of Naval Ordnance (1905); Rear Admiral (1907); 
Vice Admiral Commanding Atlantic Fleet (1910); Second Sea 
Lord (1912); acting Admiral and Commander-in-Chief, Grand 
Fleet (1914-1916); senior British officer at Battle of Jutland (1916); First Sea Lord (1916-1917); created 
Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa (1918) and promoted Admiral of 
the Fleet (1919). 
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submarines, and patrol craft. 39 Assuming naval estimates of 
£5,000,000, £3,500,000, or £1,000,000 respectively, the 
following force levels were proposed: 
£5 Million £3.5 Million £1 Million 
$25 Million $17 Million $5 Million 
2 battle cruisers 1 battle cruiser 
7 light cruisers 5 light cruisers 
1 flotilla leader 1 flotilla leader 
12 destroyers 6 destroyers 
16 submarines 8 submarines 8 submarines40 
Jellicoe prepared the report with a desire that the 
Royal Canadian Navy should form an integrated element of a 
greater Imperial Navy. What stands out from his 
recommendations is that while the contribution of strong 
surface forces, including the provision of battle cruisers, 
was a desirable contribution by Canada, what was of 
fundamental importance was the fielding of a submarine 
component. Nor did Jellicoe offer a strictly traditional 
assessment of the naval requirements of the fledgling Royal 
Australian Navy. Following his naval mission of 1919, 
amongst his report's proposals was the admission that 'One 
of the earliest requirements of the Commonwealth is the 
acquisition or loan of an Aircraft Carrier. i41 
On balance, to understand the capital ship 
controversy, it is necessary to recall that it operated 
against the backdrop of the British naval experience of the 
1914-1918 conflict. Left unsaid publicly, but very much 
present in the calculations of the severest critics, 
particularly those critics within the Royal Navy, was that 
39 'Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of 
Scapa, G. C. B., O. M., G. C. V. O. on Naval Mission to the 
Dominion of Canada (November-December, 1919), ' Volume I, 
Jellicoe Papers, British Library, Additional MSS 49,055. 
40Ibid., p. 15. 
41'Report of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of 
Scapa G. C. B., O. M., G. C. V. O. On Naval Mission to the 
Commonwealth of Australia (May-August, 1919), ' Volume I, 
p. 11, Jellicoe Papers, Additional MSS 49,048. 
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the Service was never again likely to enjoy the advantages 
of numerical superiority in materiel, the benefits of 
geography, and the fruits of special intelligence against 
an adversary. 42 If a navy so endowed could not secure 
command of the seas through its battlefleet, then perhaps 
the fault resided in the nature of the battlefleet itself 
and its constituent unit, the capital ship. A review of 
the Service's operational and tactical experience of the 
late war is therefore appropriate, prior to beginning a 
detailed assessment of the interwar capital ship 
controversy. 
420n this point, the following is cited: the Admiralty 
had at their disposal priceless information which we may 
never hope to have again in the future, and which they 
certainly did not make the best use of. ' from 'Summing Up 
by Director, Royal Naval Staff College on Jutland Lectures 
1927: ' Captain Allan Thomas George Cumberland Peachey 
Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/PCY/1. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE EXPECTATION OF NAVAL WARFARE AND 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LATE WAR 
I wish to express to the Flag Officers, 
Captains, Officers and Men of the Grand 
Fleet my congratulations on the victory 
which has been gained over the sea power of 
our enemy. 
The greatness of this achievement is in 
no way lessened by the fact that the final 
episode did not take the form of a Fleet 
Action.... 1 
Admiral Sir David Beatty 
Throughout these four years every sane 
Englishman's mind has rested in confidence 
on the Navy, and now when the end has come 
the British Navy is more clearly than ever 
the saviour of the country and the destroyer 
of the Central Powers. How true it is and 
how often forgotten that the final collapse 
is the direct result of our command of the 
seas !2 
Sir Walter Runciman 
The Expectation of Naval Warfare and the Operational 
Experience of the Late War. For Great Britain, the Royal 
Navy was viewed as the nation's first line of defence, and 
as an island nation it recognised that communications with 
its vast empire were only possible while its maritime 
routes remained open. With the dramatic rise of the German 
Navy under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Grand Admiral Alfred von 
Tirpitz, the Royal Navy had long considered that it might 
have to contest command of the sea with the High Sea Fleet. 
'Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet memorandum H. F. 1199/6 
dated 21 November 1918, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake 
Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/BLE/2. 
2Runciman letter to Jellicoe dated 14 November 1918 
cited in Temple Patterson, ed., Jellicoe Papers, Volume II, 
p. 281. 
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To this end, it resolved to maintain its superiority over 
the Imperial German Navy. Primarily, this was measured in 
the number of capital ships, but no less important in 
maintaining this superiority was the manning of the Fleet, 
the development of extensive dockyard and supporting bases, 
and the courting of naval partners such as France and Japan 
to facilitate the concentration of its heavy ships in Home 
Waters. A treaty reached with Japan in 1902, and 
originally aimed at addressing a threat from Russia, was 
accordingly renewed in 1911 with an eye towards Germany. 3 
With a similar aim in mind, Great Britain reached agreement 
with France in February 1913 that the French Navy would 
assume primacy for operations in the Mediterranean area. ' 
In the event of war the Royal Navy would impose a 
blockade against Germany, defeat in detail any ships found 
outside the blockade zone, and seek a fleet action with the 
High Sea Fleet under terms most favourable to the main 
striking arm of the Royal Navy--the Grand Fleet. In 
practice, this meant a resolve not to accept battle close 
to the Heligoland Bight where the numerical superiority of 
the Grand Fleet could be neutralised by German defensive 
mining. In a fleet action close to Germany proper, damaged 
ships might have to be abandoned or sunk due to the 
distance the Grand Fleet would have found itself from its 
main anchorages at Scapa Flow, Rosyth, and Cromarty. It 
has been said that the initiative for any fleet action 
resided primarily with the Germans. This is only partly 
correct. With the rise of wireless telegraphy as a means 
of controlling naval movements and the corresponding 
development of signals intelligence and cryptanalysis to 
divine the pending actions of an opposing naval force, the 
3Thomas H. Buckley and Edwin B. Strong, Jr., American 
Foreign and National Security Policies, 1914-1965 
(Knoxville: University of Press, 1987), p. 64. 
4Dan Van Der Vat, The Ship that Changed the World: The 
Escape of the Goeben to the Dardanelles in 1914 (Bethesda: 
Adler & Adler, 1986), p. 34. 
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Admiralty's attack on German naval ciphers allowed it the 
option to refuse battle if it so desired. 
Still, it is important to remember that fleet action 
has rarely existed as an end in itself, but, rather, has 
more frequently been the result of one navy responding to 
an ongoing operation of another, such as the threat of an 
amphibious landing or the escorting of a convoy. 5 Thus, if 
the Grand Fleet was intent on forcing a fleet action with 
the High Sea Fleet, it could have advanced the issue by 
threatening an amphibious landing on the German coast--a 
plan that was very close to the heart of Admiral of the 
Fleet Lord Fisher6 when he succeeded Prince Louis of 
Battenberg' as First Sea Lord. That it never did attempt 
such an assault highlights the fact that the British 
strategic aim of maintaining command of the sea was not in 
itself dependent on securing a victory over the main fleet 
units of the Imperial German Navy. As the geographic 
position of the British Isles lay astride the sea lanes of 
the North Sea, Germany faced the immediate problem that any 
shipping destined for her must perforce pass through areas 
under British control. This was a problem that could be 
discounted in the event of a short war, but which assumed 
a greater degree of importance, if the German Army could 
not deliver a quick military decision. 
Given the proximity of its main naval rival and the 
command arrangements established with its allies, the 
French and the Italians, for the Mediterranean area, the 
5Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and 
Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 33. 
6Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841- 
1920). Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean (1899-1902); 
First Sea Lord (1904-1910) and (1914-1915). Raised to the 
peerage as Baron Fisher of Kilverstone (1909). 
7His Serene Highness Prince Louis of Battenberg (1854- 
1921); First Sea Lord (1912-1914). Forced to resign his 
post because of his Germanic connections, he was ennobled 
as the Marquess of Milford Haven (1917) and promoted 
Admiral of the Fleet (1921). 
25 
main theatre for the Royal Navy was always going to be the 
North Sea; this was especially true for capital ship 
operations. ' Nevertheless, both in response to Central 
Power naval actions, and, also in pursuit of its own 
strategic aims, operations in the Mediterranean, the 
Atlantic, the Near East, and the Pacific Ocean areas 
featured prominently during the course of the Great War for 
the Royal Navy. Although of a secondary nature, it would 
belittle these efforts to view them as of no consequence. 
At times, these peripheral theatres witnessed operations of 
a most considerable scale. Such was certainly the case 
during the combined operations associated with the 
Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916, and the ramifications of 
these out of area events were at times most pronounced. 
Whilst it is true that much of pre-war naval thought and 
planning centred on a potential clash of battlefleets, 
technology had fostered new weapons, such as the aeroplane, 
the mine, and the submarine that would move naval warfare 
into the realm of the three-dimensional. The Navy was 
alive to the new tools of war and a brief discussion of 
their rise and development up to the end of the war is now 
in order. 
Aviation in the Royal Navy. Even prior to the First 
World War, the Service had begun using aircraft in support 
of fleet operations. Flying instruction began in March 
1911, and the first naval air unit was formed at Eastchurch 
in November of the same year. In July 1914, the Royal 
Naval Air Service (RNAS) was formed from the Naval Wing of 
the Royal Flying Corps, ' and when hostilities opened the 
RNAS had roughly fifty serviceable aeroplanes and 50 
8For a discussion of operations in the Mediterranean 
see Paul G. Halpern, The Naval Warn the Mediterranean 
1914-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 
9Peter Lewis, Squadron Histories: $. F. ý., $. N. A., S. and 
R. A. E. 1912-1959 (London: Putnam, 1959), p. 69 and pp. 171- 
172. 
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officers and 500 ratings. '° From such humble beginnings a 
force was to emerge that, by the time of its absorption 
into the Royal Air Force in April 1918, stood at 55,066 
officers and men and 2929 aircraft. " Yet, if British naval 
airpower had grown appreciably, it had grown haphazardly. 
During its expansion it had found itself responsible for 
the anti-aircraft defence of Great Britain, strategic 
bombing, and even for armoured cars. Yet, progress there 
was and capital ships were fitted with platforms for flying 
off aircraft and employed kite balloons to assist in 
reconnaissance and gunnery observation. Moreover, tenders 
and the first aircraft carriers, rudimentary as they were, 
joined the fleet, so that by the end of September 1918 the 
Royal Navy possessed 3 large aircraft carriers, 9 smaller 
carriers, 1 kite balloon ship, and 24 seaplane lighters. 12 
Certainly, however, the official assessment on the naval 
air arm's performance was guarded: 
Work with the Grand Fleet has been 
useful rather than spectacular. The 
principle of flying aeroplanes off the 
turret or decks of ships has been steadily 
developed which enables flights to be made in weather which would preclude the use of 
seaplanes.... 11 
This view was no doubt shaped by the practical difficulties 
of operating aircraft in the demanding environment of the 
sea and by the performance limitations of the aeroplanes of 
the day. 
Nevertheless, it is no exaggeration to assert that the 
Service initially embraced the aeroplane wholeheartedly and 
wasted little time in attempting, to employ it in 
'°ADM 1/8549/13, 'Appreciation of British Naval Effort, 
R. N. A. S. Aircraft Operations, Part 1'. 
"Ibid. 
12Admiralty report 'The British Naval Effort. 4th 




operations. So much so, that an attack on the Zeppelin 
sheds of Cuxhaven in late October 1914 was attempted. " 
Serving in the cruiser HMS Arethusa as a junior officer, 
Hugh Miller recorded: 
We have just carried out a most 
hazardous operation which turned out a 
complete failure. If it now succeeded 
England would probably have been singing our 
praises, but it was unsuccessful and so no 
one will hear about it. We ran a great risk 
and carried out our part to the letter, but 
the other part failed. 
We left Harwich at 5.30 a. m. on 
Saturday with UNDAUNTED, 16 destroyers and 
HM Waterplane Carriers RIVIERA and ENGADINE. 
By Sunday morning we were creeping along the 
Schleswig Holstein Coast of Germany. At 
4.48 a. m. we were within 12 miles of 
Heligoland to the Northward and here we 
stopped. The RIVIERA and ENGADINE commenced 
to get out their waterplanes (6 in all) and 
completed the operation before 6. a. m. The 
plan was to fly to Cuxhaven (50 miles off) 
and blow up the Zeppelin sheds there with 
bombs .... It was soon obvious that all was 
not well. Three waterplanes were taxi-ing 
all over the place, like flies trying to get 
off fly paper, but only one was in the air, 
and 2 were doing nothing at all... apparently 
the rain had made them too heavy to fly. " 
Ultimately, 'Plan Y, ' as the attack on Cuxhaven was styled, 
was carried out in December 1914, but the results were 
meagre and the risks taken great. Again, Miller's 
impression in Arethusa is worth noting for the insight it 
provides on the dangers and limitations of early twentieth 
century naval air warfare: 
We were an easy bag for the German Battle 
Cruisers if they would only dare to pass our 
line of submarines ten of which were strung 
"Planning for the strike began in early October 1914, 
and a dry run of the operation was held on 18 October 1914 
near Spithead. See War Diary, entries 11 and 17 October 
1914, Lieutenant Commander R. Erskine Childers Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/PP/MCR/C28. 
15Diary entry dated 26 October 1914, Paymaster Rear 
Admiral Hugh Miller Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/73/11/1. 
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out round Heligoland inside of us. At 8.45 
a hostile waterplane - we did not recognise 
it as hostile until it was almost on us and 
sailed straight over the ship from stem to 
stern at a height of under 1000 feet I 
should think. She looked very big and the 
little iron crosses on her wings were quite 
obvious to us looking straight up at her it 
seemed as if she had only to hand out her 
bombs and they would fall on our deck 
causing great destruction. He dropped 4 
bombs at us but they fell on either side 
between us and our destroyer ... 
11 
Miller continued with the British part of the operation: 
The Seaplane pilots do not appear to 
have done anything. One of the 3 pilots 
with us has not even dropped his bombs. The 
others report much fog over the land and 
although they dropped bombs they do not 
appear to have hit anything worth hitting 
either at Cuxhaven or elsewhere... '' 
Still, whatever the limitations in aircraft performance, or 
the dangers in such limited strike operations, the air was 
now a factor in almost all aspects of naval warfare to 
include strategic reconnaissance, convoy escort, and anti- 
submarine patrols. Tactically, aircraft were integrated 
into fleet operations, and by the final year of the war the 
Grand Fleet Battle Instructions recognised their increasing 
importance. Fleet aircraft were expected to conduct 
strategic long-range reconnaissance and tactical 
observation during the approach of the battlefleet and the 
subsequent engagement. Just as importantly, the fleet's 
organic aircraft were to deny the enemy reconnaissance by 
means of his aircraft. " Offensively, the aircraft of the 
Grand Fleet were expected to destroy the enemy's air 
reconnaissance, to conduct torpedo strikes on the capital 
"Ibid., entry dated 25 December 1914. 
17Ibid. 
"'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions' dated 1 January 
1918, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/7/4/1. 
29 
ships of the High Sea Fleet, and to strafe the topsides of 
German destroyers and capital ships. Further, they were. to 
attack any remotely-controlled motor boats or torpedo- 
hydroplanes approaching the fleet. Finally, aircraft were 
to assist the gun control of the fleet by observing the 
fall of shot for individual ships. 19 Certainly, given the 
day's technology, the instructions represented a robust 
assessment of the capabilities of the Grand Fleet's air 
forces. 
Submarine Development and its Employment in the War. 
It has been remarked previously that the Royal Navy enjoyed 
a marked superiority over the Imperial German Navy in the 
number of submarines in commission at the start of the war. 
Yet, as it was fundamentally a weapon of sea denial and the 
prime task of the Royal Navy was to ensure access to the 
sea, it was a weapon of limited operational scope for 
Britain. However, given the reluctance of the Kaiser to 
risk the High Sea Fleet and the increasing effectiveness of 
the British blockade, it was only logical that the 
submarine would come to play a greater role in German naval 
operations. It promised to negate the numerical advantage 
of the Grand Fleet's surface warships and was extremely 
difficult to counter. The usefulness of the submarine in 
supporting German naval operations was recognised from the 
beginning: 
"Our object is to damage the British 
Fleet by means of offensive advances against 
the forces watching or blockading the German 
BIGHT, and also by means of a ruthless 
mining, and if possible, a S/M offensive 
carried as far as the British coasts ... 1120 
For their part, the British appreciated that the underwater 
threat posed by both the submarine and the naval mine 
"ibid. 
"Precis of lecture 'German Naval Strategy, The War 
Order to the Fleet, August, 1914' by Commander J. F. 
Stevens, Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, Captain R. 
Oliver-Bellasis Papers, National Maritime Museum, 
Greenwich, NMM/BEL/151. 
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threatened the presumed supremacy of the Grand Fleet. 
Outlining his views to the Admiralty, the Commander-in- 
Chief, Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe minuted: 
It is quite within the bounds of possibility 
that half of our battlefleet might be 
disabled by underwater attack before the 
guns opened fire at all if a false move is 
made, and I feel that I must constantly bear 
in mind the great probability of such an 
attack and be prepared, tactically, to 
prevent its success. 21 
This assessment was not much different from that of Fisher 
who wrote in January 1915 on the eve of the Dardanelles 
operation: 
We play into GERMANY's hands if we risk 
fighting ships in any subsidiary operation 
such as coastal bombardments or the attack 
of fortified places without military co- 
operation, for we thereby increase the 
possibility that the Germans may be able to 
engage our fleet with some approach to 
equality of strength... 
The second method of forcing the fleet 
out, that is to say, by attacks on the 
enemy's territory, is difficult. Attacks on 
German colonies are not sufficient to tempt 
it out and joint operations against 
continental GERMANY are impracticable in 
view of the enemy's strength in submarines. " 
Offensive and Defensive Mining During the 1914-1918 
War. In no other war has the influence of the naval mine 
been as great as during the 1914-1918 conflict, and it is 
indeed the case that the naval mine came of age during the 
First World War. That this was so owed much to geography, 
to the limitations in surface warship design, and to the 
inadequate means at first available to combat this weapon. 
"Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet letter 
No. 339/H. F. 0034 to Admiralty cited in precis of lecture 
'Pre-Jutland Tactics and Command' by Commander G. E. 
Colpoys, Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, 1936 
Session, Oliver-Bellasis Papers, NMM/BEL/151. 
22First Sea Lord memorandum, dated 25 January 1915 
cited in precis of lecture 'British Naval Strategy, II' by 
Commander H. S. Squance, Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 
1936 Session, Oliver-Bellasis Papers, NMM/BEL/151. 
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The Royal Navy conducted both offensive and defensive 
mining operations, and, in turn, faced the perils of enemy 
mining. During the war the efficacy of mining operations 
was much debated--particularly as it placed prodigious 
demands on a class of naval vessel of which there never 
seemed to be enough, but of the latent danger of the mine 
there was little doubt. Whilst all types of naval vessels 
were at risk from the mine, the capital ship, by virtue of 
its value, size, and prestige appeared the most vulnerable 
and helpless, and confirmation of this is best demonstrated 
by the events surrounding the loss of HMS Audacious. 23 
Audacious, in company with the Second Battle Squadron, 
struck a mine off the Irish coast in the morning hours of 
27 October 1914 during a course of routine gunnery drill. 
Before the close of day, the battleship was lost; the 
striking feature of the tragedy was that not one member of 
the ship's company was lost. 24 
However, if the naval mine could be lethal, it could 
also be mastered. Increased screening by escort vessels 
and the fitting of paravanes to capital ships lessened the 
danger as the war progressed, but only new construction or 
substantial warship reconstruction could overcome any 
structural defects. Intelligence and reconnaissance 
identified static areas known to be mined, while Fleet 
guidance addressed the issue of enemy tactical mining. 25 To 
this end, 
The danger from mines dropped from 
retiring enemy cruisers must be guarded 
against. Ships should avoid crossing any 
"Commissioned 1913, armed with ten 13.5-inch guns, and 
of 28,000 tons displacement. 
24A singular testament to a warship's vulnerability, 
perhaps? Still, a series of errors compounded the tragedy 
and ensured the loss of Audacious. See R. A. Burt, British 
Battleships of World War One (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1986), pp. 183-186 for a discussion of the ship's 
loss. 
25Diary entry dated 26 August 1914, Childers Papers, 
IWM/PP/MCR/C28. 
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track passed over 
necessary to do so, 
angles if possible. 
to be kept to r 
dropped. 








the enemy but, if 
to cross it at right 
continuous watch is 
e any mines being 
fired out of stern 
The greatest risk to capital ships posed by enemy mining 
was in constricted waters that offered natural choke points 
or in waters close to fleet anchorages where manoeuvring 
room was at a premium. 
Surface Action in the Great War. Only once during the 
1914-1918 period did the main fleets of capital ships of 
the principal antagonists clash. The Battle of Jutland, 
fought on 31 May-1 June 1916, was a confused encounter in 
which poor visibility made control of the engagement by 
both commanders, Jellicoe of the Grand Fleet and Admiral 
Reinhard Scheer of the High Sea Fleet, difficult in the 
extreme. Any study of the capital ship controversy and the 
Royal Navy must be prefaced with an analysis of the Jutland 
engagement, as its shadow was to loom large over the 
remainder of the war and over the entire interwar period. 
It is perhaps a truism that in war more is often learnt 
through defeat than in victory. Captain Stephen Roskill 
has written that the Royal Navy was obsessed with learning 
the lessons of Jutland, and so at first glance it would 
appear. 27 Yet it is important to remember that prior to 
battle much of the Grand Fleet's doctrine was theory, and 
many of the faults later identified in method and equipment 
could only have been exposed under conditions of active 
service. Thus, to its credit, it was the precise aim of 
the Royal Navy to ensure that a second Jutland, with its 
"Memorandum No. 018 dated 25 November 1914 issued to 
Rear Admiral and Commanding Officers H. M. Ships & Vessels, 
Admiral Sir Richard F. Phillimore Papers, Imperial War 
Museum, IWM/66/9/1. 
"'Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 
Volume I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 
(London: Collins, 1968), p. 533. 
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inconclusive outcome, should not occur. 
Jutland, it is frequently claimed, was a tactical 
victory for the Germans whilst a strategic victory for the 
British. Over the German claim to tactical victory there 
can be little disagreement, if measured by losses 
sustained. Whilst it did not initially refuse battle when 
making contact with the British Battle Cruiser Fleet under 
the command of Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, 28 the High Sea 
Fleet sought to retire when the main units of the Grand 
Fleet intervened. Still, whilst engaged with Beatty's 
force, the Germans inflicted telling blows and destroyed 
HMS Queen Ma2229 and HMS Indefatigable; 3° before the day was 
over another battle cruiser, HMS Invincible, 31 flying the 
flag of Rear Admiral the Honourable Sir Horace Hood32 of the 
Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had succumbed to German 
fire. 33 
Jutland highlighted many deficiencies in both materiel 
and methodology within the Senior Service--deficiencies it 
28First Earl Beatty (1871-1936). Captain by the age of 
29 and the Royal Navy's youngest flag officer before his 
fortieth birthday; Vice Admiral (1915); acting Admiral and 
Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet (1916); created Earl and 
First Sea Lord (1919-1927). 
"Commissioned 1913, armed with eight 13.5-inch guns, 
and of 31,000 tons displacement. 
30Commissioned 1911, armed with eight 12-inch guns, of 
22,000 tons displacement. 
31Commissioned 1909, armed with eight 12-inch guns, and 
of 20,000 tons displacement. 
32Rear Admiral the Honourable Horace L. A. Hood (1870- 
1916). Rear Admiral (1913); Naval Secretary to Mr. 
Churchill, and Commander Third Battle Cruiser Squadron 
(1915-16). 
33The audit of Jutland was the loss of 3 battle 
cruisers, 3 armoured cruisers, 1 flotilla leader, and 7 
destroyers by the Royal Navy whilst the High Sea Fleet lost 
a battle cruiser and a pre-dreadnought battleship, 4 light 
cruisers, and 5 destroyers. From N. J. M. Campbell, 
Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1986), p. 338. 
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must be added that even if corrected may have not altered 
the outcome of the battle given the reluctance of the High 
Sea Fleet to continue the engagement and the visibility 
conditions prevailing. From poor coordination between the 
Operations and Intelligence Divisions of the Admiralty in 
handling signals intelligence and directing subordinate 
forces, such as the Harwich Force under the command of 
Reginald Tyrwhitt, 34 to the poor signalling and reporting 
procedures of the Grand Fleet's scouting forces, Jutland 
offered a host of lessons to be learned. The battle also 
highlighted other areas of concern including defective 
shells and dangerous handling procedures of ammunition 
charges, the failure to concentrate forces, and the 
difficulty of achieving tactical cohesion when forces 
shared disparate anchorages and did not regularly train 
together. Moreover, Jutland demonstrated that the issue of 
accepting a night time engagement had to be revisited and 
its associated tactics refined, and that ship recognition 
under conditions of minimal visibility had to be improved. 
Surely, Beatty's oft-repeated words when overheard to 
exclaim, '"Whats (sic) the matter with our bloody ships 
today" i35 capture in a moment the frustrations felt within 
the Grand Fleet over its operational performance. 
In the main, Jutland was a less than satisfactory 
affair for the British and controversy over the engagement 
was rife from the beginning. One naval officer, Philip 
Dumas, who served at the Admiralty during the war has 
recorded something of the immediate reckoning surrounding 
the battle: 
Jellicoe hesitated to fight as it was 
34Admiral of the Fleet Sir Reginald Yorke Tyrwhitt 
(1870-1951). Commander, Harwich Force (1914-1918); 
Commander, Third Light Cruiser Squadron (1921-1922); and 
Commander-in-Chief, China Station (1927-1929). Created 
baronet 1919. 
35Beatty as cited by Arthur Roderick Lewis, Boy 
Telegraphist Arthur Roderick Lewis Papers, Imperial War 
Museum, London, IWM/MISC/1010/65/2. 
35 
just dark & rather foggy about the German 
fleet during the night but there was 
sufficient fleet action for him & Beatty to 
claim very severe losses on the part of the 
Germans which the latter deny.... The general 
idea in the Admiralty is that Jellicoe is 
making wild & almost unsubstantiated claims 
to cover what ought to have been a great 
victory & was - but heavens alone knows why 
- periously (sic) near a defeat. Beatty on 
the other hand has covered himself with 
glory... 136 
While another was to note, 'It is a nasty knock and there 
is no denying it. We have engaged an inferior force & got 
the worst of it. 07 Thus, Jutland not only failed by its 
inconclusiveness to become another Trafalgar, it damaged 
the standing of the Navy in the country and divided the 
Service over the responsibility, or culpability, for the 
outcome. 
A future chapter will examine the modification of 
tactical thinking and the innovations in capital ship 
evolutions introduced in an effort to ' ensure its 
survivability and to make it a more effective weapon 
system. Not surprisingly, many of the steps pursued in 
tactical development were in direct response to the 
experience of the Great War and of the Jutland action in 
particular. From the earliest date, a vigorous attempt was 
made by both the Admiralty and the Grand Fleet to capture 
the lessons of that engagement. Within the Grand Fleet, 
committees were formed to investigate such aspects as ship 
construction and gunnery effectiveness, and from the Fleet 
Commander an order was issued requesting that: 
All battleships, battle-cruisers, 
cruisers and light-cruisers, engaged in the 
action during daylight on 31 May 1916, are 
to forward to the Admiralty their Dreyer 
36Diary entry dated 2 June 1916, Rear Admiral Philip W. 
Dumas Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/PP/MCR/96. 
37Arthur J. Marder, Portrait of an Admiral: The Life 
and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London: Cape, 1952), p. 
213. 
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table plotting charts and other range and 
bearing records that they may have of the 
period of time during which they were in 
sight of the enemy. 38 
A summation of the specific tactical deficiencies 
identified is now appropriate. 
Gunnery and Torpedo Fire. With the development of 
rifled artillery of ever larger calibres, the theoretical 
range at which a naval engagement could take place had 
vastly increased. An immediate problem, though, was that 
firing to a greater range did not come with a commensurate 
ability to actually hit anything. The difficulties of 
registering fire on a warship steaming at 20 knots at 
distances of ten to twelve miles in varying degrees of 
visibility promised to expend a capital ship's supply of 
ammunition unless newer means of fire control were devised. 
Still, it was not enough just to hit, but to hit 
continuously, and, moreover, to hit at the earliest 
possible moment. Or, as one authoritative source put it, 
'Battleship tactics are mainly the handmaiden of gunnery: 
they exist to help bring the greatest volume of hitting on 
the enemy. i39 It was observed that at Jutland, the German 
method for registering the range was superior to that 
employed by the'Grand Fleet, and, in an after-action report 
from the battle cruiser Lion, 4° it was noted that: 
At the commencement of the recent 
action it is known that the fourth salvo 
from an enemy ship was fired at 12 minutes, 
while the fourth salvo from our ship was 
fired at 4 minutes. This shews that the 
enemy have a system of ranging by a 
"Grand Fleet memorandum H. F. 1187/68 dated 24 September 
1916 to Flag Officers, Commodores, and Officers in command 
of H. M. Ships, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/6/6/7. 
39Reginald Bacon, The Jutland Scandal (London: 
Hutchinson & Company, 1933), p. 71. Original emphasis. 
"Commissioned 1912, armed with eight 13.5-inch guns, 
and of 30,000 tons displacement. 
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succession of rapid salvoes. 
There are undoubtedly great advantages 
in this method as compared with that of 
waiting for the fall of shot before firing 
the next salvo. 
While, therefore, there is no great 
difference in accuracy in their opening 
range as compared with ours, they have, 
undoubtedly, greater chances of first 
hitting. 
We therefore recommend that this form 
of attack be countered by a "ladder" system 
of salvoes... 41 
And, on the to be adopted 'ladder system' approach the 
report continued with: 
On opening fire. Range, deflection, and 
rate to be calculated as at present, but 2 
or 3 salvoes (according to the time of 
flight) to be fired in rapid succession 
without waiting to spot fall of shot. 
Sights to be adjusted as follows: - 
1st salvo: A determined amount below 
the estimated range. 
2nd salvo: Mean or estimated range. 
3rd salvo: A determined amount above 
the estimated range. 
Should these combined salvoes not cross the 
target, repeat the ladder until target is 
crossed.. . 
42 
and the report concluded that: 
As soon as the 
deliberate or rapid 
continued, as at pres 
is entirely lost, and 
the ladder system is 
regaining touch. 43 
straddle is obtained 
salvoes should be 
ent, until the target 
then we consider that 
the quickest way of 
Still, for the Royal Navy gaining the range was only 
half of the gunnery conundrum, since Jutland confirmed that 
there was something wrong with the shells in use by -the 
Grand Fleet. This problem was closely related to the 
41'Gunnery Lessons learnt from Action of 31st May' 




increased ranges that could be expected in a fleet action 
involving dreadnought-type ships. In an engagement fought 
at close quarters, the trajectory of gunfire was nearly 
flat. As the range of an engagement increased this ceased 
to be the case, and a shell's angle of descent approached 
400.44 Unfortunately, the burster employed in the heavy 
shells of the Royal Navy was designed to explode on a 
perpendicular trajectory. Accordingly, as the range of 
battle increased, the effectiveness of Royal Navy shellfire 
was limited and shells were liable not to explode. 45 
Rumours of this phenomenon reached the fleet, and, Beatty 
wrote to the Admiralty in August 1916: 
I have the honour to report that in the 
course of conversation with Dr. Delgren, the 
Swedish Naval Officer who visited "LION" 
recently, he informed me that German Naval 
Öffirp-s had mentioned to the Swedish Naval 
Attache in Berlin, that during the Battle of 
Jutland many of our shells struck their ship 
"sideways" and not point first. My 
informant was emphatic that these were not 
ricochets. 46 
Certainly, there had been hints earlier that all was not 
well. Campbell has noted that the limitations in lyddite 
heavy shells were known even prior to the war, in 
particular their ineffectiveness in penetrating heavy 
"Invincible letter No. Al/4 to Commander-in-Chief, 
South Atlantic and South Pacific dated 18 December 1914, 
Milford Haven Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
45This writer is struck by the weight and diversity of 
testimony that concluded that British shells were extremely 
deadly at the Falklands Islands, Heligoland Bank, and the 
Dogger Bank, yet deficient at Jutland. One explanation not 
previously offered may be that the quality of the shells 
produced during the war was less than the pre-war issue and 
compounded the basic problem. Thus, as shells were 
expended, either in battle or during practice shoots, the 
quality of British shellfire was steadily weakened. 
46Vice Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet letter No. 
320/B. C. F. 05 to Admiralty dated 30 August 1916, Beatty 
Papers, NMM/BTY/6/8/1. 
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armour. 47 It must, however, be said that the evidence was 
at best contradictory. Following the December 1914 Battle 
of Falkland Islands a summary of the action forwarded to 
the Admiralty from the battle cruiser HMS Inflexible48 
included the observation that: 
German reports indicate that all shells 
burst on striking the water, but I am 
convinced that a certain number did not, 
since the column of water thrown up, was 
precisely similar to that caused by practice 
projectiles, whilst others were as shown. 49 
Others, though, held little reservation regarding the 
efficacy of British shells. Following the Dogger Bank 
action of 24 January 1915 between Beatty's Battle Cruiser 
Fleet and the scouting forces of the High Sea Fleet one 
British officer noted that, 'Our shells burst with terrific 
effect whenever they hit... and the lyddite caused furious 
fires to break out which they did not appear to be able to 
cope with at all. i5° This view was shared by Paymaster 
Hugh Miller who, while in hospital, had the advantage of 
actually speaking to a captured German naval officer who 
had been on the receiving end of lyddite-filled shells. In 
a summary written to the Admiralty, Miller recorded that: 
He says that our Lyddite is terrible 
and that the Germans have a great respect for it. For some time 2 Officers of his 
Torpedo Boat during her fight were rendered 
insensible by the fumes of the 4" Lyddite 
shell which struck near the bridge. " 
"Campbell, Jutland, pp. 385-386. 
48Commissioned 1908; details as per Invincible. 
49n INFLEXIBLE" report dated 18 December 1914, 
Phillimore Papers, IWM/66/9/1. 
"Diary entry dated 26 January 1915, Surgeon Captain G. 
E. D. Ellis Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/PP/MCR/197. 
51'Information Obtained from a German Officer' report 
dated 27 November 1914 by Paymaster Miller serving in 
Arethusa, Miller Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/73/11/2. 
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Finally, one last observation of British lyddite shells is 
offered by Captain Charles Wintour who while serving in the 
flotilla leader HMS Tipperary, was to come to grief at 
Jutland. Writing early in the war, he recorded: 
I went on board "Liverpool" for a few 
minutes & heard from Edward Reeves all about 
the sinking of the "Mainz" & his taking off 
the prisoners. It must have been a beastly 
show - they never stood a chance - simply 
cut to ribbons by our lyddite. 52 
However, after Jutland, and accepting that German capital 
ships possessed superior armour and internal sub-division, 
there was no escaping the fact that British heavy 
projectiles had a latent defect which the Service, at last, 
took steps to address. In August 1916, at the instigation 
of Jellicoe, a Projectile Committee was formed to 
investigate the matter, but it was not until March 1917 
that its final report was completed. 53 In the meantime 
another panel was constituted to examine the problem, and 
the Shell Committee, as the body was known, established 
that the deficiency was more severe than originally 
presumed as the shells in question went beyond just the 
rounds fired from 12-inch guns. 54 Unfortunately, shells 
could not be replaced overnight and nearly a year after 
Jutland the following scene was witnessed aboard HMS 
Warspite, 55 a battleship of the 5th Battle Squadron: 
The signal had come thru about midnight and 
thru out the forenoon there were various 
interpretations and intense excitement. 
During the previous night all C. A. P. shells 
52Diary entry for 1 September 1914, Captain Charles J. 
Wintour Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/P447. 
"Precis of lecture given by Commander H. S. Squance, 
'British Naval Strategy, II, ' with 'Some Notes on Shell 
Development after Jutland, ' Royal Naval Staff College, 
Greenwich, 1936 Session, Oliver-Bellasis Papers, 
NMM/BEL/151. 
"Ibid. 
"Commissioned 1915, armed with eight 15-inch guns, and 
of 27,500 tons displacement. 
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had been inspected and many were found to be 
of bad quality... . At an early hour we 
started disgorging our dud shells bestowing 
them in an ammunition ship alongside the 
Port side . 
56 
Nonetheless, with the development of a new heavy shell, the 
Grand Fleet Battle Instructions were amended to reflect 
that at close range, lyddite remained of value, but that at 
greater ranges its use was to be forsaken. To wit, 
Ships having 30%, or greater, supply of 
new A. P. C. (or A. P. C. 'R' or 'X') shell are 
to use them at the commencement of an action 
with heavy ships, and continue to do so 
unless the conditions are manifestly too 
unfavourable. 
Otherwise ships are to use C. P. C. shell 
at ranges over 12,000 yards. Below this 
range the old type A. P. C. are the more 
effective . 
s' 
The new A. P. C. round corrected the shortcomings cited 
earlier when a shell struck at an oblique angle; it also 
introduced a delayed fuse that allowed the shell to 
penetrate the vitals of a ship before detonating. " 
Certainly, however, the problem persisted to the end of the 
war, as it was only after the Armistice that sufficient 
stocks of the new type of shell were made available to all. the 
battleships. 59 
"Midshipman Journal entries dated 29-30 April 1917, 
Commander H. C. Burton Papers, Imperial War Museum, 
IWM/81/13/1. If Burton's entry is correct, C. A. P. was the 
code used to describe chemical shells filled with 
chloroacetophenone, a non-lethal lachrymatory agent. See 
ADM 186/82, 'C. B. 3021, Handbook of Chemical Warfare, 
1931, ' Admiralty, Torpedo and Mining Department dated 
September 1931, pp. 16 and 40. Alternatively, Burton may 
have meant to describe A. P. C. filled shells. 
57 'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions' dated 1 January 
1918, as amended, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/7/4/1, p. 29. 
C. P. C. is the abbreviation for Capped Pierced Common. 
58ADM 1/8656/25, Director of Naval Ordnance minute 
dated November 1924. 
59tSome Notes on Shell Development after Jutland, ' 
Oliver-Bellasis Papers, NMM/BEL/151. 
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Nevertheless, gunnery involved more than the fire of 
disjointed ships; it was about making the whole greater 
than the sum of its parts, and the concentration and proper 
distribution of the fleet's firepower was the linchpin of 
fleet tactics. Jutland demonstrated that numerical 
superiority and heavier broadsides could not by themselves 
guarantee victory if the powerful synergy of command and 
control and squadron concentration were missing. This was 
most acutely highlighted during the initial phase of the 
action when the Fifth Battle Squadron was not concentrated 
with the rest of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. Still, so 
marked was the Royal Navy's potential firepower superiority 
during the period typically known as the 'Run to the South' 
that this shortcoming could have been mitigated had the 
distribution of fire by the First and Second Battle Cruiser 
Squadrons against the First Scouting Group ensured the 
engagement of all German capital ships. 60 
The above conclusion is certainly at variance with the 
apparent lesson that some officers of the Royal Navy drew 
from the engagement, which may only prove that not every 
lesson learned is the correct one. One officer's analysis 
included the observation that: 
It will be noted that fire 
concentration forms an essential feature of 
our battle plan, for we require to 
concentrate the fire of our whole fleet on 
a part of the enemy's line. This has been 
the recognised key to victory for more than 
100 years, but it is submitted that Section 
XV of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders contains 
certain expressions of opinion on this 
subject which directly violate the above 
principle. In particular, the law "fire at 
your opposite number" will create a strong 
tendency to select a more distant target, 
because she is the "opposite number", and 
60The First Battle Cruiser Squadron included HMS Tiger, 
HMS Princess Royal, Lion, and Queen Marv; the Second Battle 
Cruiser Squadron comprised HMS New Zealand and 
Indefatigable. The First Scouting Group was composed of 
five battle cruisers. Collectively, the British ships 
mounted 32 13.5-inch and 16 12-inch guns; German ships 
totaled 16 12-inch and 28 11-inch guns. 
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thereby to neglect priceless opportunities 
for concentrated fire on a nearer target. 61 
Drax's62 view failed to address the fundamental flaw of the 
battle cruiser--namely its sacrifice of armoured 
protection--and the place of the battle cruiser in the line 
of battle forms one aspect of the capital ship controversy. 
Nevertheless, given its role in the line of battle during 
the 1914-1918 war, it was essential that British battle 
cruisers when engaging their counterparts ensured that each 
ship came under fire, if only to disrupt the effectiveness 
of the German shooting. The tendency for the accuracy of 
German fire to diminish once British ships found the range 
was understood in the gunrooms and the wardrooms of the 
Grand Fleet. This effect was increased when the greatest 
rate of fire was produced by British heavy ships. 63 Gilbert 
Bickmore, an Assistant Paymaster Clerk, whose action 
station at Jutland was in 'A' Turret of Warspite observed 
that 'the German shooting was at first much more accurate 
than ours for they had better range-finders. But, as 
always happened, once our shells began to hit, the German 
accuracy tailed off. '64 
One issue that proved difficult to resolve even in the 
light of war experience was the ideal range to be aimed at 
61Drax letter to Beatty dated 9 August 1917, Beatty 
Papers, NMM/BTY/7/2/12. Original emphasis. 
62 Admiral Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle- 
Erle-Drax (1880-1967). First Director Royal Naval Staff 
College, Greenwich (1919-1922); Commander, First Battle 
Squadron (1929); Commander-in-Chief, America and West 
Indies (1932-1934); Commander-in-Chief, The Nore (1939- 
1941); retired (1941); recalled to active duty, and 
commodore of convoys (1943-1945). 
63ADM 186/615, 'C. B. 925, Grand Fleet Gunnery and 
Torpedo Memoranda on Naval Actions, 1914-1918, ' Admiralty, 
Naval Staff, Gunnery Division dated April 1922, pp. 4 and 
8. 
"Personal memoirs of Dr. Gilbert H. Bickmore, Bickmore 
Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/85/26/1, p. 16. 
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in a fleet action. Tied as it was to an estimate of the 
capabilities of the enemy's fleet and its likely tactics, 
it was not an issue easily reconciled. The divergence of 
views is exemplified by the conflicting recommendations 
reached following the Dogger Bank engagement. Thus, Beatty 
noted: 
'The Falkland Islands fight and the 
24th January have proved that hits can be 
made without difficulty at 19000 or 20000 
yards, but this range is not decisive and 
the percentage of hits is too small. An 
hour's fighting may find guns disabled and 
ammunition running short without a decisive 
result being obtained. Therefore there is 
no harm in slow firing at long range, but we 
must try to get in closer without delay. 
Probably 12000 to 14000 yards would suit us 
well, this being outside the effective range 
of the enemy's torpedo and 6" guns. We must 
try to combine early hits with decisive 
hitting soon afterwards. 65 
An opinion that Chatfield, Beatty's Flag Captain, took 
exception with when he observed that: 
it appears that any range under 22000 yards 
hitting can be attained within a few 
minutes. The mistake made was in not at 
once going into rapid independent and 
putting forth our whole volume of fire 
regardless of ammunition expenditure. The 
enemy would then have been overwhelmed and 
would never have recovered. 66 
Moreover, it was after Jutland that the Service began to 
refine its gunnery tactics by concentrating the fire of 
multiple ships upon a single target. To this end, Admiral 
65'NOTES ON THE ACTION OF THE 24TH JANUARY 1915. BY 
THE V. A. COMMANDING THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET. 
H. M. S. "LION"., ' Milford Haven Papers, IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
Original emphasis. 
66' REMARKS ON THE ACTION OF THE 24TH JANUARY 1915. BY 
THE CAPTAIN. H. M. S. "LION"., ' Milford Haven Papers, 
IWM/DS/MISC/9. Original emphasis. 
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Sir Charles Madden, 67 wrote to Jellicoe, his brother-in-law, 
now serving as First Sea Lord: 
Much gunnery activity in the Committee line 
& rather full ideas in the air, but I think 
we can steady them down one is to 
concentrate 4 ships on one ship plotting and 
spotting for four & directing them by a 
Seaplane Wireless set. 68 
As a tactical precept, the idea of concentrating the 
fires of multiple ships had long been recognized, and the 
benefit of one ship providing spotting assistance to 
another was noted at the time of the Dogger Bank action. 
In an after action report, it was observed: 
At the beginning of the action "TIGER'S" 
fire was observed to be going considerably 
over and she was evidently materially 
assisted in correcting this by a signal made 
from "SOUTHAMPTON". It would appear that 
under similar conditions in the future, 
spotting might be effectually carried out by 
the system of inter-squadron communication. 69 
Turning to the use made of the torpedo by British 
capital ships at Jutland, it must be remarked that its 
promise remained unfulfilled. Campbell records that only 
13 torpedoes were fired during the daylight action by the 
battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet, and 
none at all were expended by capital ships during the night 
of 31 May -1 June 1916.7° In turn, only one British heavy 
"'Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles E. Madden (1862- 
1935). Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief Grand, Fleet 
(1914-1916); Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet (1917- 
1919) Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, (1919-1922); and 
First Sea Lord (1927-1930). 
"Madden to Jellicoe letter dated 3 January 1917, 
Jellicoe Papers, Additional MSS 49,009. 
69'REMARKS ON THE ACTION OF 24TH JANUARY 1915. BY : - 
THE CAPTAIN. HMS "NOTTINGHAM", ' Milford Haven Papers, 
IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
70Campbell, Jutland, pp. 400-404. 
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ship, HMS Marlborough71 sustained damage by enemy torpedo 
fire. 72 Grove notes that at Jutland British capital ships 
had no less than 364 such weapons. 73 The question of 
whether capital ships should continue to maintain a torpedo 
armament capability given its cost in manpower, its 
perceived weakening of a ship's armoured protection, and 
its limited tactical utility would be addressed during the 
interwar period. 
Night-Fiahtina. During the Jutland action Jellicoe 
made the decision as the daylight hours waned to shift the 
Grand Fleet into night cruising formation with the thought 
of continuing the action on the dawn of 1 June 1916. One 
writer has said that 'British night-fighting technique was 
very inferior to the German, and indeed virtually non- 
existent. '74 While it is true that German night-fighting 
skills were superior, it is wrong to claim that the Royal 
Navy was not trained in this aspect of naval warfare. That 
this was so is best typified by the initial desire of Rear 
Admiral Troubridge75 to engage the German battle cruiser SMS 
neben in a night action in August 1914. At sea, British 
heavy ships routinely operated at Night Defence Stations, 
if not to seek battle with the enemy, then at least to be 
in a better tactical disposition to meet any potential 
attack, and evidence exists that pre-war training in night- 
fighting was more common than previously thought. For 
"Commissioned 1914, armed with ten 13.5-inch guns, and 
of 25,000 tons displacement. 
"Precis of lecture 'Jutland', Royal Naval Staff 
College, Greenwich, Session 1927-1928, Admiral Sir William 
George Tennant Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
NMM/TEN/41/5. 
73Eric Grove, Fleet to Fleet Encounters: Tsushima, 
Jutland, Philippine Sea (London: Arms and Armour, 1991), p. 
76. 
74Campbell, Jutland, p. 257. 
75Admiral Sir Ernest Charles Thomas Troubridge (1862- 
1926). Commander, First Cruiser Squadron (1912-1914); 
Senior Naval Officer, Danube (1918); and retired (1921). 
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example, Vice Admiral Brian Schofield's midshipman journal 
is replete with night time tactical exercises conducted by 
the battle cruiser HMS Indomitable76 and other capital ships 
during the 1913-1915 period. These evolutions included 
practice firing of the 12-inch guns of Indomitable and the 
13.5-inch batteries of her consorts, the exercise of 
secondary armament, and countering torpedo attack by 
destroyers. These progressions confirmed the extreme 
difficulty of co-ordinating the searchlights used for 
directing fire and the risks that destroyers posed. " 
Jellicoe's decision to defer battle was therefore founded 
upon the understanding that the capital ship's offensive 
attributes were lessened at night while darkness maximized 
the advantage of the smaller silhouette enjoyed by flotilla 
forces. At Jutland, that the Grand Fleet was athwart the 
High Sea Fleet and its bases added impetus to the decision 
to seek to renew the battle on the following morning. 
Unfortunately for Jellicoe, Scheer was determined to reach 
the Jade and forced the High Sea Fleet through the British 
cruising formation. During the night, numerous encounters 
of a disjointed nature occurred between the two fleets-- 
encounters that went unreported to Jellicoe. Consequently, 
Jellicoe was forestalled in his attempt to continue the 
engagement. Still, if Jellicoe's decision was tactically 
sound, it came to be recognised that chances for battle 
must be taken as they come and not as they are desired, and 
the Service during the interwar period was to work hard at 
developing its night-fighting skills. 
In the immediate aftermath of Jutland it was 
recognised that a reliance on searchlights for night time 
battle drill was not enough, and the Royal Navy worked to 
develop an effective star shell--a shell, it should be 
76Commissioned 1908; details as per Invincible. 
"See Midshipman Journal of Brian B. Schofield, 
especially entries 2-3 June 1913,13-14 April 1914,15 and 
19 June 1914, and 7 April 1915. Vice Admiral Brian B. 
Schofield Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/P. 72. 
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noted, very much in the arsenal of the High Sea Fleet. The 
danger of poorly worked searchlights was documented and one 
report observed that: 
If searchlights must be used, then in 
one position only; the use of two 
searchlights widely separated gives away the 
position of the ship and her alterations of 
course .... As searchlights form a focus for 
enemy fire, those on the Bridge should not 
be used if it can be avoided. 78 
In time, star shells would make their way to the fleet, and 
the Grand Fleet Battle Instructions were revised to reflect 
this fact. Still, they were considered of secondary 
importance, and the searchlight continued to be the 
preferred means of illumination for the remainder of the 
war. Hence, the following principle prevailed: 
When it is decided to engage the enemy 
ships, the searchlight is to be considered 
the primary means of illuminating them. 
Star shell are to be kept ready for firing 
but, generally, are only to be used for : -- 
(a) Examining a suspected area. 
(b) Assisting gunfire when searchlights 
cannot be used. 79 
Notwithstanding the dangers of poorly operated 
searchlights, the star shell too had its limitations, so 
that: 
Against an alert enemy it is unsafe to use 
star shell as a primary means of 
illumination. If, as may be expected, he 
switches on his searchlights simultaneously 
or in reply, the star shell effect is 
nullified. " 
The drawbacks of relying solely on searchlights became 
obvious after Jutland, but the question of why the British 
had not developed the star shell previously when it knew 
78 'Gunnery Lessons learnt from Action of 31st May' 
report dated 22 June 1916, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/6/17/4. 
79 'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions' dated January 1918, 
Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/7/4/1, p. 21. 
80Ibid. 
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that the High Sea Fleet had such a capability remains. 
Probably the most satisfactory answer is that with its 
emphasis on firepower in warship design and on offensive 
action in its operational doctrine, the Service viewed the 
star shell, even when employed in a ship's secondary 
armament, as a weakening of a unit's offensive potential. 
Identification. Closely associated with the issue of 
searchlight and star shell employment and night time battle 
was the matter of identification. Merely sighting a 
warship is not enough to determine whether to engage or to 
flee. At some point, and preferably, from tactical 
considerations, the earlier the better, a 'determination 
has to be arrived at as to whether the vessel is hostile or 
friendly. In naval action, the issue of identification is 
compounded by the acceptance that a legitimate ruse of war 
is for a ship to fly false colours. 81 Prior to the 1914- 
1918 war, the Royal Navy had worked out a basic means of 
determining warship identification. At the start of 
hostilities, recognition signals consisted of the 'British 
Private Disk' and a 'Challenge and Reply' documented in the 
Allied Fleet Signal Book, while British torpedo craft had 
a unique set of identification lights. 82 However, as the 
war progressed it proved necessary to develop a broader 
range of identifying signals and marks in order to control 
merchant shipping and convoys and to recognise aircraft and 
submarines as friendly or hostile. By the end of the war, 
therefore, the British had developed an extensive range of 
procedures and means to foster proper unit identification 
including the 'British Private Signal, ' Very Brock Signals, 
and unique lettering applied to ships of the Grand Fleet to 
allow proper recognition by aircraft. It must be added 
that the sophistication of these means increased as the war 
progressed. The first steps taken were rudimentary at best 
81ingrid Detter De Lupis, The Law of War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 259-262. 
82ADM 1/8558/135, 'Identifications and Recognition 




and stemmed from the consideration that, from afar, the 
German naval ensign and the White Ensign of the Royal Navy 
could be confused. 83 Thus, in the first month of war the 
order was made that: 
Ships are to hoist Blue ensign as well as 
White when going into action or approaching 
any suspicious vessel, to distinguish our 
ships from German. Ships with two masts are 
to fly the Blue ensign at the main. 84 
This was quickly superseded by new instructions that the 
Blue Ensign was to be replaced by the Union Flag to be 
flown from the fore stay which, in turn, were followed by 
instructions on the flying of the Red Ensign. 85 Large white 
lettering, unique for individual ships, was also applied to 
the turrets of capital ships to aid in ship recognition. " 
These measures were a quick fix to a critical problem, and, 
in time, the disk with its multiple settings proved a 
better solution. It was recognised that the means employed 
could not remain static lest the enemy copy them and employ 
them as a ruse. Thus, settings were defined via Key 
memorandum and issued to ships with procedures defined for 
supersession in the event of a compromise. 87 Moreover, as 
naval operations were from the very beginning a coalition 
affair, some procedures had to be shared with allies and 
associates. 88 This complicated the issue of identification, 
83Admiralty Order of 16 November 1914, Jellicoe Papers, 
Additional MSS 49,005. 
"Diary entry dated 1 September 1914, Ellis Papers, 
IWM/PP/MCR/197. 
"Ibid., entries dated 4 September and 15 November 
1914. 
"Ibid., entry dated 28 September 1914. 
87ADM 1/8558/135, 'Identification and Recognition 
Signals, ' dated 9 May 1919. 
"While the United States fought as an associated 
power, its unique operational role with the Grand Fleet 
where its capital ships formed the Sixth Battle Squadron, 
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but by war's end a problem that rarely featured in the 
writings of prewar theorists had been embraced, 
investigated, and, if not resolved, at least adequately 
addressed given the technology of the day. In the confused 
action at Jutland, the question of identifying friend from 
foe was to have deadly consequences, particularly during 
the encounters at night. A postwar assessment of the 
battle by the Navy included the following incident observed 
by the Commodore, 11th Destroyer Flotilla: 
I must mention that about 2100 a ship at the 
head of the 2nd squadron made the following 
signal by searchlight: "Please give me the 
challenge and reply for the day as I have 
lost mine. I did not see the reply made but 
evidently the signal was made by one of our 
ships and the Captain of the MANNERS told me 
he saw the reply made. It is possible that 
the question had been asked by one of the 
enemy vessels" ... 
89 
Prior to Jutland, the High Sea Fleet had gained knowledge 
of the British identification procedures in general, and 
during the battle the specific 'Challenge and Reply' in 
use. 90 
During the war, a prime consideration was to minimise 
the risk of what has become known as 'friendly fire' or a 
'Blue on Blue' engagement. To this end, a premium was 
placed on the safety of British forces, and the Grand Fleet 
Battle Instructions required that: 
The challenge procedure must be carried 
out before fire is opened and it must be 
borne in mind that vessels already in action 
may fail to reply to the V. B. S. and may have 
allowed access to Royal Navy procedures denied any other 
ally. This was particularly true in the realm of 
identification and caused much concern in the initial 
postwar period. 
89NID P256/24, pp. 120-121, Beatty Papers, 
NMM/BTY/9/10. HMS Manners was a unit of the 11th Destroyer 
Flotilla commanded by Lieutenant Commander G. C. Harrison; 
the Commodore commanding the 11th Destroyer Flotilla was J. 
R. P. Hawksley. 
"Campbell, Jutland, pp. 277-278. 
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had their fighting lights shot away. 
No item of recognition by appearance or 
pendants painted on the bow must be 
overlooked and under such circumstances fire 
should only be opened by the supporting 
vessels on a certain enemy. 91 
The evolution of the Royal Navy's doctrine on 
identification was to undergo much change in the period 
following the Armistice, and this will be addressed in due 
course. For the present, let it be said that the 
effectiveness of battlefleet tactics would not be 
sacrificed on the altar of safety during the 1919-1939 
period. 
Scouting and Reconnaissance. The Grand Fleet's 
tactical disposition for battle against the High Sea Fleet 
was markedly different than its normal cruising 
disposition. The former emphasised the development of the 
greatest firepower on a given course during battle; the 
latter was meant to minimise the risk of submarine attack, 
maintain fleet cohesion, facilitate unit station keeping, 
and allow a quick deployment on the appropriate bearing 
relative to the enemy's course. 92 A consequence of the 
Grand Fleet having a distinct battle formation was that the 
Fleet Commander required timely intelligence on the enemy's 
disposition in order to develop the maximum rate of fire of 
the British gun line upon engaging the High Sea Fleet. The 
information required could be gleaned by signals 
intelligence or by the fleet's scouting and reconnaissance 
forces. At best, the signals intelligence provided by the 
Admiralty could only indicate that the High Sea Fleet was 
at sea, provide an estimate of its numbers, its possible 
course of action, and a general indication of its course 
91'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions' dated 1 January 
1918, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/7/4/1. V. B. S. refers to Very 
Brock Signal. 
92Hughes, Fleet Tactics, pp. 70-72. 
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and location. 93 Perforce, the tactical value of such 
information diminished with time. And time, indeed, it 
took to intercept, decode, evaluate, and disseminate the 
intelligence, if warranted, to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Grand Fleet. 94 On this point, Jellicoe himself addressed 
the limitations of Admiralty signals intelligence: 
It should be realised that implicit reliance 
could not be placed on "Intercepts". I 
could not assume, for instance, that because 
the High Sea Fleet steered a course S. S. E3E. 
at some time between 9 and 10 p. m. that this 
course would be maintained until I received 
information from the Admiralty to the 
contrary. I could not expect that any but 
a small proportion of Scheer's signals would 
be intercepted. 95 
Likewise, the tactical signals intelligence provided by HMS 
St. Vincent, 96 HMS Canada, 97 and Indomitable98 at Jutland 
"While generally known, little has been written about 
signals intelligence and the naval war during the 1914-1918 
period. What has been written discusses the strategic 
capabilities of the Admiralty; see Patrick Beesly, Room 40: 
British Naval Intelligence 1914-18 (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1982). Virtually nothing has been 
written on the tactical signals intelligence capabilities 
of the Grand Fleet. 
"James Goldrick, The King's Ships Were at Sea: The War 
in the North Sea August 1914-February 1915 (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 209. 
95 'Jutland, Remarks on Narrative, ' Jellicoe Papers, 
Additional MSS 49,027, pp. 41-42. 
"Commissioned 1910, armed with ten 12-inch guns, and 
of 22,000 tons displacement. 
97Commissioned 1915, armed with ten 14-inch guns, and 
of 32,000 tons displacement. 
98ADM 186/625, 'S. P. 02085, Battle of Jutland, Record 
of Messages Bearing on the Operation, ' Admiralty, Naval 
Staff, Communications Division dated 23 September 1919 
reproduces the British signals associated with the 
engagement. Tactical intercepts of High Sea Fleet wireless 
communications were passed to Jellicoe via semaphore or 
searchlight by St. Vincent, Indomitable, and Canada in 
order not to alert the Germans that their signals had been 
compromised. 
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could do little more than indicate which ships or 
commanders were at sea based on their call signs, the type 
of units present based on the wavelength of the 
transmission, the relative urgency of the signal, 99 and the 
transmitting ship's approximate distance based on the 
strength of the signal. 1°° Given the vagaries in reception 
due to signal propagation and the difficulty of estimating 
the bearing of the signal's origin, such information could 
provide little more than an indication and warning of an 
impending action and was of limited value to the Fleet 
Commander in reaching a decision regarding battlefleet 
deployment. 10' Writing after the fact, Jellicoe stressed 
that he valued the scouting information provided by a ship 
in direct observation of the enemy over the signals 
intelligence of the Admiralty. 102 Given the limitations in 
signals intelligence previously cited, one can accept the 
Admiral at his word, and yet British scouting and 
reconnaissance were not without fault at Jutland. Many 
scouting units failed to provide enemy sighting reports or 
provided reports of questionable value due to errors that 
arose when the reporting ship estimated its own position by 
means of dead reckoning relative to the enemy's location. 
Moreover, the need to provide reconnaissance reports after 
the battle had been 'broken off, or during periods of 
99Goldrick, King's Ships, p. 222. 
100ADM 186/625, 'S. P. 02085. ' 
'°'Section XXI, Grand Fleet Wireless Telegraphy orders 
of 10 March 1915, in ADM 116/1663 specify the procedures to 
be followed for ships monitoring enemy tactical wireless 
communications. A review of the Grand Fleet ships 
providing such information to Jellicoe shows that it was 
the last ship of a division that was usually detailed to 
perform such work. The reason can be attributed to 
electromagnetic interference caused by gun fire and using 
the rearmost ship minimised this phenomenon. See G. H. 
Collman Williams, 'Notes on Fleet Tactics, ' Naval Review, 
Volume VIII, 1920, p. 51. 
102'Jutland, Remarks on Narrative', Jellicoe Papers, 
Additional MSS 49,027, p. 15. 
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limited visibility, had not been appreciated by the 
scouting forces. "' Beatty, for one, came to appreciate the 
need for tactical reconnaissance and scouting after Jutland 
and modified the standing orders of the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet to read: 
"It becomes the duty of subordinate leaders 
to act in the spirit of the Commander-in- 
Chief's requirements. These are only two 
and they are very simple. So long as the 
enemy ships remain afloat we must locate and 
report, attack and destroy: but to perform 
either duty without the other is to fall 
short of that co-ordination which ensures 
success, nor should it be thought that to 
perform one duty effectively it is necessary 
to abstain from the other. "°4 
The problems in scouting and reconnaissance and poor 
reporting procedures were certainly not limited to the 
fleet's flotilla forces, and neither the Fifth Battle 
Squadron nor the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron made contact 
reports to the Commander-in-Chief during the battle. 105 
These failings were recognised, and during the interwar 
period the Service would pursue changes in reporting 
procedures in an effort to enhance the accuracy of tactical 
scouting and reconnaissance. Finally, the scouting and 
reconnaissance forces available to the British at Jutland 
were principally those of the flotillas. There was a hint 
of aerial reconnaissance when HMS Engadine'°6 launched one 
103'Summing Up by Director, Royal Naval Staff College 
on Jutland Lectures 1927, ' Peachey Papers, NMM/PCY/1. 
104'Jutland V' lecture, Appendix to Synopsis, Royal 
Naval Staff College, Greenwich, Session 1931-1932, Tennant 
Papers, NMM/TEN/41/3. Original emphasis. 
"'Precis of 'Jutland' lecture delivered December, 1938 
by Captain H. J. Egerton to Senior Officers' School, 
Sheerness, Tennant Papers, NMM/TEN/41/5. 
"'Merchant vessel converted into a seaplane carrier; 
commissioned August 1914, rebuilt in 1915, and of 2400 tons 
displacement. See Norman Friedman, British Carrier 
Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 364-366. 
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of her Short aircraft. The sortie of Flight Lieutenant 
F. J. Rutland and his observer, Assistant Paymaster G. S. 
Trewin, was aborted prematurely when the engine failed, 1°7 
and Engadine was unable to relay via searchlight the 
limited information secured to another ship. 1°8 The 
reconnaissance was hindered by low cloud cover, and Rutland 
recalled that: 
On sighting the enemy it was very hard 
to tell what they were, and so I had to 
close to within a mile and a half at a 
height of 1,000 feet. They then opened fire 
on me with anti-aircraft and other guns, my 
height enabling them to use their anti- 
torpedo armament. 109 
The problems in passing such information reflect the 
shortcomings of naval command and control during the 1914- 
1918 war, and it is this issue that will now be considered. 
Command and Control. "' Fleet doctrine during the 
1914-1918 war was promulgated via a series of standing 
orders, instructions, and memoranda. They covered a myriad 
of issues that were central to ensuring that the Grand 
Fleet operated as an integrated force. The 'Grand Fleet 
Battle Orders' and their successor, the 'Grand Fleet Battle 
Instructions' were more than just a tactical handbook to 
support fleet operations. "' In a very real sense, they 
107V. E. Tarrant, Jutland: The German Perspective 
(London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995), p. 71. 
108Halpern, Naval History of World War I, p. 317. 
109H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper, The Fighting , Jutland: The Personal Experiences of Sixty Officers and Men 
of the British Fleet (Glasgow: Maclure, MacDonald & Co., 
1921), p. 13. 
1101t is not possible to discuss adequately the issue 
of naval command and control. The best one volume source 
is Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and 
British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996). 
"'Beatty replaced the 'Grand Fleet Battle Orders' with 
the 'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions' and 'Grand Fleet 
Manoeuvering Orders' in January 1918. See Gordon, Rules of 
the Game, pp. 527-529 and ADM 186/596, 'Introduction to 
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provided the Commander's estimate of the situation, defined 
a priori the type of battle to be fought against the High 
Sea Fleet, and provided for its rules of engagement. Given 
the Grand Fleet's performance at Jutland, much criticism, 
contemporary and subsequent, has been directed against the 
orders and instructions. A common complaint has been that 
they all too frequently stifled the initiative of ships' 
captains. In this criticism there is some truth. Yet, 
frequently overlooked by commentators is that given the 
technical limitations in signalling during the 1914-1918 
war and the expanded area over which a potential fleet 
engagement would take place, standing doctrine had perforce 
to play a greater role if a fleet commander were to retain 
any control over the battle once the action became 
general. "' Further, a common tactical picture of an 
engagement such as Jutland did not exist between Jellicoe, 
the Fleet Commander, his subordinate flag officers, and the 
captains of individual ships. Moreover, the initiative 
open to a ship's commanding officer is dependent on the 
scale of the engagement; the scope for individual 
initiative in a combat between two ships is infinitely 
greater than in an engagement between opposing fleets, or 
for that matter even squadrons. In an engagement between 
single ships the aim of the tactical commander and the aim 
of ship's captain are one; this cannot be said about a 
fleet engagement. "' In the light of wartime experience the 
Grand Fleet Battle Orders'. A separate set of standing 
orders, 'Grand Fleet Wireless Telegraphy Orders', covered 
fleet communication procedures whilst general fleet 
procedures were specified in 'Grand Fleet Orders'. 
112Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, p. 248 and 
Hughes, Fleet Tactics, pp. 79-81 touch upon aspects of this 
issue. 
"'Pre-1914 Royal Navy doctrine recognised that the size 
of the fleet must influence the . tactics adopted. Devolvement of control to column commanders was specified 
in memorandum H. F. 03, a supplement to Admiralty 
Instruction M. 0.426/13/A of October 1913. See Thursfield 
Papers, NMM/THU/107. 
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benefits of decentralised command were certainly 
acknowledged in the revised Grand Fleet Battle Instructions 
but only to a point. Given its penetration of German naval 
wireless communications and the limited dissemination of 
such intelligence, the instructions still recognised that 
the Fleet Commander remained the final arbiter of command. 
Thus, 
Notwithstanding the decentralisation of 
command indicated above, the Commander-in- 
Chief will retain the power to order the 
movement of the whole fleet by a general 
signal. Such a movement may be necessary 
owing to information known only to him and 
in order to ensure decisive results. "' 
Beyond the published orders, control of the fleet during 
the 1914-1918 war was exercised by semaphore, searchlight, 
wireless, and flag hoist. Each had their benefit, and, as 
important, their limitation. This was particularly true at 
night or during periods of limited visibility when visual 
means of signalling were employed. Communications by 
wireless possessed a unique set of problems. Mutual 
interference arose when ships attempted to transmit their 
signals simultaneously--one estimate is that at Jutland 65 
ships were operating on the fleet's general wavelength, and 
the effective range could be extremely short. "' 
Consequently, traffic discipline became essential as ships 
shared common waves or frequencies. Still, common to both 
flag hoist and wireless communications was that once battle 
damage was sustained maintaining communications became 
difficult, if not impossible, as halyards and aerials were 
lost. Both Lion, Beatty's flagship, and HMS Barham, "' the 
flagship of the Fifth Battle Squadron temporarily attached 
""Grand Fleet Battle Instructions, ' dated 1 January 
1918, Beatty Papers, NNE'! /BTY/7/4/1, p. 2. 
"5Group captain Arthur John Brister Papers, Imperial 
War Museum, London, IWM/MISC/1010/65/1. During the 1914- 
1918 war Brister served as a Telegraphist in HMS Iron Duke. 
"'Commissioned 1915; details as per Warspite. 
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to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, suffered damage at Jutland 
that destroyed their wireless facilities. " Thus, the 
scouting and reconnaissance intelligence cited earlier 
which was so important to the Fleet Commander was itself 
dependent on a constrained command and control system. 
Within the Grand Fleet, these limitations were recognised 
and light cruisers were used to relay the flag signals of 
the Fleet Commander to the rest of the fleet. "' 
Capital Ship Protection. With the loss of three 
battle cruisers in a day, Jutland pointed to the particular 
vulnerability of that type of heavy ship for the Royal 
Navy. Writing soon after the event in a private letter to 
Arthur Pollen, i19 Jellicoe confided: 
Our battle-cruisers showed their 
terribly weak point of want of protection as 
compared with the German. The public should 
know how poorly they compare in this 
respect . 
120 
Yet, if Jutland demonstrated which side in the prewar 
debate between speed or protection in warship design was 
correct, there were practical limits in immediately 
assimilating the lesson. The Grand Fleet's losses had to 
be made good, and the Germans were continuing with their 
own battle cruiser building programme. 121 Jellicoe forwarded 
117Arthur Hezlet, The Electron and Sea Power (London: 
Peter Davies, 1975), p. 126. 
118Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Jutland (London: B. 
T. Batsford, Ltd., 1964), p. 70. 
119Arthur Joseph Hungerford Pollen (1866-1937). 
Civilian naval writer and inventor. 
120John B. Hattendorf, et al., eds., British Naval 
Documents 1204-1960 (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1993), p. 
830. 
'21In an immediate attempt to alleviate the deficiency 
in battle cruisers Jellicoe recommended that the Japanese 
be approached with an eye towards selling two such ships to 
the British. Jellicoe to Geddes memorandum dated 21 July 
1917, Temple Patterson, ed., Jellicoe Papers, Volume II, p. 
185. 
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to the Admiralty a recommendation that the armour 
distribution for a proposed new class of battle cruisers be 
examined by the Director of Naval Construction in light of 
the experience of Jutland. 122 Ironically, given their 
identified weaknesses, the only British capital ships under 
construction by war's end were battle cruisers. 123 
Campbell has concluded that the specific reason why 
Invincible came to grief at Jutland was the flash of 
cordite charges from the turret to the magazine. 12' Gordon 
has noted that in the aftermath of the battle, detailed 
instructions were issued to improve the anti-flash measures 
in the handling of cordite. "' Thus, the protection of 
capital ships was closely tied to both structural and 
procedural deficiencies. Immediately following Jutland, 
the problems of ammunition handling and magazine safety 
were accepted and the need to develop defensive tactics to 
avoid being hit endorsed. "' 
Manoeuvre. The aim of manoeuvre in fleet tactics was 
to maximise the collective firepower in combat and provide 
the greatest degree of protection and safekeeping whilst 
cruising. Given the size of the Grand Fleet and its 
importance in developing fleet fires, it can be argued that 
manoeuvre was perhaps the greatest tactical issue-- 
122Jellicoe to Admiralty letter dated 29 June 1916 cited 
in Temple Patterson, ed., Jellicoe Papers, Volume II, p. 
21. 
123The ships were HMS Anson, HMS Howe, HMS Rodney, and 
HMS Hood, of which, only Hood was completed. See Deputy 
Chief of Naval Staff memorandum D. W. P. 3852 dated 22 
December 1918, Admiral Sir Sydney Robert Fremantle Papers, 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/FRE/312/925; ADM 
1/8564/210 discusses the relative weakness of the Royal 
Navy battle cruiser force to its German counterpart. 
"'Campbell, Jutland, p. 169. 
"'Gordon, Rules of the Game, p. 505. 
126'Gunnery Lessons learnt from Action of 31st May, ' 
report dated 22 June 1916, Lion, Beatty Papers, 
NMM/BTY/6/17/4. 
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exceeding even gunnery. Indeed, a ship manoeuvred poorly 
could negate the gunnery effectiveness of the fleet, as the 
example of HMS Orion127 at Jutland showed. Recalling his 
service as a midshipman in Erin, 128 Norman Lockhead noted: 
I regret to say that my ship was unable 
to fire, as during the short time the enemy 
was in sight, the Orion who was next to us 
in line, had failed to take station astern 
of us and was lying between us and the 
enemy. 129 
The very size of the Grand Fleet and the limited means 
of command and control available made its wielding as an 
integrated force extremely difficult. This dilemma led to 
a realisation that a decision in a fleet engagement might 
be more attainable by ceding the initiative to the separate 
squadrons of the Grand Fleet. It was with this in mind 
that Drax wrote to Beatty: 
The chief question arising from this 
plan of battle is, whether it might not be 
better executed by the method of attack 
known as "divided squadrons", i. e. squadrons 
widely separated, which simultaneously close 
in on the enemy's fleet and surround it. 13o 
Still, the twin aims of manoeuvre could at times conflict. 
Never more was this the case than when the fleet faced a 
concerted torpedo attack. Following its deployment for 
action, the Grand Fleet could be disposed in a linear 
"'Commissioned 1912, armed with ten 13.5-inch guns, and 
of 25,500 tons displacement. 
128Commissioned 1914, armed with ten 13.5-inch guns, and 
of 26,000 tons displacement. 
129'Recollections of the Battle of Jutland, ' Lieutenant 
Commander Norman McClean Lockhead Papers, Imperial War 
Museum, London, IWM/MISC/1010/65/2. 
130Drax letter to Beatty dated 9 August 1917, Beatty 
Papers, NMM/BTY/7/2/12. 
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formation that exceeded twenty miles in length. 131 Though 
such a formation maximised the power of the fleet's 
gunline, it came at the price of offering the broadest 
target for a torpedo attack. Whilst screening forces 
accompanied the Grand Fleet to minimise the danger, they 
could never totally negate such a threat. Thus, once a 
torpedo attack was launched, the options for countering 
devolved to: turning the fleet away from the axis of 
attack, turning the fleet towards the axis of attack, 
allowing ships the freedom of independent manoeuvre, or 
maintaining course and speed and riding out the strike. 
During the Great War, the 'turn away' of the 
battlefleet was the conventional means of negating torpedo 
attack. Still, if the 'turn away' was the accepted 
tactical palliative, Jellicoe received much criticism for 
executing the manoeuvre at Jutland. While the increase in 
range provided by a 'turn away' minimised the effectiveness 
of the enemy's torpedo attack, it took the Grand Fleet's 
guns away from its primary target--the heavy ships of the 
High Sea Fleet. By 1918, the Grand Fleet was willing to 
accept the torpedo risk, if in action with the High Sea 
Fleet. As a result, the Grand Fleet Battle Instructions 
were modified to read: 
it is the intention of the Commander-in- 
Chief to keep outside the line 15,000 yards 
from the enemy's course measured along the 
normal. If, however, this- procedure would 
entail the loss of gunfire, the torpedo 
menace will be accepted, and the fleet 
turned towards the retiring enemy. 132 
Summary. On balance, the Royal Navy's performance in 
the 1914-1918 war, while of mixed results, proved more than 
satisfactory and allowed the Entente Powers to prevail. If 
131'Grand Fleet Manoeuvring Orders, Appendix 2, Diagram 
Showing the Order of the Fleet After Deployment, ' Beatty 
Papers, NMM/BTY/7/3/3. 
132'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions, ' dated 1 January 
1918, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/7/4/1, p. 2. 
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it could not materially alter the German position vis-a-vis 
Russia, it ultimately ensured, through its maintenance of 
the sea lines of communication to the New World, that the 
entry of the United States would. The war that transpired 
was certainly not the war the Service anticipated. A 
latent submarine threat that was largely ignored prior to 
the war, had come within an ace of neutralizing the Royal 
Navy's traditional control of the seas. Moreover, the 
capital ship, the presumed essence of the Service's 
strength, was shown to be seriously flawed. Nevertheless, 
the Royal Navy prevailed and that it did so was a testament 
to its officers and men, the advantage of geography, and 
the vital importance of numbers. A navy bred on a 
tradition of ultimate victory, it absorbed its setbacks 
with a stoicism and a grim determination to prevail. It 
had misjudged the underwater threat, and the war had ended 
before the promise of the aeroplane could meet the vision 
of some of its prophets. The Royal Navy was determined 
that its next fleet action would be Trafalgar writ anew; 
the intervening period would be spent on rectifying the 
operational and tactical deficiencies identified by the 
test of war, and at the centre of this was the capital 
ship. Would the Navy prove more successful in dealing with 
the threat from the air than it had with the danger from 
below, and, indeed, had the sub-surface danger yet been 
mastered? Time could only tell. 
Yet, the Royal Navy was not necessarily master of its 
own house. The sharp end of British foreign policy, 
perhaps, but it was also an agency of government--and, a 
very costly agency at that. Others, including the Treasury 
and the Foreign Office, would define the environment in 
which the interwar Service operated. It is therefore now 
appropriate to examine two of the external determinants 
that shaped the capital ship controversy: the regime of 
naval arms control that arose during the period under 
review and the state of the navy's finances. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INFLUENCE OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND THE 
TREASURY ON THE INTERWAR ROYAL NAVY 
We are guarding against every danger 
except the real danger, which is 
bankruptcy. ' 
Andrew Bonar Law 
It is cheaper to maintain a limited 
number of large capital ships than a larger 
number of small ships. ' 
The regime of naval arms control agreements arrived at 
during the interwar period defined the practical limits by 
which the Royal Navy could scale its operational planning. 
The effects of the several political agreements reached, 
including the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, the London 
Naval Treaty of 1930, the Anglo-German Naval Accord of 
1935, and the London Naval Treaty of 1936, influenced the 
nature of naval strategy and force structure throughout the 
period of this study. Given the fact that the provisions 
of these accords affected other fleet units, including the 
aircraft carrier, the cruiser, the destroyer, and the 
submarine, their significance went beyond the capital ship. 
Yet, it was because the capital ship had become the 
accepted yardstick of naval power that these agreements 
were possible at all. 
Others have examined the negotiations and the treaties 
at some length, including the vigorous contemporary debate 
concerning the role and the size of capital ships. As 
these naval agreements had at times both a quantitative and 
'Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting of the Sub-Committee 
to take Evidence on the Question of the Capital Ship in the 
Royal Navy, Committee of Imperial Defence held 7 January 
1921, Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/8/3/3, p. 18 
2Undated note provided to Admiral Chatfield for an 
article to appear in Home and Empire, Chatfield Papers, 
NMM/CHT/3/1. 
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qualitative nature to them, they had a direct bearing on 
the debate surrounding the vulnerability of the capital 
ship, the development of naval air power, the planned naval 
building programme of the Royal Navy, and the way, in which 
maritime power could be exercised. This chapter seeks to 
move the discussion beyond the political, strategical, and 
economic realm that has been the hallmark of earlier 
analyses. Rather, this chapter will review the naval arms 
control process based on its operational impact on the 
Royal Navy both at the Admiralty and in the Fleet. In so 
doing, it is readily acknowledged that navies do not exist 
in a void, and the underpinnings of maritime operations are 
very much dependent on external factors, at times, beyond 
the influence of naval staffs. This phenomenon was perhaps 
never truer for the Royal Navy than in the period following 
the Great War. 
No less significant than the regime of naval arms 
control was the influence of the Treasury and the financial 
environment that Britain faced soon after the First World 
War. With a National Debt of £7,400,000,000, the interest 
payments alone to finance this level of debt accounted for 
40% of Government spending during the 1920's. 3 Indeed, the 
major stimuli for entering the naval arms limitation 
process were fiscal and not strategic. The introduction of 
the 'Ten Year Rule', the declaration of a 'One-Power 
Standard', and the frequent delays in establishing the 
defences of Singapore' to a standard able to support a fleet 
operating at a distance removed from its traditional 
supporting infrastructure were symptomatic of a country 
struggling to find the necessary financial resources to 
'Paul Kennedy, Stratecrv and Diplomacy 1870-1945 
(London: Fontana Press, 1983), p. 97. 
4Cabinet approval to proceed with the Singapore project 
was secured on 16 June 1921 (See ADM 1/8967/96); the 
project was completed in 1938; Martin Middlebrook and 
Patrick Mahoney, Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince of 
Wales and the Repulse (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1979), p. 5. 
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meet its diverse maritime commitments. True, most of the 
initial financing for the Singapore naval base had been 
advanced by New Zealand, Hong Kong and the Federated Malaya 
States, yet it is also true that the Admiralty balked at 
increasing the dimensions of the planned floating dock to 
support ships drawing more than 40 feet of water (not an 
inconceivable proposition for a ship of Hood's 
specifications if damaged) when it realised that the costs 
involved were in excess of £260,000.5 Even the Invergordon 
Mutiny, a disaffection that broke out in units of the 
Atlantic Fleet in September 1931, had its immediate origins 
in the financial pressures that prompted the government to 
reduce the pay of its servicemen. The burden of debt, and 
then of depression--Britain suffered severe economic 
downturns in 1921 and 19316--tied to an increasing tendency 
for each class of warship, ' including capital ships, to be 
more expensive and lavish than its predecessor were 
considerations that made it all the more easy for 
politicians to press for legal limitations in naval forces. 
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the 
pressures for naval limitations were entirely financial; 
they were not. In the aftermath of the 1914-1918 war, a 
general : revulsion against war and the accoutrements of war were 
much in evidence. ' Moreover, perhaps because of the 
'ADM 1/9264, Board of Admiralty minute 2139 dated 9 
December 1925. 
'John Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: 
Imperial Policy in the aftermath of War 1918-1922 (London: 
Macmillan, 1981), p. 35. 
7A feature it may be noted not unique to naval vessels. 
Contemporary passenger cruise liners exhibited a similar 
tendency to become ever larger; see 'Major, ' 'The Size of 
Capital Ships, ' Naval Review, Volume XXIV, 1936, pp. 251- 
256. 
'For a survey of the period's political, social, and 
economic milieu see A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914- 
1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). For the 
impact on public opinion and rearmament see N. H. Gibbs, 
History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy, volume . 
1, 
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sacrifices demanded of the governed during the war, 
successive British Governments of whatever political 
persuasion were committed to improving their social lot. 
Finally, at least in the initial postwar period, it was 
difficult to conceive that a major naval war was in the 
offing. Japan and the United States, her main naval 
rivals, were still friendly if not quite friends. As for 
the other naval powers, Russia and Germany were prostrate 
in defeat, whilst Italy and France were in a diminished 
state though nominally victors. Certainly, seen in this 
light, the introduction of the 'Ten Year Rule' and the 
'One-Power Standard' can be viewed as, reasonable attempts 
by the Government to define a practical structure of the 
political and financial limits associated with Imperial 
defence planning. It was only later that the benefits of 
imposing such limits became questionable. This was partly 
a result of the changing strategic situation--particularly 
the rise of hostile states in widely separated theatres-- 
and partly the result of entering treaties that failed to 
provide a regular replacement schedule for capital ships. 
A review of the period's naval arms control agreements and 
the finances of the Senior Service is now in order. 
The Aftermath of the Great War and the Washington 
Conference of 1921-1922. On 11 November 1918, the capital 
ship strength of the Royal Navy, including both ships of 
dreadnought and pre-dreadnought design, stood at 36 
battleships and 8 battle cruisers in full commission with 
a further two battleships maintained with reduced manning. 9 
If measured purely in terms of capital ships then Britannia 
truly did rule the waves, for the Royal Navy possessed 
twice as many battleships and battle cruisers as the rest 
Rearmament Policy (London: HMSO, 1976), p. 99. 
9Statistics Department Admiralty Note of 23 April 1926, 
Vice Admiral Kenneth G. B. Dewar Papers, National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich, NMM/DEW/4, p. 205. At the same time, 
the Royal Navy operated thirteen aircraft carriers. 
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of the world's navies combined. 10 This formidable force, 
though, was quickly reduced as the Navy moved from a force 
engaged in hostilities to a Service scaled to operate in a 
peacetime environment. Thus, in late 1918 the Admiralty 
was advised that: 
The Permanent Secretary pointed out that the 
whole question under discussion was one of 
some urgency, as the Treasury had recently 
given notice that the Vote of Credit would 
cease to be available after the 31st March 
next, and that after that date Naval 
expenditure would be governed by regular 
Naval Estimates sanctioned by Parliament. " 
Moreover, three of the four battle cruisers under 
construction as part of the Emergency War Programme were 
cancelled. 12 The breadth and speed of this reduction are 
illustrated by the fact by September 1919 the Royal Navy 
was planning to operate ten battleships and four battle 
cruisers in a newly established Atlantic Fleet and six 
battleships in the Mediterranean Fleet. 13 On paper, at 
least, this still represented a substantial force for the 
Royal Navy, but with the adoption of the 'Ten Year Rule' by 
the Cabinet in the previous month, the Senior Service could 
only be complacent about its future financial prospects at 
its peril. 
The 'Ten Year Rule' postulated that the Services in 
forming their budget requests should assume 'that the 
British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during 
'°James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the 
Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 2. 
11ADM 1/8564/210, Operations Committee un-numbered 
minute dated 20 November 1918. 
12Raymond Carl Gamble, 'Decline of the Dreadnought: 
Britain and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, ' 
unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts, August 1993, ' p. 168. 
13Admiralty memorandum concerning Post-War Fleet, M. 
03710 dated 11 September 1919, Beatty Papers, 
NMM/BTY/8/1/4. 
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the next ten years '. 14 The rule was made annually self- 
perpetuating in 1928 and was not rescinded until 1932.15 If 
the 'Ten Year Rule' represented a general framework for 
overall defence planning, a statement of policy for the 
Navy of a slightly more specific nature was soon 
forthcoming. In March 1920, during the parliamentary 
debates surrounding the Naval Estimates, the Government 
proclaimed that henceforth the Royal Navy would be 
maintained at a 'One-Power Standard' . 
16 There was nothing 
new in the idea of pegging the size of the Royal Navy to 
the relative strength of her rivals. Previously, during 
the zenith of 'Pax Britannica' when the Naval Defence Act 
of 1889 was passed, the Royal Navy had operated under a 
'Two-Power Standard'. In other words, the Royal Navy would 
be maintained at a level equal to the number of capital 
ships of her two strongest naval competitors. When the 
burden of this had proved too daunting in the run-up to the 
First World War, it had opted, in turn, to maintain a sixty 
percent superiority over the Imperial German Navy in 
capital ships. " Now, ironically, having seen off the 
greatest threat to her maritime position since the 
Napoleonic wars, Britain, in opting for a 'One-Power 
Standard', was settling for the maintenance of the Royal 
Navy at a level which left little to chance. 
Such structured formulations in defining British naval 
policy made sense only in so far as her potential rivals 
"John Gooch, 'The Chiefs of Staff and the Higher 
Organisation for Defence in Britain, 1904-1984' in John B. 
Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan, eds., Maritime Stratecrv 
and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: MacMillan, 1989), p. 191. 
15G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement 
between the Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 105-107. 
191. 
16Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., Maritime Strategy, p. 
17David French, The British. Wav in Warfare 1688-2000 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 152-165. 
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acceded to such schemes or, failing that,. Great Britain 
maintained the political, financial, and industrial 
wherewithal to see off any challenges. By 1921, it was by 
no. means certain that this was still the case. When, 
therefore, in July 1921 the American President, Warren G. 
Harding, invited the leading naval powers to attend a 
conference to discuss arms limitations, Britain responded 
favourably with the proviso that the parley also address 
issues arising in the Far East. 18 Hence, the Washington 
Conference sought to address a wide range of issues beyond 
the limitation of capital ships including the status of 
China, the limitation of land armaments, and the 
fortification of Pacific bases. In the event, the United 
States and Britain refused to guarantee French security, 
the sine qua non for her acceptance of any limitation in 
military forces. 19 Yet, if the Washington Conference failed 
to resolve the issue of land armaments, its proceedings 
still resulted in the conclusion of nine treaties and 
twelve resolutions. 20 
For the Royal Navy, the likely benefits accruing from 
a potential naval arms limitation agreement were tied to 
the fate öf its planned capital ship construction 
programme. During the war, capital ship construction had 
been severely disrupted as the need for auxiliary forces, 
particularly to deal with the enemy's submarine offensive, 
had to be met. 21 Moreover, the recent war had been arduous 
18Buckley and Strong, American Foreign and National 
Security Policies, pp. 64-65. 
"Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
20Stephen Roskill, Hanke v: Man of Secrets, Volume 2I 
(London: Collins, 1972), p. 239. 
21Emphasizing this last point, Rear Admiral Andrew 
Cunningham wrote that 'at the end of the last war, 412 
destroyers of a total of 370,000 tons were fully employed 
against an enemy with no ships at sea except submarines. ' 
See Rear Admiral (Destroyers) Mediterranean letter No. 
698/018 dated 20 December 1934 to Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean, ADM 1/8828/123/35. 
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on the ships of the Grand Fleet. For example, whereas the 
anticipated operational life of a light cruiser was 
estimated at 17 years, those that had served in the 1914- 
1918 war were deemed to need replacement after 8 to 10 
years service. 22 If battle with its opposite number had 
been rare, the strain of maintaining a high state of 
readiness in the Grand Fleet in anticipation of battle over 
a such a sustained period had a telling effect on the 
anticipated operational life of the battleships and battle 
cruisers of the Royal Navy. Accordingly, reconstitution of 
the main units of the Navy was a major objective of the 
Admiralty. The 1921 Naval Estimates included sanction to 
construct four battle cruisers of 48,000 tons displacement 
to be armed with a main armament of nine 16-inch guns, a 
secondary battery consisting of sixteen 6-inch and six 4.7- 
inch High Angle guns, thirty-two 2 pounders for air 
defence, and two 24.5-inch torpedo tubes. 23 
In the event, even before the close of the Washington 
Conference in February 1922 and the resultant Five Power 
Treaty, the four battle cruisers so soon laid down were 
cancelled. As these ships had only been started the 
previous October and their demise anticipated the actual 
ratification of the Five Power Treaty, 24 it must be admitted 
that their real purpose was probably to display British 
resolution to maintain naval parity in the face of American 
and Japanese pressure. 25 Beyond the four newly laid down 
22ADM 1/8735/72, 'Admiralty Memorandum for the Cabinet 
and C. I. D., W. D. C. -9' dated 21 November 1921. 
230S car Parkes, British Battleships (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1966), pp. 650-651. 
24The Five Power Treaty became effective for Great 
Britain on 15 October 1923; see ADM 116/2197, Order in 
Council dated 11 October 1923. - 
25Commenting on the Washington Conference, Elkins notes 
that the construction of the four battle cruisers laid down 
in October 1921 was suspended the following month. See 
entry Midshipman Journal of R. F. Elkins entry dated 18 
November 1921, Vice Admiral Sir Robert Francis Elkins 
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battle cruisers, Great Britain also agreed to decommission 
a further 22 battleships to meet the terms of the treaty. 26 
It has been argued that Britain and the other naval powers 
were forced into an agreement on capital ships simply 
because the United States, if required, could build beyond 
the capacity of any rivals. Notwithstanding America's 
industrial potential, it is by no means evident that the 
United States had the will to build to the required level, 
if an agreement limiting capital ships had not been 
reached; after all, she did not build cruisers in the 
requisite numbers to match the Royal Navy. Agreement may 
have been possible simply because each of the principal 
naval powers were ostensibly friendly rivals who had 
recently fought in a common endeavour, saw no prospect of 
a general war in the short term, and held that the benefits 
associated with deferring major naval construction 
outweighed those in proceeding. 
The Five Power Treaty recognised that differences 
currently existed in the relative capabilities of the 
capital ships of the principal naval powers--America, 
Japan, and Britain. In the main, those of the Royal Navy 
were accepted as being older and of a lesser displacement 
than the ships of its leading rivals. In the absence of 
battle between them a direct comparison of the capabilities 
of the capital ships of the Treaty powers was impossible, 
and remained a matter of conjecture. For its part, the 
United States Navy was not sanguine about its prospects in 
a fleet action against the Royal Navy during the first 
years covering the Washington Treaty. In 1925, a Naval War 
College study concluded that 'BLUE Fleet as it exists today 
can not engage the RED Fleet in gun action with any 
prospects of victory. Every recent tactical exercise, or 
war game, at the War College has shown this in the most 
Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/ELK/1. 
''Parkes, British Battleships, p. 654. 
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emphatic manner. 27 Likewise, the claim that British capital 
ships were older must be tempered with an understanding 
that the naval powers did not build and commission their 
ships in a uniform manner. The most modern American 
battleships (USS Oklahoma28 through USS Maryland21) were 
newer than the latest Royal Navy ships (HMS Royal 
Sovereian3° through Warspite). Yet, in older battleships, 
the Service enjoyed an advantage. HMS Benbow31 through HMS 
King George V32 were markedly superior to their American 
counterparts, USS Texas33 through USS Delaware. 34 Further, 
the Royal Navy possessed four battle cruisers--a type of 
warship not found in the United States Navy. 35 Chapter II 
of the accord which specified which ships could be retained 
provided the Royal Navy with a somewhat higher aggregate 
tonnage than the United States and allowed for the initial 
retention of twenty-two heavy ships. In time, these 
variances would disappear as replacement vessels were built 
27Captain J. M. Reeves, USN, Department of Tactics, 
cited in Michael Vlahos, The Blue Swor The Naval War- 
College and the American Mission 1919-1941 (Newport: Naval 
War College Press, 1980), p. 107. 
"Commissioned 1916, armed with ten 14-inch guns, and 
of 28,900 tons. 
"Commissioned 1921, armed with eight 16-inch guns, and 
of 32,500 tons. 
"Commissioned 1916, armed with eight 15-inch guns, and 
of 25,750 tons displacement. 
"Commissioned 1914; details as per Marlborough. 
32Commissioned 1912, armed with ten 13.5-inch guns, and 
of 23,000 tons displacement. 
33Commissioned 1914, armed with ten 14-inch guns, and 
of 27,000 tons displacement. 
34Commissioned 1910, armed with ten 12-inch guns, and 
of 20,000 tons displacement. 
35ADM 1/8735/72, 'Admiralty Memorandum for the Cabinet 
and C. I. D. ' dated 21 November 1921, p. 2. 
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and both navies would be stabilized at fifteen capital 
ships by 1936.36 Still, the Washington accords stipulated 
more than just numerical limitations in capital ships. 
Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and the United States agreed 
to restrict their capital ships to a standard displacement 
of 35,000 tons, the main armament to sixteen inches, to 
forego new construction for a period of ten years, and to 
limit total aggregate tonnage for capital ships and 
aircraft carriers. 37 
In addition, whilst the Five Power Treaty38 did not 
restrict cruiser numbers, it did define the practical 
limits of that class of warship by limiting their 
displacement to 10,000 tons and the main armament of non- 
capital ships to the 8-inch gun. Similarly, the maximum 
displacement of the aircraft carrier was limited to 27,000 
tons; provision was allowed for signatories to exceed the 
individual tonnage limit by converting two capital ships 
due for scrapping to aircraft carriers as long as their 
tonnage did not surpass 33,000 tons. 39 By classifying all 
existing types of aircraft carriers as experimental, by 
allowing for their replacement regardless of age, and by 
limiting their allotted tonnage to little more than twenty- 
seven per cent of that allowed for capital ships, an 
36The Five Power Treaty is reproduced in Harold Sprout 
and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: 
American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922 
(London: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 302-311. 
37Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, Volume II, The 
Navy and Defence: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet 
Lord Chatfield (London: William Heinemann, 1947), p. 3. 
38Through bilateral negotiations with Great Britain, 
Turkey accepted the Washington Treaty limits on warship 
size in the Treaty of Lausanne; Germany, in principle, 
acceded to the restrictions through the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement. See ADM 1/8634/184. It can be argued that 
Germany, with her pocket battleships armed with 11-inch 
guns on a restricted displacement, honoured the pact more 
in the breach. 
39Sprout and Sprout, New Order of Sea Power, pp. 302- 
303. 
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implicit assumption of the Five Power Treaty was that the 
aircraft carrier was a supporting and not a primary 
determinant of naval power. On balance, the signatories 
viewed the battlefleet as the primary arbiter of naval 
power for the life of the treaty. 
That an agreement of any kind proved possible was 
surely a measure of how strong the political and financial 
pressures were in demanding limitations in naval armaments. 
In more than one delegation, professional advice was 
forced to give way to political imperatives. 40 The 
Admiralty, for one, sought to eliminate the submarine41 and 
to forestall any lapse in capital ship construction but to 
little avail, 42 while the Second Sea Lord and Controller 
advised against accepting a limit of 35,000 tons 
displacement for capital ships if the United States moved 
to convert any of its battle cruisers presently under 
construction into aircraft carriers. 43 For Great Britain, 
a measure of the political and financial pressures at work 
are best exemplified by Prime Minister David Lloyd George's 
reaction to the Admiralty's proposal to keep capital ship 
construction alive. Writing to Beatty, the First Sea Lord, 
the Prime Minister expressed the view that the 'sovereign 
"Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 169. 
41Bryan Ranft, 'Restraints on War at Sea before 1945, ' 
in Michael Howard, ed., Restraints on War: Studies in the 
Limitation of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), p. 53. The Service's view on the abolition 
of the submarine was not dogmatic. Whilst Britain, as an 
island nation, was at risk to a guerre de course campaign 
waged by submarines, its elimination would make development 
of Asdic, the echo sounding device now commonly known as 
sonar, extremely difficult and would hinder defence of the 
Far East against Japan. ADM 1/8616/213 and ADM 1/8715/194 
discuss the tactical and operational merits for retention 
of the submarine. 
42Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., Maritime Strategy, p. 
196. 
43ADM 1/8615/207, Second Sea Lord to First Sea Lord 
signal dated 21 November 1921. Ultimately, the battle 
cruisers USS Lexington and USS Saratoga were converted. 
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virtue of the naval holiday consists in the fact that there 
will for ten years be a complete cessation of capital 
shipbuilding. 144 The Admiralty's concerns regarding a 
building holiday were tempered, in part, by the argument 
that since the laying down of Hood, Britain had already 
been engaged in a building holiday for five years, 45 while 
the recent approval of the Cabinet sanctioning the 
construction of the four new 16-inch gunned battle cruisers 
had only been gained after much delay and strong resistance 
from the Treasury. Maintenance of even a 'One-Power 
Standard' demanded both quantitative and qualitative 
equality with other naval powers--particularly the United 
States and Japan, both of whom were well on the way to 
commissioning battleships armed with 16-inch naval rifles. 46 
The initial 'naval holiday' proposed by the United States 
was eventually modified to allow Britain to build two new 
ships meeting the displacement and gun restrictions of the 
Five Power Treaty. Thus, the genesis of HMS Nelson4' and 
Rodney, 48 the only 16-inch gunned battleships to commission 
into the Royal Navy. Finally, though not stated at the 
time, the Washington Treaty spelt the demise of the battle 
cruiser--at least, for the Royal Navy. Certainly, they 
"'David Lloyd George cited in Gamble, 'Decline of the 
Dreadnought, ' p. 341. 
45ADM 1/8735/72, 'Admiralty Memorandum for the Cabinet 
and the C. I. D, ' W. D. C-9., dated 21 November 1921. 
"Vis-a-vis the United States Navy, the Admiralty, by 
1923, anticipated an American force of 24 battleships and 
3 battle cruisers possessing main armament totalling 282 
guns. The Service anticipated having 23 battleships and 4 
battle cruisers of 244 guns. The Royal Navy deficiency in 
total guns was mitigated as 6 of the American battleships 
were equipped with 12-inch guns whilst the smallest main 
battery in Royal Navy capital ships would be 13.5-inch. 
See 'Comparative Table - Dreadnoughts Completed' in Beatty 
Papers, NMM/BTY/8/1/4. 
47Commissioned 1927, armed with nine 16-inch guns, and 
of 33,500 tons displacement. 
"Commissioned 1927; details as per Nelson. 
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were retained, but never again would, or could, they be 
built. 49 This was because a displacement limit of 35,000 
tons was an insufficient margin to allow a warship to mount 
a main armament built around the 16-inch gun, while 
possessing even a minimal degree of armoured protection, 
and still provide sufficient engineering space to allow a 
speed in excess of thirty knots. In an appreciation 
written to describe the design considerations of Hood, but 
equally applicable to the consequences of the Washington 
Treaty, Eustace Tennyson-D'Eyncourt, 5° the Director of Naval 
Construction, noted that 'if it is desired to improve any 
feature involving weight, the easiest method of doing this 
is to reduce speed. '5' 
The London Naval Conference of 1930. Following the 
ratification of the Five Power Treaty in 1922, a general 
disarmament conference including a further round of talks 
covering naval arms limitation was convened in Geneva in 
1927. Agreement, though, proved elusive, particularly on 
the issue of cruisers, on which naval building programmes 
had concentrated in light of the hiatus in capital ship 
construction that the Washington Conference had largely 
"Sketch designs for a new class of battle cruiser were 
prepared in 1935. Assuming a displacement of 35,000 tons, 
one alternative envisioned a ship mounting twelve 14-inch 
guns whilst a second design considered a vessel armed with 
nine 16-inch guns. In the event, such ships were viewed as 
of doubtful utility in any war with Japan whilst her 
existing types (i. e., Hood, HMS Renown, and HMS Repulse) 
were considered more than a match for any existing European 
threat. See Director of Naval Construction minute M. F. O. 
845/35 dated 19 August 1935 in ADM 1/9379 and 'Protection 
of Capital Ships' in ADM 1/9387. 
50Sir Eustace Henry William Tennyson-D'Eyncourt (1868- 
1951). Director of Naval Construction (1912-1924). 
Responsible for the designs of the Royal Sovereign, Hood, 
and Nelson-classes of capital ships, he introduced the 
'bulge' as a protective measure in Royal Navy warships; 
created baronet (1930). 
51ADM 1/9225, Director of Naval Construction minute 
C. SecO 1214/19 dated 3 July 1919. 
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endorsed. 52 As the Admiralty viewed its cruiser numbers 
insufficient for its total requirements such a shift in 
shipbuilding priorities was logical. Thus, Dudley Pound, 
the Director of the Plans Division recommended that: 
As the "NELSON" and "RODNEY" are due to be 
completed in 1925, and as it will be 
necessary by the terms of the Washington 
Conference Agreement to resume the 
construction of Capital Ships in 1931, the 
period from 1925 to 1931 will be a 
favourable time financially to replace Light 
Cruisers, Destroyers and Submarines and 
other essential craft. " 
However, in preparation for the Geneva talks, the 
Admiralty sought to maintain the general tenets of the 
Washington Agreement, to extend its provisions to all naval 
powers (including those not members of the League of 
Nations) and to achieve naval limitations consistent with 
meeting the security interests of the British Empire. 14 
Altruism aside, faced with having to submit Naval Estimates 
of the order of £80,000,000 to a Government reluctant to 
fund such levels of expenditure, the Naval Staff accepted 
the arms control process as a means of limiting the naval 
threat. 55 To that end, it agreed to accept a new and lower 
standard of capital ship for the Geneva talks (-one 
displacing 28,000 tons and mounting 13.5-inch guns-) whilst 
internally it investigated whether a battle cruiser armed 
52After the Five Power Treaty, Japan announced her 
intention to increase her cruiser, destroyer, and submarine 
strength to alleviate her disadvantaged position in heavy 
ships. See Brian Schofield, British Sea Power: Naval 
Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: B. T. Batsford, 
1967), p. 102. 
53ADM 1/8702/151, Plans Division minute 01813/23, 
'Programme of Construction and Re-construction, ' dated 12 
June 1923. 
54ADM 1/8699/118, Joint minute from Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff, Controller, and Assistant Chief of the Naval 
Staff to Chief of the Naval Staff dated 21 December 1926. 
"Ibid. 
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with six 12-inch guns56 and capable of 30 knots was viable 
on a similar displacement. 57 Finally, the Admiralty 
accepted that the life of its existing capital ships could 
be extended beyond the 20 years that was regarded at the 
time of the Washington Conference as the limit of its 
service life. Therefore, where previously it had 
anticipated building eleven new heavy ships of 35,000 tons 
displacement and armed with 16-inch guns between 1931-1940, 
it was now willing to build seven ships on a displacement 
of 28,500 tons and armed with 13.5-inch guns; such a 
programme, it was believed, would save roughly £33,000,000 
from the Naval Estimates between 1931-1940.58 
The provisions of the Five Power Treaty which 
suspended capital ship construction were due to expire in 
1932; in the absence of another accord, capital ship 
construction looked likely to begin anew thereafter. Thus, 
a further naval conference was held from 21 January to 23 
April 1930 in London between the principal maritime powers 
to discuss additional limitations. The new treaty59 
extended the susepnsion in capital ship building for a 
further five years and broadened the tonnage ratios applied 
to capital ships to cover cruisers, destroyers, 60. and 
56The 12-inch gun was designed to fire a shell weighing 
950-lbs., ADM 1/8779/190. 
57ADM 1/8715/182, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff 
minute M. 0797/27 dated 16 March 1927. 
58ADM 1/8715/188, Plans Division minute 02832/27 dated 
6 May 1927. 
59The ratifications of the treaty were deposited in 
London on 27 October 1930; see ADM 1/8743/108, 
Mobilisation Branch un-numbered minute dated 3 November 
1930. 
60The British were allowed tonnages of 150,000 and 
52,700, respectively, for destroyers and submarines, ADM 
1/8747/82. 
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submarines. 61 Unfortunately for the Royal Navy neither the 
Italian nor French navies, parties to the original 
Washington Treaty, accepted the continuing suspension in 
heavy ship construction that the Treaty endorsed. " 
Again, the Admiralty considered several alternative 
designs for the capital ship in preparation for the talks. 
Such designs served a three-fold purpose. First, they 
allowed the Naval Staff to estimate the likely impact 
future restrictions on the capital ship would have on its 
survivability. Secondly, they supported the analysis of 
the Naval Staff in measuring the ability of the capital 
ship to fulfil its operational role in the light of any new 
legal constraints, and, finally, they allowed the Admiralty 
to support and influence the negotiation process. In the 
internal staff discussions leading to the London Conference 
of 1930, the Admiralty examined a host of capital ship 
alternatives, from the Washington standard of vessel of 
35,000 tons and mounting 16-inch guns to a much reduced 
ship armed with 10-inch guns on a displacement of 22,000 
tons. 63 
From an operational perspective, the London Treaty of 
1930 meant that the Third Battle Squadron, so recently 
established for the training of boys, would be 
disestablished without replacement. Moreover, the 
agreement, in so far as it covered light forces, implicitly 
made naval planning with the Dominion and Commonwealth 
Navies essential if a 'One Power Standard' were to be 
maintained. This new element in naval planning was 
61Ernest Andrade, Jr., 'Arms Limitation Agreements and 
the Evolution of Weaponry: The Case of the "Treaty 
Cruiser, " Daniel M. Masterson, ed., Naval History: The 
Sixth Symposium of the U. a. Naval Academy (Wilmington: 
Scholarly Resources, 1987), p. 184. 
62See ADM 1/9081/53, 'Board Memorandum on a New 
Standard of Naval Strength. ' 
63ADM 1/9302, Roger Bellairs Minute No. S. 0.3513/29 
dated 9 January 1930. 
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encapsulated by Admiral Sir Frederick Field, 64 the Chief of 
the Naval Staff, in a minute that read in part: 
The situation up till now with regard 
to the Dominion Navies and their relation to 
the Royal Navy has needed no special 
consideration, for the Washington Treaty 
only fixed the strength of battleships and 
aircraft carriers, of which the Dominion 
Navies did not possess any units. 
The extension of the rationing system 
to all classes of ships except sloops in the 
London Treaty, and the emphasis which has 
been laid during the Treaty negotiations on 
the principle of equal status with the 
Mother Country, has changed the 
situation.... The Admiralty, however, cannot 
view this policy without anxiety. 
Our Empire Fleet, which may, in 20 
years' time, consist of Australian, New 
Zealand, Canadian, Indian and South African 
units, could not be compared in efficiency 
with the United States Fleet of the same 
size, which would be trained and operated as 
one unit . 
65 
In anticipation of the London talks, the Admiralty 
formulated its irreducible minimum requirements for heavy 
ships. Thus, Captain Roger Bellairs, the Director of 
Plans, minuted that: 
After careful consideration, the 
Admiralty have already decided to propose on 
the next suitable occasion that 25,000 tons 
should be adopted as the maximum limit for 
the battleship.... 
In deciding on the limit of 25,000 tons 
a considerable reduction has been made on 
the limit proposed at Geneva in 1927, and in 
64Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Laurence Field 
(1871-1945); Commanding Officer, King George V (1916); 
Third Sea Lord and Controller (1920-1923); Commander, 
Battle Cruiser Squadron (1923); Vice Admiral (Acting), 
Special Service Squadron (1923-1924); Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff (1925-1928); Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean 
(1928-1930); First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff 
(1930-1933). 
65ADM 1/8744/125, Chief of Naval Staff un-numbered 
minute to Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff dated 19 June 
1930. Field was incorrect. HMAS Australia, a battle 
cruiser disposed of under the terms of the Five Power 
Treaty, had been a unit of the Royal Australian Navy. 
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the Admiralty view an efficient, well- 
designed battleship capable of fulfilling 
her function under modern conditions cannot 
be constructed on a smaller tonnage ... 
66 
In the event, agreement with the other naval powers on 
capital ships with such a limited displacement proved 
impossible, yet the Admiralty's willingness to consider 
such proposals and others imposing even stricter limits 
belies a commonly held perception that the Service was 
fundamentally inflexible to the point of dogmatism 
regarding the size of the capital ship. It must, however, 
be observed that the views held within the Admiralty were 
not universally shared. To this end, Field, whilst serving 
as the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, had previously 
written to Richmond that: 
it is essential that the tonnage of the 
individual ships should be such as to permit 
of her being reasonably capable of 
withstanding attack from the air and from 
under the water - the airplane and submarine in fact are the principal dangers to which 
the capital ship is exposed. 
Since no limitation is placed to the 
number of submarines and aircraft or to the 
size of the weapons (torpedoes and bombs) 
which may be carried by these vessels, it 
is necessary to consider whether the tonnage 
of the individual capital ship is sufficient 
to enable her to combine a reasonable degree 
of offensive power in combination with the 
necessary protection against the largest 
bomb and torpedo that is likely to be 
developed. A study of this problem has led 
the Admiralty to conclude that, far from 
being able to accept a smaller tonnage for 
capital ships, it may be necessary to obtain 
agreement to some increase. 67 
The London Naval Conference of 1935, the Anglo-German 
Naval Agreement, and the End of the Naval Arms Limitation 
Process. With agreement secured to extend the capital ship 
66ADM 1/8741/89, Director of Plans un-numbered minute 
dated 9 July 1929. 
67Field letter to Richmond dated 7 May 1926, Richmond 
Papers, NMM/RIC/7/2. 
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building holiday for an additional five years, it was not 
long before fresh proposals were being made to limit naval 
forces. In 1932, the United States Government proposed 
reducing the number of capital ships from fifteen to ten 
for the two main naval powers; a proposal vigorously 
resisted by the Board of Admiralty, although it was willing 
to consider qualitative limitations including restricting 
capital ships to a 25,000 displacement and the main 
armament to the 12-inch gun. 68 One of the reasons why the 
Admiralty had been willing to countenance a freeze in 
capital ship construction was to ensure that sufficient 
funds were available to provide the Fleet with an adequate 
number of cruisers, both for working with the battlefleet 
and to protect the extensive sea lines of communication 
over which passed Britain's trade. 69 Still, accepting that 
the capital ship still had a role to play, the need for the 
Royal Navy to begin a sustained construction programme to 
replace her ageing heavy ships was viewed as paramount. 
Thus, the Admiralty could argue that: 
Owing to almost all our capital ships 
having been completed in the war period, and 
to the building holiday in this category 
accepted under the London Naval Treaty, it 
will be necessary to lay down at least one 
capital ship per year, commencing in 1937.7° 
and 
the Hoover proposals to reduce the number of 
capital ships from 15 to 10, are quite 
unacceptable, but even if they could have 
been accepted they would have had no effect 
68' Memorandum by the Sea Lords on the condition of the 
Navy and its reserves' dated 3 November 1932, Chatfield 
Papers, NMM/CHT/3/1. 
69Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament 
Policy in the 1920s (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), pp. 
119-120. 
7°' Memorandum by the Sea Lords on the condition of the 
Navy and its reserves' dated 3 Nov 1932, Chatfield Papers, 
NMM/CHT/3/1. 
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on the necessity for this replacement 
programme at any rate for the first eight 
years, i. e., to 1944 programme inclusive. 71 
A second naval conference convened in London in 
December 1935 and succeeded in securing the London Naval 
Treaty of 1936. The numerical restrictions of the Five 
Power Treaty and the earlier London Naval Treaty were 
abandoned, but the main armament of the capital ships was 
now restricted to the 14-inch gun. 72 Again, it was the five 
principal naval powers that met, but the Japanese left the 
conference when equality in naval armaments was denied to 
them. 73 In 1938, France, Great Britain, and the United 
States agreed to increase the displacement restrictions of 
the accord to 45,000 tons for capital ships. 74 
As with earlier conferences, the Naval Staff defined 
its requirements in preparation for the negotiations. 
Chatfield, the then First Sea Lord, based on his experience 
with the Battle Cruiser Fleet during the war, placed a 
premium on capital ship protection, and there is certainly 
ample proof that the Naval Staff in defining anew its 
capital ship requirements followed this trend. 75 One study 
concluded that if future capital ships were restricted to 
12-inch guns, a ship of 32,000 tons would be required just 
to withstand the shellfire of existing 16-inch guns, bombs 
71Ibid. 
72George V. Fagan, 'Anglo-American Naval Relation 1927- 
1937, ' unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1954, p. 300. To be sure, the adoption of 
the 14-inch gun limitation was provisional. 
73Through bilateral negotiations, the British reached 
agreement with the Soviet Union and Germany to honour the 
terms of the 1936 accord. See ADM 223/825, 'Confidential 
Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report, ' No. 215, dated 15 
April 1937, p. 3. 
74 Roskill, Naval Policy, Volume II1 p. 419. 
75Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 5. 
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of 2,000-lbs., or a torpedo armed with a 750-lbs. warhead. 76 
Moreover, the Admiralty was even willing to consider 
capital ships restricted to 11-inch guns on a displacement 
of 22,000 tons, if cruisers could be limited to guns of 
6.1-inch and a displacement of 7,000 tons. " The Admiralty 
certainly recognised that agreement with the United States 
along such lines would prove difficult, and a warship of 
such dimensions proved to be but one alternative of several 
considered. 
Finally, mention must be made of the Anglo-German 
Naval Agreement of 1935. Under the terms of the Versailles 
Treaty, Germany was precluded from possessing ships larger 
than 10,000 tons displacement 
78 With 
-Japan's- announcement in December 3934 that she intended to 
leave the Five Power Treaty and the London Naval Treaty of 
1930, Britain faced the prospect of renewed naval 
competition. 79 Though it damaged Anglo-French relations, 
the unilateral agreement to allow Germany to build up to 35 
per cent of British naval tonnage defined the maximum 
surface threat that the Royal Navy might have to face in 
its Home waters. 80 Moreover, unlike the previous agreements 
76ADM 1/8802/89/35, 'Naval Staff Appreciation of 
Requirements for the 1935 Naval Conference, ' Admiralty 
Paper No. 1, April 1934, p. 9. As 32,000 tons represented 
the approximate displacement of all of the Royal Navy's 15- 
inch armed battleships, one may conclude that by 
implication, the battleships of the Queen Elizabeth and 
Royal Sovereign-classes were recognised by the Naval Staff 
as being vulnerable based on this assessment. 
77 Ibid . 
78David Brown, Warship Losses of World War Two (London: 
Arms and Armour, 1990), p. 165. 
79R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Depuy, The Encyclopedia 
of Military History from 3500 B. C. to the Present (London: 
Jane's, 1977), p. 1028. 
"Certainly, the 35% allotted to Germany would be 
composed largely of newly constructed warships. 
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she had entered, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was 
intended to be a permanent arrangement. 81 
The Naval Estimates of the Interwar Era. It has 
already been noted that from the end of the Great War the 
Royal Navy found itself under severe financial pressure. 
Closely associated with the fiscal stringency of the period 
was the climate, not just in Britain but in the several 
democracies, which favoured a general reduction in 
armaments spending. These two elements formed a powerful 
dual influence to limit the size of the Naval Estimates of 
the Service. The pressure to economise was felt at all 
levels in the Service, from the Board of Admiralty to the 
ships of the Fleet, whether operating in Home waters or 
patrolling on the distant stations. It was in the face of 
such pressure that the Admiralty announced: 
Drastic reductions in the expenditure 
on administrative services of Fleet are 
imperatively necessary and are, (the) ??? 82 
a condition to obtaining the financial 
provision required for the gradual 
replacement of our ships and the maintenance 
of a One Power Standard of material 
strength. In effecting the economies 
Admiralty are being guided by the Cabinet's 
decisions that not less than ten years are 
available in which to complete our 
preparation for war and that as a corollary 
to this, expenditure can be slowly cut down 
in all directions.... The following measures 
have already been taken or are under 
consideration : - 
(a) Reduction in the proportion of the ships 
in active commission and in reserve. 
(b) Curtailment of facilities such as 
Fleet Drifters and Destroyer Depot Ships. 
(c) Scrapping of vessels whose life is not 
likely to extend to 1935. 
(d) Slowing down accumulation of war 
reserves of all kinds. 
(e) Closing down of two dockyards at Home. 
(f) Reductions of the Staffs ashore and 
afloat. 
"Charles S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 99. 
"Corrupted group from file copy. 
87 
(g) Curtailment of Gunnery, Torpedo and 
Depth Charge practices. 
(h) Complements of H. M. Ships. 
(i) Other miscellaneous proposals of less 
importance including expenditure on 
education in all its branches .... 
81 
The financial pressures on the Royal Navy can only 
partially be measured by an examination of the yearly 
estimates; their force is best gauged by reviewing the 
impact they had on naval operations and exercises. 
However, any evaluation must of necessity begin with the 
Naval Estimates. Appendix II depicts the Naval Estimates 
of the 1919-1939 period, reflecting both their absolute and 
constant value for Sterling where the year 1930 equals one 
hundred per cent. 84 For most of the interwar period, the 
Royal Navy saw its funding reduced in absolute terms from 
one year to the next until rearmament was initiated in the 
1930's. With economy the watchword, the operational 
effectiveness of the Fleet was sacrificed. Notwithstanding 
the Fleet's concerns discussed in the previous chapter that 
its system of warship identification had been compromised 
during the late war and needed immediate replacement, the 
decision was reached to continue with the existing pattern 
83Admiralty signal No. 460. to Commander-in-Chief, East 
Indies dated 12 September 1925, Richmond Papers, 
NMM/RIC/7/3a. 
84No two sources discussing the period's estimates 
agree. Appendix II depicts the estimates as cited in 
official Admiralty papers, John Ferris, Men, Money, and 
Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919- 
26 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Bryan Ranft, 
ed., The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and 
Official Correspondence and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet 
Earl Beatty, Volume II1 1916-1927 (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 
1993), Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, Roskill, Naval 
Policy, Volume I and Naval Policy between the Wars: Volume 
II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939 (London: 
Collins, 1976), Gibbs, Rearmament Policy, and Charles N. 
Robinson and H. M. Ross, eds. Brassey's Naval & Shipping 
Annual (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1935). The 
weighting used is based on John Stevenson, British Society 
1914-45 (Middlesex: Penguin, 1984), p. 117. 
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of Very Brock Signals due to cost considerations. " 
Moreover, the length of time that a warship served on a 
overseas commission was increased86 and the manning for 
heavy ships was reduced to further drive down the operating 
costs of the Service. Thus, in 1921 the battleships HMS 
Centurion, 87 HMS Emperor of India, 88 and Royal Sovereign and 
the battle cruiser Tiger89 were commissioned with sixty per 
cent of their normal complements, 9° whilst by 1924 Hood's 
ship's company had been reduced by 254 men or 18%. 91 The 
Admiralty also hastened the decommissioning of the ships of 
the first King George V-class. Under the provisions of 
Article II of the Washington Naval Agreement, HMS 
Thunderer, 92 HMS Ai ax, 93 King George V and Centurion were to 
be paid off upon the completion of the Nelson and Rodney. 94 
85ADM 1/8558/135, Admiralty letter M/SD435 to 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet dated 24 December 1919 
and Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff unnumbered minute 
dated 26 May 1920. 
86ADM 1/8567/250, Admiralty Fleet Order M. 20265/22 
dated 24 February 1922. 
"Commissioned 1913; details as per King George V. 
"Commissioned 1914; details as per Marlborough. 
"Commissioned 1914, armed with eight 13.5-inch guns, 
and of 28,500 tons displacement. 
90ADM 1/8948/271/1923, Director of Plans minute P. D. 
01629/21 regarding 'The Naval Situation of the British 
Empire in the Event of War Between Japan and the United 
States of America. ' 
91ADM 1/8659/74, Committee on Provision of Personnel 
for Ships under Construction, 1924-25, Office Memorandum 
No. 37 dated 15 April 1924. 
"Commissioned 1912, armed with ten 13.5-inch guns, and 
of 27,000 tons displacement. 
93Commissioned 1913; details as per King George V. 
"In the event, Nelson and Rodney did not commission 
until 1927. Thus, the Service decommissioned King George 
V, Ajax, Thunderer, and Centurion earlier than required for 
financial and manning considerations. 
89 
The Admiralty sought to redistribute the battleships 
remaining so that the ships of the Royal Sovereign and 
Oueen Elizabeth-classes would be available to serve in the 
Mediterranean as a strategic reserve. 95 Following the 
combined exercises of the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets 
to be held in the Spring of 1926, the Iron Duke, 96 
Marlborough, Emperor of India, and Benbow serving in the 
Mediterranean were to return to England and form the Third 
Battle Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, where their primary duty 
would be to serve as a training squadron. 97 To this end, 
the following signal was made: 
In view of the scrapping in 1926 of 
battleships of KING GEORGE V class and 
THUNDERER it is necessary to reduce four 
battleships from- full commission to reduced 
complement partly to preserve the drafting 
margin and partly to provide accommodation 
for training of boys afloat. Their 
Lordships accordingly propose early in 1926 
to transfer the four battleships of the IRON 
DUKE class now in the Mediterranean to the 
Atlantic Fleet and to reduce them to one 
half active service complement in peace 
completing them to full complement with boys 
for training. In war a three-quarter active 
service complement will be provided, the 
full complement being complemented with 
reserves. At the same time Their Lordships 
propose to transfer two battleships of the 
REVENGE class to the Mediterranean. 98 
Tactically, the impact of strict economy on the 
Service's programme of exercises was no less pronounced. 
One observer noted of the Atlantic Fleet's autumn 
manoeuvres of 1927 that it was: 
95The strategic rationale for such basing is specified 
in Admiralty letter M. 0472/22 cited in ADM 1/8700/121. 
"Commissioned 1914; details as per Marlborough. 
97ADM 1/8700/121, 'Admiralty Fleet Order 3038. -- 
Battleships-Redistribution dated 30 October 1925. ' 
98ADM 1/8700/121, Admiralty signal to Commanders-in- 
Chief, Atlantic Fleet and Mediterranean dated 7 October 
1925. 
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a revelation of the extent to which economy 
stifles the work of the Navy. Before the 
war the Fleet used to spend five days out of 
seven at sea. To-day it spends only two, 
and yet it is admitted that, although much 
useful training can be given in harbour, 
only practice at sea can promote the human 
material from the technically passable to 
the technically excellent. Exercises often 
have to be postponed for days because there 
must be no risk of losing valuable torpedoes 
or wasting any moment of the total time 
available upon less than perfect 
conditions. " 
Moreover, at a cost of £5,500 each, torpedoes were reused 
in exercises rather than simply expended. '°° Following their 
run, they were designed to rise to the surface and emit a 
cloud of smoke to speed their retrieval by attendant 
ships. 10' The failure to retrieve a torpedo following an 
exercise was not a matter to be treated lightly, at least 
aboard the battleship Emperor of India, and when that ship 
lost a torpedo during its manoeuvres of August 1924, a 
court of enquiry was convened. 102 Further, the drive for 
economy meant that steaming at speed was greatly 
restricted. Thus it was that the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Atlantic Fleet issued a general order to the First Battle 
Squadron that: 
In view of the necessity for economy in 
the expenditure of oil fuel, the full power 
"From an undated newspaper article titled "'The 
Atlantic Fleet. Autumn Manoeuvres at Sea. A Week's 
Impressions. ' from Our Special Correspondent" in Captain 
John F. Beaufoy-Brown Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, King's College, London. 
1°°'Notes on Technical Subjects, ' Vice Admiral Sir 
Geoffrey Barnard Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/P256, p. 3. 
"'Martin H. Brice, The Royal Navy and the Sino-Japanese 
Incident 1937-41 (London: Ian Allan, 1973), p. 28. 
102See Midshipman Journal of G. T. Lambert, entry for 
18 August 1924, Captain G. T. Lambert Papers, Imperial War 
Museum, London, IWM/90/19/1. 
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trial the Quarter ending 31st March will not 
take place, but the full calibre firing and 
torpedo individual long range firings should 
be carried out a speed not less than 17 
knots. The exercises should be arrange so 
that this speed may not be maintained for a 
longer time than necessary. 103 
Lest one believe that the above measure was an aberration, 
it should be noted that capital ship evolutions in 
exercises of the interwar era were frequently conducted at 
speeds hardly representative of active service conditions. 
This will be addressed in detail later, but a scenario 
featured regularly in tactical evolutions of the period was 
for a force of battleships, typically escorting a slow 
moving convoy, to be attacked by light surface forces such 
as destroyers. 104 
The Impact of Finance on the Royal Navy and the Naval 
Arms Limitation Process Evaluated. Criticism of the 
period's several naval treaties by both former serving 
officers and historians has been legion. The late Stephen 
Roskill opined that: 
Looking back to-day one cannot but conclude 
that of all the ideas hopefully devised by 
man to reduce the likelihood of war, and of 
all the measures of alleged economy forced 
by politicians on the fighting services, the 
naval limitation treaties will stand for all 
time not only as the most ineffective, but 
also the most dangerous to those nations 
which loyally tried to abide by their 
restrictive terms. 105 
"'Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet signal A. H. 0051/3 
to Vice Admiral Commanding First Battle Squadron dated 15 
February 1920, Rear Admiral Montague G. B. Legge Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/P. 394. 
104For example, see Midshipman Journal of Henry A. King, 
entry dated 17 January 1922, Captain Henry A. King Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/90/23/1 and C. R. 
Benstead, H. M. S. Rodney at Sea: Being the Story of the 
Second Commission of His Majesty's Battleship 'Rodney' 
(London: Metheun & Company, 1932), p. 10. 
1°5S. W. Roskill, H. M. S. Warspite: The Story of a Famous 
Battleship (London: Collins, 1957), p. 86. 
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while in his memoirs, Admiral Chatfield registered strong 
disagreement over the London Naval Treaty of 1930 to the 
point where he believed the Labour Government of Ramsay 
MacDonald had: 
put the British Fleet into a strait jacket, 
padlocked it and sealed it "not to be 
unlocked till December 31st, 1936". The 
rebuilding of the old capital ships, so 
carefully planned b the Admiralty At the 
Washington Conference, had been put back 
five long ears, and our power properly to 
restore the cruiser, or destroyer, situation 
during those five years had been 
destroyed. 106 
These assessments, written as they were after the 
fact, and with the legacy of a second great war are 
telling, but what of their accuracy? Chatfield is 
doubtless correct that the extension of the capital ship 
building holiday for a further five years was detrimental 
to the maintenance of the fighting efficiency of the Fleet, 
and one noted historian has commented that by the 
'provisions of the London Treaty of 1930 the British Navy 
was reduced to the lowest point reached between the two 
Wars in strength and efficiency'. 107 Yet, Chatfield was 
being less than honest , 
in claiming that an outcome of 
the Washington Conference was that the Admiralty had 
arrived at a coherent capital ship building programme. 
Indeed, the opposite was the case. As has already been 
cited, the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord, Beatty, in 
particular, had strenuously resisted attempts to abandon a 
sustained regime of replacing the Royal Navy's capital 
ships. The argument was made on both technical and 
economic grounds that it was imperative to have a 
regularized building programme and that any suspension in 
lo6Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 115. Original 
emphasis. 
107F. H. Hinsley, Command of the Sea (London: 
Christophers, 1950), p. 22. 
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capital ship construction was fraught with risk. "" 
Chatfield, then serving as the Assistant Chief of the Naval 
Staff, briefed the members of the Imperial delegation at 
the Washington Conference on these risks. He argued, in 
part, that: 
the main and immediate danger is that the 
fleet of the British Empire the sole force 
on which she is invited to rely for the next 
15 to 18 years, will consist of war-worn 
vessels which even at the present time are 
for the greater part unreliable, since they 
are with the exception of the "HOOD" and to 
some very minor extent the "Royal Sovereign" 
class, provided with no protection against 
the torpedo, mine and air attack of even 
1921.109 
Additionally, the Admiralty argued that the industrial base 
sustaining the Royal Navy was in danger of collapse, if new 
orders were not placed. In this the Admiralty overstated 
their case, but serious effects there were nonetheless; for 
instance, when rearmament was pursued in earnest the 
limited number of skilled draughtsmen available resulted in 
a delay of nine months for the completion of the first two 
ships of the second King George V-class when the Naval 
Staff approved a design change that saw the : inclusi8n;, - of 
a twin 14-inch mount : to allow for additional armour 
protection. "' Further, it would prove more expensive, 
overall, to have to complete several ships at the end of 
the treaty period than to construct the same number of 
ships over the life of any accord. 11' Moreover, the fighting 
efficiency of the fleet would be impaired, if the 
technology underpinning the capital ship was not undergoing 
108Gamble, 'Decline of the Dreadnought, ' pp. 341-347. 
109ADM 1/8615/207, Assistant Chief of Staff statement 
to the British Empire Delegation dated 9 December 1921. 
Original emphasis. 
110ADM 1/9411, First Lord minute M. F. O. 102/36 to the 
Naval Staff dated 20 March 1936. 
"'Gamble, 'Decline of the Dreadnought, ' pp. 383-384. 
94 
constant fielding and testing. Each of these points is 
valid, and, yet, each in their way applied no less to the 
other signatories. At least for the Royal Navy the 
agreement reached in 1922 allowed for the construction of 
Rodney and Nelson. Whilst these ships were to experience 
numerous teething problems, they were viewed by many as the 
definitive statement in capital ship design when they 
commissioned. "2 
Chatfield noted that a benefit of the 1922 accord was 
that it put a stop to the process whereby each naval power 
attempted to go one better in capital ship design than 
their rivals. A measure of stability and predictability 
was thus introduced at the top end of naval construction. 
This was doubtlessly so, but the 
_ 
Admiralty nevertheless 
ensured that Nelson and Rodney were completed with an 
additional naval rifle over their Japanese and American 
counterparts. Notwithstanding the 1922 agreement, within 
three years new economies were sought in the Service's ten 
year projected shipbuilding programme. Whilst the 
economies desired covered the entire spectrum of the Royal 
Navy's shipbuilding programme, and not just heavy ships, 
the total of such economies--almost £57,000,000 over the 
1925-1935 period--indicate that in the absence of the 1922 
naval agreement, the Service would have faced still greater 
cuts of a unilateral nature. "' 
As for Chatfield's lament about the 1930 London Agreement 
limiting the cruiser strength of the Navy, it must be 
112 Those holding such thoughts included Admiral William 
Leahy, Rear Admiral Jehu Valentine Chase, and Commander 
Harold Train of the United States Navy. Chase is credited 
with writing the first paper on the square law effect on 
the concentration of force. See Wayne P. Hughes' Appendix 
C in Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 375 and ADM 
1/9272. Train, retiring as a Rear Admiral in 1946, had 
specialised in gunnery, commanded USS Arizona (1940), and 
served as Director of Naval Intelligence (1942-1943). 
113ADM 1/8685/152, Ten Year Building Programme, Plans 
Division minute 02171/25 dated 6 March 1925. 
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recalled that at no time after 1919 did the Service possess 
70 cruisers--the defined irreducible minimum for that class 
of warship. "4 Indeed, in agreeing to limit its cruiser 
strength to 50, Britain faced the ironic position that she 
would actually have to increase her cruiser numbers. "' 
Turning to Roskill, his assertion that the naval 
limitations process was both dangerous and ineffective 
contains an element of truth. Yet, for Britain, the treaty 
process pursued with its rivals was a means of achieving 
economies in concert with an overall strategic vision. The 
alternative was the imposition of unilateral naval 
114Richardson, Evolution of British Disarmament Policy, 
p. 120. In 1937, the Naval Staff determined that 100 
cruisers were required, See 'Board Memorandum on a New 
Standard of Naval Strength, ADM 1/9081/53. Previously, in 
assessing its expected wartime requirements, the Naval 
Staff determined that 148 cruisers or armed merchant 
cruisers would be needed in the event of a conflict with 
Japan. See 'Naval Staff Appreciation of Requirements for 
the 1935 Naval Conference, ' Admiralty Paper No. 1, April 
1934, ADM 1/8802/89/35. 
115 The active cruiser strength of the Service (including 
the Royal Australian Navy and the New Zealand Division) 
during the interwar years based on Admiralty records and 
the Nav List was: 
1918 109 ADM 1/8744/140. 
1919 84 ADM 1/8685/152. 
1920 68 Ibid. 
1921 52 Ibid., n. b., ADM 1/8735/72 gives it as 54. 
1922 35 ADM 186/61. 
1923 50 ADM 1/8685/152. 
1924 48 Ibid. 
1925 33 Navy List, January 1925, pp. 201-210. 
1926 34 Navy List, January 1926, pp. 201-210. 
1927 33 Navy List July 1927, pp. 201-210. 
1928 36 Navy List, July 1928, pp. 201-210. 
1929 37 Navy List, July 1929, pp. 201-210. 
1930 35 Navy List, January 1930, pp. 201-210. 
1931 34 Navy List, January 1931, pp. 201-210. 
1932 33 Navy List January 1932, pp. 201-210. 
1933 32 Navy List, January 1933, pp. 200-209. 
1934 34 Navy List, July 1934, pp. 200-209. 
1935 33 Navy List, July 1935, pp. 200-209. 
1936 35 Navy List, July 1936, pp. 200-209. 
1937 33 Navy List, January 1937, pp. 200-209. 
1938 34 Navy List, January 1938, pp. 200-209. 
1939 37 Navy List, July 1939, pp. 241-249. 
96 
reductions made in the absence of any agreement requiring 
reciprocal cuts by its naval rivals. Thus, it was that 
during the time of the Washington Treaty negotiations in 
December 1921, the Royal Navy maintained only 16 of its 
heavy ships in full commission. Ultimately, the Five Power 
Treaty reached provided the Service sanction for operating 
22 capital ships in the near term. 116 
This situation, it should be noted, existed similarly 
eight years later at the time of the first London 
Agreement, a fact that has for too long gone unobserved. 
Hinsley may be correct in his dating of the nadir of the 
interwar navy, but it is erroneous to tie the decline to 
the treaty process. Rather, it was finance, or more 
appropriately the lack of it, that allowed the Service to 
reach such a state of affairs. The 1930 agreement may have 
resulted in the scrapping without replacement of the ships 
of the Third Battle Squadron and Tiger of the Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, but as an operationally effective force 
the Third Battle Squadron had ceased to count from at least 
1 January 1930 when it was made an independent command of 
the Reserve Fleet. "? The decision to change the status of 
the Third Battle Squadron was the result of the ships of 
the Queen Elizabeth-class returning to Britain from 
Mediterranean duties. ll$ With the Government's desire to 
find new savings in the Naval Estimates based on extending 
the 'Ten Year Rule, ' the Reserve Fleet came under scrutiny. 
The Admiralty was loath to touch the active fleet, but a 
strategic assumption that a major war was not likely for 
ten years allowed the readiness of the Reserve Fleet to be 
116 ADM 1/8616/218, Plans Division un-numbered minute 
dated December 1921, 'Proposed Redistribution of the Fleet 
in the Event of the Washington Conference Proposals Being 
Carried Out. ' 
"ADM 1/8736/92, Mobilisation Branch signal to 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet et al. dated 13 December 
1929. 
118ADM 1/8736/92, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff minute 
M. 02712/29 dated 10 October 1929. 
97 
reduced. Thus, the Plans Division noted: 
the fully commissioned fleet is only 
sufficient now to carry out the tactical and 
sea training required, to maintain a one- 
power standard and to uphold our political 
and commercial interests abroad. So far as 
the fully commissioned fleet, therefore, is 
concerned, the reply of the Admiralty to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer is not affected 
by the 10 year decision and no economy in 
this direction can be suggested. 
3. Apart from the fully commissioned 
fleet, however, there is the reserve fleet. 
Under the 10 year basis it is unnecessary 
for emergency purposes to have the reserve 
fleet available for service at short notice, 
provided the requirement for a minor 
emergency which might break out without 
warning could be met without the use of the 
reserve fleet. 119 
The staff assessment continued by noting that if the Third 
Battle Squadron did form a part of the Reserve Fleet: 
The chief disadvantage in reducing this 
squadron to reserve is that the tactical 
training of the Atlantic Fleet will suffer 
and, to this extent, the efficiency of the 
active fleet will be prejudiced. 120 
Still, the same assessment concluded that in the event of 
an emergency, the Atlantic Fleet's deficiency in cruisers 
were likely to be greater than any shortfall in heavy 
ships, and, if necessary, cruisers could assume the task of 
training boy entries. '2' Thus, the demise of the Third 
Battle Squadron as an operational entity predated the 
London Agreement of 1930.111 Moreover, the qualitative 
119ADM 1/8737/97, 'Possible Economies in the Naval 
Estimates Consequent on the Adoption of the New 10 Year 




"'one can argue that the Iron Duke-class failed to have 
operational value by 1925 when they were formed into Third 
Battle Squadron. Manning existed for only two of the five 
main turrets, no ratings were provided for the secondary 
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terms arrived at in the Five Power Treaty (e. g., 35,000 
tons displacement and main guns of 16-inch) were in 
consonance with the general British view of the capital 
ship as determined by Post-War Questions Committee of 
1920.123 Prior to the Washington accord, the Admiralty was 
aware that both the Americans and Japanese navies were 
designing ships with armament that would render the 15-inch 
gun of her latest heavy ships in commission obsolete. 124 
Jellicoe, after inspecting the gun foundry of the 
Washington Navy Yard, advised that the United States Navy 
was likely to adopt the 20-inch gun125 for her next class of 
capital ships whilst the Imperial Japanese Navy was 
reported to be developing an 18-inch naval rifle. '26 
Accepting the cost and the operational difficulties the 
Royal Navy would have faced, given her existing dockyards, 
if it had to operate heavy ships of the dimensions required 
to match those of her rivals, the critics of the period's 
accords fail to address how the Service would have fared in 
the absence of the 1922 agreement. 127 That Britain, in 1938, 
batteries, and only practice ammunition was embarked. See 
'Complement of "Iron Duke" Class, ' undated and un-numbered 
minute, ADM 1/8700/121. 
123ADM 1/8586/70, 'C. B. 01557. ' Given the state of 
British marine engineering in the early 1920's, the 
adoption of the 16-inch gun in a triple turret 
configuration on a displacement of 35,000 tons probably 
resulted in an unbalanced ship design but no more so than 
contemporary Japanese and American warships. 
1211bid. 
125ADM 1/8580/22, Jellicoe letter No. 61/P. 230 to 
Admiralty dated 20 January 1920. 
"'Confidential Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report, 
Number 13, dated 15 May 1920, Richmond Papers, NMM/RIC/4/1. 
'27Designs for new classes of battleships and battle 
cruisers prepared in 1920 anticipated warships exceeding 
51,000 tons displacement and drawing about 33 feet of 
water. As the Suez Canal, at that time, was limited to 
taking ships drawing less than 31 feet, the ability to use 
the heavy ships of the Mediterranean Fleet as a strategic 
reserve would have been at risk in the absence of a naval 
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designed a new class of battleships128 around a displacement 
of 40,000 tons when she was permitted to build to a 45,000 
tons standard, indicates that operational considerations, 
such as the limits imposed by the Suez Canal, 129 exerted a 
strong influence in her willingness to accept naval 
limits . 
130 
However, notwithstanding the valid technical and 
economic factors that the Admiralty claimed argued against, 
at least, the clauses of the Five Power Treaty dealing with 
the suspension in capital ship construction, it must be 
questioned whether the 1922 agreement prevented the Royal 
Navy from carrying out its responsibilities. Afterall, the 
treaty guaranteed capital ship parity with United States 
Navy and a clear superiority over any other rival. 
Further, the Five Power Treaty did nothing to reduce the 
margin of superiority that the Royal Navy enjoyed over the 
agreement. See Director of Naval Construction minute C. 
Sec. 0530/20 dated 21 October 1920, ADM 1/9232. 
'28Designated as the Lion-class they were to be armed 
with nine 16-inch guns, sixteen 5.25-inch guns, and six 2- 
pdr. Mark M pom-poms. Though laid down, they never 
completed. See "Legend of Particulars of Proposed 
Battleships of the 'Lion' Class" dated 6 December 1938, ADM 
1/9441. 
129Many commentators have noted the restrictions of the 
Service's docking facilities but fail to realise that the 
primary limitation was the ability of the Suez Canal to 
accept deep draught ships. If required, the Royal Navy 
planned to tow floating drydocks to Trincomalee and 
Singapore and station a repair ship at Singapore to service 
its heavy ships, if war with Japan arose before the 
completion of the Singapore naval base; see 'The Naval 
Situation of the British Empire in the Event of War Between 
Japan and the United States of America, ' PD 01629/21, ADM 
1/8948/271/1923. As designed, the Suez Canal could not 
accept ships drawing more than 25 feet. Later, it had been 
dredged to accept ships drawing as much as 31 feet. WO 
78/2320, the Hydrographer's survey of 1879 based on an 
original French survey of 1876, documents the initial depth 
of the canal. 
130ADM 1/9441 undated minute M. F. O. 4349/38 and ADM 
1/9434, First Sea Lord to First Lord minute P. D. 06806/38 
dated 26 May 1938. 
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United States Navy in non-capital ship forces such as 
cruisers. Moreover, it has already been demonstrated that 
the fiscal pressures facing the Royal Navy that arose 
immediately after the Armistice forced the Service to 
unilaterally reduce the number of ships in commission. 
Thus, in one sense the Five 
, 
Power Treaty and the London 
Naval Agreement of 1930 merely codified, for the Royal 
Navy, reductions that were being faced anyway, with the 
benefit of also legally limiting naval competition from its 
principal rivals. 
Balanced against these factors must be that an 
implicit assumption of the Five Power Treaty was that the 
capital ship existed to do battle with other capital ships. 
The very raison d'etre of the capital ship since its 
transformation in Dreadnought was to outsail, outgun, and 
outfight any other surface warship. Yet, the Five Power 
Treaty overlooked the fact that a subsidiary, but 
nonetheless vital, mission of naval forces, including 
capital ships, was to support military operations ashore. 
The Dardanelles campaign of the recent war was evidence 
enough of this task, and here the experience had been 
anything but reassuring for the Royal Navy. During that 
in-shore operation, the Navy's battleships and battle 
cruisers proved at risk from mines, land-based artillery, 
and torpedoes fired from both submarines and destroyers. 
Two pre-dreadnoughts, HMS Irrestible and HMS Ocean, were 
lost on 18 March 1915, while three other pre-dreadnoughts, 
HMS Goliath, HMS Majestic, and HMS Triumph were sunk in May 
1915.131 Tonnage restrictions, then, on capital ships, if 
set too great, might preclude their use during in-shore 
operations, and, yet, it was just those ships that would be 
most useful and survivable. 132 
In 1926 one officer who certainly understood such 
131Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, pp. 47-124. 
"'Survivability being a function of the amount of 
reserve buoyancy possessed by a ship. 
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risks was Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, 133 Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean. With the possibility of war looming, Keyes, 
who had served as the Chief of Staff to the Commander of 
the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron13a during the Dardanelles 
campaign, estimated that the Mediterranean Fleet would 
require no less than ten battleships, if war with Turkey 
broke out. 135 When it is recalled that sufficient personnel 
to man nine of the required minesweepers for any potential 
operation could be secured only by transferring personnel 
from the battleship HMS Valiant, 136 it becomes apparent that 
by this early date, the Royal Navy was pressed to meet the 
challenges of even a minor naval power. In fact, from the 
time of the Armistice until 1922 the heavy ships of the 
Mediterranean Fleet had been engaged in a series of 
operations in the Bosporous and the Crimea. Whether facing 
Turkish Nationalist forces or supporting the White Russian 
forces against the Bolsheviks, the capital ships of the 
Royal Navy were engaged in combat operations including 
shore bombardment and the evacuation of refugees. The 
scale of these operations, in time, required the Admiralty 
to order the deployment of three additional battleships 
with supporting forces from the Atlantic Fleet to augment 
133Roger John Brownlow Keyes (1872-1945). Commanding 
Officer, Centurion (1916-1917); Rear Admiral, First Battle 
Squadron (1917); Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron (1919- 
1921); Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (1921-1925); 
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean (1925-1928); Commander- 
in-Chief, Portsmouth (1929-1931); and ennobled (1943). 
134Rear Admiral John M. de Robeck. 
135Keyes cited in Paul G. Halpern, The Keyes Papers, 
Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of 
the Fleet Baron Keyes of ZebruaQe, Volume II11919-1938 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Commander-in-Chief 
Mediterranean Fleet letter No. 242/0095/12 to Admiralty, p. 
167. 
"'Commissioned 1916, armed with eight 15-inch guns, and 
of 31,000 tons displacement. 
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the ships then on station. 137 
The above examples illustrate the vital importance of 
numbers, and the major flaw of the Five Power Treaty and 
London Naval Treaty from a British standpoint was that a 
force of capital ships could not be maintained--especially 
as at any time a certain number of battleships and battle 
cruisers would have to undergo refits--adequate to meet her 
maritime requirements. The argument can be made that the 
same constraints applied to the other signatories, and, to 
a point, this is a valid criticism, 1313 yet, the Royal Navy 
was at a significant disadvantage in trying to project 
power into Asia and the Pacific. Whilst she had an 
extensive network of overseas dockyards including Malta in 
the Mediterranean, Simonstown in South Africa, Esquimalt in 
Canada, Trincomalee in Ceylon, and Hong Kong in China, they 
were either strategically vulnerable, underdeveloped, or at 
a distance removed from the probable theatre of operations. 
Hence, the necessity of developing Singapore as a naval 
base of sufficient capability to support a fleet. 139 In the 
end, the naval treaties negotiated were divorced from the 
operational responsibilities that the Royal Navy faced. 
This was true in 1922; it was even more the case in 1930 
and 1936. Far better would it have been for the Service, 
if it had been allowed to retain in an inactive and 
demilitarised state a number of its heavy ships. Such an 
option would have allowed a measured programme of arms 
reduction to proceed and reduced the day-to-day running 
137Roskill, Naval Policy, Volume I, p. 198. 
138This is particularly true of France which also had 
worldwide imperial responsibilities stretching from Africa 
to the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific. Yet, 
geographically she could never escape that the first call 
on her defences were the borders of Metropolitan France. 
'"Under provisions of Article 19 of the Washington 
Agreement, Britain was precluded from developing Hong Kong 
as a fortified naval base. See Ian Cowman, "An Admiralty 
'Myth': The Search for an Advanced Far Eastern Base before 
the Second World War, ' The Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Volume 8, Number 3, September 1985, p. 317. 
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costs of the fleet. More importantly, though, it would 
have allowed the Royal Navy to reconstitute the fleet in a 
timely manner, if ever strategic circumstances warranted 
such a change. 
As negotiated, it was only on paper that any degree of 
superiority in capital ship strength existed for the Royal 
Navy. Whilst concentration of her forces could 
theoretically provide local superiority, the fact remained 
that given the breadth of her maritime commitments such a 
concentration could only take place if British diplomacy 
ensured that only one crisis at a time arose; hence the 
truth of Richmond's observation that imperial defence in 
the Far East was based on 'the illusion that a Two- 
Hemisphere Empire can be defended by a One-Hemisphere 
Navy. "40 Since the concentration of British capital ships 
in Home waters prior to World War I, the Royal Navy in 
Asiatic waters was primarily a light cruiser and flotilla 
force whose mission was one of presence. "' Maintaining 
British commercial interests (particularly along the 
Yangtze and Yellow Rivers in China) and the suppression of 
piracy were its day-to-day missions. 142 As long as the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty was in effect, the British had no 
real need to maintain capital ships in the Far East. 
However, the price of securing the Five Power Treaty was 
"'Cited in Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, 'The 
British Armed Forces, 1918-39, ' in Allan R. Millet and 
Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Volume II: 
The Interwar Period (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 108. 
141In 1919, the ships of the China Station included the 
flagship HMS Hawkins, the Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron 
composed of HMS Cairo, HMS Carlisle, HMS Capetown, and HMS 
Colombo, the light carrier HMS Ark Royal, and a flotilla 
each of destroyers and submarines. See 'Post-War Fleet' 
memorandum M. 03710 dated 11 September 1919 in Beatty 
Papers, NMM/BTY/8/1/4. Roskill states that the force was 
also to include one battle cruiser. See Roskill, Naval 
Policy, Volume I, p. 106. 
142ADM 1/8727/146, Admiralty M. 01565/21, 'Standing 
Instructions for the Guidance of the Commander-in-Chief on 
the China Station, ' dated 1 February 1922. 
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that Britain had to forego renewal of her Japanese pact. 
Whilst it may be true that the United States and Canada 
insisted on such a course, the fact remains that the 
agreement with Japan, in the absence of a German or Russian 
threat, in the postwar era could only have brought Britain 
into conflict with one other power--the United States. 
British policy was to find accommodation with the United 
States, and a treaty that gave her superior advantage over 
the third naval power was a better deal than an agreement 
that put her at odds with potentially the premier naval 
power. "' It may very well be the case that the interests 
of Britain and Japan were bound to clash, even if the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty had been renewed. Still, after 1922 
and in the absence of any capital ships, British naval 
forces could only operate in Asiatic waters at the 
sufferance of the Japanese. A point Beatty, as First Sea 
Lord, advised the Government. 144 At the time of the Imperial 
Conference in June 1921, Beatty estimated that a war with 
Japan would require the despatch of eight battleships and 
sixteen cruisers. 145 Given the ongoing commitment of capital 
ships in the Eastern Mediterranean area, it is as well that 
the British did not have to face such a deployment. 
As for the refitting of capital ships, it did take 
place, but the time spent out of commission was a cause of 
concern--most acutely from the time of the Abyssinian 
Crisis onward. It was very much a case of having to accept 
a short-term loss for the promise of a longer-term gain. 
Writing after the fact, Chatfield admitted that: 
During the last three years of my time 
as First Sea Lord, I had continuous anxiety 
because we had only twelve available 
143See ADM 116/1774, 'Memorandum for the Cabinet. Navy 
Estimates and Naval Policy, ' dated 13 February 1920. 
144W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore 
Naval Base (London: MacMillan, 1974), p. 34. 
145Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty: 
The Last Naval Hero-An Intimate Biography (London: Collins, 
1980), p. 307. 
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battleships. In crisis after crisis, this 
hampered the Admiralty and, indeed, the 
Cabinet in their foreign policy, and the 
Dominions especially, felt the weakness of 
the Fleet . 
lab 
Indeed, the problem was at times even direr than Chatfield 
posited. Writing to Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, 14' the 
Commander-in-Chief, China Station, in February 1934 
Chatfield noted that: 
For the next two years I shall have 4 
Capital ships laid up only leaving 11 ships 
at sea. These will be distributed normally 
as -5 Battleships in the Mediterranean, 4 
Battleships and 2 Battle Cruisers in the 
Home Fleet. "' 
Winston Churchill observed an even more depressing state of 
affairs. Writing to his fellow parliamentarian, the 
ubiquitous Admiral Keyes, as the Abyssinian Crisis was 
beginning to break, he observed: 
It is rather odd however, that at this 
time of crisis seven out of fifteen of our 
capital ships are on the sick list, to wit: 
Royal Oak, Warspite, Malaya, Repulse, 'paid 
off into dockyard hands'; Ramillies rammed 
by a Hun, Rodney and Nelson, cracked 
gunslides. 149 
'46Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 123 
"'Admiral Sir Frederic Charles Dreyer (1878-1956); Flag 
Captain, Orion (1913); Commanding Officer, Iron Duke and 
Flag Captain to Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet (1915- 
1916); Director of Gunnery Division, Naval Staff (1920); 
Commanding Officer, Repulse (1922-1923); Assistant Chief of 
the Naval Staff (1924-1927); Commander, Battle Cruiser 
Squadron (1927-1929); Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff 
(1930-1933); Commander-in-Chief, China Station (1933-1936); 
retired (1939) and recalled for service in World War II; 
retired (1943). 
"'Chatfield to Dreyer letter dated 2 February 1934, 
Chatfield Papers, NNE! /CHT/4/4. 
"'Churchill cited in Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Volume 
II, pp. 344-345. HMS Ramillies was damaged in a collision 
with the German ship Eisenach off Dover on 31 August 1935. 
See R. A. Burt, British Battleships 1919-1939 (London: Arms 
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Another consideration that must be taken into account 
is that many of the capital ships of the Royal Navy were 
materially deficient even before the dangers of the air 
threat had become pronounced. This aspect of British 
capital ship design had been noted by Jellicoe whilst 
serving as the Second Sea Lord in 1914. In a memorandum 
written shortly before the outbreak of war he remarked 
that: 
The inferiority of the protection of British 
ships of 1909-1911 classes against guns and 
torpedoes is very striking. This is 
undoubtedly a weak point in the design of 
our ships . 
150 
And yet, for much of the interwar period, it was the same 
1909-1911 classes of capital ships that formed the backbone 
of the Mediterranean Fleet. '5' Concern over the material 
deficiency of British capital ships was heightened even 
more after the experience of Jutland. In an effort to 
determine what improvements could be made in future warship 
construction based on its most recent experience, a 
committee was formed within the 2nd Battle Cruiser 
Squadron. Its initial findings included the revelation 
that: 
British battle cruisers, whether in service 
or about to be commissioned, are unequal to 
and Armour, 1993), p. 200. 
"0Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Supreme Command 
in the First World War (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1963), p. 116. 
151The ships of the 1909 programme were decommissioned 
as follows: the battleships HMS Hercules, Orion, HMS 
Monarch, Conqueror, and the battle cruiser Lion in 1923; 
the battleship Thunderer in 1926, and the battleship HMS 
Colossus in 1929. The battleships King George V and Max 
of the 1910 programme were disposed of in 1926 whilst the 
battleship Centurion was converted to a target ship in 
1926. Of the 1911 programme, the battleships Marlborough 
and Emperor of India and the battle cruiser Tiger were paid 
off in 1931 as a result of the London Treaty of 1930 and 
scrapped whilst the battleships Benbow and Iron Duke, 
decommissioned since 1928, were scrapped and de- 
militarised. 
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the duties assigned to them, as their 
protection is insufficient to enable them to 
encounter the capital ships of the enemy 
without incurring undue risk of 
destruction. 152 
It is academic whether the battle cruisers of the 1921 
programme would have been similarly disadvantaged. What 
remains is that the Washington Agreement ensured the 
retention of at least two battle cruisers beyond their real 
öperational effectiveness,. 153- 
The legal requirement to eliminate surplus capital 
ships also had unintended consequences. The development of 
the Mobile Naval Base Depot Organisation, the Royal Navy 
and the Royal Marine tactical formation for developing and 
operating an advanced base, suffered for want of a proper 
depot ship. The Washington Agreement precluded the planned 
use of HMS Agincourt154 and funds to construct a specialised 
ship were never forthcoming. '55 Finally, one last defect of 
the Five Power Treaty and its successors, the London Naval 
Treaties of 1930 and 1936, was that they rested on the 
assumption that the terms of the accords would be followed 
by the contracting parties. The intelligence means to 
verify compliance were lacking, and the necessary 
522nd Battle Cruiser Squadron memorandum No. 527d. 
dated 23 June 1916, 'Interim Report of Committee on 
Construction, ' in Beatty Papers, BTY/7/17/4. 
153Namely, Repulse and Renown. Both ships were also 
disadvantaged in that their main armament was limited to 
six 15-inch guns. To be sure, both ships were modernised 
during the period and saw service in World War II. Their 
retention owed much to the fact that they mounted 15-inch 
naval rifles. 
154Commissioned 1914, armed with fourteen 12-inch guns, 
and of 31,000 tons displacement. 
155ADM 1/9037/114/1936, First Sea Lord undated and un- 
numbered minute, 'Naval Construction Programme 1936, ' to 
the Board of Admiralty; see also ADM 116/2149, Naval 
Section table regarding 'British Capital Ships, ' dated 13 
December 1921 which identifies Agincourt as a Mobile Naval 
Base Ship. 
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cooperation in securing inspection of naval dockyards and 
warships was not always forthcoming. 156 Thus, at the Second 
London Naval Conference whilst the British were pressing 
hard for the adoption of the 14-inch gun as a new treaty 
maximum, the Japanese were already proceeding quietly with 
plans to build battleships of a more radical nature in the 
Yamato-class. 157 To this end, by 1931 Japan had test fired 
156In July 1937 the Director of Plans developed a formula for estimating the true displacement of a warship based on solving the products of length, beam, and draught 
and comparing the results with known figures for British 
ships. Inexact as it was, it indicated that German and 
Italian warships were larger than their declared 
displacements. See F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in 
the Secon World War, Its Influence on Strateav and 
Operations, Volu I (London: HMSO, 1979). -p. 506. Recent 
assessments of the Admiralty's intelligence capabilities include Joseph A Maiolo, "'I believe the Hun is cheating': 
British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German 
Navy, 1936-39, " Intelligence and National Security, Volume 
11, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 32-58 and Donald Cameron Watt, 
'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World 
War in Europe, ' in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's 
Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
157A former Assistant Naval Attache to Japan, George 
Ross, relates the following account: 'I called on Captain 
Tom Troubridge, our Naval Attache!, and a number of Germans 
whom I had met through Alice Lnuss' German born wife]. I 
then called the Japanese Embassy where I knew the Naval 
Attaches., Captain Kojima and Commander Yamamoto. They 
invited me to lunch and a motor tour of the city, including 
the new Olympic Stadium. Quite unexpectedly they talked 
about the new gigantic battleships being built secretly. 
These were the YAMATO and MUSASHI. Displacing over 64,000 
tons, they carried a main armament of nine 18-inch guns. 
They were heavily armoured and had huge bulges at the 
waterline to protect them against torpedoes. It was indeed 
exciting and unexpected news which I passed to Tom 
Troubridge as soon as I could see him again. Kojima must have thought I was already aware of the new ships. It was 
news to the British Admiralty. ' Whilst this writer can 
accept Ross' claim to have been told that the Japanese Navy 
was building new capital ships, given the Naval Staff 
decision to adopt the 14-inch guns in the King George y- 
class, it must be doubted whether Ross was advised of the 
true details of such ships. See 'Unpublished Memoirs, ' pp. 299-300, Engineer Rear Admiral George Campbell Ross Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/86/60/1. 
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the 18.1-inch gun and initiated detailed design work of 
that class in 1934. Indeed, such was the degree of secrecy 
surrounding HIJMS Yamato158 and her sisters that the first 
European to view the ships, the German naval attache to 
Japan, only did so in October 1942.119 
Turning to the question of the Service's finance in 
the interwar period, it is undoubtedly the case that 
Britain failed to allocate sufficient funds to the Royal 
Navy to allow it to meet the minimalist goal of operating 
at the 'One Power Standard'. 160 Whether one looks at her 
deficiency in ammunition stocks, the lack of fuel which 
curtailed high speed steaming, the reduction in naval pay 
that fostered the 'Invergordon Mutiny, ' or the Keyes' 
example of sacrificing a capital ship to find the necessary 
personnel to man minesweepers, one is left with the 
impression of a Service struggling to meet its 
responsibilities. Indeed, of the legal constraints 
presented by the several treaties and the fiscal 
constraints demanded by the Treasury, the requirements of 
the latter were always the more pressing. Thus, when 
laying up the ships required under the Washington 
Agreement, the Mobilisation Branch of the Admiralty could 
report that: 
The first stage in the scrapping of 
Capital Ships, i. e. de-storing and de- 
ammunitioning will, it is anticipated, be 
completed by 31st May. This expedition has 
been dictated, not so much by considerations 
of the Washington Treaty, as by the 
forthcoming early discharge of Naval 
"'Commissioned 1941, armed with nine 18.1-inch guns, 
and of 65,000 tons displacement. 
'"Malcolm Muir, Jr., 'Rearming in a Vacuum: United 
States Navy Intelligence and the Japanese Capital Ship 
Threat, 1936-1945, ' The Journal of Military History, Volume 
54, Number 4, October 1990, pp. 473-485. 
160The Fourth Sea Lord in un-numbered minute to Chief 
of the Naval Staff dated 27 September 1928 observed that 
'The One Power standard is not being maintained in the 




The manning of the fleet was tied to Vote A of the Naval 
Estimates, and, here as elsewhere, reductions for the sake 
of economy were evident. It has already been remarked that 
the peacetime complement for capital ships was 
substantially below the levels required for active service. 
Less obvious, perhaps, is that the reductions in manning 
influenced, albeit indirectly, the development of 
battlefleet tactics during the period. In 1930, a 
committee chaired by Rear Admiral C. M. Forbesl62 was charged 
with investigating the manning to support the signalling 
and wireless establishments aboard capital ships--an issue 
of concern to the Admiralty as some argued that a private 
ship must have the same communications capabilities as a 
flagship. By limiting a heavy ship's signals 
establishment, an unintented consequence was that it 
restricted the ability of capital ships to operate in a 
decentralised manner, 163 
Previous studies of the interwar Royal Navy have 
commented on the strict financial climate that the Service 
faced, yet have offered little direct evidence upon which 
to measure its actual import from an operational 
perspective. Viewed together, Appendix 111,164 Appendix 
161ADM 1/8623/66, Mobilisation Branch un-numbered minute 
dated 10 April 1922. 
162Later Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Morton Forbes 
(1880-1960); Flag Commander, Iron Duke (1915-1916); 
Commander, Mediterranean Fleet Destroyer Flotillas (1930- 
1931); Third Sea Lord and Controller (1933); Vice Admiral, 
First Battle Squadron (1934); Commander-in-Chief, Home 
Fleet (1938-1940); and Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth 
(1941-1943). 
163See ADM 1/8740/69, 'Report of W/T and V/S 
Organisation Committee 1930. ' 
164Appendix III reflects the geographic areas where the 
Royal Navy either was engaged in active operations or 
deployed forces in the anticipation of becoming engaged in 
active operations. 
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IV, 115 and Appendix V166 of this study provide an indication 
of how the steady reduction in the period's Naval Estimates 
influenced the operations of the Service as measured by 
visits of capital ships to friendly states. The years 1928 
and 1929 are particularly noteworthy. These were times of 
relative tranquility, and yet the Service's routine of 
'showing the flag' with- its heavy ships was at a standstill 
due to underfunding. 
That said, the fact remains that the Navy fared better 
than the British Army and the Royal Air Force in securing 
funds from the Treasury. 167 Reflecting on the financial cuts 
of the period and their impact, Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Henry Oliver168 recalled that: 
Gibraltar had suffered much from post 
war economy and the garrison had been cut to 
the bone and everything was in a very bad 
state, guns batteries etc. and there was 
only one weak infantry battalion and not 
half the R. A. and R. E. necessary, it might 
have been a Portuguese fortress from its 
"'Appendix IV recounts Royal Navy operations involving 
capital ships. 
"'Appendix V does not consider the visits of the 
Mediterranean, Atlantic, or Home Fleets to ports routinely 
visited on the Mediterranean Station. 
"'Given the dual control exercised by the Royal Navy 
and the Royal Air Force over the Fleet Air Arm, this was 
not necessarily for the best. For example, whilst the 
Admiralty had identified a requirement for six squadrons of 
aircraft for fleet support in 1922-1923, the practical 
result of the Geddes Committee proposal to limit the Air 
Estimates to £10,000,000 would have limited the air force 
to fielding only two squadrons for naval support. See 
'Appendix III, Memorandum by the Admiralty, Prepared for 
Mr. Churchill's Committee, Relations between the Air and 
the Navy, ' dated 6 February 1922, ADM 1/8653/265. 
168Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Francis Oliver (1865- 
1965); Director of Naval Intelligence (1913); Deputy Chief 
of the Naval Staff (1917); Rear Admiral, First Battle 
Cruiser Squadron (1918); Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet 
(1919); Second Sea Lord (1920-1924); Commander-in-Chief, 




While accepting the severe financial pressures at work, one 
must question whether the Service spent wisely what funds 
were allotted to it. As an example, in March 1932, Field, 
the First Sea Lord, thought the need to reintroduce sailing 
ships for cadet training so pressing that he was prepared 
to place either HMS Malaya170 or valiant in reserve to pay 
for this enterprise. 171 In the event, Field's proposal came 
to nought as Chatfield cancelled the initiative upon 
assuming the post of First Sea Lord, yet the fact remains 
that while the Service was faced with strict economies, it 
was slow to rationalise the number of yachts in commission 
and continued to upgrade the accommodations afforded to 
flag officers afloat. Indeed, even with rearmament finally 
gathering pace, the Admiralty proceeded in 1938 with plans 
to provide a new Royal Yacht at an estimated cost of 
£825,000.172 
Still, such savings were on the margins, and the funds 
simply did not exist to cover all of the Service's unfunded 
requirements. Thus, at a conference held at the Admiralty 
in November 1920 to address the Navy's air requirements: 
It was stated that an Aircraft Carrier cost 
in the neighbourhood of four millions. 
The C. in-C. Atlantic Fleet had asked that 9 
or 11 might be supplied to meet Naval needs, 
which number he considered an essential 
requirement; that is to say he considered 
that a large Aircraft Carrier Fleet was 
required. The Admiralty had been unable to 
169From 'Recollections, Volume II', p. 262, Admiral of 
the Fleet Sir Henry Francis Oliver Papers, National 
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/OLV/12. R. A. and R. E. 
refer to Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, respectively. 
"'Commissioned 1916; details as per Warspite. 
171Field memorandum to Board of Admiralty dated 12 March 
1932 and 'Minutes of Meeting of Sea Lords and A. C. N. S. 
Tuesday, 15th March 1932', Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/3/3. 
172Anthony Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1900- 
39: The Inverctordon Mutiny in Perspective (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1981), p. 174. 
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accept this number for financial reasons and 
had decided on five instead of eleven as a 
minimum aim of the moment. "' 
Certainly, in 1920 it was by no means clear that the 
aircraft carrier would assume the position of prominence 
that it later did, and therefore, reasons other than fiscal 
existed for proceeding with a degree of caution in any 
programme adopted. This will be addressed more fully 
during the discussion of the period's naval operations and 
tactical development. Let it be remarked, now, that at the 
very conference cited previously, the possibilities of 
employing parasite aircraft with airships or of using a 
forerunner of a wing-in-ground effect aircraft with the 
fleet were two potential technologies that stood in direct 
competition with the aircraft carrier. '74 
In the end, the need for economy and the desirability 
of naval arms control became a self-perpetuating process. 
Having demanded savings in the Naval Estimates, the 
Government, with the Service's active support, pursued 
legal limitations with its rivals as a means of limiting 
its future naval requirements. With each new agreement, 
the Treasury posed the question whether additional 
economies were not now possible. The size of the Royal 
Navy at the end of the Great War allowed the British to 
reduce its maritime forces to a level adequate to meet its 
needs and minimise any demand for new construction, yet 
only for a time. Beatty's arguments to Lloyd George about 
the deleterious effects a naval building holiday would have 
173ADM 1/8602/53, Report of Conference held on 29 
November 1920. 
"'Ibid. The United States Air Force experimented with 
parasite aircraft as a fighter escort for its B-36 
strategic bomber in the 1950's whilst the Soviet Union 
developed two classes of wing-in-ground effect aircraft, 
the Utka and the Orlan, for naval purposes during the 
1980's. See Understanding Soviet Naval Developments 
(Washington: Chief of Naval Operations, 1991), pp. 77-78. 
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were, in the end, more than proven correct. And surely, it 
is also the case that the British pursued economy to an 
inordinate degree. Accepting that it had a substantial 
level of debt arising from the 1914-1918 war, was it 
appropriate to reduce naval construction in the 1920-1930 
period to the extent that, for much of that period, the 
French, who had no less of a war debt175 and substantial 
military obligations, were actually outbuilding the Royal 
Navy as measured by tonnage? 176 
Finally, the reduction in the number of heavy ships 
operated by the Royal Navy, whether caused by fiscal 
pressure or by treaty agreement, meant that the opportunity 
for many a promising mid-level or senior officer to serve 
in a capital ship was unavailable. In a Service where the 
path to higher command was very much tied to one's 
experience and development afloat, the only solution on 
offer that seemed to permit the evaluation of the greatest 
number of officers was to reduce the time in command in 
battleships and battle cruisers. 177 It was an unsatisfactory 
state of affairs and clearly recognised as such, moving 
Admiral Field to write: 
I am quite sure that the greatest 
obstacle to full efficiency in the present- 
day Navy is caused by the numerous and 
frequent changes of officers. I am fully 
aware of the requirements for specialisation 
and how difficult it is to maintain the 
175By war's end, The United Kingdom owed the United 
States $4,200,000,000 whilst France owed the United Kingdom 
£600,000,000 and the United States $3,000,000,000. See J. 
M. Winter, The Experience of World War I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 216. 
176See ADM 1/8748/139 for a comparison of the British, 
French, and Italian navies postwar construction levels. 
177 Indicative of this trend, Benbow had eleven captains 
between 1919-1929, Marlborough had ten commanding officers 
during the same period whilst Emperor of India had an equal 
number including three in 1921. See ADM 1/8776/146 and 
Viscount Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography 
of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope 
(London: Hutchinson, 1951), p. 147. 
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balance between technical training and ship 
efficiency, but I consider that, in reaching 
any decision which involves a reduction in 
the number of officers serving in the most 
important units of the Fleet, it is 
essential that the necessity for the reduced 
complements being fully efficient should be 
stressed most strongly. Officers in 
battleships and cruisers should therefore, 
as far as possible, commission and pay off 
their ships and should never be changed 
until they have completed at least twelve 
months in a ship. 178 
Field's concerns were, in the end, not unjustified, and 
there are a host of reasons why the disturbances in the 
Atlantic Fleet commonly known as the 'Invergordon Mutiny' 
transpired. Yet, even allowing for the issues of pay and 
allowances, for the shortcomings in the methods of naval 
discipline, or for the effects of political agitation cited 
by contemporary observers, the fact remains that the bonds 
between officers and ratings had been weakened. 179 This was 
particularly the case in the capital ships with their large 
crews, lack of meaningful operational employment, and 
strict social hierarchy. There is a direct link between the 
fiscal stringency and naval arms control agreements of the 
interwar period, and their culminating point for the Royal 
Navy was at Invergordon. One contemporary officer serving 
in Nelson attempting to find a silver lining, observed 
that: 
These have been paralysing days - impossible to believe. The whole future now 
seems in jeopardy; long after this business 
is settled its memory will remain & affect 
the whole disposition of the fleet & its 
activity. The only bright spot is the 
powerful weapon it places in the Admiralty's 
hands in future when governments might 
hastily propose mucking about with the 
178ADM 1/8762/265, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean 
letter No. 236/678/65. dated 12 February 1930. 
179J. M. Kenworthy, The Real Navy (London: Hutchinson 




One recent study has concluded that financially and 
operationally, the Royal Navy was in a much better state 
during the initial interwar period (1919-1929) than is 
commonly accepted and that its troubles became manifest 
only in the middle part of the 1930's. 18' In the end, this 
writer cannot accept Ferris' conclusions, as he fails to 
grasp that the strength afforded by seapower is a strength 
built on a long-term political commitment and a 
corresponding financial investment. The fact that Britain 
was not challenged on the seas during the 1920's meant that 
she enjoyed her supremacy by default and lived off the 
fruits of an investment made during the Great War. The 
treaties she entered into were a symptom of this under- 
investment and not the cause. Indeed, it is the present 
writer's view that no aspect of interwar naval policy can 
be sufficiently understood without reference to the 
Service's financial plight. Still, for the Royal Navy, it 
remains that the capital ship was influenced by factors 
other than legal and financial including strategic, 
operational, and tactical considerations. How these 
additional influences altered the concept and design of the 
capital ship during the period under investigation form the 
balance of this study. 
180Diary entry dated 16 September 1931, Captain Arthur 
Dyce Duckworth Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/76/207. 
"'See John Ferris, "'It is Our Business in the Navy to 
Command the Seas': The Last Decade of British Maritime 
Supremacy, 1919-1929, " in Keith Nielson and Greg Kennedy, 
eds., Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in of 





THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL WEAPONRY AND THE CAPITAL SHIP: 
THE OFFENCE, THE DEFENCE, AND THE THREAT 
Some officers say the battleship is more 
alive than ever; others declare that the 
battleship is dead. I regarded the 
surface battleship as dead before the War, 
and I think her more dead now, if that is 
possible. ' 
Admiral Sir Percy Scott 
Our faith in aircraft is gradually 
diminishing, a flying boat today had to 
descend owing to engine trouble & had to be 
towed back by a destroyer, & frequent 
complaints are made about their inefficiency 
in passing information. Clearly, Sir Percy 
Scott's time is not yet, when battleships 
shall be driven off the seas by numberless 
airplanes. 2 
Midshipman Henry A. King 
Any discussion-regarding the efficacy of the capital 
ship within the Royal Navy during the era must take account 
of the many technological developments and then assess 
their influence on the offensive and defensive capabilities 
of battleships and battle cruisers. Moreover, the 
improvements witnessed in military and naval technology 
benefited not only the capital ship, but also its rivals. 
This chapter, then, investigates the steps taken to ensure 
the survivability of the capital ship, the material 
measures taken to increase its offensive effectiveness, and 
the corresponding evolution in the threats that it faced. 
'Percy Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy (London: 
John Murray, 1919), p. 332. 
2Journal entry dated 29 June 1922, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
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It is vital to remember that while many 
contemporaries, not least members of the Treasury, may have 
judged the relative strengths of navies by merely counting 
the number of capital ships, such vessels formed but two 
types of warships, albeit the most prominent ones. Thus it 
was not necessary for heavy ships to deal directly with all 
the myriad threats they might face, if supporting units, 
including aircraft, were likely to be present. 3 Similarly, 
the offensive capabilities of the capital ship did not 
stand in isolation, but formed a part of the overall 
offensive potential of the fleet. For example, some naval 
actions, such as in-shore operations in support of military 
forces or anti-submarine warfare operations, were better 
left to other naval vessels based on considerations of 
suitability, risk, and time. It will be left to future 
chapters to discuss the doctrine, operational employment, 
and tactical precepts of the Royal Navy during the interwar 
era. For now, a discussion of the technical 
characteristics of the capital ship and a review of the 
active measures taken to ensure its continued survivability 
is required. ' 
'Thus, in the knowledge that a primary function of 
light cruisers was to defend the battle line, the Fire 
Control Requirement Committee of 1919 recommended that a 
smaller gun (i. e., less than a 6-inch mount) be adopted as 
the secondary armament in capital ships. See 'Final Report 
of the Fire Control Requirement Committee, ' ADM 116/2068. 
4This chapter can offer only a summation of the 
technical issues in extant, but a, basic understanding is 
required prior to entertaining a aiscussion of battlefleet 
tactics. The secondary literature is extensive. Norman 
Friedman, Battleship: Design and Development 1905-1945 
(Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press, 1978), though it 
primarily addresses the U. S. Navy, remains the standard 
work on the technical trade-offs in capital warship design 
during the period. Its assessment of the Royal Navy is 
hindered by a failure to consult operational and tactical, 
as opposed to technical, source material. Alan Raven and 
John Roberts, British Battleships of World War Two: The 
Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's 
Battleships and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946 (London: 
Arms and Armour Press, 1976) offers the best single source 
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The Distinctions in Royal Navy Capital Ships. During 
the interwar period, the term 'capital ship' was a generic 
reference applied to two distinct types of warship: the 
battleship and the battle cruiser. As a result of the Five 
Power Treaty, a legal definition of the capital ship was 
codified, and, thus, from 1925-1930, the Royal Navy 
restricted usage of the phrase 'capital ship' in its 
official writings and adopted, instead, the term 'heavy 
ship'. ' In the main, it can be said that the two classes of 
warships shared similarities in offensive striking power, 
though the battleship often carried an extra mount in its 
main armament. 6 However, whereas the battleship placed a 
premium on providing adequate armour protection over its 
vital components, the battle cruiser sacrificed a measure 
of passive protection and relied, instead, on speed to 
evade a stronger adversary. The emphasis on speed, rather 
than armour and total offensive power, certainly still 
resulted in ships of very large dimensions. Hood, for 
example, was in the interwar period the largest vessel in 
the Royal Navy with a displacement greater than 42,000 tons 
and a length of 860 feet, whilst Tiger had been the 
Service's heaviest ship of the 1914-1918 war. ' 
Following the Washington Naval Treaty, a legal 
discussion on the characteristics of British capital ships 
on the eve of the 1939-1945 war. 
5'Admiralty Fleet Order 3358. --British Warships-- Classification. ' dated 4 December 1925 and 'Admiralty Fleet 
Order 3131. --Capital Ships--Use of the Term. ' dated 5 
December 1930, ADM 1/8753/230. 
'Compare for example, the main armament of Dreadnought 
(ten 12-inch guns in five mounts) to its contemporary the 
Invincible-class battle cruisers' arrangement (eight 12- 
inch guns in four mounts) or the even more limited 
arrangement found in Repulse and Renown. 
7John Roberts, Anatomy of the Ship: The Battlecruiser 
Hood (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1982), p. 12. 
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definition was reached that a capital ship was any warship 
exceeding 10,000 tons displacement and mounting guns 
greater than 8 inches. As Britain was, in the main, 
scrupulous in following the terms of the era's naval 
treaties, the legal definition and the operational 
definition of what constituted a capital ship were for her 
the same. This was not always the case, and the role 
envisioned for the pocket battleships of Germany, in truth 
large-gunned cruisers, meant that whilst these ships met 
the legal definition of a capital ship, operationally they 
did not. 
Returning to the battle cruiser, the weight saved by 
minimising its armour was partially accounted for by 
increasing the machinery in its engineering spaces, and, 
partly, in providing a vessel of greater length. Whilst 
the increase in length made for a faster and more fuel- 
efficient warship, it resulted, conversely, in a more 
vulnerable ship as adequate armour protection could not be 
provided along the entire length of the hull. ° The battle 
cruiser is perhaps the perfect example of how the theories 
formulated in peacetime were found wanting by the test of 
war, and the recent experience of the Royal Navy confirmed 
that the battle cruiser's design assumptions were spurious. ' 
'It is a rule of naval engineering that due to the 
properties of fluid dynamics, for two ships of a given 
displacement and other factors being equal, the longer ship 
will require an engineering plant of less horsepower to 
achieve a given speed. 
'Campbell in Jutland argues that while its losses can 
be attributed to a lack of protection, the real cause was 
the nature of British charges and the measures taken for 
preventing the flash of ignited propellant reaching the 
magazines. It is significant, though, that Royal Navy 
battleships did not suffer correspondingly similar 
casualties, and that Hood, long after steps had been taken 
to reduce the peril of flash from charges reaching the 
magazine, was lost in short order in its engagement with 
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in May 1941. In truth, it 'was 
recognised that all warships were vulnerable at given 
ranges, and the calculation of this vulnerability directly 
determined the fleet tactics adopted. 
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It can certainly be argued that battle cruisers were not 
originally envisioned as forming a part of the battleline 
per se, but were designed to engage light cruisers and 
ensure that the scouting and reconnaissance requirements of 
the battlefleet were met. 1° That the original emphasis was 
on the cruiser aspects of the class is highlighted by the 
fact that Royal Navy battle cruisers were equipped 
initially with hydrophones to facilitate submarine 
detection, something that the Service's battleships never 
employed. " Therefore, to the extent that its operational 
employment was at variance with its original conception, 
reflects rather more adversely on the practioners of naval 
art than on its architects. Yet, it remains that following 
the commissioning of Hood in 1920, the Royal Navy was to 
complete no further warships of this type. 
The Offensive Characteristics of Battleships and 
Battle Cruisers. Whilst the primary striking power of 
Royal Navy battleships and battle cruisers must of 
necessity be considered its main armament, the naval rifle, 
it was not unusual for British capital ships of the period 
to also embark multi-purpose aircraft capable of conducting 
independent strike operations. Moreover, a torpedo 
complement was a significant feature of the capital ships 
of the Service. For the Royal Navy, therefore, the capital 
ship soon became the ideal platform upon which to integrate 
not only the new offensive means of naval warfare, but also 
the improved versions of older arms. In time, the torpedo 
armament of some ships was reduced, repositioned, or 
eliminated, and the trend was confirmed when the second 
King George V-class was commissioned with no torpedo 
complement at all. 12 A discussion of the specific offensive 
loon the military rationale for the battle cruiser see, 
ADM 1/8586/70, 'C. B. 01557. ' 
"ADM 186/172, 'C. B. 1654, Armament of His Majesty's 
Ships' dated 1924, p. 9. 
12Burt, British Battleships of World War One, p. 265. 
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attributes of the capital ship follows. 
Main Armament. In the interwar period, various 
calibres of main armament guns were in use, ranging from 
the 12-inch, 45-calibre rifles of Dreadnought, the first 
all-big gun warship, to the 16-inch, 45-calibre guns of the 
Nelson-class of battleships. 13 The arrangement of the main 
armament for capital ships varied significantly, but 
eventually the turrets were arranged along the ship's 
centreline. Likewise, the number of turrets, and the 
number of rifles associated with each turret, were not 
constant. Arrangements varied from the most common, a dual 
mount in five turrets, to the quadruple mounting scheme 
employed in the latter King George V-class. In the main, 
as the calibre of the gun became larger, the number of 
turrets present became fewer as considerations of weight 
became more pronounced. While the advantages of placing 
the turrets along the centreline were obvious, the 
engineering required for super-mounted turrets was 
considerable, and the first classes of Royal Navy capital 
ships had turrets fore and aft as well as batteries located 
midships offset from the centreline. 14 Finally, to reduce 
wear on rifling of the main guns and to minimise relining, 
a 6-pdr gun was provided for each rifle to allow for sub- 
"It is recognised that the Royal Navy did adopt the 
18-inch gun in HMS Furious, styled as a 'large light 
cruiser' and in the monitors HMS Lord Clive and HMS General 
Wolfe. Yet, as Furious was taken in hand for conversion in 
the war to operate aircraft, and in due course, lost its 
main armament, it lies outside the scope of this work. 
Likewise, this work does not address monitors as their 
limited operational role precludes their consideration as 
a capital ship. 
"The introduction of the super-firing turret brought 
with it the problems of increased concentration in weight 
which could compromise a ship's sea-keeping abilities. See 
Burt, British Battleships for a discussion on the design of 
HMS Neptune. Moreover, turrets disposed in wing formation 
allowed for more guns to be trained fore and aft--an 
important consideration for engagements fought on other 
than parallel lines. 
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calibre firing. " 
In many respects, the aim in designing a capital ship 
was to secure the best possible balance between offensive 
striking power, passive defensive protection, displacement, 
speed, range, manning, and the final arbiter--cost. 16 In 
this regard, the unique arrangement of the Nelson-class' 
main armament was a direct result of the displacement 
restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty. '7 Similarly, 
the number of guns housed in a turret was a compromise 
which balanced the risks of sacrificing the least number of 
guns through the loss of a turret and considerations of 
minimising the weight required for protection. Indeed, a 
debate existed amongst serving officers on just these very 
matters, and one writer observed: 
with ships of large beam it is possible, and 
far more economical in weight, to install 
triple turrets. Hence the Rodney and Nelson 
were given three triple turrets, which 
provided 9 guns at less weight than would 
have been needed for 8 in twin turrets. 
With no restriction on size, however, it is 
desirable to give a capital ship one turret 
beyond the strict minimum, to allow for 
casualties. This leads to the conclusion 
that the ideal main armament should comprise 
12 guns carried in four turrets. " 
15ADM 186/172, 'C. B. 1654, ' pp. 2-9. 
16'finance is the principal factor governing the size 
of a Navy' quoted from the Admiralty paper 'Imperial Naval 
Defence' of 1919, Dewar Papers, NMM/DEW/4. 
17The arrangement of the turrets for Nelson and Rodney 
where the entire main armament was located forward of the 
superstructure was unique for British capital ships, but it 
was not the only example. The French Navy employed a 
somewhat similar scheme in the Dunkerque and Richlieu- 
classes of capital ships constructed during the period. 
18'Major', 'The Size of Capital Ships' Naval Review, 
Vol. XXIV, 1936, pp. 251-256. Certainly, Royal Navy 
capital ships never did adopt the ideal arrangement 
referred to by 'Major' though the second King George V- 
class was originally designed to carry twelve main guns to 
be housed in two quadruple mounts and two dual mounts. In 
the Montana's, a follow-on to the Iowa-class battleships, 
the United States Navy did design a capital ship that 
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Still, other factors applied, and the teething problems of 
new gunnery arrangements should not be discounted. 
Commenting on the triple turrets of Nelson, Pound, 19 then 
serving as the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, wrote to 
Keyes, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that: 
The tonnage of the capital ships may 
have to be put up a bit as triple turrets of 
Nelson have not proved altogether 
satisfactory on trials and I think it quite 
likely that in the future we shall have to 
go back to 4 twin turrets, which means 
additional weight both for mountings and 
necessary increase in length of the ship. 2° 
The naval rifles of capital ships were only as good as 
the shells and charges they fired, and in the Great War 
those of the Royal Navy were found wanting. The story of 
the performance of British naval artillery during the late 
war exposed at the Battle of Jutland has been treated 
elsewhere and lies outside the scope of this work. 21 
Suffice it to say that at Jutland only the battleship 
Revenge22 was able to penetrate the heavy armour of a German 
conformed to the ideal discussed by 'Major'. See John C. 
Reilly, Operational Experience of Fast Battleships; World 
War II, Korea, Vietnam (Washington: Naval Historical 
Center, 1989) p. viii. 
"Later Admiral of the Fleet Alfred Dudley Pickman 
Rogers Pound (1877-1943); Flag Captain Colossus (1916); 
Commanding Officer, Repulse (1920-1922); Director of Plans 
(1922-1925); Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (1927- 
1927); Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron (1929-1931); 
Second Sea Lord (1932-1935); Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean (1936-1939); First Sea Lord (1939-1943); and 
Chairman, British Chiefs of Staff Committee (1940-1942). 
20Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Volume II, p. 221. 
21For treatment of the Royal Navy's shell problem see 
Lord Chatfield, The Navy and Defence: The Autobiography of 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield (London: William 
Hineman, Ltd., 1942), pp. 151-157 and Anthony Pollen, The 
Great Gunnery Scandal: The ste of Jutland (London: 
Collins, 1980). 
"Commissioned 1916; details as per Royal Sovereign. 
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capital ship, that of the battle cruiser SMS Derfflinger, 23 
and to achieve a successful detonation by a major calibre 
shell. 24 
Yet the problem cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. 
Certainly, once the problem was identified, the Admiralty 
and the Grand Fleet took steps to correct the situation. 
As no further fleet actions took place after the Jutland 
engagement, the efficacy of these steps taken cannot be 
proven. However, if one accepts Chatfield's assertions 
that the shell problem had been resolved by the middle of 
1918, it must also be admitted that problems with naval 
gunnery persisted throughout the interwar period, when the 
question is viewed in toto. As late as June 1922, the 
battleship Barham experienced numerous misfires in its main 
15-inch battery during gunnery exercises, 25 whilst the 
problems previously noted by Admiral Pound in Nelson's main 
armament were still evident in May 1934 when a sustained 
fire demonstration was held. 26 
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the guns of a 
capital ship could be no better than the crews which served 
them, and reductions and changes in a ship's company meant 
that regular schedules of training were required to 
maintain the fighting efficiency of a ship's weapons. 
23Commissioned 1914, armed with eight 12-inch guns, and 
of 26,000 tons displacement. 
24Campbell, Jutland, p. 222-224. 
25See Journal entry dated 22 June 1922 for the 
experience of Barham, in King Papers, IWM/90/23/1. For a 
similar account regarding the battle cruiser Thew Zealand 
see the diary of John S. Hammill, entries dated 14 and 15 
July 1919, Captain John S. Hammill Papers, Imperial War 
Museum, London, IWM/92/18/1. On the mechanical problems 
associated with the 13.5-inch guns of Marlborough during 
gunnery exercises see entry for 30 July 1920 in the 
Midshipman Journal of Renfrew Gotto, Captain Renfrew Gotto 
Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, IWM 83/55/1. 
26ADM 186/328, 'C. B. 3001/35, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1935 Edition, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training 
and Staff Duties Division dated March 1935, pp. 100-101. 
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During the 1914-1918 war, the manning in capital ships had 
been increased. In peacetime, in the face of financial 
constraint, it was perhaps natural that manning problems 
would arise as officers and ratings engaged for hostilities 
were released from naval service. The potential 
seriousness of the problem is illustrated by the example of 
Centurion, a battleship of the first King George V-class. 
When in April 1923 the ship exercised its main armament 
Midshipman Geoffrey Lambert recorded that: 
We went to General Quarters at 0915 and 
prepared for the C-in-C's shoot. As we are 
only 3/5th complement we only use 'A' 'B' & 
'X' turrets if the 4" gun crews happen to be 
closed up at the same time; they are made up 
of 'Q' & 'Y' turrets crews. 27 
Moreover, one argument amongst several for adopting a 
uniform secondary armament in capital ships was to reduce 
the manning levels required to fight the ship. 28 The 
Service was continually faced with the need to minimise its 
manning levels in all classes of warships, particularly in 
capital ships. In March 1925, a committee chaired by 
Admiral Sir William Goodenough29 investigated the issue in 
depth and recommended that the number of control positions 
in heavy ships be reduced, that a greater reliance be 
placed on employing ratings engaged for short service, and 
that the complements for crew served weapons be reduced by 
a fixed percentage. 30 These conclusions met with vehement 
opposition from both the Director of the Gunnery Division 
and the Director of Naval Operations. They issued a joint 
27Journal entry dated 16 April 1923, Lambert Papers, 
IWM/90/19/1. 
28ADM 116/2068, 'Final Report of the Fire Control 
Requirement Committee. ' 
"Admiral Sir William Edmund Goodenough (1867-1945). 
Rear Admiral, Second Battle Squadron (1916-1918); 
Commander-in-Chief, Africa Station (1920-1922); Vice 
Admiral, Commanding Reserve Fleet (1923-1924); Commander- 
in-Chief, the Nore (1924-1927); and retired (1930). 
30ADM 116/2284, Report of the Manning Committee. 
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rebuttal that drew attention to the fact that British heavy 
ships were already undermanned when compared to their 
Japanese counterparts. 31 In so far as the cost of manpower, 
approaching 30%, was the greatest single expense borne in 
Naval Estimates, the issue was never far from the fore in 
the Service's negotiations with the Treasury. 32 A report 
circulated in 1936 recommended reducing the number of 
commissioned officers (particularly lieutenants) on surface 
combatants, and relying more heavily on senior ratings to 
perform duties once the preserve of officers. 33 
As for the ammunition employed in the main armament of 
Royal Navy capital ships, it consisted primarily of four 
types of shells: armour piercing, capped (APC); common 
pointed capped (CPC); nose fused high explosive (HE), and 
shrapnel. 34 Additionally, a nominal number of practice 
rounds were carried. Filled with an inert agent such as 
sand, sawdust, loam, or pitch they were designed to have 
the same ballistic characteristics of service ammunition. 35 
For a battleship of the Nelson-class, typically, ten 
31See ADM 116/2284, Joint Report from the Director of 
Gunnery Division and Director of Operations. 
32See ADM 116/2282, 'Summary of War Fleet in 1925 
Estimates. ' 
33See report of 'Peace and War Complement Committee 
1935-1936, ' Admiral Sir Thomas Hugh Binney Papers, Imperial 
War Museum, London, PP/MCR/95. The report, written against 
the backdrop of Japan's war in China and the possibility of 
deploying additional British forces to the theatre, offers 
insight into the operational implications of the manning 
issue. No reductions were envisioned in the officer 
manning of the carrier force save for the loss of one 
lieutenant in HMS Hermes whilst the manning of the 
Mediterranean Fleet, the immediate strategic reserve, was 
favoured over the Home Fleet. 
34ADM 186/364, 'B. R. 154, Ammunition Pocket Book, 
1935, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Branch dated 27 
February 1935, p. 15. 
35ADM 116/2090, Admiralty Fleet Order '976. --Practice 
Projectiles--New Methods of Weighting, ' dated 1 November 
1920. 
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practice rounds were carried for each of the 16-inch naval 
rifles. 36 The amount and type of ammunition actually 
embarked varied, but APC, the ship-killing shells for 
attacking opposing capital ships, predominated. In 1919, 
it was the rule that battleships were supplied with 100% 
APC shell whilst battle cruisers embarked shell in the 
proportion of 80% APC and 20% CPC. 37 The difference in fit 
between the two types of heavy ships was because APC was of 
little value against lightly armoured warships, and battle 
cruisers could be expected to meet light forces in the 
course of carrying out their scouting and reconnaissance 
functions. 38 Eventually, an adjustable time fuse set for 
non-delay was perfected that allowed APC to be used against 
light craft with a reasonable chance of success. 39 
During the war, a battleship of the Queen Elizabeth- 
class carried about 800 shells and associated charges for 
its main armament, or in other words, about 100 rounds per 
gun, 4° whilst a battle cruiser carried 120 rounds. 41 This 
had not always been the case; at the start of the Great 
War, 80 rounds per heavy gun had been the norm, 42 and it was 
36See figure titled 'H. M. S. RODNEY. ARCS of GUNFIRE. ' 
in Journal, Beaufoy-Brown Papers, LHCMA. 
37ADM 186/244, 'C. B. 1561, Progress in Gunnery 
Materiel, 1920, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Branch 
dated July 1920, p. 46. 
"Ibid. 
39ADM 186/293, 'C. B. 3001/28, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1928, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division dated March 1929, pp. 85-86. 
"Jon Tetsuro Sumida, 'British Naval Operational 
Logistics, 1914-1918, ' The Journal of Military History, 
Volume 57, Number 3, July 1993, p. 455. 
"ADM 1/8586/70, T. B. 01557. ' 
"Ibid. 
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with this number that Nelson and Rodney were armed. 43 At 
Jutland, at least, the battleships of the Queen Elizabeth 
and Royal Sovereign-classes had not carried HE rounds as 
these were carried by lesser gunned warships. 44 As the 
older 12-inch, 13.5-inch, and 14-inch gunned capital ships 
were paid off the requirement for 15-inch armed capital 
ships to carry HE shells arose, although it was not always 
met. During the interregnum an acute shortage of HE rounds 
for 15-inch guns was noted at the time of the Turkish 
crisis of 1926; 45 a situation which had still not 
appreciably improved nine years later at the time of the 
Abyssinian crisis, when a shortage of high explosive 
ammunition was discovered for both 15-inch and 16-inch 
guns. In fact, in late 1935 the Royal Navy's entire stock 
of high explosive rounds for 16-inch guns was only 50 
shells. 46 
Any discussion about the range of a capital ship's 
main armament must be prefaced with the comment that the 
theoretical maximum ranges specified represented the ideal; 
actual ranges obtained in wartime were always likely to be 
much less. There are many reasons why this was so, but the 
problems associated with visibility, both natural and that 
generated by battle, and the rudimentary means of fire 
control available were no doubt two of the greatest 
43David Brown, ed., The Design and Construction of 
British Warships 1939-1945 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 
1995), p. 25. Beaufoy-Brown specifies the number of rounds 
carried as 100. The variance between what could be carried 
and what was carried while small can be attributed to 
considerations of weight and cost. 
"Campbell, Jutland, p. 345. 
41See Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean assessment in 
Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Volume II, p. 169. 
46 See Admiral Roger Backhouse Note to Chatfield dated 
4 September 1935, Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/4/1. 
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limitations. 47 No example better illustrates how bad 
visibility could be than the Battle of Jutland. Visibility 
in the North Sea was rarely good, and when compounded by 
the smoke produced by the Grand Fleet and the German High 
Sea Fleet steaming at speed it was absolutely dismal. As 
Chalmers has written, 'Owing to low visibility, no two 
commanders got the same view of the action, and although 
250 ships took part, there were never more than three or 
four enemy capital ships in sight at the same time from any 
point in the British line. i48 
The range of naval gunnery was also limited by such 
considerations as the wearing of the guns' rifling from 
previous firings, 49 the type of shell fired and its 
corresponding shape, the charge employed, the maximum 
elevation allowed by the turret's guns, and the prevailing 
meteorological conditions. Still, if the general tendency 
had been for the fielding of ever larger guns, checked only 
by considerations of cost and naval arms limitations 
agreements on capital ships, the value of greater range 
47The question of naval fire control exercised some of 
the best minds in the Navy including Admiral Scott, Admiral 
Sir Frederic Dreyer, and Chatfield; it also piqued the 
interest of the gifted civilian Arthur Hungerford Pollen. 
In claiming that the instruments of the day were 
rudimentary, the author does not wish to imply that they 
were simple. On the contrary, they were for their time, 
examples of the most sophisticated of technology. Still, 
as they depended on light for observation, they suffered a 
weakness that was only remedied by the application of new 
means: radar. 
48W. S. Chalmers, The Life and Letters of David, Earl 
Beatty (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 265. 
49The life expectancy of a 15-inch gun was about 335 
full calibre, full charge firings before relining was 
required. See Roskill, Warspite, p. 89. An improvement 
over the 12-inch, calibre 50 naval rifle which needed 
relining following 130 full charge firings. See Friedman, 
Battleship, p. 129. 
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was, at times, open to question. 50 One Chief of Naval Staff 
could write to a Commander-in-Chief of the China Station 
that: 
I am also considering the elevation of the 
guns of those. . . ships so that we shall have 
at least 7 eventually that will be able to 
fire the same ranges as the Americans and 
Japanese, for what firing at those ranges is 
worth, and with aircraft spotting one never 
knows . 
51 
A sentiment it can be said that was shared by another Flag 
Officer, Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, 52 who commented that: 
For years we have demonstrated that we can't 
hit often at anything over 10,000 yds to 
make it worthwhile going on with it--look at 
Monarch firing--all day long at a sitting 
target & only 5 hits from the might of the 
British Navy. Year by year we fritter away 
what little ammunition they allow us by a 
lot of long range experiments instead of 
trying to perfect ourselves by good fire 
discipline at effective ranges & thereby 
"blooding the pack" & giving them something 
to look at in the way of wrecked targets 
flying aloft in splinters. 53 
Hood's main armament had been designed to elevate to 
50Admiral Sir John Fisher had pressed for the 
development of the 20-inch gun. See Fisher letter to 
Commodore Charles de Bartolome dated 18 April 1916, Arthur 
J. Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought: Volume III, 
Restoration, Abdication, and Last Years, 1914-1920 (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1959), p. 340. 
'Chatfield letter dated 11 May 1934 to Vice Admiral 
Sir Frederic Dreyer, Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/4/4. 
52Admiral Sir Walter Henry Cowan (1871-1956). 
Commanding Officer, Princess Royal (1915-1917); Commander, 
Baltic Force (1919); Commander, Battle Cruiser Squadron 
(1921-1922); Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies 
Station (1926-1928); and retired (1931). 
53Cowan letter to Keyes dated 26 November 1926 in 
Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Volume , p. 194. Monarch was 
used as a target for gunnery and bombing trials on 20 
January 1925 after being paid off as a result of the Five 
Power Treaty. See Parkes, British Battleships, p. 528. 
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a maximum of 30151 and the Nelson-class to 401, though the 
maximum elevation initially attained by earlier heavy ships 
was more restricted. 55 The maximum elevation attainable in 
the primary armament of Dreadnought was 13.50,56 while the 
Royal Sovereign, Repulse, and Queen Elizabeth-classes were 
initially limited to 20°. 57 Thus, during the period under 
review, modifications were made in the main armament to 
allow for the increased training in turret elevation. 58 
The 12-inch guns of Dreadnought had a listed range of 
18,850 yards firing a shell weighing about 850 lbs. 59 Given 
that the exchanges at Jutland were at times in excess of 
20,000 yards, it must be admitted that even by 1916 
Dreadnought was a capital ship in name only. In contrast, 
the 16-inch guns of the Nelson-class, the Royal Navy's sole 
experience with 16-inch armed battleships, had a range in 
excess of 37,000 yards firing a shell of 2,375 lbs., 60 
whilst the 14-inch guns of the King George V-class could 
fire a shell weighing 1,590 lbs. to 36,000 yards. 61 
However, two considerations every bit as important as the 
range of a capital ship's main armament were the weight of 
54Diagram between entries 7 and 8 May 1921, Elkins 
Journal, Elkins Papers, NMM/ELK/1. 
55'H. M. S. RODNEY. ARCS OF GUNFIRE. ' Journal, Beaufoy- 
Brown Papers, LHCMA. 
56Roberts, Battleship Dreadnought, p. 29. 
57ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915, Anti-Aircraft Defence. 
Summary of the Report of the Naval A. A. Gunnery Committee, 
1931, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties 
Division dated October 1933, Plate No. 6. 
58The ships eventually modified included Renown, Queen 
Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite. 
59Roberts, Battleship Dreadnought, p. 29. 
60Robert Gardiner, ed., The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The 
Warship 1906-45 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 
p. 174. Parkes in British Battleships credits the weight 
of shell for the 16-inch gun as 2,461-lbs. 
"Parkes, British Battleships, p. 666. 
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broadside that could be delivered and the rate of fire that 
could be sustained. 62 Chatfield could justify the reduction 
in the planned main armament configuration of the King 
George V-class from twelve to ten 14-inch guns based on the 
higher rate of fire he believed the Royal Navy enjoyed over 
its rivals. Writing to Winston Churchill, he explained: 
By this change 800 tons were saved to 
increase the armour and the underwater 
protection. Thus greater safety was given 
the Class against their being destroyed by 
a lucky shell or by a mine before getting 
into battle. The loss of 2 guns could be 
made up by the increased loading efficiency 
of British seamen. 63 
Campbell credits the Germans with being able to fire 
three rounds a minute per gun for their 11 and 12-inch 
armed ships, while the British could manage about two 
rounds a minute per gun during the late war. 64 These 
figures are in keeping with the maximum rates of loading. 65 
This is not the same as the maximum rate of fire under 
combat conditions where the target range, bearing, 
inclination, and deflection had to be recalculated prior to 
each shoot. In short, as ranges grew the maximum rate of 
fire was reduced as the control period increased due to the 
62Broadside firing by a ship, except during a night 
engagement when ranges were closer, was atypical and guns 
were usually fired in a salvo of one gun from each turret. 
This minimised the time that the opposing vessel was not 
under fire, allowed the degree of correction for fall of 
shot to be reduced, minimised ballistic interference 
between guns of the same turret, and reduced hydraulic 
strain. 
"Chatfield letter to Churchill dated 10 March 1942, 
NMM/CHT/7/3. 
"Campbell, Jutland, p. 345. 
65 In trials at HMS Excellent, the 38cm guns of Baden 
were fired and loaded in 23 seconds; the corresponding time 
for the 15-inch guns in HMS Queen Elizabeth was 36 seconds. 
See ADM 186/251, 'C. B. 1594, Progress in Gunnery Material, 
1921, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Branch, p. 42. 
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salvo's longer time of flight. 66 Charles Drage records that 
in one exercise Renown fired a pair of salvos in 22 
seconds. 67 In fact, the degree of variation between ships 
of even the same class was so striking that a generalized 
statement concerning heavy ships' rates of fire is 
meaningless. Based on the recorded results of battle 
practices for 13.5 and 15-inch gunned ships, a vessel that 
approached firing one round per gun per minute was near the 
optimum, but a more typical rate was about one round per 
gun every 90 seconds. 68 The Admiralty, for its part, sought 
a rate of fire of three salvos per minute in a 15-inch gun 
ship. 69 Dreadnought's weight of broadside of eight guns 
was 6,840 lbs. whilst a Nelson-class ship could deliver a 
broadside of 21,375 lbs. with its nine heavy guns. 70 
Indicative of the importance attached to building 
survivable ships late in the interwar era within the 
constraints of international agreements, the second Kin 
George V-class actually delivered less weight of broadside 
than the Nelson-class. The ten 14-inch guns of a King 
George V-class ship fired a total weight of shell equal to 
15,900 lbs. 
In light of the previous discussion, then, the exact 
lethality of a capital ship's primary armament is not 
66ADM 186/338, 'C. B. 3001/36, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1936, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division dated June 1936, p. 12. 
"Midshipman Journal of Charles Drage, entry dated 20 
October 1926, Commander Charles Hardinge Drage Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/DH/2/3/82. 
68ADM 1/8658/69, 'Appendix I. Average target practice 
results, 1921 and 1922.15" and 13.5" ships at "QUEEN 
ELIZABETH" at 60° inclination. ' 
69ADM 186/339, 'C. B. 3001/1914-36, Summary of Progress 
in Naval Gunnery, 1914-1936, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Training and Staff Duties Division dated December 1936, p. 
49. 
70Mounting ten 12-inch guns, the broadside of 
Dreadnought was restricted to eight guns due to their 
placement. 
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readily quantifiable. Certainly, they demonstrated an 
ability to sink ships, but it is more appropriate to 
enquire how effective they were 4n doing this. The 
experience of the late war had demonstrated that whilst 
shooting could be spirited, few hits were actually obtained 
in relation to the quantity of ordnance expended, 72 a fact 
noted by Chatfield when he commented that: 
The large number of rounds fired to hits 
obtained, both by the Germans and ourselves, 
proved the difficulty of engaging when both 
the firing ship and the enemy were steaming 
at speed. The movement of the ship, the 
vibration, the reduced visibility due to 
smoke and spray, all made not only finding 
the initial range, but still more, keeping 
on the target once the range was determined 
a matter of the utmost difficulty. 73 
Numerous tests were conducted to determine not only 
the survivability of the surface ship, but the presumed 
killing power of capital ships. These included the August 
1921 firings against the ex-German battleship Baden74 by the 
71As fleet action was rare in the Great War, the number 
of engagements involving Royal Navy capital ships was 
limited. At the Battle of the Falklands, the German 
armoured cruisers SMS Scharnhorst and SMS Gneisenau 
succumbed to battle cruisers whilst in the Dogger Bank 
action, SMS Blucher, too, fell prey to British battle 
cruisers. At Jutland, the only High Sea Fleet capital 
ships lost were the battle cruiser SMS Lu zow and the pre- 
dreadnought SMS Pommern. 
"Liddell Hart records that at the Falkland Islands 
encounter less than 5% of the rounds expended by British 
battle cruisers achieved hits whilst at Jutland only 2.2% 
of the heavy shells struck home. The Dogger Bank 
engagement resulted in hits of about 1% for the Royal Navy. 
See 'Naval Notes 1933', 11/1933/47, LHCMA. 
"Chatfield, Navy and Defence, p. 160. 
"Commissioned 1916; details as per Derfflinaer. Baden 
was also used in 1921 as a test ship to measure the 
effectiveness of aerial bombing. See ADM 116/2089, Air 
Ministry letter S. 13077/S. 6 to Admiralty dated 5 December 
1921. 
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monitor HMS Terror, 75 the 1922 shoot by Barham, Hood, 
Warspite, and Valiant against the former German cruiser 
Nürnbera, 71 and the June 1931 tests against the Emperor of 
India by Iron Duke. " The Baden test was aimed at ensuring 
that the defects in armour piercing shells noted during the 
war had been resolved. 78 It must be noted, however, that a 
common problem facing such demonstrations was that they 
never replicated conditions likely to be found on active 
service. The test against Nürnberg is a case in point. 
While the range at which she was engaged varied from 28,000 
yards by Hood to 18,000 yards by Barham and Warspite, when 
she was attacked by destroyers firing torpedoes, Nürnberg 
was being towed at a mere four knots by Repulse. 79 
The Service measured the presumed destructiveness of 
its armament based on a mathematical expression which 
combined the variables of shell diameter with the rate of 
fire of the specific gun mount. Thus, the 'destructive 
effect of shells varies approximately as D4, where D 
represents the diameter. 180 Based on the above rule, the 
basic destructiveness of Royal Navy capital ship main 
armament, where the value of the 16-inch shell is 100, 
could be calculated as: 
75ADM 186/251, 'C. B. 1594' and ADM 186/259, 'C. B. 1640, 
Progress in Gunnery Material, 1922 and 1923, ' Admiralty, 
Naval Staff, Gunnery Branch (G. 0470/23). 
76ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 
1922, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division dated April 
1923. 
"ADM 186/309, 'C. B. 3001/31, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1931, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division dated April 1932, p. 17. 
78Roskill, Naval Policy, Volume I, p. 249. 
79Journal entry dated 7 July 1922, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
80ADM 1/8685/152, Appendix B, 'The Fighting Quality of 















When the above figures are adjusted to account for the 
greatest number of guns able to be trained, the figures 
become: 
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Erin (10X13.5) 
Canada (10X14) 
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Queen Elizabeth (8X15) 
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It can therefore be seen that the decision to adopt 
the 14-inch gun represented a significant reduction in the 
offensive potential of the King George V-class battleship 
compared to the 16-inch armed battleship, and to a lesser 
extent, the 15-inch armed capital ship. Although there are 
81Though it was possible for 'P' and 'Q' turrets to 
fire across the deck, the resulting blast was so severe 
that it was proscribed except during an emergency. See 
Commanding Officer, Invincible letter No. A1/4 Commander- 
in-Chief, South Atlantic and South Pacific dated 18 
December 1914, Milford Haven Papers, IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
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many considerations and compromises in the construction of 
a warship, the British decision to adopt the 14-inch gun 
was certainly one of the most questionable of the period, 
particularly when bearing in mind that the offensive 
potential of the Royal Navy was already severely 
compromised with the retention of Repulse and Renown with 
their limited striking power. 82 Chatfield justified the 
adoption of the 14-inch gun with the observation that: 
we were satisfied that our 14-inch gun ships 
were in all respects a match for any 15 inch 
ships of the same displacement such as 
Germany and Italy were laying down, and 
could also be better defended on a 35,000 
tons displacement against underwater and air 
attack. 83 
Of course, a fleet action was not the only instance 
when the main battery of a battleship or battle cruiser 
could be employed. Bombardment in support of military 
operations has been a recurring mission for surface 
warships and practice shoots against targets ashore were a 
feature of gunnery exercises. Centurion held such a 
practice at Malta in November 1923 when ten rounds, full 
calibre charge, were fired by 'X' and 'Y' turrets, and when 
it appeared that close support might have to be provided to 
British Army units operating in the Dardanelles in 1922 a 
naval fire control party was landed to liaise with 
signallers of the Highland Light Infantry, an ashore naval 
battery, Centurion, and the accompanying cruiser HMS 
"It could be argued that the decision to decommission 
the Iron Duke-class and retain the Repulse-class was 
mistaken. Moreover, Repulse and Renown, with only six main 
guns, were disadvantaged in spotting the fall of their 
shots during salvo firing. See Raven and Roberts, British 
Battleships, p. 47. As offensive gun power is but one 
attribute in the equation of warship effectiveness such a 
conclusion would be premature. 
"Chatfield letter to First Lord dated 16 March 1940, 
Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/6/4. 
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Ceres. 84 In the main, though, the Royal Navy exercised its 
main guns during the era in preparation for fleet action, 85 
and when the occasion did arise for capital ships to 
support inshore operations, such as when Marlborough 
engaged Turkish Nationalist forces in the 'summer of 1920, 
it was the 6-inch guns of its secondary armament that were 
used to back up the landings carried out by the Royal 
Marines. 86 
Secondary Armament. The secondary armament mounted in 
capital ships varied considerably during the period and 
reflects most clearly the evolving nature of what was 
viewed as the primary threat to battleships and battle 
cruisers. The ammunition outfit for secondary armament 
consisted of five types of shells: semi armour piercing, 
capped (SAPC) for use against armour of medium thickness; 
common pointed ballistic cap (CPBC) for use against armour; 
semi armour piercing (SAP) for use against armour; CPC for 
use against unarmoured ships; and common pointed (CP). 87 
While the main armament of a capital ship represented a 
heavy ship's maximum offensive potential, the secondary 
armament was employed in more limited offensive and 
defensive roles. Again, the evolution of naval engineering 
improved the layout and performance of secondary armament 
over the course of the interwar era. Whilst the 
improvements noted in the main armament of capital ships 
were essentially on the margins such as improving the 
mountings to allow for the increased elevation of the guns 
thus affording greater range, the modifications made in 
secondary armament frequently resulted in a wholesale 
"See Journal entries dated 6 November 1922 and 3 
January 1923, Lambert Papers, IWM/90/19/1. 
85ADM 186/117, 'C. B. 3042, Manual of Combined 
Operations, 1938, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and 
Staff Duties Division dated December 1939, p. 59. 
"See Journal entry dated 6 July 1920, Gotto Papers, 
IWM/83/55/1. 
87ADM 186/364, 'B. R. 154, ' p. 15. 
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change to a ship's configuration. 88 The placing of the 
secondary armament in the first generation of dreadnought 
type heavy ships had been on the roofs of the main turrets 
and in the superstructure proper. 89 In such a position, the 
widest possible arcs of fire were provided, but the crews 
were subject to the effects of blast from the main guns. 9° 
In time, as the calibre of gun in the secondary armament 
became larger, and, thus heavier, they were located in 
casements beneath the ship's main deck and along the beam. 91 
In such a disposition they afforded the ship little or no 
protection from air attack. 
An example of how extensive the changes made in the 
secondary armament could be is offered by Chatfield in a 
letter written to Admiral Sir William Fisher, 92 the 
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean: 
In the "WARSPITE" I am taking out four 
6-inch guns, removing the 6-inch battery 
armour, and putting it on the engines and 
boiler rooms, re-engining and reboilering 
the ships, doubling the number of 4-inch 
guns, fitting 4 Mark M Pom Poms, and a 
catapult on the boat deck with observation 
and 2 Fighting Aircraft. 
In the other ships I intend to remove 
the 6-inch batteries altogether and 
substitute the 4.7 inch twin mountings, 8 
88The conversion of Furious and the 'large light 
cruisers' HMS Courageous and HMS Glorious to aircraft 
carriers did change their main armament. In 1924, 
Courageous and Glorious were stripped of their four 15-inch 
guns mounted in twin turrets. Yet, with their conversion 
they ceased to exist in the role originally conceived for 
them and became a new class of warship. 
"Friedman, Battleship, p. 135. 
9'Ibid. 
91Ibid. 
92Admiral Sir William Wordsworth Fisher (1875-1937). 
Commanding Officer, St. Vincent (1916); Rear Admiral, First 
Battle Squadron (1924-1925); Director of Naval Intelligence 
(1926); Fourth Sea Lord (1927-1928); Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean (1932-1935); Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth 
(1936-1937). 
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guns aside, H. A. and L. A. This mounting 
will not be ready for the "WARSPITE" 93 
The actual secondary armament found varied from 4-inch 
to 6-inch mounts, with the 6-inch mounts of the older ships 
gradually losing favour to be replaced by a smaller weapon 
which was typically dual purpose and afforded a greater 
rate of fire--an important consideration as the threat from 
the air grew in prominence. 94 Likewise, the number of 
secondary guns carried varied with each class of capital 
ship, and it must be pointed out that as ships underwent 
refit not only did the type of secondary armament change, 
but so too, frequently, did the numbers carried. 
Indomitable and Inflexible of the Invincible-class battle 
cruisers mounted twelve 4-inch, calibre 45 guns, in a 
mixture of open air and semi-enclosed mounts as its 
secondary armament and were capable of firing twelve rounds 
per minute each, 95 while the later King George V-class went 
to sea with sixteen 5.25-inch guns in eight protected 
turrets capable of firing eighteen rounds per minute each. 96 
The number of rounds carried for the secondary armament 
varied, but HMS Royal Qak's97 establishment was 130 rounds 
for each of its fourteen 6-inch, calibre 45 guns, 91 while 
the Nelson-class carried around 150 operational and 24 
93Chatfield to Fisher letter dated 2 August 1934, 
Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/4/5. The other ships referred to 
were Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, and Renown. H. A. and L. A. 
refer to High Angle and Low Angle anti-aircraft guns. 
94Dual purpose secondary armament incorporated both an 
anti-air and anti-surface capability. The secondary 
armament in Dreadnought was unique in that it consisted of 
12-pounder guns. 
95 Burt, British Battleships, pp. 39-58. 
"Middlebrook and Mahoney, Battleship, p. 34. 
"Commissioned 1916; details as per Royal Sovereign. 
98ADM 1/9244, 'Statement of Dimensions', Royal Oak. 
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practice rounds for each of its 6-inch guns. 99 The maximum 
elevation attainable varied from 60° for the Nelson-class to 
301 for Hood and the Repulse-class, and 151 for the Queen 
Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign-classes. '°° 
One important shell not found in a capital ship's main 
armament was the star shell. Used for target illumination 
during operations at night, secondary batteries with their 
higher rates of fire could illuminate a target up to 9,000 
yards away and maintain the pattern without detracting from 
a ship's main offensive weapon. 101 Developed after the 
Battle of Jutland, star shells allowed an adversary to be 
highlighted without necessarily giving away the position of 
the firing ship, as was apt to happen when high-powered 
searchlights were employed. 102 The star shell, itself, was 
a time-fused pyrotechnic fired at a high angle which 
released a parachute-deployed magnesium flare. 103 During the 
period, a flashless star shell was perfected that masked 
the firing ship. 1°4 Searchlights were however retained for 
use when cloud cover was low and star shells were unable to 
illuminate surface targets. In turn, searchlights suffered 
when it was raining"' or the range was in excess of 6,000 
"See figure titled 'H. M. S. RODNEY. ARCS of GUNFIRE' in 
Journal, Beaufoy-Brown Papers, LHCMA. 
1°°ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915, ' Plate No. 6. 
'°'ADM 1/8766/43, unnumbered and undated minute 
regarding exchange of gunnery information with the United 
States Navy. 
102Hezlet, Electron and Sea Power, p. 153. At Jutland, 
the cruisers HMS Southampton and HMS Dublin received 
extensive damage after illuminating German ships with 
searchlights. 
lo3Studholme Brownrigg, 'Gunnery in the Royal Navy, ' 
Reginald Bacon, ed., Britain's Glorious Navy (London: 
Odhams Press, Ltd., n. d., but c. 1942), p. 222. 
104ADM 186/318, 'C. B. 3001/32, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1932, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division April 1933, p. 7. 
105Bacon, ed., Glorious Navy, p. 222. 
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yards and illumination proved difficult. 106 During the 
1920's, a ship of the Queen Elizabeth-class carried about 
200 star shells for use by her 6-inch and 4-inch guns. 107 
Another shell unique to the secondary armament was the 
target smoke burst. Fired at altitude to simulate an 
attack by a high level bomber, 108 the smoke burst was a less 
than adequate target for a ship's high angle anti-aircraft 
weapons. 109 Finally, mention must be made of the gas shell. 
Developed on an experimental basis for naval use against 
submarines during the 1914-1918 war, "' the fielding of a 
chemical shell by the Royal Navy during the period is an 
issue of some doubt. 11' The Service recognised that it was 
being developed by other naval forces, including the United 
States Navy. "2 Its anticipated use was as an anti-personnel 
weapon to be fired at control and gunnery positions during 
ship engagements"' and in breaking up exposed military 
"'journal entry dated 29 September 1921, King Papers, 
IWM 90/23/1. 
'°7ADM 1/9266, 'Statement of Dimensions, ' for Queen 
Elizabeth following her 1926 reconstruction. 
'°8ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, ' p. 21. 
"'Smoke shell for screening an amphibious assault or 
a flotilla attack against an enemy fleet whilst developed 
was, for safety reasons, not embarked during peace time. 
See ADM 186/244, 'C. B. 1561, ' p. 51. 
110ADM 116/1775, First Sea Lord minute to Cabinet dated 
7 May 1920. 
"See Appendix VI. 
112 See ADM 1/8586/70, 'Final Report of the Post-War 
Questions Committee, ' dated 27 March 1920, p. 101. The 
1940 edition of its naval ratings' handbook includes a 
table identifying the distinctive colour patterns of naval 
shells in use including gas. See The Bluejackets' Manual 
United States Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1940), pp. 524-525. 
113ADM 116/2068, Director of Naval Ordnance un-numbered 
minute dated 24 April 1920. 
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formations during a shore bombardment. 114 
Tertiary Armament. Rapid fire light weapons for 
dealing with aircraft or unprotected surface targets were 
fitted to heavy ships, and the specific types in use were 
to undergo much change throughout the period. In 1922, all 
capital ships except Centurion were equipped with two 3- 
inch guns and four 3-pdr guns each. 115 The 3-inch guns were 
provided for defence against aircraft whilst the 3-pdr guns 
were employed for ceremonial saluting purposes. "' 
Eventually, the 4-inch gun was adopted as the standard 
anti-aircraft armament in British heavy ships and a 
complement of four per ship was provided. "? An exception 
to the above was the use of the six 4.7-inch anti-aircraft 
guns provided in the Nelson-class which were capable of 
elevating to 600.118 By 1930, the multi-barrel Mk. VI M Pom- 
porn"9 was the Service's primary short range air defence 
weapon being fitted to capital ships; an eight barrel mount 
fired 720 rounds per minute for up to two minutes using a 
shell fused to burst on impact. 120 Maxim, and then, Lewis 
guns were also fitted to heavy ships for close range anti- 
aircraft fire, 121 and by 1933 the standard fit was for 10 
Lewis guns in anti-aircraft mountings. '22 The effectiveness 
of such anti-aircraft weaponry depended on reaching a 
114 ADM 1/8586/70, T. B. 01557. ' 
115ADM 186/59, 'C. B. 1534, British Navy, Part I, 
Battleships and Battle Cruisers, September 1922, pp. 4-22. 
116Ibid. 
117 ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915, ' Plate No. 6. 
118Ibid. 
"'The 40mm, calibre 40 pom-pom was commonly identified 
as the 2-pdr. See Friedman, Battleship, p. 115. 
120Bacon, ed., Glorious Navy, p. 223. 
"'Parkes, British Battleships, p. 494. 
122ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915, ' Plate. No. 6. 
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satisfactory firing solution that brought an aeroplane 
under accurate and sustained fire at the earliest possible 
moment. Unfortunately, the fire control system developed 
by the Royal Navy did not measure an aircraft's course, so 
much as guess it, with a consequence that the system was 
inadequate for its task. 123 Perfecting an anti-aircraft fire 
control system was complicated as, unlike a system designed 
to calculate surface gunfire, it had to track a target in 
three dimensions. Commenting on the difficulties of high 
angle anti-aircraft control, Humphrey Madden, a midshipman 
serving in Repulse, recorded that: 
H. A. control is by far the most difficult 
control, because the control officer has to 
deal in three dimensions. 
He can spot easily for vertical & 
horizontal deflection, - as it does not have 
to be so accurate as in 15" firing - but he 
cannot tell, unless there is a direct hit, 
once he is on for line, whether the shots 
are bursting short or beyond the target. It 
looked as if all our shots were bursting 
near the smoke shell - once we were on for 
line - but from the marking party in the 
tug, they were seen to be several thousand 
yards short. 124 
Torpedo Armament on Roval Navy Capital Ships. All 
classes of Royal Navy capital ships during the period were 
initially armed with torpedoes save for the second King 
George V-class of battleships. Controversy surrounded the 
continued retention of a torpedo armament on Royal Navy 
capital ships and the matter was soon addressed by both 
Fire Control Requirement and Post-War Questions Committees 
in 1919. The argument against their retention was that 
their use by capital ships had been minimal during the war, 
and that they sometimes required separate facilities for 
123Geoffrey Till, 'Impact of Airpower on the Royal Navy 
in the 1920's, ' University of London, unpublished Ph. D. 
Dissertation, 1976, p. 68. 
124Humphrey Madden Midshipman Journal entry dated 6 July 
1925, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Madden Papers, 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/MDN/3. 
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plotting and controlling, and, hence, additional naval 
personnel. 125 Moreover, the firing of torpedoes from heavy 
ships was rarely as satisfactory as their firing from 
cruisers and destroyers, and the problems associated with 
their use by heavy ships resulted in special trials being 
carried out in 1927 by Malaya and ueen Elizabeth. 126 
Finally, the tactical conditions under which the weapon 
could be employed were at variance with long range gunnery 
requirements. Commenting on the differing tactical 
requirements Tennyson-D'Eyncourt noted: 
It may be assumed that the gun is the 
primary weapon of a Capital Ship: therefore 
do away with torpedo tubes (except possibly 
1 or 2 for the moral effect, or for use in 
case of a special emergency). The argument 
for this is that it is undesirable to have 
two totally different weapons of offence 
requiring different tactics for the best use 
of them, the projectile reaching its 
objective in a few seconds and that of the 
other taking perhaps a half an hour. The 
possibility of using either or both of these 
in an action is only likely to confuse the 
mental attitude of those in command and 
cannot make for the greatest efficiency. 127 
Additionally, when located beneath the waterline, they 
weakened a ship's armoured belt, but if located topside, 
torpedoes were liable to cause a sympathetic explosion if 
struck by shell-fire. Experiments were conducted on the 
latter point, and the risk was thought minimal, though as 
with most assessments regarding the torpedo and the capital 
ship, this verdict was not universally shared. 128 Tennyson- 
D'Eyncourt, for one, objected strongly to the practice and 
125ADM 116/2068, 'Final Report of Fire Control 
Requirement Committee. ' 
126ADM 189/47, 'C. B. 1770 (27) , Annual Report of Torpedo School, 1927' pp. 26-29. 
127ADM 1/9225, Director of Naval Construction minute CSecO 1214/19 dated 3 July 1919. 
128'Remarks on the Final Report of the Post-War Question 
Committee of Capital Ships, ' Phillimore Papers, IWM 66/9/1. 
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wrote: 
A number of torpedo tubes on the upper deck 
constitutes... a grave danger to the ship 
from direct hit, the result of which might 
easily cripple or destroy the ship. 129 
Of course, the reason that torpedoes had migrated to an 
above the waterline mounting was that as the maximum speed 
at which capital ships could operate increased, they proved 
difficult to fire when located on the beam from a submerged 
flat. "' Moreover, the fitting of anti-torpedo bulges, such 
as in Repulse, hindered the firing of torpedoes from a 
submerged flat. 131 In Nelson and Rodney, this limitation was 
mimimised by placing the tubes in the bow where they were 
aligned to fire ahead. 132 Finally, a drawback of the above- 
water torpedo tubes of the Royal Sovereign-class was that, 
unlike those located in a submerged flat, they could not be 
reloaded at sea. 133 
During the war it was customary for capital ships to 
embark five torpedoes for each of its submerged tubes, "' yet 
the trend in the postwar period was for their elimination 
during successive refits as a part of battleship's armament 
though they continued to be carried by battle cruisers. 
129ADM 1/9225, Director of Naval Construction minute 
CSecO 1214/19 dated 3 July 1919. 
130ADM 116/2068, 'Final Report of Fire Control 
Committee. ' A drawback that presumably did not apply to 
Hood as she was able to discharge her submerged flat 
torpedoes whilst steaming at speed. See enclosure (10) to 
Vice Admiral, Special Service Squadron letter No. 
235/32/1/4 to Admiralty dated 5 August 1924, ADM 116/2256. 
131ADM 189/42, 'C. B. 1638, Annual Report of Torpedo 
School, 1922, ' p. 113. 
132Friedman, Battleship, p. 152. 
133See report of 'Peace and War Complements Committee 
1935-1936, ' Binney Papers, IWM/PP/MCR/95. 
134ADM 1/8615/200, 'Basis on which Reserves of Torpedoes 
for various types of vessels was decided, ' un-numbered 
minute dated 20 October 1921. 
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The number of tubes carried could be as few as two, such as 
found on the Lion-class of battle cruisers and the Nelson- 
class of battleships, to as many as ten as employed in 
Repulse. '35 Still, Nelson and Rodney carried fourteen 
torpedoes for their two tubes, 136 the Queen Elizabeth-class 
carried twenty for their four tubes, 137 and Repulse embarked 
a total of 26 torpedoes. 138 This represented a significant 
reload capability for a weapon for which, by common 
assessment, little use had been found in the late war by 
heavy ships . 
139 
The size of the torpedo was not a constant, either, 
and ranged from a minimum of 14-inches, as found in the 
small picket boats embarked aboard the Dreadnought, 
Invincible, Bellerophon, St. Vincent, Neptune, 
Indefatigable, Colossus, Orion, and Lion-classes, to the 
242-inch tubes of the Nelson-class. '40 The maximum range 
of the 21-inch torpedo, armed with a 500 lbs. warhead of 
TNT or Amatol, was between 15,000-18,000 yards, depending 
135'A FEW DETAILS OF H. M. BATTLE CRUISER "REPULSE"', 
Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens Papers, Imperial War Museum, 
London, IWM/90/35/2. 
136ADM 1/8694/12, 'Basis of Reserve Torpedoes, ' 
unnumbered and undated minute. 
137ADM 1/9258, 'Statement of Dimensions, ' dated 17 
February 1925 for Warspite. 
138'A FEW DETAILS OF H. M. BATTLE CRUISER "REPULSE"', 
Dickens Papers, IWM/90/35/2. 
139CJouding the issue further was the 'torpedo carrier, ' 
a warship armed with a very heavy torpedo battery mounting 
upwards of fifty tubes for delivering a barrage against the 
enemy battle line. Madden discounted the concept and 
argued for the adequate provision of destroyer flotillas or 
an aircraft carrier armed with torpedo planes. See 'Final 
Report of the Fire Control Requirement Committee' and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet letter A. H. 242/28 dated 
23 November 1920, ADM 116/2068. 
"'Parkes, British Battleships, pp. 477-533. 
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on the specific mark. "' The 242-inch torpedo found in 
Nelson and Rodney carried a 750-lbs. charge to a range of 
20,000 yards. 142 In exercises, a charge composed of cork and 
water, or cork and oil, was used. "' This facilitated 
recovery of what was during the period the most expensive 
naval weapon in use. The settings for range, speed, and 
angle could be adjusted prior to firing. "' 
Plotting: The Correlation of the Offence and the 
Defence. The tactical rationale of the capital ship was its 
superior offensive potential when measured against other 
surface warships. Yet, the firepower of an individual 
capital ship was not an end in itself, unless it had been 
detached for independent operations, but formed part of the 
overall offensive potential of the fleet. The means of 
ranging, concentrating, and delivering the firepower of the 
ship or of the battlefleet was through a coordinated 
process known as fire control which served a specific 
tactical purpose. The use of the fleet's scouting and 
reconnaissance forces, the availability of any strategic 
intelligence on enemy fleet movements, the collation of 
tactical signals intelligence, and the movement of the 
fleet's battle squadrons had the aim of maximising the 
total firepower available at the moment the fleet deployed 
from its cruising formation to its battle formation in 
anticipation of a fleet action, and then of delivering the 
greatest concentration of fire. The requirements of fire 
control and the requirements of manoeuvre necessitated that 
141ADM 186/403, 'C. B. 523, Handbook for R. N. T. F. 
Torpedoes. 18-inch Marks VII to VII"'"' 21-inch Marks II. 
to IV", 1918, ' p. 10. 
142ADM 189/47, 'C. B. 1770(27), ' p. 6. 
143Diagram 'Collision Head, ' Beaufoy-Brown Journal, 
Beaufoy-Brown Papers, LHCMA and King Journal, IWM 90/23/1 
entry dated 13 September 1921. 
... Midshipman Journal entries for 25 and 27 May 1926, 
Midshipman J. Waldron Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/86/59/1. 
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a plot should be kept. Though of a similar nature, the two 
requirements were not identical, and two separate plots 
were maintained by flagships and senior officers of 
independent formations. 145 Thus, plotting served two 
distinct purposes: strategical and tactical. 146 Whilst the 
need for plotting had been recognised in the Grand Fleet, 
there had not been a single prescribed method developed for 
individual ships or squadrons during the war. 147 In part, 
this was due to space and personnel constraints, and one 
benefit of a larger ship was that plotting arrangements 
were enhanced. 148 
In an age when computers and computing have pervaded 
so much of the fabric of everyday life, the difficulty of 
analyzing and then plotting in a manual form the 
information reports received from so many disparate 
sources, with varying degrees of accuracy, may not be 
readily appreciated. Grenfell captured the essence and the 
difficulties of plotting when he observed that: 
The detailed examination of any tactical 
problem, whether involving torpedo attacks, 
tactical minefields, gunnery concentration, 
or movements of fleets, is very largely a 
matter of plotting. Anyone who has plotted 
out even a comparatively straightforward 
problem of plain manoeuvring will know what 
a very lengthy and laborious process such an 
'45The two plots were variably called strategical and 
tactical, general and action, and primary and secondary. 
Confidential Admiralty Monthly Order, C. M. O. 890 issued 
November 1920 standardized on the terms strategical and 
tactical. See ADM 116/2090. 
'"Royal Navy writings of the period address the subject 
in terms of strategic and tactical plotting; modern naval 
doctrine discusses the issue in terms of the intelligence 
requirements of the operational and tactical levels of war. 
The author is aware of this distinction but retains the 
original construct as most contemporary references are to 
strategical plotting. 
147ADM 116/2090, Royal Naval Staff College to Director, 
Training and Staff Duites letter dated January 1920. 
148ADM 116/1673, Grand Fleet Orders (Revised 1917). 
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investigation is, 149 
In addition to the information provided by the screening 
forces (i. e., destroyer flotillas, cruisers, and 
submarines) införmation on enemy fleet movements could be 
received by long range aircraft patrols, the organic 
reconnaissance aircraft of the fleet, fleet tactical 
signals intelligence received through onboard direction 
finding (D/F) equipment, "' and strategic signals 
intelligence made available from sources under the control 
of the Admiralty and the Government Code and Cypher School 
(GCCS) . 
151 
The accuracy of the information received was critical. 
If a ship, submarine, or aircraft made a report that was of 
dubious reliability, then the information was not 
immediately plotted and subsequent reports by that unit had 
to be treated with caution. If incorrect information was 
plotted, then the Fleet Commander's understanding of the 
situation would be faulty and contact with the opposing 
force might be missed or a deployment carried out that was 
149Russell Grenfell, 'Training in Tactics, ' Naval 
Review, Volume XI, 1923, p. 684. 
'50Tactical direction finding equipment was installed 
in capital ships after Jutland and the concept was first 
tested during fleet exercises conducted during the latter 
part of the war; see Brister Papers, IWM/MISC/1010/65/1. 
Barham shadowed Queen Elizabeth during a nighttime 
encounter exercise by fixing her position from wireless 
signal transmissions. Barham subsequently engaged her. 
See King Journal entry 26 January 1922, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
151At the time of the Spanish Civil War, the Royal Navy 
benefited from the ability of GCCS to intercept and decode 
Italian naval wireless traffic. See Wesley K. Wark, 
'British Intelligence and Small Wars in the 1930s, ' 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2, No. 4,1987, p. 
73. In the Far East, the Navy enjoyed success against 
Japanese naval traffic and by 1938 were decrypting the 
operational codes used by the Imperial Japanese Navy. See 
Antony Best, 'Constructing an Image: British Intelligence 
and Whitehall's Perceptions of Japan, 1931-1939, ' 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 
1996, p. 408. 
152 
detrimental to the tactical requirements at hand. A 
discussion regarding the two types of plotting is now in 
order. 
Strategical Plot. The Strategical Plot was 
maintained on a squared board, typically to the scale of 
five miles to the inch, and tracked the presumed movements 
of the enemy fleet from first report to the conclusion of 
the action. 152 In addition, the Strategical Plot depicted: 
the position of the Fleet Flagship at 5 or 
10 minute intervals, the positions of 
outlying units of the Fleet, minor actions, 
points of land or enemy bases, and the 
position of the enemy as deduced from all 
available intelligence. 
On the situation as revealed by the 
"Strategical plot" depend the movements of 
the Fleet until visual contact is made with 
the enemy. 153 
A benefit of maintaining the Strategical Plot was that an 
understanding of the general situation could be garnered 
during the approach phase and allow subordinate commanders 
to 'appreciate the Commander-in-Chief's intentions and act 
according to his requirements. ' 154 By collating, assessing, 
and plotting all information received, a picture could be 
developed of the probable disposition of the enemy 
battlefleet, 155 even in the absence of sighting reports of 
heavy ships, by tracking the lines of direction and advance 
of the enemy's screening forces. 156 
Tactical Plot. The Tactical Plot correlated the 
152ADM 116/2090, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
letter No. 709/A. H. 710 dated 21 May 1920. 
1531bid 
154ADM 116/2090, Precis of 14 August 1919 lecture 
delivered by Lieutenant Commander W. S. Chalmers, 'Tactical 
Plotting, ' Royal Naval Staff College. 
'55C. A. G. Hutchinson, 'Battle by Night, Naval Review, 
Volume X, 1922, p. 12. 
156ADM 116/2090, Precis of 14 August 1919 lecture 
delivered by Lieutenant Commander W. S. Chalmers, 'Tactical 
Plotting, ' Royal Naval Staff College. 
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information required once contact had been established and 
was kept on a gridded board to the scale of one or two 
miles to the inch. 157 Whilst the primary purpose of the 
Tactical Plot was to arrive at the correct firing solution 
for the ship's (or ships') guns, it also supported the 
requirements for torpedo fire control. 158 The plot was 
initiated just prior to contact of the opposing forces 
based on the information passed from the Strategical Plot, 
and tracked the speed and course of the firing ship and the 
presumed track of the ship likely to be engaged. 159 The 
estimated distance to the opposing target was determined by 
rangefinders, whilst the True bearing of the targeted ship 
was forwarded to the Tactical Plot from the Torpedo Control 
Position and from the Gunnery Transmitting Station. 160 The 
Tactical Plot was amended to reflect the location of any 
minefields, the presence of any coast lines, and the likely 
arcs of enemy torpedo f ire . 
161 
If a key strand of the earlier 'dreadnought 
revolution' was the shift from local control, where each 
turret ranged and fired independently, to director control 
where all the ship's main guns came under central control, 
the culmination was the coordination of an entire battle 
squadron's fire through a process labelled master ship 
control. 162 Initially, the information necessary to 
coordinate such a fire plan was passed visually through 
range clocks mounted on the control top and deflection 
'57ADM 116/2090, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 





162The best study of the dreadnought revolution is ion 
Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, 
Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
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scales applied to the main turrets. In time, the range 
clocks and deflection scales were removed. Instead, the 
information required to coordinate the fires of multiple 
ships was passed electronically via a wireless 
communications link established between the transmitting 
stations of the several ships where it was plotted, 163 and, 
in a somewhat similar fashion, the concentrated torpedo 
fire of a squadron's ships could be coordinated. 
Whether the information received was destined for the 
Strategical Plot or for the Tactical Plot, a degree of 
error was inherent in the information. A common problem 
was that for units making a sighting report, the time and 
positional information contained in the report was 
difficult to correlate to that of the receiving ship, while 
the accuracy of rangefinding suffered due to engine 
vibration when ships travelled at speed. '" Similarly, 
direction finding information, whether received from a 
shore station or a fleet unit, could not pinpoint the exact 
location of the transmitting source but only an 
approximation. In an attempt to reduce the positional and 
time errors associated with the sighting reports of 
screening forces, an approach using the benefits of echo 
sounding and direction finding termed Radio/Acoustic 
reporting was developed. When sending a sighting report, 
the reporting ship concurrently dropped a depth charge. 
D/F bearings based on the sending ship's wireless signal 
were plotted, whilst echo sounding equipment identified the 
position of the ship based on the time it took for the 
explosion to travel through water from the source to the 
receiver . 
165 
Finally, one last source of information available for 
163See Journal entry dated 26 July 1923, Madden Papers, 
NMM/MDN/1. 
'"Journal entry 3 April 1929, Beaufoy-Brown Papers, 
LHCMA. 
"'Ibid., entry dated 24 January 1929 and Journal entry 
dated 10 June 1937, Milford Haven Papers, IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
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plotting must be mentioned: radar. The Royal Navy was at 
the fore in its development, and the Type 79X, operating on 
a wavelength of 4 metres, was fitted in Rodney and the 
cruiser HMS Sheffield prior to the outbreak of war in 
1939.166 Yet, its promise was not without risk, and in a 
Service versed in exploiting the intentions of an adversary 
through signals intelligence, the danger that radar 
emanations by the fleet could prove of more use to an enemy 
was a concern. Indeed, Rodney had been able to detect 
Sheffield at a distance of 100 miles by tracking her radar 
emissions during a late pre-war exercise. 167 
The Use of Aircraft on British Capital Ships. By the 
end of the 1914-1918 war, aircraft routinely operated from 
flying-off platforms fitted to Royal Navy capital ships and 
acted as an advance scouting element for the fleet. During 
the war, all post-dreadnought ships had been earmarked for 
modification to operate aircraft, though, in the event, 
only 26 capital ships actually embarked aeroplanes by 
conflict's end. 168 By 1 December 1918 the Grand Fleet was 
operating 99 aircraft, whilst another 77 planes of mixed 
type were operating from shore stations in direct support 
of its operations. 169 In addition, by the time of the 
Armistice over one hundred airships were employed in 
support of naval operations. 170 
As the aircraft carrier became a regular unit in fleet 
operations the continuing need or wisdom for aircraft to 
166Derek Howse, Radar at ea: The Royal Navy in World 
War 2 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993), p. 26. 
167 Ibid. 
168R. C. Cronin, Royal Navy Shipboard Aircraft 
Developments 1912-1931 (Tonbridge: Air-Britain, Ltd., 
1990), p. 61. 
169'Royal Air Force State of Personnel and Materiel 
Readiness' dated 1 December 1918, Phillimore Papers, IWM 
66/9/1. 
170Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Seapower (London: Cox and 
Wyman, Ltd., 1970), p. 104. 
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operate from battleships and battle cruisers was debated. 
Against their usefulness in acting as a scouting force and 
spotting for gunnery and torpedo fire, was the liability 
that they brought to a ship through the storage of aviation 
spirit, the compromises that they forced in fleet 
evolutions when launching or recovering aircraft, and the 
concern that locating catapults or flying off platforms 
atop the turrets of the main armament weakened the fighting 
efficiency of the capital ship's main weapon. Moreover, 
the float planes which operated from capital ships were, in 
the main, less capable than their counterparts operating 
from aircraft carriers. 171 A further argument against the 
retention of aircraft on capital ships was that with 
limited financial resources, on the one hand, and limited 
deck space on the other, the retention of catapults meant 
that fewer anti-aircraft guns could be mounted and less 
money was available to build carriers. 172 Yet, initially, 
there was a strong case to be made in retaining an organic 
aircraft capability for capital ships. Admiral Madden 
while serving as the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
argued that: 
It is desirable that capital ships and 
light cruisers should again carry fighting 
planes; the threat from torpedo planes can 
only be adequately met by attack from the 
air. Squadrons of vessels detached from the 
fleet are unlikely to be accompanied by a 
carrier, and many other occasions must occur 
in war when ships or squadrons will have to 
depend on themselves for protection... 173 
Madden' s plea was made as the period of his command of the 
Atlantic Fleet approached its end, and he reflected upon 
"Chatfield letter to Vice Admiral Sir Hugh J. Tweedie, 
Commander-in-Chief, The Nore dated 4 March 1935, Chatfield 
Papers, NMM/CHT/3/6. 
172Roskill, Naval Policy, Volume II, pp. 397-398. 
173ADM 1/8628/130, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
letter No. 1119/A. H. 1220 dated 14 August 1922 to 
Admiralty. 
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the experience gained from commanding what was the premier 
naval force in existence. His advocacy of embarking 
aeroplanes aboard capital ships had been consistent, yet he 
was primarily a champion of the carrier and sought its 
integration as a tactical unit in the fleet. 174 
However, the argument that capital ships should retain 
an organic air capability went beyond simply the need to 
safeguard the defensive requirements of that vessel. The 
argument was also advanced that the provision of aircraft, 
particularly reconnaissance and fighter types, on surface 
ships would allow the true offensive potential of the 
carrier to be realised as it would be possible then to 
embark more torpedo and bomber aircraft. 175 As these grew 
heavier in weight, it became necessary to adopt the 
catapult, employing a cordite or compressed air charge, '76 
to launch an aircraft and to dispense with the practice of 
simply using a flying off platform mounted above the 
turret. 177 In 1926, the Admiralty decided to provide 
catapults for its heavy ships and cruisers, but deferred 
procuring the necessary aircraft to operate from them until 
after 1935.178 Thus, in 1932 and 1933 none of the 
Mediterranean Fleet's heavy ships and only Valiant and, for 
a brief time, Hood in the Atlantic/Home Fleet operated 
174See ADM 1/8576/341, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic 
Fleet letter No. 1293/A. H. 0036 of 2 December 1919. 
175ADM 1/8733/38, 'Provision of Catapults for 
Battleships, Battlecruisers, and Cruisers, and the 
Development of the Fleet Air Arm, ' un-dated and un-numbered 
Admiralty minute. 
176ADM 186/560, 'C. B. 3003(26), Progress of the Fleet 
Air Arm Up To 30th September, 1926, ' Admiralty, Naval 
Staff, Naval Air Section dated March 1927, p. 12. 
177 ADM 1/9007/79, Director Naval Air Division minute 
M. 003500/33 dated 16 December 1933. 
'78ADM 1/8733/38, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff un- 
numbered minute dated 29 September 1928. The decision was 
made for reasons of economy. A similar decision resulted 




Although, the first tentative steps in the Navy's use 
of aircraft certainly predated the 1914-1918 war the onset 
of conflict saw an expansion in means and ability on the 
part of the Royal Navy that brought upon it at one point 
the role of air defence of Great Britain. 180 Peacetime had 
brought retrenchment, but the vital role of aircraft in 
support of fleet operations was recognised and the 
requirement that all capital ships should operate aircraft 
was approved by the Admiralty. "' Still, if aircraft were 
retained during the period, the function that they 
fulfilled had altered. Where once they were carried to 
maximise the effectiveness of naval gunfire, their use 
evolved over time to one of supporting fleet air defence, 
and, finally, by the end of the period, to assisting in the 
scouting and reconnaissance requirements of the fleet and 
in conducting limited strikes. This evolving role was the 
result of the limitations in carrier tonnage permitted by 
naval treaty, the desired range to be aimed at in an action 
between battlefleets, and the performance characteristics 
of the aeroplanes themselves. Their use aboard surface 
ships, rather than in aircraft carriers, was a compromise 
and clearly recognised as such, and caused Admiral Sir 
Roger Backhouse'82 to comment that : 
I wish to say, too, in my opinion, it 
is fallacious to suppose that we can create 
179Nav List, January 1932, pp. 201-210 and Navy List, 
January 1933, pp. 200-209. 
180Till, 'Impact of Airpower on the Royal Navy in the 
1920's', p. 178. 
181Roskill, Naval Policy, Volume I, p. 244 
182Later Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Roland Charles 
Backhouse (1878-1939). Flag Captain, Battle Cruiser Force 
(1916); Director of Naval Ordnance (1920-1922); Commanding 
Officer, Malaya (1923-1925); Rear Admiral. Third Battle 
Squadron (1926-1927); Vice Admiral, First Battle Squadron 
(1932-1934); Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (1935-1938); 
First Sea Lord (1938-1939); retired and promoted Admiral of 
the Fleet (1939). 
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a large and efficient Fleet Air Arm by the 
policy of crowding aircraft into all our 
ships. If we want a large Fleet Air Arm we 
must have carriers from which to operate the 
aircraft . 
183 
Much had changed during the period that would alter the 
assessment on the need to carry aircraft in surface ships. 
For one, catapult-launched aircraft were being outstripped 
in performance by land-based aircraft. It was in 
recognition of this trend that Naval Staff in 1936 
concluded: 
The Staff agree that the general increase in 
air efficiency to be gained by carrying 
aircraft in carriers and the gain in A. A. 
armament in battleships by the omission of 
the catapult are such as to warrant very 
serious consideration being given to 
omission of catapults and the building of 
extra carriers.... The above conclusions have 
been arrived at from full consideration of 
the great increase in efficiency inherent in 
carrier-borne when compared with catapult- 
borne aircraft and the impairment of the 
A. A. efficiency of the ship resulting from 
the fitting of catapults.... The A. A. 
armament of the ships will almost certainly 
be engaged on numerous occasions before the 
main armament and it is upon this armament 
that the security of the vessels against air 
attack for their final offensive must rest. 
The catapult aircraft can contribute little 
or nothing to security against air attack. 
Furthermore it is improbable that the 
aircraft will survive the blast of the A. A. 
armament. 
184 
For ships operating Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance (TSR) 
aeroplanes rather than Spotter-Reconnaissance (SR) 
aircraft, the allowance of ordnance was increased with the 
provision of three 500 lb. and two extra 250 lb. bombs for 
183ADM 1/9088/63, Backhouse letter to Cunningham dated 
31 December 1936. 
184ADM 1/9088/63, Director of Tactical Division minute 
94/36 dated 10 June 1936. 
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each unit embarked. '85 By September 1939, the Fairey 
Swordfish was the most prevalent aircraft operating from 
capital ships, 18' though the Fairey IIIF had been the 
aircraft which had seen the widest service with the Fleet 
Air Arm during the 1919-1939 period. 18' Whilst the air 
component of its carriers was obsolescent towards the end 
of the period, for their limited duties the aircraft 
embarked on capital ships were adequate to the task. The 
limited strikes that they were expected to launch were 
against naval targets and not military targets ashore. 
Indeed, the Service was loath to contemplate using even its 
carrier air wings with their limited numbers in such a 
manner. 188 
The Threat and the Means of Protection Emvloved in 
British Capital Ships. Protective measures of both a 
passive and active nature can be employed to minimise the 
risk of damage to both crew and ship and to alleviate 
damage once sustained. For example, as a result of its 
experience during the late war, the Service introduced a 
flame retardant balaclava to protect crew members from the 
intense heat associated with cordite burns, whilst 
respirators were introduced to provide protection from 
asphyxiation. 18' Additionally, measures can be adopted in 
a ship's design to maximise its survivability when the 
object of direct attack, and the 'tactical requirement of 
"'ADM 186/104, 'C. B. 01777(37), Naval Ordnance, Basis 
of Reserves, ' Admiralty, Gunnery Branch dated 1937, pp. 40- 
41. 
'86Malaya, Warspite, and Repulse operated two each 
whilst Barham and Rodney were equipped with a single 
Swordfish. See Admiralty 'Pink List' as of 3 September 
1939, Peachey Papers, NMM/PCY/11. 
'87Chaz Bowyer, The Encyclopedia of British Military 
Aircraft (London: Bison Books, 1982), p. 69. 
188See particularly ADM 1/9088/63, Backhouse letter to 
Cunningham dated 31 December 1936. 
'89ADM 1/8628/122, Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet 
letter No. 1742/h. f. 1187 dated 2 August 1916. 
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a battleship was that it should be sufficiently well 
balanced as regards gun power and protection that it could 
not be destroyed by chance. '190 
The Threat from Naval Gunnery. The question of how 
much was enough in capital ship protection revolved around 
considerations of the threat and the range at which an 
engagement between battlefleets was desired. - A presumed 
advantage of the Five Power Treaty was that it defined the 
maximum surface threat to be faced. The Naval Staff came 
to the view that fleet action at ranges of 12,000 to 16,000 
yards provided the optimum advantage to the Royal Navy. 
This advantage was based on the extra armour protection 
that the Service's heavy ships possessed vis-a-vis her 
rivals and a belief in the superior gunnery of British 
capital ships. 19' In short, the need was to provide 
sufficient horizontal armour protection to withstand 16- 
inch shellfire at the furthest range at which an enemy was 
likely to begin registering hits whilst affording adequate 
vertical protection to withstand the enemy's fire at the 
range when the fleet's offensive fire would prove decisive. 
Thus, the: 
staff requirement is that magazine shall be 
safe from a 16" shell at ranges of 30,000 
yds. As the shell will not commence to dive 
inside ranges of 20,000 yds., these two 
ranges represent the extremes over which 
diving shell need to be considered. l92 
As the magazine represented the one place on which a chance 
hit could prove lethal, this eventuality had to be 
"'Chatfield speech to the Institution of Naval 
Architects, May 1933, Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/3/6. 
191ADM 1/9387 contains extracts from 'C. B. 01847, 
Tactical Notes, Volume II, ' that provide estimates on the 
zones of immunity enjoyed by British, American, and 
Japanese capital ships. C. B. 01847 is not on file at the 
Public Record Office. 
192ADM 1/9284, Director of Naval Construction minute 
G. 02613/1928 dated 8 December 1928. 
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minimised through armour protection to deck and turret 
areas. Still, adequate side armour was essential to allow 
the fleet's heavy ships to prevail at the presumed decisive 
ranges as specified in the Battle Instructions. 
Accordingly, the Director of Training and Staff Duties 
observed that: 
Records show that our rate of hitting 
the enemy in ship v. ship actions rises 
rapidly inside of 16,000 yards and it is, 
therefore, our plan to get to this range and 
ships must be protected to enable them to do 
so.... Thick side armour is therefore 
essential to protect our ships for 
sufficient time to enable them to achieve 
decisive results on getting to a range in 
which a high rate of hitting is possible in 
ship v. ship action, i. e., between 12,000 
and 16,000 yards. 193 
Thus, the Service believed that the capital ship was 
relatively immune to destruction from long range gunnery 
and held that: 
neither war experience nor analysis of peace 
practices support the contention that 
concentration fire at long ranges will 
achieve destruction with the ammunition 
available. 194 
Moreover, a benefit of building a ship to withstand the 
risk of long range plunging shell fire was that it also 
afforded a degree of immunity from a direct hit delivered 
by high level bombing. As the maximum velocity a free 
falling bomb could reach was about 800 feet per second and 
did not approach the maximum velocity of a shell fired by 
a heavy gun, 195 a ship designed to withstand a direct hit 
193 ADM 1/9284, Director of Training and Staff Duties un- 
numbered minute dated 8 February 1929. 
194ADM 1/8658/69, un-titled and un-dated Royal Naval 
College lecture delivered during the 1922-1923 session. 
195In comparison, the 16-inch guns of Nelson and Rodney 
had a muzzle velocity of 2,525 feet per second when firing 
a full charge. See ADM 186/291, 'C. B. 1837, Director 
Firing Gear for "Nelson" Class, "Kent" and Later Class 
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from surface gunfire was in a strong position to withstand 
the direct effects of high level bombing. 196 
However, while the Service's own assessment may have 
stressed the desirability of seeking a gun action at the 
12,000-16,000 yards' range, this was not necessarily the 
intention of other naval powers. The Naval Staff received 
reports in 1922 that the recently commissioned battleship 
HIJMS Mutsu197 was conducting successful gunnery practices 
at ranges in excess of 30,000 yards, 198 whilst the battleship 
USS Tennessee199 was engaging at 35,000 yards and straddling 
at 32,000 yards. 200 And, incredibly, the German armoured 
ships Deutschland201 and Admiral Scheer 02 were reported to be 
firing successfully at distances up to 48,000 metres. 203 
Such ranges exceeded the maximum range of four-fifths of 
British heavy ships, 204 and the Service had little choice but 
to press forward with its reconstruction programme and 
Cruisers, and for Vessels Fitted with "Adventure" Type 
Director Gear, 1929, ' Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Plate 64. 
196John H. Narbeth and Reginald Bacon, 'Battleship 
Construction, ' Bacon, ed., Glorious Navy, p. 96. 
"'Commissioned 1920, armed with eight 16-inch guns of 
34,000 tons displacement. 
198ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, ' p. 33. 
"'Commissioned 1920, armed with twelve 14-inch guns, 
and of 32,000 tons displacement. 
200ADM 186/261, 'C. B. 971, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 
1923, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division dated 
April 1924, p. 56. 
"'Commissioned 1933, armed with six 11-inch guns, and 
of 16,000 tons displacement. 
"Commissioned 1934; details as per Deutschland. 
203ADM 186/328, 'C. B. 3001/35, ' p. 110. 
114Jon Tetsuro Sumida, "'The Best Laid Plans': The 
Development of British Battle-Fleet Tactics, 1919-1942, " 
The International History Review, Volume XIV, Number 4, 
November 1992, pp. 687-688. 
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develop shells such as the 6-crh205 that facilitated longer 
range fire. 206 
The Underwater Threat. The danger of mines was 
countered by the streaming of paravanes, basically a 
submerged kite, which had first been fitted to Royal Navy 
ships during the war as an anti-submarine measure. 207 
Deployed from the forecastle or stem of a ship by derricks 
or from a turret mount, two paravanes, complete with 
serrated cutting heads, were trailed at a variable depth by 
towed wires . 
208 With a heavy ship steaming at 15-16 knots, 
the paravanes were set to run at a depth five feet greater 
than the ship's draught and extended out to about 100 feet 
from the beam. 209 When contact was made with a moored mine 
the paravane first guided the mine down and away from the 
ship and then cut the cable, releasing the mine to the 
surface. Still, their use by a capital ship was not 
without risk as the mine, once released, was liable to 
strike the streaming ship. 210 Moreover, the paravane could 
not deal with a mine located directly in front of a ship's 
bow, was of limited use in handling magnetic or acoustic 
... Calibre radius head defined the shape of the shell 
head. The greater the crh value, the sharper the shell 
head and, thus, the less air resistance acting against the 
shell. 
206The range of the 15-inch Mk I mount of the Queen 
Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign-classes firing a 4-crh shell 
was 23,734; when firing a 6-crh shell the range became 
32,200 yards. See Raven and Roberts, British Battleships, 
p. 423. 
207Robert F. McKay, 'The Paravane, ' dated 15 September 
1919, ADM 1/8556/101. 
208Capital ships carried four paravanes with two serving 
as spares. See entry for 17 May 1926, Midshipman Journal 
of H. A. V. Haggard in Admiral Sir Vernon Haggard Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/85/21/3. 
Zo9ADM 116/2306, 'Notes on Technical Subjects. ' 
210See Beaufoy-Brown Journal, entries 17 and 18 July 
1928, for Rodney's exercises with variable depth paravanes, 
Beaufoy-Brown Papers, LHCMA. 
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mines, 211 and could not alleviate the threat posed by a 
floating mine. 212 Battleships with their slower speed were 
fitted with a heavier type of paravane than battle 
cruisers. 213 Although the different types operated in a 
similar manner, the heavier model placed more strain on the 
towing wires and caused fraying. As such, the cable 
supporting the tow could be expected to last about six 
days, if in continuous use. 214 Alternatively, the Two Speed 
Destroyer Sweep was employed as means of defeating the 
mine. 215 An outgrowth of the High Speed Mine Sweep, the Two 
Speed Destroyer Sweep, first practiced in 1926, had the 
capital ship follow in the wake of an escort vessel 
employed to clear a path for the heavier vessel. 216 This 
method, too, had its risks as the following warship had to 
maintain close station on the sweeping destroyer. When 
Rodney formed on HMS Tara during one such evolution off 
Weymouth, she collided with the stern of the destroyer. 217 
Moreover, the Two Speed Destroyer Sweep, with its 
requirement to operate at moderate speed, hindered 
211'Narrative of the Service of Captain V. H. Haggard, ' 
p. 72, Haggard Papers, IWM/85/21/2. 
212ADM 186/451, 'C. B. 1758, Handbook of Protector 
Paravanes, 1926, ' Admiralty, Torpedo and Mining Department, 
dated December 1926, p. 11. 
""Narrative of Service, ' Haggard Papers, IWM/85/21/2, 
p. 76. 
"'ADM 116/2306, 'Notes on Technical Subjects. ' 
215ADM 186/501, 'B. R. 622, Pamphlet on Paravanes, Types 
S Mark I and S Mark I* and the Two Speed Destroyer Sweep 
(T. S. D. S), 1933. ' 
216ADM 189/46, 'C. B. 1770, ' Annual Report of the Torpedo 
School, 1926, ' p. 68 and facing page. 
217Journal entry dated 17 July 1928, Beaufoy-Brown 
Papers, LHCMA. 
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destroyer Asdic operations. 218 
The High Speed Mine Sweep referred to previously had 
been the prescribed method for mine clearance during the 
1914-1918 war and in its immediate aftermath. As a means 
of protecting a heavy ship, it suffered when operated in 
shallow waters such as those found in the Baltic Sea. 
During the visit of Hood and Tiger to Scandinavian ports in 
June 1920, the destroyers HMS Veaa and HMS Vectis lost 
their sweeps whilst practising the manoeuvre. 219 The failure 
of the High Speed Mine Sweep, in this case, was viewed with 
dismay by the Director of Operations as the Admiralty was 
actively contemplating the use of heavy ships in Baltic 
waters against the Soviet Union. 220 The use of the paravane 
often entailed a slight reduction in the ship's speed as 
drag was increased '221 but capital ships of the period 
routinely practiced their streaming and tested their 
efficacy against inert mines filled with sand. 222 
By the end of the 1914-1918 war the non-contact mine, 
sensitive either to acoustic or magnetic influence, had 
218ADM 1/8735/71, Admiralty letter No. M02505/28 to 
Commanders-in-Chief, Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets 
dated 23 August 1928. 
219ADM 116/1881, Rear Admiral, Battle Cruiser Squadron, 
Atlantic Fleet letter No. 377 dated 5 June 1920. During 
the same evolution, Hood severely damaged a paravane when 
it struck a submerged wreck. 
220ADM 116/1881, Director of Operations Division un- 
numbered minute dated 22 June 1920. 
221Journal entry dated 11 June 1921, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
222ADM 116/2217, Reserve Fleet Orders dated 19 July 
1924. Marder implies that the Royal Navy forgot the value 
of paravanes by World War Two. Based on an extensive 
review of tactical exercises, nothing could be further from 
the truth. See Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, p. 
50. 
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been developed. 223 As these mines rested on the bottom of 
the sea and were not moored by cable, the paravane proved 
of little value. 224 Instead, special sweeping tactics were 
developed using trawlers to deal with bottom-laid mines, 225 
and the method was tested several times in the waters 
approaching Alexandria, Egypt during the Abyssinian 
Crisis. 226 Still, whilst the Service understood the risks 
of the magnetic mine, it took no practical steps until the 
outbreak of the war to alleviate through the process of 
degaussing the charged field introduced to a ship's hull 
during construction by riveting. 227 
Capital ship paravanes and the High Speed Mine and Two 
Speed Destroyer Sweeps were complementary to each other, 
and their combined effectiveness was thought to be great, 228 
yet such sweeps required precise station-keeping and the 
application of little or no helm in the trailing heavy 
ships. A worry therefore for the Navy was that a fleet was 
acutely at risk when steaming through confined waters 
thought to be mined, if a gun action ensued and deployment 
223Lewis Ritchie, 'Mines and Minesweeping, Bacon, ed., 
Glorious Nav , p. 227. British magnetic mines had been laid off Zeebrugge and the Schelde in 1918. See Eric 
Grove, ed., The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 
1939-1945 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p. 237. 
224At times, the noise from streaming a paravane caused 
influence mines to self-detonate. 
225 ADM 186/466, 'C. B. 1842, Manual of Minesweeping, 
1929, ' Admiralty, T. M. Department, dated October 1929, 
pp. 5-52. 
226ADM 1/9085/57, Senior Off 
Flotilla letter No. M. S. 0001 
Mediterranean dated 18 March 1936. 
ship might be mined at Alexandria 
deploying to its alternate port, 
particularly acute. 
icer, First Minesweeping 
to Commander-in-Chief, 
The risk that a capital 
and block the fleet from 
the Bay of Navarin, was 
227ADM 189/59, 'C. B. 1770 (39) , Annual Report of Torpedo School, 1939' dated April 1940, p. 83. 
... ADM 186/78, 'C. B. 3011, War Game Rules, 1929, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated April 1929, 
p. 84. 
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was required. Such a risk was inherent in any passage of 
the fleet to Singapore which, perforce, had to negotiate 
either the Sunda or Malacca Straits, and the seriousness of 
the threat accounts, in large measure, for the frequency 
with which anti-mining procedures were practiced. 
In order to reduce the risk of mine and torpedo 
damage, bulges, double bottoms, and a water jacket were 
fitted to absorb the shock of underwater explosive 
detonation. The bulge increased the beam of the ship from 
approximately six to fifteen feet and thereby protected the 
hull proper from a direct underwater detonation. 229 The 
exact risk that the torpedo posed to heavy ships was 
difficult to gauge, and revolved around estimates regarding 
the size of the warhead, the actual type of weapon (contact 
or non-contact; ship launched or aerial), the range at 
which the attack was initiated, the scale of attack, and 
the point of detonation. The issue was further complicated 
by whether it was assumed the number of torpedoes hitting 
a heavy ship were in the same vicinity, on the same beam, 
or evenly dispersed. Thus, Captain Cecil Usborne23o 
estimated that existing capital ships could possibly 
withstand up to five hits and still remain effective 
fighting units. 231 During fleet exercises, the rule of thumb 
established by 'C. B. 3011, ' the manual covering war game 
rules, was that six torpedo hits were required to totally 
disable or sink a battleship. 232 Nevertheless, one Director 
of Naval Construction offered the sober assessment for a 
229Bacon, ed., Glorious Navy, p. 95. 
230Later Vice Admiral Cecil Vivian Usborne (1880-1951). 
President, Naval Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Committee (1919- 
1921); Commanding Officer, Malaya (1927) and HMS Resolution 
(1928). 
231ADM 1/8658/69, lecture titled 'Naval Tactics, 1924' 
by Captain C. V. Usborne to Royal Naval College, Greenwich 
dated 27 June 1923. 
232ADM 1/9007/79, Director of Tactical School letter No. 
862/25 dated 8 May 1934. 
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Nelson-class vessel that if a torpedo succeeded in 
striking at the same place as one preceding it, the ship 
would probably be rendered helpless at once. 1233 
Static tests to measure the presumed lethality of the 
Service's torpedoes, as well as to determine the requisite 
defensive protection for the Royal Navy's heavy ships, were 
conducted on a model labelled the 'Chatham Float'. 234 Tests 
were conducted to measure the effectiveness of torpedoes 
armed with both 500 and 750 lbs. warheads, 235 whilst 
additional tests to determine the expected damage resulting 
from a 1000 lbs. armed torpedo were used to calculate the 
side protection required for the second Kinn George V-- 
class. 236 It was felt that the survivability of the capital 
ship, at least from submarine launched torpedoes, was 
likely to be enhanced as a result of the development of 
Asdic. If both an inner and outer screen of escorts, so 
equipped, were operating with the battlefleet, the 
submarine would have to make an attack from long range to 
avoid detection and the chance of achieving a hit would be 
less. 237 
Fleet exercises, such as 'E. A. ' conducted in January 
1922, highlighted the fact that while a heavy ship when 
screened by destroyers might expect to avoid a single 
submarine-fired torpedo, the likelihood of evading a salvo 
233ADM 1/9270, Director of Naval Construction minute 
M. 03012/26 dated 22 December 1926. 
234The Chatham Float was 
an underwater mine could be 
magazines of capital ships. 
numbered minute to First Sea 
Beatty Papers, NMM/BTY/8/2/24. 
also used to test the damage 
expected to inflict on the 
See Tennyson-D'Eyncourt un- 
Lord dated 10 January 1921, 
235ADM 1/9270, Director of Naval Construction minute 
M. 03012/26 dated 22 December 1926. 
"'Second Bucknill Committee Report dated 25 April 1942, 
Binney Papers, IWM/PP/MCR/95. 
237ADM 1/8658/69, Royal Naval College, Greenwich lecture 
delivered by Captain J. A. G. Troup on 30 and 31 January 
1924. 
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of several torpedoes was another matter. 23' Furthermore, in 
a surface action, a British battlefleet might face upwards 
of 400 torpedoes launched in a mass attack by destroyers, 
cruisers, and the opposing battlefleet. Such an assault, 
it was felt, would result in upwards of 40 hits being 
registered against ten capital ships. 239 To be sure, the 
Atlantic Fleet assessment was pessimistic in the extreme as 
the difficulty of coordinating such a combined attack with 
surface vessels that, of necessity, would have to launch 
their attacks at different ranges were not addressed. 
Moreover, by 1924 an experienced submariner, Captain Max 
Horton240 believed that the ability of a submarine to deal 
a mortal blow to modern capital ships through a torpedo 
attack was much diminished. 241 The fact, however remains 
that the threat from the torpedo, whether launched from a 
submarine, a surface warship, or an aeroplane was viewed 
with great concern throughout the period, and the risk was 
most acute in restricted waters, such as the Johore Straits 
or Scapa Flow, where the room for a heavy ship to manoeuvre 
was limited. 242 
The Air Threat. Still, of all the threats facing the 
capital ship, the danger from the air was always the most 
contentious. Much of this was tied to the promise of 
238ADM 1/8628/130, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
to Admiralty letter No. 1119/A. H. 1120 Admiralty dated 14 
August 1922. 
239Ib1d. 
240Later Admiral Sir Max Kennedy Horton (1883-1951). 
Commanding Officer, Resolution (1930); Commander, First 
Cruiser Squadron (1935); Commander, Reserve Fleet (1937); 
Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches (1942). 
241ADM 1/8658/61, Commanding Officer, Conquest letter 
No. 028/147 to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet dated 2 
April 1924. Horton proposed the development of midget 
submarines to attack a fleet in harbour or at sea as a 
remedy. 
2°ZADM 1/9649, Naval Intelligence Directorate minute 
0520/38 to Assistant Chief of Naval Staff et al. dated 14 
May 1938. 
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airpower made by advocates243 of the air and the attention 
the issue received in the popular press. 24 In this regard, 
demonstrations such as Brigadier General William Mitchell's 
against the former German battleship Ostfriesland 245 in 1921, 
and the Royal Air Force test against HMS Superb 246 in 1922 
generated more heat than light in the debate over the 
vulnerability of the capital ship, and a contemporary 
witness could write: 
In the forenoon all captains & Flag Officers 
came aboard to witness a film of the sinking 
of various ex-German ships by American 
bombing aeroplanes, which we had seen the 
previous evening. Considering the height at 
which the machines apparently flew, & the 
fact that their targets were at anchor it 
struck one that air bombs are not so 
alarming and dangerous for a ship as the 
Press so frequently points out, as it took 
a considerable time (1) for any hits to be 
secured & (2) for the ship to sink after 
several hits had been obtained. 247 
Confusing such assessments was that any calculation on the 
air threat facing heavy ships was subject to continuous 
alteration, as the technology of both aircraft and their 
243Amongst the advocates were William Mitchell, Winged 
Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air 
Power, Economic and Military (New York: Dover Publications, 
1988) and Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air 
(Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983). 
244Though he witnessed the experiment that the U. S. 
Navy carried out in October 1920, it was not until a London 
newspaper published a photograph of the USS Indiana as a 
twisted wreck and the story caused a sensation in America 
did Mitchell press for having the Army Air Service conduct 
a test with live ordnance. See Maurer Maurer, Aviation in 
the U. 3. Army, 1919-1939 (Washington: Officer of Air Force 
History, 1987), p. 115. 
245Commissioned 1911, armed with twelve 12-inch guns, 
and of 22,400 tons displacement. 
"'Commissioned 1909, armed with ten 12-inch guns, and 
of 22,000 tons displacement. 
247Journal entry dated 8 July 1922, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
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weapons evolved. Further, the argument was conducted in 
the abstract without references to a specific enemy threat 
or the presumed theatre of action. For its part, the Royal 
Air Force in 1923 believed that: 
(a) An attack on a fleet at sea by fleet 
aircraft at night is not at present a 
practicable proposition. 
(b) An attack on a fleet at sea by aircraft 
based on shore is a feasible proposition 
under certain conditions, but the 
opportunity is not likely to occur 
frequently, and will probably be of a 
fleeting nature. 
(c) An attack on a fleet in harbour by 
fleet aircraft is a practicable proposition 
provided the attack is arranged so that 
aircraft can either return to carrier in 
daylight or fly back to their own base. 
(d) An attack on a fleet in a harbour by an 
aircraft based on shore represents an ideal 
form of attack, and, if carried out by 
aircraft based at a distance from their 
objective and utilising an advanced 
refuelling base, would be an impossible type 
of attack to counter. 248 
Moreover, in kind, an attack from land-based aircraft was 
viewed as a more distinct threat than an attack from an 
opposing fleet air arm. In the case of the former, 
airfields were likely to be more numerous than carriers and 
it would be extremely difficult for the Navy's own limited 
air arm to strike at such fields. 249 
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force conducted tests to 
estimate the threat from the air. Those tests, in addition 
to the Superb test mentioned previously, included low, 
medium, and high altitude bombing, and the risk of fighter 
sweeps against the lightly-protected bridge areas of 
capital ships. Tests were conducted against ships operated 
under wireless remote control, such as the pre-dreadnought 
248ADM 1/8726/132, Air Staff memorandum No. 7 of May 1923. 
249ADM 1/9007/79, Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers letter 
No. A. C843/2 to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet dated 2 
March 1934. 
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HMS Actamemnon and the destroyer HMS Opportune. In 
addition, a full scale replica of Hood operated by 
Excellent, the gunnery training establishment, was employed 
in the bombing experiments conducted from late 1921 through 
August 1922.250 Controversy surrounded the results as, of 
necessity, the attacks could not be actively countered, and 
the aircraft violated the rules governing the test 
programme. 25' It was generally accepted, however, that 
improved armour protection must be provided to bridge 
personnel to reduce the risks from aircraft strafing 
attacks and that the best defence was an aggressive offence 
to forestall such strikes in the first instance. 252 The 
Admiralty's Gunnery Division concluded that a reasonable 
assessment must be that the accuracy of high altitude 
bombing was at least as accurate as long-range naval 
gunnery. 253 A concession of sorts, perhaps, but the Chief 
of the Air Staff stressed that the effectiveness of bombing 
did not depend entirely upon achieving direct hits. 
"It is true, " said Trenchard, "that the 
percentage of direct hits in high bombing at 
the last Agamemnon trials was five per cent, 
but if close misses are counted the 
percentage was eighteen. It is on close 
misses we depend to sink ships (for) it is 
against the unprotected bottom that the 
force of the delayed action bomb develops. 254 
... ADM 1/8613/177, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth minute 
2541/017 dated 21 September 1921 and Commanding Officer, 
Excellent letter No. S. 26 to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth 
dated 24 August 1922. 
251ADM 1/8613/177, Commanding Officer, Excellent letter 
No. S. 26 to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth dated 24 August 
1922. 
252ADM 1/8613/177, Director of Gunnery Division un- 
numbered minute dated 11 September 1922. During the tests, 
mannequins had been placed in selected exposed positions 
and suffered casualties of 20%. 
253ADM 1/8624/79, Director of Gunnery Division un- 
numbered minute dated 5 September 1922. 
254Hugh Trenchard, cited in Andrew Boyle, Trenchard 
(London: Collins, 1962), p. 473. 
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Agamemnon was bombed again in 1923 and, in 1924, by three 
flights of three aircraft each having flown 150 miles to 
reach their objective. 255 As the bombing results against 
Agamemnon were significantly poorer in 1924 than in 1923, 
the Gunnery Division assessment cited the greater distance 
travelled by the attacking aeroplanes as a contributing 
factor. 256 Further tests were carried out in 1924 with 
Monarch, from 1929 with Centurion, 151 and in 1932 with 
Marlborough acting as the target ships. 258 The results of 
the last named demonstration, at least to one naval air 
officer serving in Courageous, showed that surface forces 
were not yet at serious risk when he wrote: 
With regard to all this talk about the 
fleet being destroyed by bombs, I think the 
trials on the Marlborough proved it all to 
be sheer nonsense. They of course are 
absolutely secret. 259 
The threat from the air became more than just an 
abstract issue during the Abyssinian Crisis, and the 
deficiency in the fleet's air defences led directly to the 
development of the anti-aircraft cruiser. Yet the risk and 
palliative had long been recognised within the fleet. 
Following exercises conducted in June 1924 that saw torpedo 
aircraft launch a series of successful attacks against the 
battleships Resolution260 and Royal Oak, Rear Admiral W. H. 
255ADM 186/263, 'C. B. 977, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 
1924, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division dated April 
1925. 
256Ibid. 
, p. 52. 
257Till, 'Impact of Airpower on the Royal Navy in the 
1920s, ' p. 70. 
258Burt, British Battleships of World War ne, p. 206. 
259Lieutenant Crichton letter to Roger Keyes, MP dated 
25 February 1936, Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Vol. II, pp. 
349-350. 
260Commissioned 1916; details as per Royal Sovereign. 
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D. Boyle261 had recommended that a special 
screening cruiser be developed for fleet use to deal with 
the air threat. 262 Boyle's recommendation was not seconded 
by Admiral Oliver, the Atlantic Fleet commander who wrote 
to the Admiralty that: 
While I concur that this type of craft 
would be most useful in war time, I do not 
consider that the cost involved in laying 
them down in peace would be justified, and 
I think it probable that the majority of 
Flag officers would prefer to have a 
corresponding value in cruisers, destroyers 
and aircraft. 263 
In addition to the practical demonstrations previously 
discussed, the Service twice chartered a Naval Anti- 
Aircraft Gunnery Committee to analyze the nature and extent 
of the air threat and the equipage necessary to counter the 
projected level of attack. The first committee, under 
Usborne, met from 1919-1921 with the broad remit to 
determine: 
(1) What forms of aerial attack may be 
expected by ships generally, and which of 
these need to be specifically countered by 
the gun from the ship. 
(2) What are the most suitable weapons 
for adoption in the navy for operations 
against hostile aircraft. 
(3) In what numbers should anti- 
aircraft weapons be allocated to H. M. ships 
of various classes, and what should be the 
calibre in each class. 
(4) What systems or methods of control 
must be adopted to enable these weapons to 
261Sir William Henry Dudley Boyle, later Admiral of the 
Fleet the Earl of Cork and Orrey (1873-1967). Commanding 
Officer, Repulse (1917-1918) and Tiger (1919-1921); Rear 
Admiral, First Battle Squadron (1924-1925); Rear Admiral, 
Second Battle Squadron (1925); Vice Admiral Commanding, 
Reserve Fleet (1928); Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (1933- 
1935); Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (1937-1939). 
262ADM 1/8685/151, Rear Admiral, Second Battle Squadron 
letter No. 533/1. to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
dated 3 February 1925. 
263ADM 1/8685/151, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
letter No. 682/A. F. 1. to Admiralty dated 15 April 1925. 
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be used to the greatest advantage. 
(5) What apparatus, and what grouping 
of weapons are recommended to carry out the 
recommendations made in reply to (4), 
observing that every endeavour is to be made 
to use existing apparatus. 
(6) In brief, what systems and what 
apparatus other than those recommended for 
adoption under (3) and (4) have been 
considered by the committee, and why 
rejected. 
(7) What future developments of aerial 
attack are foreseen, and what 
recommendations are made with a view to the 
navy keeping abreast of, and combating them. 
(8) What systems of training in 
shooting and control should be given to 
officers and men, and what targets are most 
suitable for carrying out this training. 264 
Having reviewed the various threats in extant, the 
committee concluded that the torpedo-carrying aeroplane was 
the greatest threat to the 'battlefleet, 265 and that an 
interim response was the immediate development of a 
temporary system for the control of anti-aircraft fire in 
capital ships. 266 This measure was largely completed by 1928 
when the Standard Temporary System (STS) was fitted in all 
capital ships save the Iron Duke-class. 26' STS was viewed 
as only a stopgap fire control measure, and the High Angle 
Control System (HACS) was the promised solution to 
developing effective anti-aircraft fire. In 1929, Rodney, 
Revenge, and Malaya became the first heavy ships to be 
fitted with HACS. 268 
264ADM 186/244, 'C. B. 1561, ' p. 77. 
265ADM 186/245, 'C. B. 1577, Final report Naval Anti- 
Aircraft Gunnery Committee, ' dated 18 June 1921, p. 13. 
266Ibid. 
, p. 25. 
267ADM 186/289, T. B. 3001/27, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1927, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division 
dated March 1928, p. 54. 
268ADM 186/298, 'C. B. 3001/29, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1929, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division dated March 1930. 
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A second sitting of the Naval Anti-Aircraft Gunnery 
Committee began in October 1931.169 It reviewed at length 
the possible forms of attack (i. e., precision bombing, dive 
bombing, torpedo, gas, and 'B' bombing27'), the performance 
of existing aircraft, calculated the time available for a 
ship to defeat such attacks, and weighed the benefits of 
defensive manoeuvring. 27' In reaching its conclusions, the 
committee drew upon the record of recent fleet exercises, 
and if a criticism can be levelled against its proceedings, 
it is that it sought to define the measures to defeat such 
attacks. outright rather than ensuring the survivability of 
the surface warship. By 1933 the dive bomber was viewed 
with increasing concern, and the Service's steps to counter 
such an attack were hampered by the lack of a suitable 
target to replicate such a threat. 272 
Damage Control. As it is easier to provide greater 
reserve buoyancy in a larger vessel, the survivability of 
capital ships was not helped by the artificial tonnage 
limitations imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty. The 
defensive measures of watertight sub-division, anti-torpedo 
bulges, double bottoms, horizontal armour, ' and redundant 
machinery all made demands on ship size as measured in 
displacement, and one writer of the period could claim 
that: 
From a purely naval standpoint we should do 
better with no artificial limit, that is, 
with freedom to build to absolute standards. 
Nevertheless, a 35,000 ton ship is far from 
269ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915. ' 
270Buoyant bomb. An attack where the diving aircraft 
bombed short of the target with the detonation occurring 
beneath the vessel's bottom. See ADM 186/560, 'C. B. 
3003(26), ' p. 31. 
271ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915. ' 
272ADM 186/323, 'C. B. 3001/34, Progress In Naval 
Gunnery, 1934 Edition, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training 




In the event that damage was sustained below the waterline, 
the question arose whether it was advisable to perform 
counter-flooding to reduce the degree of list present as a 
part of a ship's damage control actions. ' In 1937, an 
understanding of the trade-off between reserve buoyancy and 
the amount of list acceptable in a ship was inexact, at 
best, but a lesson drawn from the loss of Audacious during 
the 1914-1918 war was that counter-flooding was not 
desired. The body established to investigate and recommend 
changes in the Service's damage control procedures noted 
that Audacious: 
sank owing to damage from a mine which 
flooded her port engine room and other 
compartments. After the explosion she 
assumed a list which was partially corrected 
by the immediate counter-flooding of a few 
compartments. The amount of water admitted 
was comparatively small, but it was 
unnecessary and added nothing to her safety. 
Finally, when she had lost her freeboard 
aft, the sea broke over the quarter-deck, 
and forced its way below through hatches and 
ventilators, a condition which was 
undoubtedly aggravated by the loss of 
buoyancy and freeboard caused by voluntary 
flooding. 274 
Thus, during the interwar period it was the case that a larger 
ship was a more survivable ship. 
The Threat Evaluated. There was a point beyond which 
the capital ship could not be expected to meet all forms of 
256.211 
'Major, ' 'Size of Capital Ships, ' Naval Review, p. 
274ADM 1/9188, 'Report of the Committee on Damage 
Control, ' dated October 1937. Of the reasons cited for the 
loss of HMS Prince of Wales in December 1941, it was noted 
that the failure to counter-flood resulted in many of the 
secondary guns not being able to train; see Second Bucknill 
Committee Report dated 25 April 1942, Binney Papers, 
IWM/PP/MCR/95. This conclusion is disputed in 'B. R. 
1736(8) (48), Battle Summary No. 14, Loss of H. M. Ships 
Prince of Wales and Repulse 10th December 1941, ' Admiralty, 
Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, p. 14. 
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attack successfully by itself. In this, there was nothing 
that was new. Jellicoe during the late war had fought to 
retain his significant destroyer forces in the face of the 
growing submarine threat to merchant shipping. What was 
new was the proliferation of such threats. Indicative of 
this trend, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean warned 
that: 
The most serious form of attack on the 
British main fleet are considered to be 
those from the air, and from the submarine 
by day, and in a lesser degree from 
destroyers by night. Against submarines the 
A/S destroyer is the only antidote; against 
the other forms of attack it is believed 
that a light fleet cruiser can be 
constructed that will be effective.... It is 
considered imperative to strengthen the A/A 
defence of the battlefleet - the core of 
strength. This is being done as far as 
possible in the battleships themselves, but 
it is not considered that this will be 
enough, and reinforcement from ancillary 
vessels is required... 1275 
Even the most conservative of naval officers 
recognised that the capital ship was vulnerable to the 
myriad threats facing the surface fleet, and, indeed, the 
Royal Navy lost no fewer than eleven battleships and three 
battle cruisers in the period up to October 1918.276 When 
the old battleship HMS Britannia was sunk by submarine UB- 
50 just two days before the Armistice, no fewer than twelve 
capital ships had been lost during the war to various 
causes. 277 With the rise of submarines and aircraft, naval 
275ADM 1/8828/123/35, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean 
to Admiralty letter No. 05/429 dated 3 January 1935. A/S 
refers to anti-submarine while A/A refers to anti-aircraft. 
276From an official summary of Allied losses through 
October 1918, Admiral Sir Walter Henry Cowan Papers, 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/COW/6. 
277 Halpern, Naval History of World War I, p. 401. The 
ships lost and their causes were, by submarine: Britannia, 
HMS Formidable, Triumph, Majestic, and HMS Cornwallis; by 
surface naval gunfire: Queen Mme, Invincible, and 
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warfare had moved into the realm of the three dimensional; 
a fact that was appreciated in 1914, even if the exact risk 
was unknown. Following the war, the chief threats facing 
capital ships were mines, torpedoes, shell fire, bombs, 
and, theoretically, ramming . 
278 
Mines and torpedoes could be delivered by air, 
surface, or subsurface means whilst shell fire could come 
from other warships or from coastal artillery batteries. 
Armour-piercing shells were the greatest danger to the ship 
itself in gun actions, though the risk of chemical attack 
was viewed with increasing alarm. While Royal Navy ships 
had not experienced chemical attack during the war the risk 
was viewed seriously enough that training in defensive 
measures was adopted by the early 1920's. 279 Battle drill 
with gas masks was a regular feature in shipboard 
evolutions, 280 and boards, coated with a special paint to 
Indefatigable; by mine: Audacious, HMS Russell and HMS King 
Edward VII; by the combined effects of mine and shore 
gunfire: Irrestible and Ocean; by surface torpedo attack: 
Goliath; and by internal explosion: HMS Bulwark and HMS 
Vanguard. 
278The ram, for a time, had been seen as a primary 
weapon in naval warfare. Its demise was due to the growing 
lethality of the gun, the mine, and the torpedo. Hood was 
the first British dreadnought type ship to be built with a 
raked bow; see James Dolby, The Steel Nav :A History in 
Silhouette 1860-1963 (London: MacDonald, 1962), p. 19. See 
Hughes, Fleet Tactics for a modern assessment of the ram. 
"'While no direct evidence has been found that the 
Royal Navy experienced a chemical attack at sea attack 
during the late war, ADM 1/8693/269 contains extracts of a 
1923 article published in Proceedings describing a German 
chemical attack against the flotilla leader HMS Botha off 
the Belgian coast in 1917. The accompanying minutes do not 
confirm the event. 
280See Lambert Journal, entry dated 11 October 1922, 
Lambert Papers, IWM/90/19/1 and Journal entry dated 27 May 
1927, Drage Papers, IWM/2/3/82. As Lambert makes clear, 
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detect the presence of persistent agents, were affixed to 
key locations when attack was thought probable. 281 The 
Service expected that the next naval war would be fought in 
a chemical environment, and that individual protective 
measures would not be sufficient. Indeed, the hindrance 
that fire control personnel faced in attempting their 
duties whilst encumbered with respirators resulted in the 
adoption of collective measures. The Greenwich Air 
Purifier System, fitted in all heavy ships, allowed 
Transmitting Station personnel in battle cruisers and 
Torpedo and High Angle control personnel in battleships to 
work free of respirators. 282 The expectation that naval 
warfare would be fought in a chemical environment has 
received too little attention by postwar historians. This 
expectation helps explain the Royal Navy's view that the 
battlefleet was still central to naval power and that the' 
carrier was a supporting arm. Heavy ships, not faced with 
the problem of moving their main weapon from a protected 
magazine to an exposed deck, were more easily defended and 
fought in the presence of chemical weapons than an aircraft 
carrier. 
The vulnerability of the capital ship to the torpedo, 
whether delivered by air, submarine, or another warship was 
amply demonstrated on a regular basis in fleet exercises. 
If anything, though, these evolutions tended to minimise 
the actual damage that would be inflicted in war as 
Beaufoy-Brown noted in an exercise during the spring of 
1928: 
the masks used by the Royal Navy afforded no protection 
against carbon monoxide poisoning. Thus, a reasonable 
assumption is that when worn they were primarily meant as 
a defensive measure to counter the potential effects of 
mustard and phosgene gases and not for fire suppression. 
281See HMS Eagle War Order dated 1 May 1937, Oliver- 
Bellasis Papers, NMM/BEL/152. 
282ADM 186/82, T. B. 3021, ' p. 9 and ADM 186/270, 'C. B. 
981, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 1925, ' Admiralty, Naval 
Staff, Gunnery Division dated April 1926, p. 15. 
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Red Fleet was attacked by a flight of 
torpedo planes from Furious. These planes 
delivered their attack from behind a smoke 
screen which had been laid by other 
aeroplanes. "Nelson" was hit by several 
torpedoes and was therefore compelled to 
reduce speed from 15 knots to 11% knots. 283 
As the Royal Navy had ample opportunity to observe the 
lethality of the torpedo against its capital ships during 
the late war, the mere loss of 312 knots assessed to Nelson 
raises questions about the scripting of fleet exercises 
that will be addressed in due course. Invariably, the 
Royal Navy could not escape a degree of mirror imaging in 
assessing any threat against the capital ship based on its 
own improving offensive capabilities. This was especially 
true of the underwater threat. While it believed itself to 
be ahead of its rivals in developing innovation in 
underwater warfare, it was not complacent enough to assume 
that the other naval powers were idle in their endeavours. 
During the period the Royal Navy developed a gyroscopically 
controllable torpedo dubbed the 'W' torpedo from the zig- 
zag pattern that it ran after running a predetermined 
straight course, 284 and the magnetic firing pistol. 285 The 
latter device sought to maximise the effectiveness of an 
underwater detonation by taking advantage of the 'water- 
hammer effect' caused when an explosion occurred removed 
from the hull proper--particularly if detonation were 
achieved directly beneath the unprotected area of the 
ship's bottom. 286 These developments and a Naval 
283Journal entry dated 24 May 1928, Beaufoy-Brown 
Papers, LHCMA. 
284ADM 186/444, 'C. B. 0975, Progress in Torpedo, Mining, 
Anti-Submarine, and in Allied Subjects, 1924, ' Admiralty, 
Naval Staff, Torpedo Division dated April 1925, p. 6. 
285ADM 1/9354, Director of Tactical Division un-numbered 
minute dated 4 April 1933. 
286Ibid. Till records that the 'water-hammer effect' 
was an issue of the greatest contention between the Air and 
Naval Staffs in assessing the effectiveness of high level 
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Intelligence assessment that the Japanese were probably 
developing wireless-controlled and gliding torpedoes 
highlight the fact that the underwater threat was viewed as 
the greatest of risks. "' 
During the middle of the 1930's, the Service continued 
to view the capital ship as its primary offensiv e weapon. 
The ability of heavy ships to deal effectively with the 
various threats posed to them therefore was vital not only 
in itself, but for the perceived continuing viability of 
seapower. Accordingly, it is worth quoting at length an 
Admiralty assessment: 
6. While all weapons will bear their 
part in the defeat of the enemy, British 
tactics aim primarily at so placing the 
battlefleet in action that Gunnery 
superiority is assured and the destruction 
of the enemy thereby achieved. 
To obtain this result it is 
imperative that adequate provision be made 
to give the battlefleet security from those 
weapons which can prevent it from reaching 
and retaining the desired position. These 
weapons are principally, the submarine, the 
destroyer and aircraft. 
7. It is Their Lordships' opinion that 
modern developments in detection devices and 
the tactics of anti-submarine screens can 
provide reasonable security from the 
submarine. The efficiency of the secondary 
armaments of the capital ships and the power 
of our own flotillas in counter-attack give 
reasonable security from destroyer attacks 
by day, and the experience that has been 
gained in night screening and the method of 
counter-attack now developed go far to limit 
this threat by night. 
8. Defence against air attack, 
however, is not yet assured, and our 
bombing. As the same effect was central to the 
effectiveness of magnetic torpedoes and influence mines, a 
generous interpretation is that the Service entertained 
mixed views on the lethality of the effect. See Till, 'The 
Impact of Airpower on the Royal Navy in the 1920s, ' p. 92. 
287ADM 1/9649, Naval Intelligence Directorate minute 
0520/38 to Assistant Chief of Naval Staff et al. dated 14 
May 1938. 
184 
measures to counteract it are incomplete. 
It is as least possible that by use of his 
forces an enemy might prevent or delay 
attainment of our tactical object. Unless 
we have not only reliable A. A. defence and 
the means of counter-attacking in the air 
our ships run the risk of continual bombing 
attack. 288 
In establishing the Naval Anti-Aircraft Gunnery 
Committee in 1919, the Service recognised at an early date 
the potential risk. This should not come as a surprise; 
the Royal Navy had been at the forefront in the development 
of naval aviation. Its response on the surface may appear 
superficial and inadequate. Though it took immediate steps 
to implement STS and sought a more permanent solution with 
HACS, it thought initially in terms of countering an attack 
by a single aircraft. 28' Certainly, during live fire anti- 
aircraft practices it was the case that it frequently dealt 
with attacks by only a single target. Yet, in its defence, 
it must be admitted that before a large-scale air raid 
could be mastered, it had to perfect the means of dealing 
with the most basic of attacks. Moreover, just as the Air 
Ministry was taxed with providing sufficient targets, the 
Admiralty was constrained in its funding for more than a 
single HACS per ship. The first requirement was to field 
a system and gain experience on the widest possible basis. 
By 1931, the Service felt confident enough and financially 
able to provide a second HACS for its capital ships. 29° 
Still, defeating an air attack required more than just 
material means. By 1935, it was concluded that a dedicated 
Air Defence Officer responsible for directing a ship's 
anti-aircraft fire was a requirement in all capital ships, 
288ADM 1/9007/79, Admiralty letter No. M. 03500/33 to 
Commanders-in Chief, Mediterranean and Home Fleets dated 20 
February 1934. 
289ADM 186/309, 'C. B. 3001/31, ' p. 63. 
29OIbid. 
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aircraft carriers, and cruisers '211 and, 
in 1936 this 
tentative organisation was increased by the addition of an 
assistant. 292 
The Reconstruction of Capital Ships during the 
Interwar Era. Forced by treaty and the Naval Estimates to 
forego much new construction, the Service settled upon a 
programme of reconstruction to enhance the effectiveness of 
capital ships. With only twelve of its capital ships 
modernised, the programme, in the end, was unable to make 
good the deficiencies in all heavy ships prior to the 
outbreak of war in 1939, and, even in those ships rebuilt, 
there were limits to what could be achieved. 293 On this last 
point, an observation by the Admiralty's Tactical Division 
was particularly telling when it noted: 
Protection, in particular, is very 
difficult to add to a ship at a later date; 
and this is the present situation in regard 
to the great majority of the capital ships, 
and all the 8" cruisers of our fleet at the 
present time; they are inadequately 
protected and (anyhow in the case of the 
battleships) we cannot remedy the 
situation. 294 
The Tactical Division's assessment continued with the 
observation that the threats facing the heavy ships of the 
Navy were not so similarly constrained and continued its 
warning by advising that: 
Considerable progress must be expected 
in various directions during the above 
period, e. g., attack from the air will 
probably develop considerably, in extent and 
technique. Attack will be made in low 
visibility and at night; high bombing with 
2000 lb. bombs and the development of "B" 
bombing may be expected. In underwater 
291ADM 186/328, 'C. B. 3001/35, ' p. 6. 
292ADM 186/338, T. B. 3001/36, ' p. 61. 
"'Schofield, British Sea Power, p. 141. 
294ADM 1/9354, Director of Tactical Division un-numbered 
minute dated 4 April 1933. 
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attack, the magnetic pistol will threaten 
the (at present) unprotected bottoms of 
ships, and the effect of near misses by big 
bombs will have to be considered. Extreme 
range gunfire has already, with the aid of 
aircraft spotting, become accepted policy in 
the American fleet. 295 
The reconstruction programme touched upon almost every 
facet of a capital ship. The maximum elevation of main 
turrets was increased to enhance a ship's offensive 
potential, whilst its defensive attributes were 
strengthened through the addition of bulges to the hull. 
The reconstruction of a heavy ship resulted in a host of 
changes of a more mundane nature that were necessary, if 
the battleship and battle cruiser were to operate 
effectively in what was viewed as the likely environment of 
the next naval war. To this end, the armoured hatches 
connecting passageways to compartments and decks were 
enlarged to allow personnel encumbered with gas masks to 
pass. 296 
Summary. For the Royal Navy, the 1919-1939 period was 
a time of retrenchment, consolidation, and, finally, 
growth. This pattern of experience is no more evident than 
in the changing fortunes of its heavy ships. If the 
Service experienced, for the most part, a general hiatus in 
the construction of new capital ships, the Navy still 
attempted to ensure the offensive effectiveness of the 
battleship and battle cruiser through a programme of 
limited reconstruction. It continued to research, test and 
develop the technology of the capital ship's primary weapon 
system--the large calibre naval rifle. Moreover, it sought 
to augment the ability of heavy ships to handle aircraft 
even if the aircraft themselves were not always embarked 
due to financial constraints. There were differences of 
opinion within the Service on the need and wisdom to embark 
z9sIbid. 
296Journal entry 5 December 1927, Haggard Papers, 
IWM/85/21/3. 
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aircraft, maintaining a torpedo armament, the desired range 
at which a fleet engagement should take place, and on the 
number of personnel required to man the ships. These 
arguments were never resolved during the period. The 
Service's approach, then, was to opt for a middle course 
and take no decision that was irrevocable. Guns and shells 
were therefore modified to allow for fire at longer ranges, 
though the Service thought increasingly in terms of a fleet 
engagement that differed little in distance than that 
experienced at Jutland. Torpedoes were not fitted to the 
latter King George V-class battleships, yet they were 
retained in her predecessors. 
In the end, due to the strictures of the several naval 
treaties, financial constraint, and its requirement to 
operate on a global basis, there were limits in the 
material advances that the Service could pursue in capital 
ship technology. Any improvements in the effectiveness of 
the capital ship in the face of such limits had perforce to 
come from within. Thus, the balance of this study will 
examine British naval strategy, operations, the tactical 
doctrine of the Royal Navy during the 1919-1939 era and the 




BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY OF 
THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
... 
if we wait till Japan shows a warlike 
tendency before making our essential 
preparations she will never allow us to 
complete them. ' 
Commander Bertram Watson2 
If there is a naval war between Great 
Britain and Germany during the next ten 
years, we shall control German overseas 
communications by exactly the same means as 
we did in the last war. ' 
A. C. Bell 
A strategical plan which fails to 
provide means for tactical success is 
foredoomed to failure... 4 
'Naval War Manual, 1925' 
... we should have lost the battle of Trafalgar on a Staff Appreciation ... 
I 
Chatfield 
Viscount Jellicoe's survey of individual Dominion and 
'Plans Division minute dated 23 May 1925, Richmond 
Papers, NMM/RIC/7/3a. 
2Later Vice Admiral Bertram Chalmers Watson (1887- 
1976); Commanding Officer, Valiant (1933-1934); Chairman, 
Damage Control Committee (1937). 
3A. C. Bell, Sea Power and the Next War (London: 
Longmans Green and Co., 1938), p. 133. 
'ADM 186/66, 'C. B. 973, Naval War Manual, 1925, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division 
dated October 1925, p. 5. 
5Chatfield cited in Arthur Marder, Old Friends, New 
Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy 
Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981), p. 51. 
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Commonwealth naval requirements commented upon in the 
Introduction was handicapped by the fact that the strategy 
that his review was to support was not defined beforehand. 
Writing to the First Lord, Jellicoe observed: 
it is very difficult to formulate proposals 
of naval defence without basing them on the 
existence of a potential enemy, and with the 
present state of the world it is a delicate 
matter to select such a potential enemy, but 
the safety of our sea communications is 
vital to the very existence of the Empire, 
and it is undoubtedly essential that we 
should run no risks in this respect. ' 
Thus, in a sense, Jellicoe's survey was putting the 
requirements' cart before the policy horse. His answer to 
this dilemma was to define the naval strategy to be pursued 
based on his own assessment of the threat facing the 
British Empire and to assume that any changes of policy his 
proposals might require would be forthcoming. Ultimately, 
the failure of the Admiralty to define the strategic 
parameters guiding the Jellicoe mission detracted from an 
otherwise excellent survey and doomed its findings when 
reported. 7 It is, therefore, appropriate to examine British 
naval strategy of the 1919-1939 period and the maritime 
threat that it sought to counter. First, a summary of the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare is 
necessary. 
A Hierarchical Structure of Warfare. Military 
activity is complex, heterogeneous, and has both vertical 
6Jellicoe to First Lord letter dated 3 March 1919 cited 
in A. Temple Patterson, ed., The Jellicoe Papers: 
Selections from the private and personal correspondence of 
Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe, Volume II, 1916-1935 
(London: Sp(; ttiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., 1968), pp. 290- 
291. 
7Based on the instructions provided by the Admiralty, 
which tasked Jellicoe to evaluate the administrative and 
organisational structure of the several Dominion navies, it 
can be argued that the Admiral exceeded his brief. See 
Admiralty letter M. 026163 dated 23 December 1918, Captain 
Stephen W. Roskill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, 
ROSK/7/41. 
190 
and horizontal dimensions. 8 At the highest level, strategy 
is concerned withthe employment of the military forces of a nation 
or coalition to achieve objectives of policy-' It defines 
goals, assigns forces to a given theatre of operations, and 
establishes the limits of their use»° By its nature, 
strategy is concerned with the broadest of issues and must 
weigh the competing demands for military forces from 
separate theatres of operations. At a step removed, the 
operational level is concerned with the planning and conduct of a 
campaign in a defined geographic theatre in furtherance of the overall 
strategic objective. Finally, the tactical level is 
concerned with the actual engagement of military forces in 
battle. " It must be noted that such an ordering of warfare 
owes much to military thinking and the expansion of the 
battlefield. 12 This is particularly the case in arguing for 
an operational level in naval warfare. 13 During the period 
in question, the Admiralty, unlike the Air Ministry and War 
Office, was both an administrative and operational 
headquarters. 14 As such, it was organised along staff lines 
that reflected this hierarchy of warfare. Strategy was the 
preserve of the Plans Division, the operational tier 
8Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. 
Watman, 'The Effectiveness of Military Organizations, ' 
Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., Military 
Effectiveness, Volume I: The First World War (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988), p. 2. 
9United States Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, 
1986, p. 9. 
'°Ibid. 
"Ibid., p. 10. 
12 Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 
60-65. 
"Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, 'Reflections, ' 
Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seagower and 
Strateav (London: Tri-Service Press, 1989), p. 378. 
14Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World 
War, Volume I, p. 12. 
191 
coincided with the Operations Division, and the lowest rung 
of the hierarchy corresponded with the Tactical Division. 
Yet, the fleet was both an operational entity and a 
tactical formation, and so the Service's organisational 
structure implied both a confirmation and negation of the 
hierarchy of warfare. Nevertheless, conceptually, such a 
structuring offers a useful guide to understanding that the 
focus of military activity differs based on considerations 
of scale, duration, threat, and locale. 
Naval Strateav. From a historical perspective, a 
single definition of naval strategy does not exist. 
Rather, alternative strategies have arisen from time to 
time. Mahan in his most famous treatise did not state a 
new concept of naval strategy, but accepted an existing 
definition where '"Naval strategy has for its end to found, 
support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea 
power of a country. ii15 Naval strategy for Mahan was much 
broader than a military phenomenon but also considered a 
nation's mercantile affairs as reflected in its seaborne 
trade and merchant marine. Thus, what he aimed for was a 
coherent maritime strategy. Corbett noted that the 'object 
of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly 
either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the 
enemy from securing it. i16 He continued by noting that: 
It is this state of dispute with which naval 
strategy is most nearly concerned, for when 
the command is lost or won pure naval 
strategy comes to an end. '7 
Corbett's definition was more circumspect than that of 
Mahan and a deliberate attempt to expand Clausewitz's 
15A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 
1660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), p. 89. 
16Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 
Stratecrv (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 91. 
17Ibid. 
192 
general theory of war to a maritime environment. '8 A 
totally different view of naval strategy is offered by 
Wegener. He believed that: 
Naval strategy always is geographical [by 
nature] tied to the geographical-strategic 
position. What one generally likes to term 
"strategy" in professional naval literature 
is simply theatre operations that slide into 
battle tactics upon contact with the enemy. 
Therefore: naval strategy is the 
science of geographical position, its 
changes, and its stagnation with regard to 
trade routes. Offensive strategy is the 
acquisition of a [superior] geographical 
position; defensive strategy the stagnation 
of a geographical position. 19 
Wegener argues, elsewhere, that because the above is the 
case, a battlefleet stationed in the Caspian Sea would be 
an absurdity. 2° 
A more recent definition of maritime strategy has been 
provided by Wylie. Accepting that a critical aspect of 
maritime strategy is securing control of the sea, he states 
that the ultimate objective is to influence events on land. 
Maritime strategy therefore ultimately consists of the 
establishment of control of the sea, and the exploitation 
of the control of the sea toward establishment of control 
on the land. 121 Finally, Tirpitz once remarked that 'the 
selection of a ship design in peace-time is applied naval 
'8Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
"Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 31. Editor's 
insertion. 
20Ibid. 
, p. 200. 
2'J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of 
Power Control (Sydney: Australian Naval Institute Press, 
1967), p. 39. 
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strategy. '22 This was more than a platitude, and highlights 
that a ship is built to a specified design that defines 
where it can operate, the threat it can expect, and the 
operational purpose for which it was conceived. However, 
whether one argues for a maritime or a naval strategy, it 
is important to distinguish between strategy as an 
objective and strategy as an approach, and, in its latter 
manifestation, varying approaches have been adopted. 
British naval planners of the interwar period pursued 
alternate naval strategies primarily because the cost of 
pursuing a single strategy was beyond their means. A 
review of these strategies and the place of the capital 
ship in supporting them follows. 
Command of the Sea and Sea Control. As the term 
implies, a naval strategy based on command of the sea seeks 
to dominate a broad expanse of water to one's own advantage 
whilst conversely denying such advantage to an enemy 
maritime power. 23 Sea control implies an advantage that is 
more restricted in place and duration. Rarely, if ever, 
though, has a navy that enjoyed command of the sea been 
able to operate without any regard to threat--the sinking 
of the pre-dreadnought Britannia in November 1918 and the 
cruiser USS Indianapolis in July 1945, at times when both 
the Royal Navy and the United States Navy possessed command 
of the sea in its purest sense, are evidence of this point. 
For a navy to aspire to such a strategy many prerequisites 
are necessary, and some, such as geography, may make it 
impossible even if others are met. Of the remaining 
conditions, a strong economy is essential to allow 
sufficient resources to be applied. Clark notes that a 
command of the sea strategy implies that a navy can either 
22Tirpitz cited in Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's 
Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet 
(Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1992), p. 128. 
23Brodie, Guide to Naval Strategy, p. 85. 
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develop or acquire maritime technology equal to the task. 24 
This writer accepts the point, but notes also that a navy 
endowed with numerical superiority may be able to obviate 
this requirement. 
Fleet-in-Being. The fleet-in-being and its corollary, 
the 'Risk Theory, ' are most commonly associated with Grand 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and German naval strategy prior 
to the 1914-1918 war. Its purpose is to deny freedom of 
action to an enemy fleet by holding it hostage to the 
covering of the weaker fleet. 25 The fleet-in-being is 
essentially a defensive strategy that fulfills its purpose 
by eschewing battle and simply maintaining its existence, 26 
yet it must present some prospect for battle, lest the 
stronger power reduce its covering force and operate 
elsewhere. Thus, its association with the risk theory and 
the idea that battle may be offered not in the prospect of 
prevailing, but to weaken an adversary to such a degree 
that if defeat is suffered, the naval strategy of the 
stronger power is dangerously compromised. 27 Such a 
strategy implicitly assumes the presence of a third naval 
power hostile to the interests of the stronger fleet and a 
fleet composed of strong surface ships. The inherent flaw 
of the fleet-in-being strategy is that, if war does 
transpire, the weaker naval power will be reluctant to put 
it to the test because the outcome is readily acknowledged. 
It is with this in mind that Weir notes that as a naval 
14Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History 
and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, 1974), p. 7. 
"Guillermo J. Montenegro, 'Alternative Naval 
Strategies, ' Naval War College Review, Volume XLV, Number 
2, Spring 1992, p. 58. 
26Wegener, Naval Strategy, p. 65. 
27Holger Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United 
States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1976), p. 41. 
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strategy it failed utterly for Germany in World War I. 28 
Herwig observes that the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet of 
the 1914-1918 war was the classic example of the fleet-in- 
being. 29 Given its reluctance to engage the High Sea Fleet 
on anything but the most favourable terms (especially after 
Jutland) Herwig's comment would on the surface appear to 
challenge the precept that the fleet-in-being is a strategy 
limited to the weaker naval power. Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that Jutland highlighted serious 
deficiencies of both an operational and material nature in 
the Grand Fleet. Thus, whilst numerically the stronger 
naval power, British naval leadership operated the Grand 
Fleet as though it were the weaker force during 1917. 
Guerre de Course and Sea Denial. A guerre de course 
naval strategy sees the primary attack conducted not 
against an opposing side's naval forces, but against his 
unprotected merchant shipping. 3° Such a strategy serves 
three purposes. First, it causes economic disruption 
through the direct attack of shipping and the dislocation 
that follows as the defending side must either disperse or 
concentrate his merchant marine. Secondly, the defending 
navy invariably expends more resources in defence than the 
opposing force does in offence, and, finally, if 
successfully waged, it denies an adversary use of the sea 
in a positive form as an adjunct to his military 
operations. It is this last measure that particularly 
associates the guerre de course with sea denial. 
Traditionally, such a strategy called for a force of 
cruisers operating independently blessed with adequate 
offensive power, range, and speed. During 1880's France, 
28Gary E. Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The 
Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz 
Era, 1890-1919 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 
210. 
29Holger H. Herwig, 'Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German 
Navy 1888-1918 (London: Ashfield Press, 1991), p. 149. 
30Mahan, Influence of SeaAower, p. 31. 
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a guerre de course naval strategy built around cruisers and 
torpedo boats was favoured by the Jeune Ecole school at the 
expense of a strategy built around the battleship. 31 The 
rise of the submarine and its unrestricted use during the 
First World War increased the operational effectiveness of 
this strategy and reduced the prominence of the cruiser as 
a raider. As such, Germany, while averaging only 28 
submarines at sea at any one time forced, the Allies to 
deploy about 4,000 vessels of various types in anti- 
submarine warfare operations. 32 A guerre de course strategy 
is commonly associated as an approach more appropriate to 
the weaker naval power, as the stronger naval power will 
deny access to the sea for commerce through its command of 
the sea. 33 Yet, this association is inexact at best, and 
the United States Navy's submarine campaign against 
Japanese shipping during the Second World War is proof 
enough that the strategy has value for even the strongest 
of naval powers and can serve as a complement to a command 
of the sea strategy. 
British Interwar Naval Strategy. Given the expanse 
and the varying degrees of development within the British 
Empire, its maritime defence was a daunting task for even 
the strongest of naval powers. Fortunately, if Britain was 
hard-pressed in the immediate aftermath of the 1914-1918 
war, her traditional European rivals, Germany, France, and 
Russia, were, in many respects, in even more difficult 
straits. Outside Europe, matters were more troubling for 
her. Japan and the United States, allies of a kind, had 
31Lawrence Sondhaus, 'Strategy, Tactics, and the 
Politics of Penury: The Austro-Hungarian Navy and the Jeune 
Ecole, ' The Journal of Military History, Volume 56, Number, 
4, October 1992, p. 587. 
32ADM 116/2150, 'Submarine Notes, ' undated and un- 
numbered typescript. 
33Robert W. H. McKillip, 'Undermining Technology by 
Strategy: Resolving the Trade Protection Dilemma of 1917, ' 
Naval War College Review, Volume XLIV, Number 3, Summer 
1991, p. 35. 
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interests, particularly commercial, that diverged from 
those of Britain, and, more importantly, were in direct 
contention with each other. Thus, the initial British 
strategic dilemma was not so much the prospect of a direct 
confrontation either with the United States or with Japan, 
but the possibility that a conflict occurring between the 
two might unwittingly ensnare the United Kingdom. 
Britain's declared naval policy of following a 'One- 
Power Standard' was sufficient for meeting any single 
threat; its ability to deal with separate threats in 
different theatres or a combined threat in a single theatre 
was more problematic. The naval response to this dilemma 
was to adopt a strategy of deterrence, and, if deterrence 
failed, to fight a holding action in the Far East. 34 Thus, 
by force of circumstances, the Royal Navy followed her 
traditional strategy of command of the sea in Home waters 
whilst at the same time adopting the failed approaches 
previous rivals had employed--the fleet-in-being and guerre 
de course--for the Far East. The limits of pursuing an 
effective naval strategy under a 'One Power Standard' with 
the rise of multiple European threats eventually resulted 
in the establishment of a 'Two Power Standard' in 1938.3s 
The role of the Royal Navy was to ensure the 
territorial integrity of the British Empire, maintain her 
sea lines of communication, and to defeat the naval forces 
of any enemy. Specifically, 
17. To the Admiralty has been given by H. 
M. Government the responsibility for the 
security of the sea communications of the 
Empire and for the safety of all British 
territory against organised invasion from 
the sea. 
18. The function or military aim of the 
Navy is to destroy or neutralise enemy naval 
34ADM 1/9081/53, 'Board Memorandum on a New Standard of 
Naval Strength, ' p. 1. 
35Cowman, "An Admiralty 'Myth, ': The Search for an 
Advanced Far Eastern Fleet Base before the Second World 
War, " Journal of Strategic Studies, September 1985, pp. 
316-326. 
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forces which threaten that security. This 
involves battle or the threat of battle. 
19. As a contributory or secondary function 
or military aim, in the interval of time 
which may necessarily elapse before it is 
possible to carry out the primary function, 
the Navy will take all possible measures to 
weaken the enemy navy and to impair its 
resources and morale. At the same time 
naval effort will be directed to strengthen 
our own Navy, our resources and morale. 36 
Thus, British naval strategy anticipated both offensive and 
defensive operations by the fleet. Offensively, a fleet 
action was desired at the earliest favourable date; 
defensively, the safe passage of British and neutral 
merchant shipping had to be guaranteed. The means of 
securing the former was primarily through the battlefleet, 
though all the forces assigned to the fleet would 
contribute in this aim, whilst use of convoys would assure 
the latter. 37 The vital theatre was the North Atlantic 
irrespective of the nature of the enemy, for if Britain 
could not secure these waters for her shipping she would be 
compelled to yield. 38 In the absence of a direct threat in 
Home waters, the Main Fleet would be held in the 
Mediterranean due to the amount of trade that passed 
through these waters and its links to British interests in 
the Far East. 39 
As an island nation and a maritime empire, Britain was 
uniquely dependent on her sea communications. This 
represented both a strength and a weakness. Resources from 
one theatre could be drawn upon to assist in a conflict. in 
36ADM 1/8730/190, 'The Function of the Navy. ' This 
citation is also a direct repetition of that found in ADM 
186/66, 'C. B. 973, ' p. 4. 
37ADM 1/8802/89/35, 'Naval Staff Appreciation of 
Requirements for the 1935 Naval Conference, Admiralty Paper 
No. 1, April 1934. p. 11. 
38Ibid. 
39ADM 1/8665/143, Admiralty letter M. 1119/24 to Foreign 
Office dated 9 April 1924. 
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another theatre, yet those resources could be denied if her 
sea lines of communications were cut. This dependence on 
trade was recognised within the Admiralty and documented by 
the Trade Division. 40 Given her own vulnerabilities, then, 
a common strand of British naval planning, irrespective of 
foe, was to maximise enemy economic deprivation by denying 
maritime trade, and the Admiralty measured the varying 
degrees that states were dependent on trade, particularly 
in petroleum. 41 Such an attack, beyond depriving a foe of 
the material wherewithal to wage war, was likely to result 
in a fleet action, and a second strand of British naval 
planning that was commonly held irrespective of enemy was 
that a decisive fleet action at the earliest date was a 
desired outcome given her presumed maritime superiority 
over any single naval power. Finally, the third common 
strand of naval planning was that with force levels based 
on a 'One Power Standard, ' the fleet could not be divided 
between European and Far Eastern waters, but must remain 
concentrated. 42 This last tenet was more honoured in the 
breach as the chapter on operations discusses. Yet, 
strictly from a planning standpoint, the Admiralty saw 
little difference in the availability of its ships 
operating in Home and Mediterranean waters and their 
ability to deploy to American or Far Eastern waters. 
For deterrence to be effective and to support British 
diplomatic objectives, the Navy had to be seen as a 
credible force in peacetime capable of performing its 
ao'O. U. 6100, Commodity Chart of Great Britain, ' and 
'C. B. 6100A, Addenda No. 1. ' N. B., these documents are not 
on file at the Public Record Office. Their existence and 
presumed contents are based on references in several 
Confidential Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Reports. 
41'C. B. 1646, Commodity Chart of Japan, ' 'C. B. 1646A, 
Addendum, ' and 'C. B. 1684, Commodity Chart of France, ' 
though not held at the Public Record Office, document this 
vulnerability. 
42Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff memorandum dated 24 
May 1921, Nicholas Tracy, ed., The Collective Naval Defence 
of Empire, 1900-1940 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p. 282. 
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duties in war. 43 Unable to be strong everywhere, the Royal 
Navy adopted an organisational framework consisting of the 
Main Fleet, Detached Forces, and Local Defence Forces. 
This structure allowed it to meet its day-to-day 
operational tasks yet facilitated a transition to the 
strategic requirements for war. A summation of this 
flexible posture was briefed to representatives of the 
Imperial Conference of 1923 by the Admiralty. It read in 
part: 
In war the Naval Forces of the Empire 
must be considered as a single collective 
Empire Fleet. From the strategical point of 
view, that Fleet may conveniently be 
regarded as falling into three categories. 
These three categories are closely 
interdependent, but they stand in a very 
definite order of relative importance. 
First and foremost comes the Main 
Fleet. This must be capable of performing 
its function of destroying the Main Fleet of 
the enemy. On it rests the fate of the 
whole Empire. 
Secondly, there are the Detached 
Forces, which, backed by the power of the 
Main Fleet, exercise control of sea 
communications in areas distant from the 
main theatre of operations. 
Thirdly, there are the Local Defence 
Forces, which are necessary in order to free 
the Main Fleet and the Detached Forces for 
their proper work on the High Seas. " 
The above framework was conceptually broad enough to 
operate on a global basis and was formulated without 
expressly mentioning a specific theatre or threat. 
Admiralty war plans were prepared to support operations in 
two distinct phases. During the first phase of operations, 
the Main Fleet would pass to its anchorage whilst other 
43ADM 223/811, Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, Number 56 dated 15 December 1923, p. 
31. 
"Ibid., pp. 32-33. Original emphasis. 
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units and squadrons moved to their bases. 45 During the 
second phase, offensive air, submarine, cruiser, and 
reconnaissance operations would be initiated, offensive 
minelaying would be carried out, British and imperial 
military forces would be transported to the required area, 
and attacks on enemy shipping would begin. 46 
The Main Fleet, itself, was defined as: 
the principal naval force of the Empire and 
is composed of various types of ships, 
battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers, 
destroyers, aircraft carriers, etc. No type 
is self-sufficing and all require the co- 
operation of other types to enable them 
fully to develop their own special fighting 
qualities. 47 
Conceptually, then, the Main Fleet of the Royal Navy was a 
balanced force composed of all serving types of vessels. 
Yet, there was no mistaking that its primary offensive 
strength was thought to reside in the battlefleet, and past 
naval experience had shown that: 
In every maritime war the control of 
sea communications and tradeways has 
hitherto been exercised by that Power which, 
in addition, to possessing sufficient 
vessels to exercise this control, has been 
able to concentrate a battlefleet sufficient 
to destroy or neutralise similar enemy 
forces . 
°B 
Thus, the strategic rationale for heavy ships was that they 
provided the greatest fighting power when formed into a 
battlefleet, and the battlefleet conformed to the principle 
of concentration. This is not without irony, as Richmond, 
recognised perhaps as the severest critic of the capital 
"ADM 1/8588/81, Director Plans minute P. D. 1554 dated 
June 1920. 
"Ibid. 
47ADM 186/66, 'C. B. 973, ' p. 6. 
48Ibid. 
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ship at the strategic level, provided much of the 
intellectual framework for its existence through his 
advocacy and teaching of the principles of war. 
The Threat and the Naval Response. A single enemy did 
not present itself to the Service during the 1919-1939 
period, but, rather, the Royal Navy assessed its 
requirements based on a series of presumed threats during 
the interwar period. The Service tracked both the 
developments in naval affairs on a global basis, including 
even the most minor of naval aspirants, and the movement 
and composition of the world's navies. 49 The evolving 
threat that the Royal Navy faced can be deduced- by 
reviewing the surviving Admiralty records, examining fleet 
strategic exercises, observing the changes in curricula at 
the Royal Naval War and Staff Colleges, and by assessing 
the resources applied in the gathering of strategic 
intelligence. In 1923, Dudley Pound, the Director of 
Plans, recommended that of the joint appreciations for war 
being prepared those dealing with Japan and France were the 
more important, 5° whilst plans were also prepared for a 
possible war with either Russia and Turkey. 51 At the 
tactical level, the Navy trained, at various times, to 
fight the navies of the France, Japan, the United States, 
Germany, and Italy. 52 From a intelligence standpoint, naval 
"These developments, along with the general political 
climate, were summarised and provided to the fleet in 
Confidential Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Reports 
beginning in April 1919. Prior to April 1919, information 
was provided on a twice-weekly basis. See 'Admiralty 
Intelligence Report, ' No. 387 dated 1-3 April 1919, R. A. 
R. Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax Papers, Churchill Archive 
Centre, Cambridge, DRAX/5/5. 
50ADM 1/8646/205, Director Plans minute M. 01618/23 
dated 8 December 1923. 
51ADM 1/8672/221, Plans Division minute No. 02061/24 
dated August 1924. 
"ADM 1/8668/177, 'Admiralty Fleet order 1541. --Models 
of British and Foreign War Vessels for General 
Instructional purposes, Small Torpedo Attack Tables, and 
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resources were directed at intercepting the signal traffic 
of Germany, Italy, France, Japan, Russia, certain Arabic 
states, and the United States. 53 
Within the Service, the war game, whether conducted 
underway at sea with manoeuvre units, or afloat and ashore 
on a board, was the primary vehicle for assessing British 
naval performance, training senior officers in making 
decisions and preparing appreciations, acquainting officers 
with the capabilities of foreign warships, expounding 
doctrine as expressed in the Manouevring Orders and Battle 
Instructions, and validating operational planning for war. 54 
The war game was also employed to validate future warship 
design. Thus, one purpose of exercise 'O. A. ' conducted by 
the combined Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets in March 
1929 was to determine the respective merits of building 
battle cruisers over fast battleships. 55 The war game rules 
were written generically to allow for gaming against any 
potential enemy. Where previously 'Instructions for 
Tactical and Strategical Exercises' had defined the general 
characteristics of presumed enemy warships, 'C. B. 3011' 
merely reflected the offensive potential and defensive 
attributes of British naval ships, and remained mostly 
silent on the attributes of enemy naval and air forces, 
though these were made known to key participants at the 
start of any war game. 56 An exception to this rule was that 
Gunnery Spotting Tables' dated 8 June 1923, ADM 189/39, 
'C. B. 1569, Annual Report of Torpedo School, 1919' dated 24 
July 1920, and Journal entry dated 13 July 1937, Milford 
Haven Papers, IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
53ADM 223/469, 'Naval Intelligence Division, Volume 10, 
Special Intelligence. ' 
"ADM 186/78, 'C. B. 3011, ' pp. 10-26. 
55ADM 186/145, 'C. B. 1769/29(1), Exercises & 
Operations, 1929, Volume I, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated December 1929, p. 78. 
56ADM 186/139, 'O. U. 5243, Instructions for Tactical 
and Strategical Exercises Carried Out on Tables or Boards, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Section dated January 
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Japanese and American carriers, and heavy ships with 
embarked aircraft, were credited with performance 
characteristics not unlike their Royal Navy counterparts. 57 
The war game also featured in joint strategic 
exercises conducted by the British Army, the Royal Air 
Force, and the Royal Navy and was used as a basis to assess 
future force requirements for each of the Services. These 
exercises were conducted on a periodic basis, usually at 
the Military Staff College, Camberley, and covered such 
problems as the forces required to defend Malaya and the 
doctrine necessary to support amphibious operations. 58 The 
Services used the results of such exercises to determine 
their force offerings for various contingencies and to 
weigh the appropriate type of force to be used. Thus, with 
respect to Malaya, whether the Navy anticipated having a 
force of battle cruisers and an aircraft carrier in the 
theatre of operations influenced, and, in turn, was 
influenced by the army's provision of air defence and 
coastal defence batteries, and the number of fighters and 
bombers retained locally by the air force. 59 If a sizeable 
naval force were present, then the scale of military and air 
forces could be reduced as it-was believed that any assault 
could only be attempted once local sea control had been 
1921. 
57ADM 186/78, 'C. B. 3011, ' pp. 10-26. 
58The 1919 joint exercise examined amphibious warfare; 
see ADM 116/2086, 'Naval & Military Exercise, 1919' report 
by Commandant, Staff College, Camberley. A March 1923 
exercise examined the reinforcement of Malaya from India 
and the military, air, and naval forces required to effect 
relief of the Singapore base; see ADM 116/2394, Air Council 
letter S. 22781 to Admiralty dated 4 September 1923. A 
December 1924 joint exercise conducted by the Military 
Staff College, Quetta examined a direct Japanese assault 
against Singapore; see ADM 203/84, Admiralty letter 
M. 0735/25 to President, Royal Naval College, Greenwich 
dated August 1925. 
59ADM 116/2394, Air Ministry to War office letter 
S. 22781 dated 5 September 1923. 
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established. Conversely, if a credible naval force could 
not be provided, then the local military garrison and 
supporting air forces would have to be strengthened to 
ensure the safety of the naval base until the arrival of 
the fleet. Thus, at the strategic level, the role of the 
capital ship was central not only to naval, but to British 
and Imperial defence planning overall. 
At the Royal Naval War and Staff Colleges, the changes 
in curricula closely mirrored the Service's estimate of the 
presumed naval threat during the period and the importance 
of co-operating with the other Services. 60 The criticism is 
oft times levelled that the Service was consumed with 
fighting the Battle of Jutland to the exclusion of more 
relevant topics of the postwar period. 61 Yet, it must be 
remembered that Jutland was the only fleet action of the 
1914-1918 war, and, it might be added, one that many 
officers had directly experienced. Of the students 
attending the 1931 session of the Staff College, no fewer 
than 16 had been present at the battle, whilst at the 1932 
session the number of such students was 14.62 While an 
analysis of Jutland and other surface actions of the late 
war was a prominent feature of interwar staff training, 
much time was also spent in examining the naval 
responsibilities of the present and near future. The 1920- 
1921 curriculum included four sessions on strategy, and, 
specifically, the issue of war with America directed by 
60The Staff College was intended for junior officers 
and the War College was instituted for the instruction of 
senior officers. See ADM 203/13, Admiralty letter 
C. E. 2771/19 dated 2 February 1919 to Admiral President, 
Royal Naval College. 
61Barry Dennis Hunt, 'Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: 
Service Intellectuals and Reform in the Royal Navy, 1912- 
1931, ' Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Queen's University, 
no date, pp. 221-229 and Marder, From the Dardanelles to 
Oran, pp. 48-56. 
"Precis of lecture 'Jutland', Royal Naval Staff 
College, Greenwich, Session 1932, Tennant Papers, 
NMM/TEN/41/1. 
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Richmond, two further general sessions on the United States 
by Commanders Down and Westacott Abell, and two seminars on 
Japan led by Commander G. V. Rayment. In 1921-1922, 
America and British Atlantic strategy were featured in 
three seminars by Richmond, whilst Japan and the Russo- 
Japanese War directed by Richmond formed the subject of two 
seminars. By the 1926-1927 session, the Soviet Union and 
the Baltic campaign of 1919, Turkey, Japan, and British Far 
Eastern strategy were featured as the dominant contemporary 
naval issues. The United States was examined for economic 
purposes as was France, and a separate lecture was devoted 
to 'Current Military Problems. ' During the 1920's and 
1930's, Jutland continued to form a vital part of the 
Navy's staff and war college training, but the emphasis on 
co-operating with the army and the air force was no less 
pronounced. Amongst the senior officers to lecture at 
Greenwich during the period were Air Commodore Charles 
Sampson on 'Air Strategy, ' during the 1920-1921 session, 
Air Commodore Clark-Hall during the 1922-1923 term 'On the 
Tactical Use of Aircraft, ' and the future Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force Lord Tedder on the 'Air Aspect of Combined 
Operations' in the 1931-1932 sitting. 63 
War with France. In case of war with France, the 
Admiralty anticipated disrupting French global trade 
through the regulation of her maritime traffic. 64 Cruisers 
would visit and inspect vessels for regulated goods, and a 
blockade would be imposed on the mouth of the River Seine 
and the port of Marseilles. 65 The Royal Air Force would 
63The following review of naval higher education is 
based on a synthesis of several sources to include the 
Richmond Papers; Tennant Papers; Thursfield Papers; 
Chatfield Papers; Oliver-Bellasis Papers; Dickens Papers, 
IWM; ADM 1/8628/120; and ADM 1/8658/69. 
64ADM 186/71, 'C. B. 01759A(26), Contraband Control 
Service Manual, Supplement No. 2, ' p. 4. 
65ADM 1/8739/45, 'France. The Possibilities of the 
Exercise of Maritime Economic Pressure on France. ' Plans 
Division Study P. D. (T) 015571/30 dated August 1930, p. 11. 
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strike at communications centres, electrical power 
stations, and coal and iron mines in northern and 
northeastern France whilst aircraft carriers operating in 
the Mediterranean would launch similar strikes on transport 
and industrial centres in the South. 66 Such a strategy, it 
was envisioned, would force the French to retain for home 
defence aircraft otherwise earmarked for offensive 
operations, and, thus, offer a degree of immunity to 
British shipping and harbours within close proximity to 
France. 67 A benefit of the above strategic plan was that 
France would be isolated from her North African possessions 
and, thus, her colonial army would be neutralised as a 
strategic reserve. In March 1935, exercise 'Z. L. ' held in 
the waters adjacent to the Canary Islands presumed an 
Anglo-French naval war, and tested the defence of British 
trade plying between South America and the Cape against 
fast French commerce raiders. 68 
War with Italy. As with its planning for a war with 
France, the Admiralty Plans Division defined a strategic 
approach to a possible Anglo-Italian war based on a joint 
campaign conducted in concert with the Royal Air Force. 
The aim of such a campaign would be to inflict severe 
economic dislocation through a combination of naval 
blockade and a bombing offensive. The naval blockade would 
seek to sever Italian trade that sustained the industrial 
centres of the North and limit the importation of 
foodstuffs; the air offensive would target the electrical 
power grid supporting the country's industrial production. 69 
Again, a benefit of any naval blockade would be the 
66Ibid. 
67Ibid. 
, p. 12. 
68ADM 186/157, 'C. B. 1769/35(1) and (2), Exercises and 
Operations, 1935--Vols. I and II, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated September 1937, pp. 3-7. 
69ADM 1/8739/47, 'Italy. The Possibilities of the 
Exercise of Maritime Economic Pressure Upon Italy, ' Plans 
Division P. D. (T) 015745/30 dated March 1931. 
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severance of a mother country from her overseas 
possessions. In this case, Italy would cease to have 
access to Libya and Italian Somaliland. 70 
From 1935 onwards, the Naval Intelligence Division had 
been actively engaged in assessing Italian naval and 
military capabilities with the prospect of war in mind. 71 
With the Abyssinian Crisis and the imposition of sanctions, 
the Service faced war with Italy. The Mediterranean Fleet 
was reinforced, and the plan that emerged envisioned 
'securing and maintaining naval control in the central 
Mediterranean'. 72 Shore bombardment by Mediterranean Fleet 
heavy ships was contemplated and included raids at Benghazi 
and Tobruk in Libya, at Massawah and Hassab in East 
Africa, 73 and at Augusta Bay, Catania, and the railway hub 
at Taormina located in Sicily; meanwhile, the Home Fleet 
would bombard selected points along the west coast of 
Italy. 74 During 1937 the exercise programme of the 
Mediterranean Fleet included at least one evolution, 
'S. Z. ', which tested the general lines of a Anglo-Italian 
war. 75 Naval planning continued to assume early offensive 
operations against the Italian fleet during the 1938-1939 
period, and a surprise strike by the Fleet Air Arm and 
heavy ships against Genoa, where three battleships were 
under construction or repair, was anticipated through the 
"Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean letter 0122/00200 
to Admiralty dated 19 March 1936, Roskill Papers, 
ROSK/7/144. 
71ADM 223/488, 'Mediterranean, ' section staff history 
by Charles Morgan, p. 94. 
72Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, p. 80. 
73Present day Mitsiwa and Aseb, respectively. 
74Draft letter from Drax to Commander-in-Chief, 
Mediterranean dated 24 January 1939, Drax Papers, 
DRAX/2/19. 
75John Winton, Cunningham (London: John Murray, 1998), 
p. 64. 
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summer of 1939.76 By that time, the Navy's planning efforts 
were assisted by its possession of the Italian Ministry of 
Marine's 'Conduct of War in the Mediterranean. '" 
War with Spain. The outbreak of a civil war in Spain, 
in time, resulted in attacks on British naval and merchant 
shipping by Nationalist forces and Italian submarines. 
Following a torpedo attack on the destroyer HMS Havock on 
1 September 1937 by an Italian submarine, Eden, the 
foreign secretary, pushed for a resolute British response. 78 
The Admiralty Plans Division proposed four possible 
ripostes: a blockade of the Nationalist coast; the capture 
of Majorca whence air attacks had originated; a naval raid 
on a Nationalist port; and, finally, the prosecution of 
anti-submarine warfare operations. 79 The last option was 
adopted, and a key consideration for the Admiralty was to 
preclude events in Spain escalating into an Anglo-Italian 
war. 80 
War with Germany. A possible war with Germany receded 
slowly from British naval planning during the interwar 
period only to assume renewed prominence at the end of the 
period. Squadron level tactical exercises involving heavy 
ships were still being conducted as late as 6 June 1919 
with the High Sea Fleet in mind. 11 In time, with the 
scuttling of her ships at Scapa Flow and its size severely 
limited by the Versailles Treaty, the German naval threat 
had for Britain, at last, been contained. Moreover, at 
76Paul Stafford, 'Italy in Anglo-French Strategy and 
Diplomacy October 1938 - September 1939, ' Unpublished Ph. 
D. Dissertation, University of oxford, 1984, p. 90. 
77 ADM 223/488, p. 94. 
''Peter Gretton, 'The Nyon Conference--the naval 
aspect, ' The English Historical Review, Vol. XC, No. 
CCCLIV, January 1975, p. 105. 
79Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
81ADM 189/39, T. B. 1569, ' pp. 169-170. 
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least in the initial postwar period, Germany did not 
maintain its naval forces at even the levels allowed by the 
Versailles Treaty. This meant initially that it could 
expect to operate only in the Baltic Sea with any prospect 
of success. A renewed German naval building programme, 
which predated the accession to power of Hitler, 
fundamentally upset the strategic planning of the 
Admiralty. 82 The result was that the Mediterranean theatre 
could no longer take precedence over the defence of Home 
waters. Thus, in 1937, the Board of Admiralty determined 
that in all cases a naval force had to be retained within 
British waters sufficient to meet the needs of a German 
war. 83 The Anglo-German Naval Agreement attempted to limit 
this liability to no more than 35% of the British surface 
forces, and the fact that Britain was restricted by naval 
treaty in her building programme provided impetus to 
securing such an agreement. The tonnage ratios reached 
under the Washington Treaty and broadened at the London 
Naval Conference of 1930 to include cruisers, destroyers, 
and submarines, had guaranteed the Royal Navy, a 
theoretical position of parity vis-a-vis the Japanese and 
German navies. Still, given its geographic proximity, an 
Anglo-German naval war posed a direct threat to British 
maritime interests in a manner that a Far Eastern or 
Mediterranean war never could. " 
By the time of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the 
Royal Navy was already exercising against a potential naval 
war with Germany. Exercise 'A', held 14 May 1935, saw the 
cruisers of the America and West Indies Station defend a 
New York-bound convoy against attack from ships of the 
82ADM 223/819, 'Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, ' No. 145, dated 15 June 1931, p. 31. 
83ADM 1/9081/53, undated and un-numbered 'Board 
memorandum on a New Standard of Naval Strength. ' 
"Ibid. 
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Deutschland and Leipzig-classes. 85 During the Spanish Civil 
War, German naval movements were tracked via interception 
of ship call signs from wireless signals. 86 The 
Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 afforded the Admiralty the 
chance to follow German naval movements, and her submarines 
were tracked in Spanish Home waters, the Canary Islands, 
and Brazil. Yet, no definitive conclusions could be 
reached about the state of Nazi war planning and the role 
her capital ships would play in attacking British trade; " 
the primary concern of the armoured ship Deutschland 
appeared to be self-preservation in the face of Hood. 88 
Still, notwithstanding the recent movements of the 
Deutschland, the Naval Intelligence Division assumed that 
in a future war, the German Navy would be employed in a 
more offensive manner than had been the case in the 1914- 
1918 war. This conclusion was based on its assessment that 
Hitler would assume supreme command of the navy and that 
Hitler endorsed Wegener's theory of offensive naval warfare 
as expounded in The Naval Strategy of the World ar. 89 
War with Turkey. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
and its transition into the modern state of Turkey are 
beyond the scope and purpose of this paper. However, in so 
far as the Ottoman Empire had been a member of the Central 
Power coalition of World War I, its demise brought its 
successor in direct contact, and conflict, with the Allied 
powers. For the Royal Navy, the Eastern Mediterranean and 
"ADM 186/157, 'C. B. 1769/35(1) and (2), ' pp. 159-166. 
86ADM 223/469, Naval Intelligence Division, Volume 10, 
Special Intelligence. 
87ADM 223/483, 'C. B. 04019, German Naval Activities 
During the Czecho-Slovakian Crisis September, 1938, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division dated 
1939, p. 17. 
88Commissioned 1920, armed with eight 15-inch guns, and 
of 41,200 tons displacement. 
89ADM 223/827, 'Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, ' No. 243 dated 15 August 1939, p. 23. 
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the Straits were vital arteries to the Black Sea. So long 
as Britain supported the anti-Bolshevik forces operating in 
the Crimea, the maintenance of this line of communication 
was a necessary responsibility of British military and 
naval forces. Nationalist elements in Turkey rallied 
following the conclusion of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, 
and engaged in a series of operations with the intent of 
removing the various foreign forces occupying the country. " 
By August 1922, Turkey had succeeded in this objective as 
far as her Asian territory was concerned, but a British 
objective was to forestall the passage of Turkish 
Nationalist forces in Europe. To this end, the Admiralty 
directed that British naval forces were to take all 
measures to prevent this eventuality. 91 During the 
confrontation, Turkey was receiving naval support from the 
Soviet Union. The potential, thus, existed that war with 
Turkey could escalate to a war with Russia in both the 
Black and Baltic Seas. 92 
By 1926, the Navy again contemplated war with Turkey 
with the aim of securing passage of the Bosphorous Straits. 
To this end, plans were prepared for sending a force of 
battleships through the passage, while air strikes were 
contemplated from carriers. Of the efficacy of the latter, 
there remained some doubt, and Keyes advised that: 
What this pressure would amount to on 
a rural population like that of Asia Minor 
is another matter. We have been told a 
great deal about the effect of bombing will 
have in the next war, but no real data is 
available. If it cannot be carried out on 
a much larger scale than in the late war it 
is not likely to have any more decisive 
effect than it had at that time. Certainly 
it does not seem that the few machines which 
can be operated from Carriers would be 
"Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and 
After (London: John Murray, 1997), pp. 55-58. 
"Admiralty minute M. 01279/22, 'Appreciation of the 
Situation in the Far East, Fisher Papers, N1 /FHR/10. 
92lbid. 
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likely to have any great effect. 93 
Keyes' estimate of the forces required for a possible 
Turkish war were considerable. In addition to ten 
battleships, a force of three aircraft carriers, eleven 
cruisers, six destroyer flotillas, four submarines, and 
twenty minesweepers. 94 A strong, balanced force, it 
anticipated a significant naval commitment to secure local 
command of the sea against a modest naval threat. 
War with the Soviet Union. With the fall of the 
Romanov dynasty and the advent of a radical socialist 
state, British interests in Eastern Europe, the Near East, 
the Indian sub-continent, and the Far East appeared 
threatened to a degree that exceeded even its previous 
concerns about imperial Russia. In March 1919, the 
Admiralty anticipated moving units of the Grand Fleet, 
including the First Battle Squadron, the carrier HMS 
Araus, 95 and supporting units into the Baltic Sea and the 
Gulf of Finland to ensure the passage of British mercantile 
trade. 96 In the event, British heavy ships never deployed, 
but inshore naval operations against Soviet forces 
continued until 1920 in the Baltic area. 97 Planning 
regarding a possible Anglo-Soviet naval war was aided by 
the Admiralty's possession of the 1930 version of the 
93Keyes cited in Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Volume II1 
p. 160. 
9aIbid., p. 167. 
"Commissioned 1918, embarking upwards of 15 aircraft, 
and of 15,200 tons displacement. 
"Chief of Naval Staff undated letter M. 01301 (draft) 
to Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, Fremantle Papers, 
NMM/FRE/316b. 
97The background of this dispute and the actions of the 
Service are assessed in R. J. Bullen, 'The Royal Navy and 
the Baltic, 1918-20, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, 
University of London, 1983. 
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Soviet Navy's Battle Instructions. 98 Ranft and Till argue 
that for a time during the interwar period, the Soviet Navy 
was a coastal force that eschewed the doctrine of command 
of the sea for reasons of ideology and economic 
constraints. 99 This writer does not dispute their 
conclusion, but a reading of the 1930 Battle Instructions 
shows that even in pursuing a coastal defence naval 
strategy, the Soviet Navy viewed the battleship as the 
foundation of naval power. '°° 
War with the United States. A central tenet of 
British strategic policy was to avoid a war with the United 
States. Such a war if fought, might ultimately prove 
successful, but, in the process, it would be ruinous to 
Britain's interests. Accordingly, concessions were 
afforded the United States that were denied to others. The 
British desire to placate the United States is captured in 
Baldwin's pronouncement that: 
Never as an individual will I sanction the 
British Navy being used for an armed 
blockade of any country in the world until 
I know what the United States of America is 
going to do . 
lo' 
Thus, the British refused to let American highhandedness in 
the enforcement of prohibition escalate unnecessarily, 
whilst it vigorously challenged the extension of Norwegian 
and Russian territorial waters over commercial fishing 
rights traditionally enjoyed by British trawlers. The 
British abrogation of her treaty with Japan was carried out 
98ADM 1/8740/50, 'Russia. The Battle Instructions of 
the Naval Forces of the R. K. K. A., ' dated 1930. 
99Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The ea in Soviet 
Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 94- 
97. 
"'ADM 1/8740/50, 'Russia. The Battle Instructions of 
the Naval Forces of the R. K. K. A., ' p. 10. 
'°'Baldwin cited in Frank Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis 
(London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1974), p. 127. 
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in the understanding that it was better to antagonise the 
third naval power than to make an unnecessary enemy of 
potentially the first naval power. Britain shared gunnery 
and torpedo information with the United States Navy that 
was denied to her French and Italian counterparts, 102 and the 
United States Navy's ability to operate in the 
Mediterranean theatre was, "' in large measure, dependent on 
the access that Britain afforded the Americans at Gibraltar 
and Malta including assisting in fleet gunnery drills. "" 
These concessions were not all one-sided and, the Director 
of the Gunnery Division noted: 
The use of the U. S. N. of our bases and 
targets presents good opportunities of 
obtaining information both as to their 
methods and efficiency. 
Continuation of good relations and 
intercourse with a go ahead nation such as 
the U. S. A. is of great value, and we 
actually do obtain valuable ideas from them, 
especially as regards high angle shooting. los 
That said, Britain could not rule out the possibility 
that such a conflict might be forced upon her. Thus, the 
Service examined at the Royal Naval War College the general 
lines of how such a war might be waged, held exercises on 
war game tables, and conducted at sea exercises in which 
Red Fleet, the British force, opposed Blue Fleet, the 
102ADM 1/8766/43, Extract of Board Minutes dated 30 
November 1933. 
1°31n 1929, the European Station of the United States 
Navy was withdrawn. See ADM 223/824, 'Confidential 
Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report, ' No. 208,15 
September 1936, p. 58. 
104 ADM 186/271, 'C. B. 3001(26), Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1926, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division 
dated March 1927, p. 79. 
105 ADM 1/8711/140, Director of Gunnery Division comment 
dated 26 May 1926 to U. S. Naval Attache request for visit 
to Gibraltar by Destroyer Division Twenty-Five. 
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United States Navy. 106 An example of the last was the 
exercises conducted by the Atlantic Fleet during its 
passage from England to Spanish waters during the Spring 
Cruise of 1921. Hood and Repulse, acting as American 
battle cruisers, in company with Tiaer, representing the 
American battlefleet, were to intercept the Atlantic Fleet 
and force an action prior to the latter's arrival at Arosa 
Bay. 107 As the United States Navy did not possess a single 
battle cruiser in 1921, and had only recently begun 
construction of the type with the laying down of the 
Lexington-class, it may be concluded that one purpose of 
the exercise was to gauge the material readiness of the 
Royal Navy in a not too distant future war. '°8 
'C. B. 3011, ' the 1929 war game rules, provided an 
example of a typical tactical war game scenario to be used. 
Though no enemy is expressly named, the United States can 
be inferred as Blue Fleet is composed of fourteen 
battleships and no battle cruisers. 109 Till observes that 
the Royal Navy did not seriously contemplate a war with the 
United States though it used such a possibility for 
planning purposes. 11° Given the steps the Service pursued 
in examining a possible Anglo-American war at Greenwich, 
the Tactical School, and within the fleet, this writer is 
more cautious. Such a war was probably not of primary 
106 As a rule, 'C. B. 3011, ' specified that Red should 
represent the British force in any engagement. The America 
and West Indies Station, however, conducted exercises where 
Blue represented the British force. 
'°7Journal entry dated 17 January 1921, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. 
1°8Ernest Andrade, 'The Battle Cruiser in the United 
States Navy, ' Military Affairs, Volume XLIV, No. 1, 
February 1980, pp. 20-21. 
109ADM 186/78, 'C. B. 3011, ' p. 23. 
"'Geoffrey Till, 'Retrenchment, Rethinking, Revival, 
1919-1939, ' J. R. Hill, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History 
of the Royal Navy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p. 328. 
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consideration, but worthy of secondary investigation. The 
fact remains however, that Anglo-American naval co- 
operation during the interwar period was deeper and was 
initiated earlier than is commonly held. 
War with Japan. The possibility that Britain might 
have to fight a Japanese war troubled the Admiralty even 
before the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. " Such 
a war would be extremely difficult owing to the distances 
involved and their implications for logistics, the poor 
state of military infrastructure in the theatre of 
operations, and the known proficiency of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, amply and ably demonstrated as recently as 
the Great War. 112 Of particular concern was the exposed 
position of Hong Kong and the means of rendering it secure, 
if the treaty were not renewed. 113 To secure Hong Kong, two 
alternatives were deemed feasible and neither of them were 
relished. A fleet could be maintained in the Far East 
capable of dealing with Japan or the port's defences could 
be strengthened to withstand a prolonged siege. "' The 
Japanese occupation of nearby Canton in 1938 and Hainan 
Island in 1939 made defence of the colony even more 
"ADM 1/8608/121, Trade Division un-numbered memorandum 
to Deputy Chief of Naval Staff dated 30 June 1921. 
112A cult, of sorts, in historical circles usually 
prescribes latent racism as the reason why the West 
misunderstood and under-estimated the Japanese threat. 
Whilst this writer accepts that individual officers may 
have held prejudices, institutionally the Service 
understood the threat all too well and respected Japanese 
military capabilities. This last point is emphasised by 
the conclusion that 'it should be remembered that the 
efficiency of the Japanese Navy was a powerful contributory 
factor to the making of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
1902. ' From ADM 223/815, Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, No. 95 dated 15 April 1927, p. 28. 
113 ADM 1/8570/287, Plans Division un-numbered memorandum 




For planning purposes, the Admiralty assumed such a 
war could occur at any time after 1 April 1929.116 Until the 
completion of the Singapore Naval Base, the passage of the 
Main Fleet rested upon the adequate provision of oil 
reserves along the fleet's venue of approach and the use of 
improvised anchorages secured by the Mobile Naval Base 
Defence Organisation (MNDBO). "7 Exercise 'E. A. ' conducted 
17-20 January 1922, as the Atlantic Fleet sailed from 
Portland to Arosa Bay, tested the concept of escorting a 
convoy which- included a Mobile Naval Base Ship. "' The 
convoy formed, in part, by the carrier Courageous, "' HMS 
Pandora, HMS Assistance, and HMS Sandhurst, was escorted by 
Red Fleet, a force composed of seven battleships, the First 
Light Cruiser Squadron, ' and two flotillas of destroyers in 
the face of Blue Fleet, a squadron of two battle cruisers, 
the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, two flotillas of 
destroyers, and submarines. 120 The Red Force objective was 
to replenish the mobile base established at Arosa Bay, 
represented by HMS Snapdragon 121 and HMS Maidstone and 
defended by mines, submarines, and a local defence 
115 Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War 
in the Far East 1930-1945 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1997), P. 69. 
116ADM 116/2457, Director Plans un-numbered minute dated 
7 March 1927. 
117Director Plans minute to Deputy Chief of the Naval 
Staff dated 3 November 1921, Tracy, ed., Defence of Empire, 
p. 309. 
118 ADM 116/2173, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
letter No. 257/A. H. 1124 to Admiralty dated 27 February 1922. 
"'Commissioned 1925, displacing 22,500 tons, and 
capable of operating upwards of 35 aircraft. 
"'Midshipman Journal entry dated 18 January 1922 of G. 
C. C. Campbell-Johnston, privately held by author. 
121Journal entry dated 17 January 1922, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
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flotilla. 122 In exercise 'N. A. S. F. ', held in Greek waters 
during August 1926, the practicality of the MNBDO in a full 
scale deployment was tested. As specialist ships did not 
exist to support the MNDBO, heavy ships and aircraft 
carriers were used to land the embarked forces. 123 Exercise 
'N. A. S. F. ' saw the use of eight battleships and the 
aircraft carrier Eagle. 124 
In December 1924 a ten day exercise was carried out at 
Salsette Island, Bombay to measure the feasibility of 
Japanese forces capturing Singapore in a 1926 war. 125 This 
hypothetical encounter assumed the arrival of the British 
main fleet 35 days after war's declaration. 126 The exercise 
concluded that the Japanese force could not secure 
Singapore prior to arrival of the British fleet, but 
Richmond, the Commander-in-Chief, East. Indies, questioned 
the finding because the Japanese were not likely to spend 
12 days building an advance aerodrome to support the 
assault as the exercise anticipated. '27 Meanwhile, the 
transfer of the Main Fleet to Far Eastern waters was tested 
by the Mediterranean Fleet in August 1925 in exercise 
'M. U. '128 The fleet left Argostoli, a port on the Greek 
"'journal entry dated 17 January 1922, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. 
123Donald F. Bittner, 'Britannia's Sheathed Sword: The 
Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar Years- 
-A Passive Response, ' The Journal of Military History, 
Volume 55, Number 3, July 1991, p. 355. 
124Commissioned 1924, embarking upwards of 30 aircraft, 
and of 22,600 tons displacement. 
125ADM 203/84, Admiralty letter M. 0735/25 to President, 
Royal Naval College, Greenwich dated August 1925. 
'26 Ibid. 
127Ibid. 
'28ADM 1/8711/146, Plans Division minute 02771/27 dated 
14 February 1927. 
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island of Cephalonia, on the evening of 17 August 1925,129 
and carried out a sortie representing passage through the 
Straits of Malacca under wartime conditions. Due to the 
casualties assessed in exercise 'M. U., ' the Plans Division 
recommended examining a fleet passage through the Sunda 
Straits. "' In 1928, exercise 'M. U. 2', beginning 15 March 
saw over 80 ships from the Mediterranean and Atlantic 
Fleets test the concept of securing a decisive fleet action 
before Hong Kong, represented by Gibraltar, and Singapore, 
represented by the Spanish island of Alboran off the 
western coast of Algeria, succumbed to Japanese forces. 131 
The Royal Naval Staff College reviewed the general outline 
of the exercise and forwarded its appreciation to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, playing the part of 
Blue Fleet, prior to the exercise's commencement. 132 Unlike 
the 1924 exercise held off Bombay, no provision was allowed 
for the 'Japanese' force to construct an aerodrome in the 
vicinity to support their operations. 133 
Until the Main Fleet's arrival from Home and 
Mediterranean waters, which was variously estimated in the 
absence of an ongoing European war at 28,13' 35,135 42,136 
129ADM 116/2285, Rear Admiral, First Battle Squadron 
letter R. A. 925/14 to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean 
dated 4 September 1925. 
130ADM 1/8711/146, Plans Division minute 02771/27 dated 
14 February 1927. 
"'Jackson, Strike from the Sea, p. 49. 
132ADM 203/86, Director, Royal Naval Staff College 
letter S. C. 4238 to Chief of Staff, Atlantic Fleet dated 2 
March 1928. 
133Ibid., Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, (Session 
1927-1928), Precis of Scheme 159, p. 1. 
114Jackson, Strike from the Sea, p. 49. 
135ADM 203/84, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies to 
Admiralty letter No. 49/3202 dated 26 January 1925. 
136ADM 1/8713/168, Admiralty letter M. 01048/24 to 
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies dated 30 September 1924. 
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70,137 and 90 days, 138 respectively, submarines were expected 
to prevent the Japanese Navy from securing local sea 
control, 139 and attacks on the Kure and Yokosuka naval bases 
were contemplated. 140 The likely composition of the Main 
Fleet in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war varied during 
the course of the interwar period, but its strength was 
built around the battlefleet. In 1921, the Admiralty 
anticipated operating 12 battleships and 8 battle cruisers 
in a war breaking out around 1930.141 Following the 
Washington Naval Agreement, the Main Fleet sent East would 
be limited to nine battleships, 142 whilst up to four battle 
cruisers, depending on their availability, would most 
likely deploy to China. 143 
With the need to consider a German naval threat, a 
fleet-in-being strategy in Asia assumed greater importance. 
Previously, the Admiralty contemplated conducting 
sequential operations in widely separated theatres; now its 
aim was to forestall the possibility of such an approach 
being required. Thus, the Admiralty noted: 
... it has been assumed that our aim in the Far East, as the war with Germany lasted, 
could only be to maintain the situation 
which existed when the Fleet got out to the 
"'Committee of Imperial Defence, Chiefs of Staff Sub- 
Committee minute dated 4 June 1937, Tracy, ed., Defence of 
Empire, p. 568. 
13sAdmiralty minute M. 04403/1919 dated October 1919, 
Jellicoe Papers, British Library, Additional MSS 49,045. 
139ADM 1/8616/213, Director of Plans minute P. D. 
01644/21 dated 29 November 1921. 
'40ADM 1/8658/61, 'Harbour Attack by Submarines, ' un- 
numbered dated 18 March 1924. 
'41First Lord memorandum dated 21 June 1921, Tracy, ed., 
Defence of Empire, pp. 293-294. 
142ADM 1/8700/121, Director of Plans memorandum 
M. 01619/25 dated 12 June 1925. 
'43ADM 116/2457, Plans Division minute P. D. 02725/26 
dated 7 March 1927. 
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East and prevent further offensive 
operations by Japan. 
2. The Fleet required would therefore need 
to be strong enough to give covering 
protection to our trade in the East, to hold 
its own in a battle with Japan should she 
risk such a battle and to prevent her 
undertaking any major operation against 
Australia, New Zealand or Borneo so long as 
our fleet was in being. Our fleet should, 
however, be sufficiently strong to be able 
to afford the detachment of small forces to 
operate offensively with the object of 
harassing the Japanese Navy. "' 
In August 1933, Admiralty strategic planning had 
narrowed its focus to considerations of war with Japan 
only, though this estimate proved short-lived as other 
threats soon arose. '45 Again, common with its planning for 
other naval wars, the Royal Navy would attack Japanese 
maritime trade through a rigorous programme of visits and 
inspections of commercial shipping. "' 
British Naval Strateav Evaluated. Faced as it was 
with several different threats and widely dispersed 
theatres of operations, British naval strategy had of 
necessity to exhibit a measure of flexibility. What was an 
appropriate strategic response in one theatre was not a 
suitable course of action in another. This chapter, in 
examining the strategic setting of the capital ship has 
focused on the Service's plans with respect to individual 
naval powers, yet it is important to keep in mind that the 
conditions the Royal Navy faced in a new war might be 
materially different, depending on whether she fought as a 
144ADM 1/9081/53, undated and un-numbered 'Board 
memorandum on a New Standard of Naval Strength. ' 
145Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to Admiralty letter 
0265/439/57 dated 27 September 1933, William Fisher Papers, 
NMM/FHR/16. 
1°6ADM 186/71, T. B. 01759A(26), Supplement No. 1, ' p. 
1. 
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member of a coalition or against a coalition of powers. 14' 
Britain did not have the luxury of following a single, 
pure, strategic approach, be it command of the sea, fleet- 
in-being, or guerre de course, but, rather, practiced a 
maritime strategy that was an amalgam sharing aspects of 
each. Given a policy that defined a 'One Power Standard' 
of strength, British naval strategy was implicitly based on 
the need to conduct sequential operations in the event that 
more than one crisis arose. Further, her Far Eastern 
strategy, based as it was on deterrence through the 
maintenance of a fleet-in-being, placed a premium on 
intelligence. An early indication and warning of possible 
enemy action was pivotal, if the Main Fleet were to arrive 
prior to the loss of Hong Kong and Singapore. Anything 
that delayed the transit of the Main Fleet increased the 
time that British possessions must fend for themselves and 
increased the likelihood of their loss. Whilst the loss of 
Hong Kong might delay the offensive phase of British naval 
operations, the loss of Singapore and local sea control 
would prove nearly insurmountable. '48 An essential indicator 
of Japanese action was the movement of naval and merchant 
shipping as a precursor to offensive action. In 1932, the 
speed at which Japanese operations in China developed 
shocked the Admiralty, and the Commander-in-Chief, China 
was advised that adequate warning could not now be relied 
upon. 149 
British naval strategy during the interwar period was 
147The Royal Navy anticipated that action in war was 
likely to be a combined operation and exercised to that 
end. Exercise 'L. C., ' conducted 25-27 March 1928 off the 
coast of Spain by the Atlantic Fleet practiced the 
escorting of a convoy using the signalling procedures of 
the fleet's Allied Signal Manual and International Code. 
See entry dated 25 March 1928, Midshipman H. A. V. Haggard 
Journal, Haggard Papers, IWM/85/21/3. 
148Admiralty memorandum dated July 1931, Tracy, ed., 
Defence of Empire, p. 447. 
149Admiralty letter M. 00505/33 dated 26 April 1933 to 
Commander-in-Chief, China, Roskill Papers, RO5K/7/164. 
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no longer the prerogative of a single service, but was 
increasingly a joint maritime strategy that was heavily 
dependent upon cooperation with the Royal Air Force and the 
British Army. The Admiralty's plans for war with France 
and Italy which assumed the active cooperation of the air 
force from the beginning in any conflict and the army's 
role in the defence of Singapore and Hong Kong are proof of 
this point. Further, naval planning operated within the 
context of a greater strategic planning organisation 
directed by the Committee of Imperial Defence; issues were 
considered on a global basis and in an imperial framework 
with Admiralty planning forming but a part the process. 
From a strategic standpoint, the capital ship was central 
only to a strategy that sought to command the seas. In any 
other variant of naval strategy practiced, the capital ship 
would be a supporting and not the pivotal arm--at least 
during the opening phase of hostilities. On this, 
Chatfield observed: 
The duty of the Battle Fleet in war, until 
the enemy battle fleet had been destroyed, 
was to hold a strategical position behind 
whose cover the offensive operations in 
which the nation was employed could be 
carried out . 
150 
Still, until command of the sea was established, the risk 
existed that an enemy naval force would be at liberty to 
disrupt British trade, prevent the initial offensive moves 
by the Royal Navy, and threaten invasion. Destruction of 
the enemy battlefleet would ensure British command of the 
sea, and the vehicle for achieving such command was the 
British battlefleet. Of the differing naval threats 
posited--France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the Soviet Union, 
Turkey, Japan, and the United States--a common attribute 
was shared: each navy operated capital ships. Accordingly, 
Command at sea in the first place 
depends upon the ability to destroy or 
"'Chatfield speech to the Institution of Naval 
Architects delivered May 1933, Chatfield Papers, 
NMM/CHT/3/6. 
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neutralise the main naval force of an enemy, 
i. e., his battlefleet. If this cannot be 
done the latter will be able either to 
support his cruisers in operations against 
trade, make possible the passage of armies 
for the purpose of invasion or reinforcement 
or capture on his opponent's lines of 
communication. '5' 
This much was recognised at an early date, but given 
the interwoven relationship of all naval forces this did 
not argue necessarily for the abandonment of the capital 
ship, as Admiral Fremantle"' observed: 
There is, in my opinion, a great deal 
to be said for the abandonment of the 
capital ship, and for the maintenance of our 
naval power by destroyers, submarines, and 
light cruisers for distant stations. But 
this is a matter of high naval strategy and 
the fact that the capital ship has become 
more vulnerable does not affect the 
justification for her existence. This lies 
in her power to overcome smaller surface 
ships than herself, and in her consequent 
strategical function of supporting light 
cruisers, while light cruisers support 
destroyers, and the destroyers in their turn 
may be supporting mine-sweepers. 153 
That said, the Service modified the tactical training 
of the fleet based on the evolving nature of the strategic 
threat. Thus, with any eye toward Italy and her flotilla 
of Mas154 boats, defence of the battlefleet against a 
combined air and motor torpedo boat attack was actively 
"'Undated and unsigned Imperial Defence College lecture 
'The Application of the Principles of Empire Defence, ' 
Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, King's College, London. 
152Later Admiral Sir Sydney Robert Fremantle (1867- 
1958). Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (1918-1919); 
Commander, First Battle Squadron (1919-1921); and 
Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (1923-1926). 
153Deputy Chief of Naval Staff memorandum dated 24 
January 1919, Fremantle Papers, NMM/FRE/313/71. 
15°Motoscafi antisommergibili. 
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practiced late in the period by the Mediterranean Fleet. 155 In 
a like manner, the tactics to counter a German commerce 
raiding group composed of two armoured ships of the 
Deutschland-class, a division of destroyers, and two 
submarines acting in unison were rehearsed. 156 Thus, the 
strategic assessment of who the enemy was and his presumed 
naval capabilities, drove the Service to train accordingly 
and precluded the ossification of tactical thinking. 
Finally, in examining British naval strategy it must 
be stressed that, at times, it deviated from its 
operational doctrine and was out of step with what her 
sister Services could logistically support. An example of 
the first was the Naval Staff's planned use of the Fleet 
Air Arm in a war against either France or Italy. On such 
use, Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse noted that: 
The Fleet Air Arm is too small a force to be 
used frequently against shore objectives 
other than the enemy's fleet bases when his 
fleet is in harbour, and it is not designed 
for this duty. If it were so used, it would 
soon cease to exist as we are not likely to 
have reserves either of personnel or 
aircraft sufficiently to fill vacancies 
frequently. 157 
Moreover, when the Admiralty assumed that Main Fleet would 
not be available for use in Far Eastern waters until after 
70 days of notice, the military garrisons of Hong Kong and 
Singapore maintained reserves of equipment, food, and 
ammunition of only 60 days . 
158 Thus, it is' now appropriate 
to examine the operational experience of the Royal Navy and 
the development of doctrine as elements of the capital ship 
controversy. 
155 Journal entry dated 28 June 1938, Milford Haven 
Papers, IWM/DS/MISC/9. 
156Ibid., entry dated 13 July 1937. 
157ADM 1/9088/63, Backhouse letter to Cunningham dated 
31 December 1936. 
"'Imperial Defence College, Exercise No. 10,1937, 
Tennant Papers, NMM/TEN/42/4. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CAPITAL SHIP AND ITS OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE 
ROYAL NAVY DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
[W]hile the demands for reductions and 
economies are made with growing insistence, 
the demands upon the Navy show no signs of 
decrease - quite the contrary. ' 
Walter Long 
The Commandant of the local force of the 
State Military Police 'remarked that were it 
not for the presence of a British warship in 
the harbour, he would refuse to carry out 
his instructions and leave the town for it 
would be impossible to enforce order. 
The British flag, however, was a 
sufficient guarantee for him, were it 
hoisted on a battleship or a canoe. 12 
Commander Augustus Agar 
The Treasury, with its almost constant refrain for 
fiscal restraint, and the various naval arms accords of the 
period defined the limits of the Royal Navy materially, 
whilst the First World War provided the Service with a 
benchmark against which to assess its doctrine, ships, men, 
and organisation. The Royal Navy, no less than the nation, 
could well rejoice when the Armistice ending the 1914-1918 
war was proclaimed. For the officers and ratings of the 
Grand Fleet, the dismal solitude of Scapa Flow promised to 
be a thing of the past, and the dangers inherent in facing 
a major fleet action were, for the moment, no more. if 
'First Lord to War Cabinet memorandum titled 'Post-War 
Naval Policy' dated 12 August 1919 cited in Ranft, ed., 
Beatty Papers, Volume II, p. 54. 
2ADM 1/8760/232, Commanding Officer, HMS Scarborough 
letter No. 7/32 dated 15 October 1932, p. 6. 
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celebrations were the initial order of the day, the 
surrender of the High Sea Fleet and its internment was the 
second, and operation , 
'Z. Z. '13 as the evolution was styled, 
was carried out on 21 November 1918. H. C. Burton, now 
serving in Neptune of the Fourth Battle Squadron, described 
the scene in a letter to his mother: 
All ships had their ensigns at the masthead 
(only flown in that position when in sight 
of the enemy) guns trained fore and aft 
ready for training , on 
the enemy if 
necessary. When our leading ship reached 
the last ship in the German line she turned 
16 points i. e. a half circle and returned on 
the same course as and parallel to the 
Germans and other ships following in her 
wake. ' 
The denouement of the Imperial German Navy was a 
bittersweet affair, and the regret of not decisively 
defeating the High Sea Fleet in a fleet action already 
commented on by Beatty in Chapter I was felt no less in the 
gunrooms of the Grand Fleet: 
Somehow I think we were all too sorry for 
their defeat to be cheerful and I know that 
I would have given anything if even at the 
last minute before they met us they had 
shown fight. I don't mean that I wanted 
them to suddenly turn on us but if they 
could only have sent a wireless signal 
saying they were going to fight to the last 
ship. I suppose this sounds bloodthirsty 
but the disappointment of being done out of 
3Concerning the significance of the 'Z. Z. ' designation 
the following is cited: 'It has been customary in the fleet 
to distinguish the various operation orders with letters of 
the alphabet for purposes of reference, and when "Orders 
for Operation Z. Z. " appeared, one felt that for once the 
staff had been really human in their choice of a title, and 
that surely THIS was indeed the END. ' from H. M. S. Castor: 
Grand Fleet Destroyer Flotillas, 1915-1918; Souvenir of a 
War Commission (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1919), 
p. 35, Officer's Steward Sidney Victor Clack Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, London, IWM MISC/1010/65/1. Original 
emphasis. 
4Letter dated 21 November 1918, Burton Papers, 
IWM/81/13/1. 
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our scrap is awfully keen. ' 
Still, while a general war may have been terminated, the 
very nature of its ending had left many problems 
unresolved. Therefore, whilst the Royal Navy no longer had 
to contemplate a fleet action and the risk to its merchant 
shipping had been eliminated, it faced a plethora of 
operations in the war's immediate aftermath. Whether it 
was the occupation of Asia Minor, providing support to 
anti-Bolshevik forces in the Baltic and Crimea, clearing 
the many mines laid during the war, or providing support to 
colonial administrations, the Royal Navy returned to a 
pattern of operations not unlike its experience preceding 
the Great War and the rise of the German naval threat. 
Certainly, many of these actions were minor in nature 
and quickly resolved themselves. Others proved to be more 
intractable and would fester for years and, at times, 
demand considerable naval resources. A measure of the 
Royal Navy's operational employment during the 1919-1939 
period can be measured by referring to the table provided 
in Appendix III. Of course, not every crisis required the 
commitment of capital ships, and the use of a capital ship 
by itself may only indicate that it was the vessel most 
readily available in a given instance. Still, a cursory 
examination of Appendix III and Appendix IV highlights the 
diverse geographical commitment of the Navy, the areas of 
recurring problems, and the paramount need to maintain 
naval forces capable of the broadest capabilities while 
operating in the widest geographic milieu. 
This chapter examines the operational employment of 
the Royal Navy during the 1919-1939 period with an emphasis 
on the role of the capital ship. It investigates the many 
tasks that the fleet was expected to execute measured 
against an escalating continuum of naval operations. This 
study does not purport to be a general examination of the 
5Ibid. 
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interwar period and considerations of space do not permit 
such a treatment in any event. Hence, it cannot address 
every naval operation and such operations that are 
addressed are for the purposes of illustration and 
amplification. Still, by concentrating on the role of 
naval forces and the part played by the capital ship, the 
analysis will illuminate the Royal Navy's actual 
commitment, or lack thereof, in the continuing primacy of 
the capital ship at the operational level. Accordingly, 
this chapter offers fresh insight into the capital ship 
controversy from an operational perspective. First, 
though, a discussion on a theoretical model defining the 
continuum of naval operations is in order. 
A Theoretical Continuum of Naval Operations. The 
scope of naval operations ranges from missions of routine 
peacetime presence to the waging of general war, with a 
series of escalatory steps between the two extremes. 
Arnott and Gaffney have defined a scale beginning with 
peacetime presence, to surveillance and the showing of 
force, and culminates with the use of naval force. 6 For the 
purposes of this study, the Arnott and Gaffney definition 
is insufficient, as it neglects some aspects of lesser 
naval operations where the application of force is aimed at 
an internal threat rather than an external foe. Such 
aspects include support to Home and colonial governments in 
maintaining domestic order and lending support to civil 
authorities during periods of labour unrest. In addition, 
Arnott and Gaffney fail to distinguish between missions of 
naval presence conducted in a benign environment of allied 
or neutral waters, and what Cable refers to as 'showing an 
unfriendly flag'; the exercise of freedom of navigation, in 
an area of disputed sovereignty. 7 Still, if the Arnott and 
6Ralph E. Arnott and William A. Gaffney, 'Naval 
Presence: Sizing the Force, ' Naval War College Review, 
March-April 1985, pp. 18-30. 
'James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace (Basingstoke: 
MacMillan, 1989), p. 72. 
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Gaffney model is accepted as a starting point and is 
broadened including the aforementioned caveats, then a more 
appropriate continuum can be defined. With missions of 
naval presence at the lowest end of the scale, it 
terminates with the waging of general war at its summit. 
Between these two extremes lie surveillance, the 
application of naval force in support of domestic order, 
the showing of force for purposes of deterrence, the 
execution of limited naval strikes, and the application of 
naval force in support of limited war. This then is the 
yardstick by which the Royal Navy's capital ship operations 
will be measured. ' 
It is important to understand that the naval tasks 
which comprise the continuum are not mutually exclusive. 
Given the dispersal of naval forces and the object of each 
naval task, it is possible for naval operations, at a given 
moment, to span the entire range of the continuum. In 
addition, it may be remarked that reference to the 
continuum lends itself to applying the concept of economy 
of force--an accepted principle of war. 9 Economy of force, 
at the operational level, argues for the minimum allocation 
of combat force necessary to secure secondary objectives. 
As the capital ship was admittedly the premier naval 
'It is not to be inferred that this model represents 
the sum total of naval responsibilities. Other tasks can 
be identified such as survey and hydrographic research. 
These tasks, their importance conceded, do not involve the 
application of force. As such, their omission does not 
detract from the model adopted. For an exposition on 
contemporary Royal Navy doctrine see The Fundamentals of 
British Maritime Doctrine: BR 1806 (London: HMSO, 1995). 
'Many works discuss the 'principles of war' and the 
pitfalls of such thinking. On the latter aspect, see Bruce 
Kenner, III, 'The Principles of War: A Thesis for Change, ' 
Proceedings, November 1967, pp. 27-36, This writer relies 
on the concept of economy of force as defined in U. S. Army 
Field Manual 100-5 Operations, May 1986. The best recent 
discussion on the principles of war with respect to naval 
warfare is Wayne Hughes' Fleet Tactics whilst Corbett's 
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy provides an initial 
intellectual foundation. 
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warship of the period, its employment in minor naval tasks 
raises the issue of whether the concept of economy of force 
was understood within the fleet and the Admiralty, or 
whether it has relevance in peacetime operations. The 
strongest reply this writer can offer is that all 
operations, even peacetime evolutions, have to be measured 
against the expected risk, and the officers of the Royal 
Navy made calculations based on the concept of economy of 
force. lo 
Finally, a caveat must be voiced. The model selected 
for use in this study would have been alien to British 
naval officers of the 1919-1939 period. Such a regulated 
thought process about naval warfare is a contemporary 
phenomenon. Moreover, it is by no means claimed that this 
is the only model available to evaluate the capital ship 
from an operational perspective. An evaluation of the 
battleship and the battle cruiser from the perspective of 
the various naval tasks associated with sea control is 
certainly one such alternative. " Further, whilst an 
analytical approach built upon a series of case studies 
remains another theoretical approach, this method has been 
discounted as impractical given considerations of space. 
'°ADM 1/8588/81 on the last point includes a detailed 
outline of what topics should be addressed in devising 
Admiralty War Plans. Part V, Operations, of the outline 
specifies a series of discrete tasks to be executed by 
naval and air forces. Implicit in the outline is the 
concept of economy of force. Richmond's lectures on Tactics 
and Strategy, RIC/10/1 and RIC/10/2, National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich include a discussion of most of the 
accepted principles of war including economy of force. ADM 
186/66, 'C. B. 973, Naval War Manual, 1925, ' Admiralty, 
Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division dated 
October 1925 specifies eight principles of war: maintenance 
of the object, offensive action, surprise, concentration, 
economy of force, security, mobility, and co-operation. 
"See Joseph A. Moretz, 'Liddell Hart and Naval 
Warfare: The Missing Dimension, ' Jack Sweetman et al., 
eds., New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers 
from the Tenth Naval History Symposium (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1993), pp. 271-292. 
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The value of the model selected is that it allows an 
evaluation to be conducted against recognised naval tasks 
during a period noted for its absence of general war. 
Thus, it will facilitate assessing the capital ship's 
continuing operational viability during the period in 
question. 12 In examining the operational employment of the 
capital ship this writer will be particularly guided by 
reference to how contemporary naval officers assessed its 
contribution in performing the various naval tasks 
described. 
As naval operations are tied to the logistical 
infrastructure and the fleet organisation that sustain and 
control them, an overview of the Royal Navy's fleet 
organisation is warranted prior to an assessment of the 
capital ship's place in the continuum of naval operations. 
The Royal Navy Fleet Orcanisation of the. Interwar 
Period. The Grand Fleet survived the war long enough to 
allow a newly promoted Beatty to fly the Union Flag 
signifying his promotion to Admiral of the Fleet. Four 
days after his promotion in April 1919, though, the Grand 
Fleet was disestablished and a much reduced Atlantic Fleet 
took its place. 13 The Plans Division of the Admiralty had 
been contemplating the size of the postwar Service even 
whilst the military issue was still in doubt. To this end, 
a navy composed of thirty-three capital ships, of which, 
twenty-three would be in full commission was envisioned. 14 
Nine late model pre-dreadnought ships, all with varying 
degrees of reduced manning, and five seaplane carriers in 
full commission would also be retained. 15 
"Viability in this instance is not to be confused with 
survivability. The chapter on tactics will address the 
extent to which the capital ship was viewed as survivable. 
13Gordon, Rules of the Game, p. 538. 
"ADM 1/8549/1, Plans Division memorandum P. D. 1223 
dated 13 July 1918. 
15Ibid. 
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By February 1919, the ten ships of the Queen Elizabeth 
and Royal Sovereign-classes, the one-off Canada, " and all 
of the Service's active battle cruisers save one were 
tentatively identified for service in a newly styled 
Atlantic Fleet. A Mediterranean Fleet was to be formed 
around battleships of the Iron Duke and Kinn George y- 
classes, while six partially manned battleships of the 
Orion and King George V-classes were to make up a newly 
styled Home Fleet. '7 New Zealand was scheduled for the 
China Station, and the balance of a further twelve capital 
ships were to be assigned to the Reserve Fleet based at 
Portsmouth, Chatham, Devonport, Cromarty, Rosyth, and the 
Humber. 18 
Such planning had very much an element of wishful 
thinking about it, and the pressures for further economies 
moved the Admiralty to reconsider their capital ship plans. 
In September 1919, the best that could be anticipated was 
as an active force in the Atlantic Fleet of ten battleships 
and four battle cruisers and a Mediterranean Fleet of six 
battleships. The Home Fleet was eliminated and its units 
transferred to the Reserve Fleet on 1 October 1919; 19 the 
Reserve Fleet was to be further rationalised by eliminating 
the capital ships planned for Cromarty and the Humber. 20 In 
is Canada, originally built for the Chilean Navy, had 
been taken over by the Service during the war. Initial 
post-war efforts to transfer the ship to Chile to realise 
economic savings were hindered by Britain's obligations to 
the Arms Traffic Convention signed in Paris on 10 September 
1919. The ship was eventually transferred to Chile in 
November 1920; see ADM 1/8570/281. 
17ADM 1/8549/1, Admiralty memorandum M. 06366 dated 
February 1919. 
"Ibid. One ship not addressed in the Admiralty's 
postwar calculations was Australia, a heavy ship of the 
Royal Australian Navy. 
19ADM 1/8590/101, Admiralty letter M. 010118. dated 27 
September 1919 to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. 
2OADM 1/8549/1, Admiralty memorandum M. 03710 dated 11 
September 1919. 
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1922, the Reserve Fleet underwent further economies when it 
was reorganised into three divisions based at Portsmouth, 
The Nore, and Devonport. 21 
In addition to its two main fleets (Atlantic22 and 
Mediterranean) and several administrative Home commands 
(The Nore, Portsmouth, Devonport, Portland, Coast of 
Ireland, and Coast of Scotland) the Royal Navy maintained 
forces on distant stations including the North America and 
West Indies, China, East Indies, South America, Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand. 23 The forces assigned to the 
distant stations were primarily composed of cruisers, 
destroyers, submarines, and attendant supporting craft, 
with a cruiser serving as a flagship to the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Station or the Senior Naval Officer present. 
An exception to this general pattern was the China Station 
where a small aircraft carrier, numerous gunboats, and 
sloops were frequently deployed to support riverine 
operations, and the Australian station, where the 
Indefatigable-class battle cruiser Australia was assigned. 24 
Thus, capital ships, as a rule, did not operate on the 
lesser Stations. This failure to routinely employ capital 
ships can be ascribed to operational, logistical, 
political, and financial reasons, and no reason by itself 
forms a sufficient answer. Operationally, battleships were 
assigned to a squadron of similar type vessels and formed 
the striking arm of the main fleet; their concentration 
21ADM 1/8619/15, Admiralty Fleet Order 949, 'Reserve 
Fleet Reorganisation' dated 7 April 1922. 
22The Atlantic Fleet was redesignated the Home Fleet in 
March 1932. 
23The South American Station was eliminated and its 
area of responsibility included in a newly styled America 
and West Indies Station in 1921. See First Lord memorandum to Cabinet F. C. 72 dated 28 February 1921, ADM 1/8598/14. 
"Until, that is, it was disposed under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. 
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into a battlefleet was dogma. 25 Detaching a unit from its 
squadron for a prolonged deployment was disruptive to it 
and the squadron's operating cycle, impacted the ship's 
training regime, and required a period following the 
deployment for the ship to become an effective and 
efficient unit once more. 26 When a capital ship was 
detached for such an operation, it was typically a battle 
cruiser. For battle cruisers, the disruption of 
independent cruises was no less present, but, 
operationally, the Royal Navy accepted that such naval 
vessels in war could be expected to operate away from the 
main fleet. Thus, 
Battle cruisers will be useful in waters 
remote from the main theatre of operations, 
as they are capable of dealing with all 
types of surface vessels other than 
battleships, which are not likely to be 
employed on outlying operations. 27 
Nonetheless, such cruises were disruptive, and, in this 
regard, Renown's visit to the Far East in 1921-1922 is 
illustrative. Gun drill during the tour of the Prince of 
Wales was infrequently held. To wit: 
4" triples went to drill. I got on fairly 
well with my gun (S II) but there does not 
appear to be any drill laid down for these 
guns, and no-one in the ship knows much 
about them. 28 
25ADM 1/8605/81, Admiralty memorandum E. 4 regarding 
'Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation' dated February 1921, 
p. 12. 
26See ADM 1/8628/120, Director of Training and Staff 
Duties un-numbered minute dated 26 November 1921 to the 
paper 'Peace Distribution of the Fleet. ' 
27ADM 1/8605/81, Admiralty memorandum E. 4 regarding 
'Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation' dated February 1921, 
p. 12, 
28Journal entry for 14 December 1921, Barnard Papers, 
IWM/P255. See also the letters written by Tennant serving 
in Renown during the same cruise, Tennant Papers, National 
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, NMM/TEN/6. 
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A condition not at all unlike that experienced by New 
Zealand during her world cruise of 1919-1920. Gun drill 
was held infrequently and the results obtained were often 
disappointing. John Hammill, the ship's Gunnery Officer, 
recorded of one practice that, 'Q turret pretty good, 
remainder awful. Misfiring and bad drill or more likely, 
lack of drill. X turret especially bad. i29 
Moreover, when capital ships were employed on such 
high profile tours, it was typically the case that the 
ships were taken in hand to enhance their arrangements at 
the expense of their fighting qualities. Thus, in 
preparation for her 1919-1920 voyage, New Zealand's forward 
4-inch guns were removed to provide extra accommodation for 
Admiral and Lady Jellicoe and the range clocks eliminated, " 
whilst Renown's flying-off platforms were removed from 'B' 
and 'Y' turrets and the after 4-inch mount withdrawn to 
improve the habitability for the Prince of Wales during his 
tours of the 1919-1922 period. " 
Logistically, supporting capital ships was a difficult 
proposition in the absence of adequate docking and 
maintenance facilities and the infrastructure to support 
the provision of fuel oil. Hence, the vital importance of 
developing Singapore as a fleet base and anchorage for the 
Far East, if the Navy was to meet its extra-European 
defence commitments. Outside of the United Kingdom and the 
facilities at Gibraltar and Malta, the only naval dockyards 
in the Empire capable of supporting capital ships were 
located at Durban, South Africa and Esquimalt, Canada. Nor 
could the Admiralty contemplate using the commercial 
"Diary entry dated 15 July 1919, Hammill Papers, 
IWM/92/18/1. 
30Cruises of H. M. S. "New Zealand" on Naval Mission to 
India and the Dominions, Volume I (Ottawa: Simmons 
Printing, 1919), p. 10 and Burt British Battleships of 
World War ne, p. 102. 
31Bi11 Johnson, 'HMS Renown, ' Warship Worl Vol. 5, 
No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 18. 
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dockyards of the Empire; the only one able to handle 
capital ships was located in St. John, New Brunswick. 32 
Even the facilities found on the Mediterranean Station were 
not all that could be wished for by a navy operating 
capital ships. Summarising the results of the Atlantic 
Fleet's 1920 Spring Cruise Admiral Madden could write that, 
'The inadequacy of Malta and Gibraltar for coping with 
large modern battlefleets, either as regards berthing, 
docking or removal of guns has become very apparent. v 33 The 
problem of dockyard support was not due to a lack of 
foresight on the Admiralty's part so much as the state of 
financial stringency and the tendency for all classes of 
warships to become larger than their predecessors. During 
the late war, the need to provide better anti-torpedo 
protection was recognised and one remedy adopted was to 
provide bulges along the hull of capital ships. 
Unfortunately, this increased the beam of the ship and made 
many of the existing docks obsolescent. Eventually, the 
limited facilities of Malta cited by Madden were augmented 
by providing an ex-German floating dock. 34 This measure, 
though, was not completed until 1926 as the dock to be 
used, Kiel No. 8, had to be modified. 35 
Yet, valid as Madden's observations were, and 
notwithstanding the importance of developing adequate 
basing facilities in the Pacific, it is important to 
realise that even the dockyard facilities found in Britain 
were wanting. On this point, Field whilst serving as Third 
"Precis of a 1934 Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich 
lecture by Commander J. F. Stevens on 'Bases, II', in 
Oliver-Bellasis Papers, NMM/BEL/151. 
33ADM 1/8586/68, Report of Proceedings of Atlantic 
Fleet Spring Cruise, 1920 letter No. 374/A/H. 1186. dated 22 
March 1920. 
34ADM 1/8616/218, comments by Director of Operations 
Division to P. D. 01667/21 dated 10 December 1921. 
35N. J. M. Campbell, 'Washington's Cherrytrees: The 
Evolution of the British 1921-22 Capital Ships, ' Warship, 
Volume II, pp. 13-14 
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Sea Lord and Controller observed that: 
The Board have already approved a policy of 
bulging all ships of "QUEEN ELIZABETH" 
Class at as early date as circumstances will 
permit, and our present resources for 
docking these ships are limited to 
Portsmouth and Rosyth. In a few years' time 
there will presumably be in the Fleet the 
two new battleships, 36 "HOOD", "RENOWN", 
"REPULSE", 5 "ROYAL SOVEREIGNS", 5 "QUEEN 
ELIZABETHS", none of which will be able to 
dock at Chatham or Devonport when bulged, 
and only two at most can be docked at one 
time at Portsmouth. 37 
Politically, the distribution of the Royal Navy, including 
its capital ships, was very much tied to areas where 
Britain possessed substantial imperial interests, and one 
reason why other stations, such as China and Australia, 
were not favoured as a forward base for capital ships was 
because political instability was so acute in the Eastern 
Mediterranean for much of the period under 
investigation. 38 
As for considerations of finance, Chapter Two has 
discussed at some length the extreme fiscal pressures that 
faced the interwar navy. Still, two additional 
observations are provided. The pressure to economise was 
at times taken to excessive lengths by an Admiralty 
Secretariat fearful of a powerful Treasury Department. 
When Madden suggested deferring the paying off of a capital 
ship as his fleet had yet to use its full allowance of fuel 
owing to spending more time in port as a result of 'U. C. ' 
1923. 
"Nelson and Rodney. 
37ADM 1/8637/54, un-numbered minute dated 23 January 
38See ADM 1/8628/120, Captain G. Hamilton, 'Peace 
Distribution of the Fleet. ' Hamilton, at the time of the 
papers preparation, was an instructor at the Royal Naval 
College, Greenwich. 
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duties, 39 he was reminded that sanction existed for 
maintaining only twelve capital ships irrespective of their 
actual running costs. " As the pressure to economise 
continued throughout the 1920's, the Service was forced to 
reorganise the deployment pattern of its capital ships 
between the Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. In 1926, 
the Mediterranean Fleet was reduced from eight battleships 
to five, while the Atlantic Fleet was increased from four 
to six battleships, 41 and for a time only one of the 
Atlantic Fleet's battleships, Revenge, was fully manned. 42 
Thus, a regular regime of capital ship operations outside 
of Home waters (that part of the Atlantic from England to 
the north coast of Africa) was not an option for most of 
the period under discussion. Still, if capital ships were 
not regularly assigned to the distant stations of the Royal 
Navy, they did make periodic visits throughout the period 
in question. Typically, such visits were made in 
conjunction with a significant local anniversary or event. 
It is this aspect of naval operations, the employment of 
the capital ship in executing a mission of naval presence, 
that will now be examined. 
Missions of Naval Presence During the Interwar Period. 
The association of naval forces as an extension of a 
nation's foreign policy has long been recognised, and, 
indeed, the phrase 'gunboat diplomacy' summarizes, if only 
in a crude manner, one particular aspect of missions of 
naval presence. Naval missions of presence routinely 
involve nothing more than 'showing the flag' on a distant 
station. By such means, a country simply conveys a message 
39Scheme 'U. C. ' was the designation for the provision 
of naval and military support to the Home Government during 
periods of civil unrest. 
40See ADM 1/8599/18, Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, 
Atlantic Fleet letter M. 31928 dated 30 August 1921. 
410liver 'Recollections, Volume II', p. 288, Oliver 
Papers, NMM/OLV 12. 
"Ibid. 
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that an interest, of sorts, is present. For Britain in the 
postwar period, the Royal Navy conducted such operations as 
a tangible sign of the ties of Empire, as an indication of 
political friendship with other states, to further its 
economic interests, and to assist expatriates when 
disturbances in a third country arose. Further, while it 
is the case that missions of naval presence are sometimes 
conducted to assert a right of passage in waters of 
disputed control, this aspect of naval operations is more 
familiar in the, post-1945: era. 
Prior to the Great War, the Royal Navy had 
concentrated its forces in Home waters to deal with the 
rising German naval threat. With the war's end, the Navy 
sought sanction to return to its previous policy of 
maintaining forces in areas of substantial British 
interests. In a memorandum to the War Cabinet, Walter 
Long, 43 the First Lord, reminded his colleagues that: 
An attack by Germany in the North Sea was, 
as we now know, rightly regarded as the risk 
which overshadowed all others; and therefore 
our Navy was built for this particular work 
- and we largely abandoned the policy which 
had previously been pursued of 'showing the 
flag' in foreign and other waters. The 
information which reaches the Board of 
Admiralty from many quarters convinces us 
that the time has come when it is necessary 
that the White Ensign 'should be seen in all 
these places. " 
Capital ships were to feature prominently in these 
evolutions and, in so far as such a warship represented the 
United Kingdom, their use was often deemed vital. 
Commenting on the impression New Zealand had made at 
Bergen, Norway when it arrived to transport Queen Maud and 
"Walter Hume Long (1854-1924); Conservative 
politician; First Lord of the Admiralty (1919-1921); 
Created Ist Viscount Long of Wraxall (1921). 
"Walter Long to War Cabinet memorandum titled 'Post- 
War Naval Policy' dated 12 August 1919 cited in Ranft, ed., 
Beatty Papers, Volume II, pp. 53-54. 
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the Crown Prince to Britain in December 1918, one official 
noted: 
I have been credibly informed, since my 
return to this country, that the arrival of 
H. M. S. Battle Cruiser "New Zealand" in the 
middle of December to convey' the Queen of 
Norway and Crown Prince Olaf to England 
created a profound impression in Bergen, 
especially among the working classes and the 
Socialist. This visit, coming as it did, 
after the complete collapse of the German 
Navy brought home to every Norwegian the 
fact of our complete victory and also the 
fact that Great Britain continued to take 
the warmest interest in Norway. I venture 
to state the considered opinion that the 
dispatch of this fine cruiser to fetch Her 
Majesty was entirely justifiable and 
advisable not only from the dynastic point 
of view but more especially from that of 
British interests. " 
There is a bitter irony in Findlay's comments. British 
attempts at securing Norway as an ally during the late war 
had foundered when that state concluded that the Royal Navy 
could not protect her from Germany. 41 Still, New Zealand's 
experience was mirrored when elements of the Battle Cruiser 
Squadron toured the Baltic region in the summer of 1920. 
In an official assessment regarding the Squadron' s stay in 
Sweden, it was remarked that: 
The recent visit of H. M. Ships Hood (flying 
the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, 
K. C. B., K. C. V. O., C. M. G., D. S. O. ) Tiger and 
destroyers was an unqualified success. The 
King of Sweden, the Premier and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs were most enthusiastic, and 
the King was much touched at the mark of 
attention shown in having his flag flown as 
a British Admiral when on board H. M. S. Hood. 
Great publicity was given to the visit in 
the Press and the comments were distinctly 
friendly; incidentally the visit has had an 
"ADM 1/8551/43, Political Report No. 12 by Sir 
Mansfeldt de Cardonnel Findlay to Earl Curzon dated 4 
February 1919. Maud was the sister of George V. 
46 David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 29. 
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excellent effect on banking and commercial 
circles. 47 
The interwar period is noteworthy for the number and 
diversity of such visits by capital ships, in general, and 
by battle cruisers, in particular. Appendix V highlights 
the use made of capital ships in 'showing the flag' during 
the interwar period to countries, dominions, and colonies 
not regularly visited by units of the Atlantic, Home, and 
Mediterranean Fleets. Arguably, such visits by a capital 
ship did not always achieve the results intended. At 
times, the visits served as a catalyst for igniting local 
discontent while on other occasions they could be reduced 
to farce. During Renown's time in Indian waters in 1921, 
strikes and rioting had broken out in Bombay whilst the 
Prince of Wales was visiting, leaving one witness to 
record: 
There were some disturbances in the town 
during the day, and although Gandhi's 
efforts to boycott HRH's drive through the 
streets yesterday were a failure, owing to 
the loyalty of the great mass of natives, 
there is no doubt that his propaganda has 
had an effect. His effort to spoil the 
illuminations in the town by declaring an 
electrician's strike, failed completely. 4e 
Still, not all Indians were ill-disposed to the visit, and 
Barnard continued his narrative with the observation that 
when the Prince departed Bombay for Baroda he 'was given a 
splendid send off by the loyal population, who wanted in 
some measure to atone for the riots which rather marred his 
visit. 11 Moreover, some local dignitaries were exceedingly 
generous in welcoming such port calls. A feature noted by 
the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies when he reported: 
47 'Confidential Monthly Intelligence Report, ' No. 15, 
15 July 1920, p. 17, Richmond Papers, NMM/RIC/4/1. 
"Journal entry 18 November 1921, Barnard Papers, 
IWM/P255. 
19lbid., entry dated 22 November 1921. 
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"RENOWN" is at present cruising in the 
Persian Gulf; she returns to Bombay on the 
19th December, when arrangements are being 
made to send her crew in two watches on a 
visit lasting a week to Agra and Delhi; the 
cost of this visit is being borne almost 
entirely by a local Parsi gentleman. so 
However, the goodwill generated by a capital ship 
visit was a tenuous thing, and it could come to grief for 
reasons other than the reception provided by the local 
populace. When Hood and Repulse visited Rio de Janeiro in 
September 1922, also in attendance to celebrate Brazil's 
centenary of independence were three Japanese cruisers and 
the American battleships Marvland51 and USS Nevada. 52 With 
the American presence growing both materially and 
commercially in South America, 53 the Royal Navy was anxious 
to show itself in the best light, and, to this end, the 
customary courtesies of shipboard dinners and dances were 
held. Sports competitions were also arranged between the 
ships' companies and 
In every race our competitors walked 
through, the Japanese and the Americans 
being nowhere. That is the sort of thing 
which raises British prestige, which has 
suffered here just lately at the hands of 
the Yanks . 54 
A result that the Americans, unfortunately, were not of a 
mind to see repeated in the ring, and Elkins recorded the 
following incident: 
SOADM 1/8616/221, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies 
Report of Proceedings letter No. 881/025D to Admiralty dated 
16 December 1921. 
"Completed in 1921 and armed with eight 16-inch guns. 
"Completed in 1916 and armed with ten 14-inch guns. 
530n the background to this rivalry, see Mary Klachko, 
'Anglo-U. S. Naval Competition, 1918-1922, ' Unpublished Ph. 
D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1961. 
54Journal entry dated 9 September 1922, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. 
245 
At 2100 the boxing competition between 
the American Squadron & ourselves took 
place. There were eight fights all told, 
one of which, the heavy weights, was called 
"no fight", since the American competitor 
knocked out Sto P. O. Spillar while shaking 
hands at the beginning of the first Round. 
This nearly brought the house down and it 
looked as if the situation might develop 
into a roughhouse. 55 
In the end, the American admiral was forced to apologise 
for the misconduct of his sailors, and Maryland and Nevada 
departed Brazilian waters earlier than planned. An 
incident of more serious import was Rear Admiral Field's 
remarks in Victoria, British Columbia during Hood's visit 
to Canada. Field remarked that the operation of four 
cruisers by the Dominion would be an appropriate measure 
given her dependence on overseas trade and the expansion of 
Asiatic countries ; 51 his comments drew fire from critics on 
both sides of the Atlantic as it touched upon an issue of 
policy. 57 
It has already been remarked that battleships as a 
rule were not employed in such high profile visits to the 
distant stations. Still, departures from this pattern did 
occur and included the use of Malaya to transport the Duke 
of Connaught to India in January 1921, and the visit to 
Thingvalla, Iceland by Rodney in June 1930 in commemoration 
of the Althing's millenary. 58 Moreover, from 1931 visits to 
the West Indies by Atlantic and Home Fleet heavy ships 
"Ibid., entry dated 11 September 1922. 
56ADM 116/2256, Field as cited in Daily Province, 2 
July 1924. Field was not the only officer to fall foul of 
Canadian sensitivities on naval matters. Captain H. W. 
Parker, the commanding officer of Repulse, was forced to 
issue a retraction over comments made whilst visiting 
Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
57Ernle B. Bradford, The Mighty Hood: The Life an 
Death of the Royal Navy's Proudest Ship (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1959), p. 87. 
58Journal entry dated 26 June 1930, Beaufoy-Brown 
Papers, LHCMA; the Althing is the Icelandic parliament. 
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became an accepted practice. Yet, if battleships did not 
routinely operate on the distant stations of the Royal 
Navy, they were feted by the visits of foreign dignitaries, 
and the backdrop of the Atlantic Fleet was frequently 
employed when foreign leaders toured the United Kingdom. 
Representative of this role was the visit of the King and 
Queen of Afghanistan in April 1928 when no less than five 
battleships and three battle cruisers were assembled. " 
Turning to the matter of 'showing an unfriendly flag, ' 
it has been remarked already that freedom of navigation 
operations were of lesser importance in the interwar era. 
Still, in one instance of the period, the Royal Navy went 
to extraordinary lengths to maintain the principle of free 
maritime passage and vigorously 'showed an unfriendly 
flag'. From the end of the 1914-1918 war until the Treaty 
of Lausanne, 60 the Eastern Mediterranean was an area of 
acute turmoil, and, culminating with the Chanak crisis of 
1922, it nearly led to war between Turkey and Britain. 
Ultimately, with the Treaty of Sevres, 61 Britain secured the 
internationalisation of the Turkish Straits and commenting 
on its terms, Laird has written that 'the British were the 
leading protagonists of a treaty for Turkey which was 
humiliating even by the standards of 1919-20'. 62 Still, 
prior to the treaty, Turkish resistance was anticipated 
and: 
The situation in Constantinople is 
"The battleships were Nelson, Rodney, Iron Duke, 
Benbow, Marlborough, and Emperor of India whilst Hood, 
Repulse, and Renown were the battle cruisers present. 
Blake Papers, NMM/BLE/4. 
"'Signed 24 July 1923. 
"Signed 10 August 1920 and formally ending the First 
World War with Turkey; see Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A 
Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 
"Michael Laird, 'Wars Averted: Chanak 1922, Burma 
1945-47, Berlin 1948, ' The Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Volume 19, Number 3, September 1996, p. 343. 
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serious and very urgent. It is anticipated 
that violent resistance will be offered to 
the Terms of Peace and steps are being taken 
to strengthen the Allied position, as by 
showing a strong front at the commencement, 
it is hoped that the chances of over-awing 
any resistance will be greatly enhanced.... 
There at present at Constantinople -8 
Battleships, 1 Light Cruiser, 10 Destroyers, 
3 Sloops and 1 Seaplane Carrier. 
Arrangements have been made to land 
2,000 men from the Fleet. 63 
In fact, a series of naval landings were conducted on 
the Turkish coasts with reinforcements provided by the 
Atlantic Fleet. Amongst the ships participating in these 
demonstrations was Ramillies, and one midshipman recorded 
that: 
Seaman & Marine's (sic) battalions landed at 
7.45. a. m., & marched through Stamboul across 
the Golden Horn, & returned at 11.30. a. m. 
having marched 4 miles. The march was 
carried out under very favourable weather 
conditions, & from reports made a great 
impression on the Turkish & other native 
inhabitants. "' 
Certainly, one consideration for Britain in seeking to 
maintain unfettered access to the Straits was her ongoing 
support of anti-Soviet operations in the Crimea. Simply 
put, projecting naval power against the Soviet Union would 
not have been possible, if Turkey had been allowed to 
control the Straits. Finally, it must be remarked that 
what started out as a naval demonstration, quickly evolved 
into a mission of deterrence, and culminated with a series 
of limited naval strikes. 
How then are we to measure the contribution of the 
"ADM 1/8578/6, Director of Operations (F), 'Report on 
Matters of Naval Interest, Week Ended, 13th March, ' dated 
15 March 1920. 
"Midshipman Journal of T. L. Metters entry dated 24 
February 1920, Lieutenant Commander Thomas Lee Metters 
Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's 
College, London. 
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Royal Navy's capital ships in executing the task of 
peacetime naval presence? If judged only by their 
frequency, the Admiralty placed great credence in the 
special value that a capital ship lent to a royal tour; 
this, notwithstanding, the disruption that such use had on 
a ship's fighting efficiency. Moreover, that capital ships 
operating off Spanish waters during the civil war were 
recalled for the express purpose of participating in the 
Coronation Review of 1937 provides some indication of the 
importance the Admiralty attached to these evolutions. 
Certainly, there was an element of prestige involved, and 
the Navy was wont to capitalize on this. Afterall, it was 
the Royal Navy and not the British Navy. 65 Furthermore, at 
a time of deep retrenchment in defence spending, such 
evolutions were a potent reminder to the public and to the 
Treasury of- the utility of naval forces, an important 
fillip to crew morale, and a highly visible affirmation 
that the Royal Navy was a blue-water navy. If measured 
only by their popularity and the enthusiasm that they 
generated, such evolutions were extremely effective. One 
estimate is that during the Empire cruise of 1923-1924, the 
Special Service Squadron" was visited by nearly 250,000 
people during its stopovers at Honolulu, Vancouver, and 
Victoria. 6" 
Yet, such displays of British naval prowess sometimes 
generated a political cost. The Foreign Office objected to 
the 1931 visit of Atlantic Fleet heavy ships to the West 
Indies because of concern over possible American reaction, 
65The Navy's sensitivity to its prestige is highlighted 
by the decision to forsake the use of the pre-dreadnought 
HMS Lord Nelson as a target ship and to employ Agamemnon 
instead. See Deputy Chief of Naval Staff memorandum dated 
19 February 1919, Fremantle Papers, NMM/FRE/314/138. 
66Formation composed of Hood, Repulse, and attendant 
vessels. 
67Bradford, The Mighty Hood, p. 84. 
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while the Spithead Review of 1924 inflamed French opinion. 68 
To wit, 
The French Press contains hostile criticism 
of the British Naval Review. It is noted 
that 196 war vessels took part, and surprise 
is expressed that such a demonstration of 
Britain's Naval Power should be sanctioned 
by a Labour Government, which professes to 
be working in the interests of peace and 
general disarmament. The Prime Minister is 
accused of keeping his pacificism as an 
"article for export only. " 69 
The Admiralty balanced the use of capital ships in 
support of missions of naval presence with the operational 
requirements of the Service. Whilst the Coronation Review 
of 1937 took place against the backdrop of the Spanish 
Civil War, it was not held at the expense of the Service's 
ongoing commitment to that crisis. Unlike the review of 
1935, the Mediterranean Fleet was not totally denuded of 
capital ships, and, indeed, Royal Oak of the Home Fleet was 
especially retained near Spanish waters and missed the 
review. 70 Moreover, it is important to recall that the 
review of 1935 was held prior to the beginning of the 
Abyssinian crisis with Italy. Finally, when in the spring 
of 1939 plans were being formulated for a tour of Canada by 
George VI and Queen Elizabeth, the decision was made to use 
a commercial liner rather than Repulse as the Navy could 
not spare the battle cruiser. 71 
Of course, it would be misleading if it was left 
unremarked that other ships--particularly cruisers and 
68 'Narrative of Command, Volume VII, ' Haggard Papers, 
IWM/85/21/2, pp. 35-36. 
69ADM 223/812, 'Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, ' No. 64, dated 15 August 1924, p. 9. 
70See Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet to Rear Admiral, 
Second Battle Squadron signal (0012) received Royal Oak 
0145 20 May 1937, Peachey Papers, NMM/PCY/3. 
71Edward Parry letter to his wife dated 25 April 1939, 
Admiral Sir Edward Parry Papers, Imperial War Museum, 
London, IWM/71/19/9. 
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destroyers--were no less involved in conducting missions of 
naval presence. Given the naval forces assigned to the 
distant stations, such vessels were very much the dogsbody 
of such evolutions. Moreover, if a stay was contemplated 
at a port with restricted facilities, a successful visit 
might require the use of a less substantial warship. 
Following one battleship's visit her captain advised that: 
17. - Although the authorities had gone 
to a great amount of trouble in relaying a 
buoy inside the harbour for "ROYAL OAK", I 
decided it was impossible for the ship to 
lie at it, there being insufficient water 
for swinging in. Although it was a great 
disappointment to the Spanish that we could 
not come inside, when Port Authorities saw 
the size of the ship they were in full 
agreement.... 
19. - Should any future visit be 
contemplated it would be advisable for a 
cruiser to go to Santander instead of a 
battleship. The anchorage in Sardinero Bay 
is fully exposed to any northerly winds and 
the slightest breeze sets up a big swell, 
making boat work hazardous. 72 
Still, there remained a qualitative difference, 
intangible to be sure, when such a task was executed by a 
capital ship. It would be going too far to avow that the 
peacetime raison d'etre of the capital ship was the size of 
its quarterdeck. However, considerations of space alone 
dictated that when a tour of some importance was being 
planned, the employment of a capital. ship was the trump 
card of the Royal Navy. Assessing the effectiveness of the 
Royal Navy's capital ships in 'showing an unfriendly flag' 
is more intractable. Turkey was not over-awed by the 
presence of a reinforced Mediterranean Fleet, and, in the 
end, Britain secured her objectives only by conducting a 
series of limited naval strikes with a sizeable military 
presence ashore. Perhaps it is fitting to leave the last 
word with Beatty. A paramount reason for sending Hood and 
"ADM 1/8735/75, Commanding Officer Royal Oak letter of 
proceedings No. 43/1213 to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth 
dated September 1929. 
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Tiger and their associated escorts to Sweden and Denmark in 
the summer of 1920 was to support a possible demonstration 
against Russia. An event, in the end, that failed to 
materialise. Writing to his wife, he commented: 
We have now presented Soviet Russia 
with an ultimatum. . . We have now no men and 
no money. We have ships, but what can they 
do against a Power that is without Sea 
Forces. Blockade, yes, but that amounts to 
nothing. We can send ships, big ships, into 
the Baltic to obtain moral effect - but will 
that accomplish anything? 73 
Surveillance. Whilst forming a part of their 
operational continuum, Arnott and Gaffney do not define 
surveillance as a naval mission. Still, this writer 
accepts that surveillance exists as a distinct naval 
mission and proffers the following definition to facilitate 
an operational analysis of the capital ship. To wit, 
surveillance will be viewed as 'the act of deploying naval 
force to monitor an ongoing military or naval operation of 
another power without prejudice to the outcome of the 
operation, or the use of naval force to enforce a 
recognised international sanction such as the suppression 
of piracy, the slave trade, or the implementation of an 
embargo or blockade. ' As surveillance does not seek to 
influence the course of action being followed by another 
power it falls below deterrence. Yet, as it requires the 
deployment of force, or the augmentation of an existing 
force, surveillance is beyond the realm of a routine 
mission of naval presence. 74 
During the interwar period, the Royal Navy conducted 
73Ranft, ed., Beat Papers, Volume L, p. 97. 
74Surveillance to be effective must, at times, be 
hidden or disguised. With this aspect of covertness, 
surveillance can in some respects be viewed as the 
antithesis of naval presence and deterrence. The Israeli 
attack on the USS Liberty in 1967 and the North Korean 
capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968 remain perhaps the 
quintessential examples of the task of naval surveillance 
at work. 
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missions of surveillance in its Home waters, the waters 
covered by the Mediterranean Fleet, and on the distant 
stations. An example of a surveillance operation in Home 
waters was provided by Hood on 4 August 1920 when she 
intercepted a convoy of surrendering German warships off 
the Scottish coast. Operation 'D. Y. ' placed boarding 
parties from Hood on the German ships to determine, inter 
alia, the presence of submarine motors and wireless 
equipment, but the searches conducted revealed the presence 
of no contraband. 75 
Surveillance was a primary naval task on the China 
Station during the interwar era where its initial focus was 
the suppression of piracy along the coastal waters and 
inland waterways. Given the distances involved and the 
restricted nature of the waters, the light forces assigned, 
to include an aircraft carrier, were the ideal vessels 
suited for this naval task. Thus, when pirates seized the 
British merchant vessel SS Shuntien as it was steaming 
between Taku and Cheefoo on 17 June 1933: 
Action was taken immediately by the 
Commander-in-Chief at Weihaiwei. H. M. S. 
Eagle and Destroyers were ordered to the 
vicinity and a reconnaissance by aircraft 
was carried out over the estuary of the 
Yellow River. The pirates gave away their 
position by opening fire on the 
reconnaissance aircraft from junks in a 
creek. This fire was returned with effect. 
Live bombs were dropped near the junks 
accompanied by threats in writing to bomb 
the junks themselves. 76 
75ADM 1/8590/106, Report of Proceedings letter 
No. 27/12. dated 6 August 1920 from Captain Wilfred 
Tomkinson and Alan Coles, Invergordon Scapegoat: The 
Betrayal of Admiral Tomkinson (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1993), 
p. 102. Coles' records the interception as taking place on 
5 August but Tomkinson's report cited above shows that it 
happened on 4 August 1920. 
76p. 18, 'A Brief Historical Summary of Affairs 
connected with the China Station' dated June 1937. Captain 
R. C. Bayne Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, 
IWM/91/29/1. 
253 
In time, the emphasis of the Royal Navy's surveillance 
duties became the monitoring of military and naval 
operations of Japan as that state expanded its penetration 
in the region. As the situation continued to deteriorate 
throughout the period, these surveillance operations grew 
in importance. In the Far East, the very basis of British 
imperial defence policy was predicated on receiving ample 
warning of any threat beyond the resources of local forces. 
The policy of 'Main Fleet to Singapore' left much to chance 
and ran considerable risks. The China and East Indies 
Stations were not sized to provide even a minimum level of 
deterrence, but were composed for purposes of presence, 
surveillance, and providing support to the local 
authorities. 
In the main, the general absence of capital ships from 
Asian and Pacific waters did not hinder the conduct of 
surveillance operations against Japan. The Royal Navy's 
surveillance of Japanese operations in China had allowed a 
highly detailed assessment to be developed regarding that 
country's military and naval strengths and weaknesses. The 
rapid rise in the manning of the Imperial Japanese Navy 
from nearly 90,000 in 1932 to 112,000 by 1935 was noted by 
Rear Admiral Gerald Dickens" in a lecture at the Royal 
Naval War College. 78 In addition, the tremendous strides 
the Japanese Navy were making, and expected to make, in 
developing their naval air arm, the ongoing modernisation 
of her capital ships, and the scale of fleet manouevres 
were appreciated, particularly when contrasted with the 
"Later Admiral Sir Gerald Charles Dickens (1879-1962); 
Captain (1919); Commanding Officer, Carlisle (1922-1924) on 
China Station; Commanding Officer, Repulse (1929-1931); 
Director of Naval Intelligence (1932-1935); Vice-Admiral 
(1936). 
78Lecture titled 'Japan and Sea Power' by Director of 
Naval Intelligence, Captain Gerald Dickens to Royal Naval 
War College, Greenwich on 15 May 1935, Dickens Papers, 
LHCMA. 
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current state of affairs in the Royal Navy. 79 Commenting on 
the operations of the Japanese Third Fleet in Chinese 
waters, the Commanding Officer of the cruiser HMS Danae, 
reported: 
They are prodigal in the use of 
ammunition and they appear to lack fire 
discipline; war is even more to them a 
matter of firing the guns than of directing 
them. Equipment in the 3rd Fleet is not of 
a high order. They appear to rely upon 
barrage fire with fixed fuse setting for 
their protection against aircraft. Their 
aircraft are poorly constructed and are not 
well handled: they never operate with more 
than three or at most four aeroplanes in 
company. When large numbers are used flight 
follows flight. Their bombing is inaccurate 
particularly the high bombing. Their ground 
work is exceptionally good both on 
aerodromes and on carriers. Six bombers 
landed on a carrier in 7 Minutes. 10 Secs. 
In fact everywhere where practice is 
possible they can become all but word 
perfect . 
80 
Therefore, in terms of carrying out a mission of 
surveillance, the lack of capital ships in Asian and 
Pacific waters did not prevent a general picture of 
Japanese capabilities from being formed. An unwritten 
understanding of mutual and equal surveillance existed 
between the two navies. While the two powers were allies 
the sharing of information was made easier by the existence 
of a political understanding. Thus, the Commander-in- 
Chief, China Station reported: 
With reference to Admiralty telegram 
No. 820 the Japanese Admiralty, having 
invited two officers to accompany the Naval 
Attache (sic) to witness the battle practice 
of three Japanese Battleships and two Battle 
Cruisers on the 29th, 30th and 31st July, I 
detailed Commander Frederick Bennett of my 
79Ibid. 
80Report titled 'China, 1937' dated 20 November 1937 by 
Commanding Officer, Danae, Captain L. E. H. Maund, in 
Commander Sidney John Armstrong Papers, Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King's College, London. 
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Flagship and Lieutenant Commander C. E. 
Currey of "TITANIA" for this duty. They had 
not yet returned. Invitations have been 
sent for two Japanese Officers to come to 
Wei-hai-Wei on the 9th and 10th September to 
witness firing of British ships. 81 
Of the practice itself, the Japanese Navy made a favourable 
impression, and an internal assessment concluded in part: 
On the whole, it may be said that the 
materiel. of the Japanese is inferior to that 
in British ships, but their zeal and 
application make good use of such as they 
have, and their salvo firing is very good. 
The annual battle practices are carried 
out on very realistic lines and are 
witnessed by a large number of 
officials... The target used consisted of one 
black sail, 120 ft. by 30 ft., with a 60 ft. 
mast in the centre. This target was 
attached by spans six fathoms in length to 
a rear target 90 ft. by 30 ft., so that the 
pair represented a length of 250 ft. in all, 
towed on a 5-in. wire at a speed of 12 
knots.. . The firing ship's speed was about 21 knots. The Haruna fired 12 salvos from 14- 
in. guns and had six straddles, which was 
considered very good by the Japanese 
officers. The Hiyei fired eight salvos from 
14-in. guns and had one straddle, having 
apparently lost time. The range was 17,000 
to 19,000 yards, firing lasted 72 minutes, 
and six rounds a gun was the allowance. 
Hiyei fired 96 rounds in five minutes in 13 
salvos from her eight guns in the secondary 
armament, which was considered very good. 
The discipline at drill was excellent and 
the guns appeared easy to handle, but 
misfires occurred none the less, all firing 
being by electric tube. 82 
The reciprocity went beyond simply the inspection of each 
other's capital ships and touched almost every strand of 
"'ADM 1/8581/24, Commander-in-Chief, China Station 
Letter of Proceedings, No. 562/661C. 140 dated 4 August 
1920. 
82ADM 223/808, 'Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, ' No. 20, dated December 1920, pp. 20- 
21. 
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the bilateral naval relationship. When Renown visited 
Japan in 1922, one officer who would have a chance to 
refine his views on the Imperial Japanese Navy observed 
that: 
I took the Captain of the "Ise" round 
the ship for about half an hour. I had 
dined next to him at dinner the night 
before. He seemed a very nice little man & 
did not appear to be trying to spy. We were 
told that the Jap sailors are being taught 
to keep their eyes open .& pick up what they can for as soon as they return from 
visiting one of our ships they are all made 
to sit down & write an account of what they 
saw. Being extremely slow in the up take I 
doubt if they learn much. 83 
Still, Renown's visit afforded the Royal Navy the 
opportunity to examine the Japanese Navy at firsthand and 
when the battle cruiser anchored at Yokohama, an inspection 
of the naval base was possible. A tour by four officers 
included an inspection of the Gunnery School, the Dockyard, 
and the latest Japanese battleship--the Mutsu. Their 
subsequent report was reproduced in a 'Confidential 
Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report' and concluded with: 
In considering all we. had seen one could not 
fail to be astonished at the standard of 
efficiency and smartness that had already 
been reached, both as regards material and 
personnel, in the Japanese Navy, a Navy 
which, when viewed in comparison with those 
of Western nations, is, after all, only in 
its infancy. They have evidently 
appreciated the necessity of strict 
discipline and hard work as a basis of 
efficiency, and herein, coupled with an 
-amazing quality of perception and 
adaption, appears in some measure to be the 
secret of their remarkable success and 
progress . 
as 
83Tennant letter dated 26 April 1922, Tennant Papers, 
NMM/TEN/6. Tennant would later serve as the last 
commanding officer of Renown's sister ship Repulse. 
84 'A DAY AT THE NAVAL STATION, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN. ' in 
'Confidential Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report, ' No. 
37,15 May 1922, p. 38, Richmond Papers, NMM/RIC/4/1; 
original emphasis. 
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The process of reciprocal visits became strained when the 
British felt that they were not being accorded similar 
levels of access to Japanese ships and facilities as they 
afforded their former ally. There was very much a cat-and- 
mouse element in the way the two navies viewed each other, 
but by 1936 the one-sidedness of the relationship prompted 
a returning naval attache to recommend that visits by his 
Japanese counterpart to British naval facilities should be 
restricted. 85 Of course for the Royal Navy, the real 
problem was never one of simply determining Japanese 
capabilities or in divining Japanese intentions--those 
issues had largely been resolved. Rather, the issue was to 
muster sufficient force should a mission of deterrence 
prove necessary in the time available. 
If China represented the theatre where surveillance 
was the most regular ongoing naval task, then Spain was the 
scene that saw its furthest development, including the 
frequent use of capital ships. Certainly, the Service's 
response to the Spanish Civil War formed but one strand of 
the crisis, and its operational employment was very much 
coloured by the internationalisation of the war. Given the 
importance of the Straits for maintaining imperial 
communications and its possession of Gibraltar, Britain and 
her navy could not be disinterested in the events unfolding 
in Spain and Spanish Morocco in July, 1936, notwithstanding 
the attitude of Germany, Italy, France, and the Soviet 
Union. The Spanish Civil War provides an excellent 
operational venue to gauge the capital ship controversy. 
Coming as the war did so soon after the Abyssinian Crisis, 
the surveillance operations conducted strained the Navy and 
as Chatfield recorded: 
No sooner was the Abyssinian crisis over 
than a new one arose which was also 
seriously to affect the Navy. The Spanish 
85Best, 'Constructing an Image, ' Intelligence an 
National Security, Volume 11, Number 3, July 1996, pp. 412- 
413. 
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Civil War summoned the Navy in July, 1936, 
from Alexandria to Barcelona. For two years 
it was to keep watch and ward on the Spanish 
coast from the Bay of Biscay to 
Marseilles... 16 
In the event, the immediate issue facing the Navy was 
to protect British lives and property; reinforcement and 
rescue were the most pressing tasks. Only gradually did the 
mission expand to become one of surveillance. To this end, 
the Senior Naval Officer, Gibraltar requested that warships 
be sent to Spanish waters; a measure quickly adopted such 
that by 24 July 1936 thirteen vessels were operating in the 
immediate area. 87 One of the first units deployed and 
instantly involved in the reinforcement and rescue 
operations was Repulse. It departed Alexandria, Egypt for 
Gibraltar ferrying a battalion of infantry from the Gordon 
Highlanders; she then proceeded to Palma, Majorca and 
evacuated over 500 refugees on 30 July 1936.85 This 
operation took place against the backdrop of a series of 
air raids that had been occurring during the course of the 
week. Embarkation began at 1000 hours and was completed at 
1700 hours, at which time: 
the ship sailed for Marseilles. Just before 
weighing anchor Palma was subjected to the 
worst air raid she had yet experienced as 
though to emphasize the security of the 
battle cruiser. 89 
In the parlance of today, Repulse conducted a classic non- 
combatant evacuation operation; it would not be the last. 
By July, 1937, in excess of 27,000 refugees had been 
"Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 92. 
67Ji11 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish 
Civil War, 1936-1939 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), 
p. 105 
"Patrick Beesly, Very Special Admiral: The Life of 
Admiral J. H. Godfrey, CB (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980), 
pp. 85-86. 
89From undated report titled 'The Mediterranean Fleet 
in Spanish Waters, ' Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/3/1. 
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rescued by the Royal Navy. 90 
Notwithstanding the support in securing the safety of 
non-combatants, the Royal Navy's tasks during the Spanish 
Civil War gradually evolved into a lengthy surveillance 
operation aimed at limiting the importation of arms and 
ensuring the unhindered movement of normal commerce. First 
conducted under the sponsorship of the Non-Intervention 
Committee, they were later performed in accordance with the 
Nyon Agreement. From the beginning, an important 
consideration in mounting the surveillance operation was to 
be in a position to measure and limit Italian involvement. 
Accordingly, the Chiefs of Staff recommended inter alia 
that: 
We should maintain sufficient naval 
forces on the Western Mediterranean and 
Spanish Atlantic coasts to ensure that we 
have at least one ship at every port where 
the Italians have one, and that at important 
ports the British SNO is, if possible, 
senior to the Italian ... 
91 
The scale of these operations demanded the commitment 
of considerable resources including the capital ships, 
maritime patrol aircraft, and upwards of thirty 
destroyers. 92 At risk from air, surface, and subsurface 
threats, the dangers these naval forces faced operating off 
the Spanish coasts were very real. On 2 February 1937, 
Royal Oak was cruising off Europa Point near Gibraltar 
when: 
Three greyish low-winged three engine 
monoplanes flying 7000 feet considered 
possibly SAVOIA S 81, red wing tips, yellow 
and red horizontal stripes on rudder, two 
red bands athwart each wing and one round 
fuselage flew in formation over ROYAL OAK in 
position 36 degrees 10 minutes North 04 
degrees 45 minutes West and dropped three 
90Edwards, British Government and the Spanish Civil 
War, p. 105. 
"Ibid., p. 37. SNO refers to Senior Naval Officer. 
"Schofield, British Sea Power, p. 143. 
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small bombs in pattern, two of which 
exploded at 1135 Tuesday 2nd Feb. Nearest 
bomb fell three cables on starboard bow of 
Royal Oak. 113 
The Spanish Air Force attack missed, but Royal Oak was to 
be at the center of another incident later in the month 
when operating near Valencia. During an air raid on that 
city, an anti-aircraft shell hit the ship's quarterdeck 
slightly wounding a number of the crew. 94 An incident 
repeated in March, 1938 whilst operating near Majorca when 
Rear Admiral, Second Battle Squadron signalled: 
There was a small air raid on Palma at 1440 
today Tuesday, apparent objective insurgent 
cruisers. Three or four bombs dropped in 
the sea about six caples (sic) from 
"CANARIAS" and the same distance from "ROYAL 
OAK" One two-pounder shell hit "A" turret 
barbette in "ROYAL OAK" without exploding. 
No casualties or material damage. 95 
Still, one naval officer reflecting on the recent 
attacks against the German pocket battleship Deutschland 
and the Republican battleship Jaime Primero96 believed that 
naval surface forces had weathered the dangers well and 
commented that: 
we appear to have over-estimated the 
potentialities of air striking forces, and 
the earlier views--born of experience in the 
late war--that reconnaissance is the most 
effective role for naval aircraft seems to 
be re-established. If this is so, we ought 
to adjust the "casualty rules" used in our 
exercises, until they conform to current 
93Rear Admiral, Second Battle Squadron signal to 
Admiralty et al. dated 2 February 1937, Peachey Papers, 
NMM/PCY/3. 
94Ibid., dated 23 February 1937. 
"Rear Admiral, Second Battle Squadron signal to 
Admiralty dated 1 March 1938, Peachey Papers, NMM/PCY/3. 
"Completed 1914, displacing 16,140 tons, and armed 
with eight 12-inch guns; sunk after an internal explosion 
in June 1937. 
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results. 97 
A view endorsed much after the event by Chatfield when he 
recorded that: 
The Spanish War had one interesting 
effect. It warned the uniformed, that the 
extreme views of those who claimed that the 
days of navies was past, were premature. 
The small nationalist navy dominated the 
waters of Spain though within easy reach of 
modern aircraft. That there was difficulty, 
in hitting ships with bombs dropped from 
heavy bombers travelling at high speed, was 
shown... 98 
Indeed, even one of the severest of critics during the 
interwar period of the capital ship had to admit that the 
actual experience of war had shown that the threat from the 
air had yet to materialise. Thus, Russell Grenfell noted 
that: 
There have been a certain number of 
incidents in recent years in which aircraft 
and men-o-war have come into hostile 
contact. There was the Greek naval 
rebellion of 1935, when aircraft were sent 
out to bomb the rebel cruiser Averoff. 
There was the Dutch naval revolt in the Far 
East a couple of years earlier, when they 
were similarly sent to deal with a mutinous 
battleship. And there has been the evidence 
of the Spanish war. In all these cases, the 
achievements of the aircraft have been poor 
and a long way below what the air 
enthusiasts claimed would be the case. 99 
An officer who attempted one of the most analytical 
evaluations of the air threat from the Spanish Civil War 
was Captain William Tennant. '°° In 1938, whilst serving as 
an instructor at the Imperial Defence College, he directed 
97Alpha, 'Recent Naval War Experience, ' Naval Review, 
Volume XXV, 1937, p. 647. 
"Chatfield, It Might Happen Again, p. 94. 
99Grenfell, ea Power in the Next War, pp. 68-69. 
100Later Admiral Sir William George Tennant (1890-1963); 
Commanding Officer, Repulse (1941); Rear Admiral (1942); 
Vice Admiral (1945); Admiral (1948); retired (1949). 
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an exercise that examined, in part, the role of airpower in 
the Spanish Civil War. He concluded with: 
In my opinion, if a fleet is subject to the 
combined attack of the metropolitan air 
force of a country and if such an attack can 
be synchronised and if the A. A. fire has not 
improved on its present state today I 
believe such attack will be very serious. 
But, and I consider this a big but such 
synchronisation will be rare in war. 
Air Forces will have many calls on 
them .... 
111 
Tennant supported his argument by noting that of the 
thirty-four attacks made on warships in harbour, only 
eleven vessels had been damaged. 1°2 Whilst of forty-six ships 
that were attacked when underway, only six had received 
hits; in any event, no vessel had to date, been sunk by air 
attack. l°3 
Support to Civil Authorities Involving Capital Ships. 
On more than one occasion during the 1919-1939 period the 
Royal Navy provided support to civil authorities in dealing 
with industrial labour disputes, and planning for scheme 
'U. C. ' dated from at least October 1920.104 Furthermore, at 
least one Atlantic Fleet exercise of the period, 'M. M., ' 
conducted in October 1929, was played out against a 
presumed civil war occurring in Scotland. 1°5 (Perhaps not 
such a farfetched evolution, when it is recalled that the 
Navy and the Royal Marines had been actively involved in 
counter-guerilla operations arising from the civil war in 
101'Summary of Exercise 7, ' Tennant Papers, 
NMM/TEN/42/4. Original emphasis. 
102 Ibid. 
lo3Ibid. 
lo4ADM 1/8593/139, Military Branch un-numbered minute 
dated 2 November 1920. 
'°5Journal entry dated 25 October 1929, Beaufoy-Brown 
Papers, LHCMA. 
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Ireland between 1920-1922.106) Thus, it is perhaps with some 
irony that the capital ships of the Atlantic Fleet had a 
role to play in the former though not in the latter. 1°7 In 
an industrial dispute in Scotland in 1921, substantial 
naval forces were deployed to support local police efforts. 
Amongst the forces deployed was Nore Battalion D located at 
East Fortune, under the command of Captain M. L. Goldsmith. 
Composed of four companies of 1,100 ratings, they were 
taken, in part, from the battleship Erin, Royal Oak Depot, 
and from Repulse. 108 A second unit of similar strength, 
drawn in part from Repulse and Royal Oak, Nore Battalion A 
under Captain A. D. P. R. Pound, was held at Sheerness. 119 
Meanwhile, Hood deployed a naval landing party of sailors 
and Marines to protect railway operations from striking 
coal miners. "' When it appeared that a secondary strike by 
bus drivers of the Scottish Motor Transport was likely to 
occur in sympathy, Hood's midshipmen were seconded as 
drivers. "' 
Five years later, another coal strike began on 1 May 
1926 and turned into a General Strike by 4 May 1926. This 
promised to be a more difficult matter, and, again, the 
106As the loyalty of the workers handling the Royal Mail 
was open to question, special channels for handling U. C. 
related communications between the Admiralty, the Atlantic 
Fleet, and the several naval commands were established. 
See ADM 1/8593/139. 
lo' ala a visited Queenstown briefly in 1922 and readied 
a naval landing party. In the event, no landing was 
required; see ADM 1/8632/173. ADM 1/8652/253 discusses the 
specific support provided by the Royal Navy in Irish 
waters. 
108 ADM 1/8604/71, Confidential Office Acquaint M. 
0627/21 dated 5 May 1921. 
1091bid. 
"'Journal entry dated 14-16 April 1921, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. 
111A1an Coles and Ted Briggs, Flagship Hood: The Fate 
of Britain's Mightiest Warship (London: Robert Hale, 1985), 
p. 19. 
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Government took steps to mitigate the strike's effect. The 
Atlantic Fleet deployed from its Home Ports on 3 May 1926 
to perform its 'U. C. ' duties. 112 Stokers from Ramillies, 
with an escort of Marines, were transported to Holyhead, 
Wales to assume control of a power station whilst another 
contingent of Marines were ferried to Manchester from 
Ramillies to guard the city's oil tanks. 113 
Certainly, however, where support to civil authorities 
was most prominent was in the colonies of the Empire or 
areas where Britain retained substantial influence. When 
unrest broke out in the autumn of 1921, Centurion was 
ordered to Egyptian waters to render assistance. The 
battleship's crew was used to man six commandeered small 
craft which formed the Nile Flotilla and of the event, one 
participant wrote: 
We have been ordered up here to man 
some river steamers on the Nile which may be 
an interesting show.... I am going some 250 
miles up the Nile to Kenha. There are 6 
boats all together with 9 sailors in each & 
5 machine guns. I don't know how long we 
shall be up the Nile but it will be a great 
experience. It is many years since the 
White Ensign has been seen on the Nile. The 
object of our show is to evacuate any 
Britishers in Upper Egypt should it be 
necessary. A considerable amount of rioting 
has occurred here such as the breaking of 
shop windows and chopping down of trees by 
the road side all of a very childish 
nature. 114 
Centurion's contribution was deemed decisive and included 
in addition to Lieutenant Commander Trevor, six other 
112Diary entry dated 3 May 1926, Oliver Papers, 
NMM/OLV/15. 
"'Journal entries dated 5-12 May 1926, Waldron Papers, 
IWM/86/59/1. 
114Lieutenant Commander Ronald Trevor letter to his 
parents dated 24 December 1921, Commander Ronald A. Trevor 
Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, IWM/66/35/1. Kenha is 
at times also referred to as Qena. 
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officers, seven midshipmen, a gunner, and fifty-two petty 
officers and ratings. "" The disturbances soon ended and, 
The moral effect caused by the 
appearance of the White Ensign in the waters 
of the Nile was evidently of much value and 
exercised considerable influence in cooling 
the ardour of the extremists. 
Lord Allenby, in paying a warm tribute 
to the aid rendered by the Navy, remarks 
that, "It made just the difference between 
safety and chaos" . 
116 
One may question whether the populace even recognised the 
White Ensign for what it was, but of the salutary effects 
of the Nile Flotilla's gunboats Trevor's official report 
noted: 
Mr Boys, an Englishman in charge of a cotton 
spinning factory came down to the bank to 
meet us.... Mr Boys amused us very much at 
lunch by saying that the first intimation he 
received of our arrival was from a Greek who 
rushed into his office and told him that 
"Two dreadnoughts had arrived". '" 
It is difficult to make an accurate assessment on how 
vital, or even necessary, was the contribution of the 
Atlantic Fleet's capital ships, or more appropriately, 
their ships' companies, in supporting the civil authorities 
of the Home Government during the period's labour disputes. 
For a start, it was not just capital ships that provided 
naval landing parties in 'U. C. ' operations; personnel were 
also drafted from lesser warships. 11e Balanced against the 
fact that such sizeable forces could be quickly mustered 
and deployed, they clearly upset the routine of the fleet. 
The paying off of the older 12-inch gun battleships St. 
"5ADM 1/8617/229, Enclosure No. 5, Mediterranean Fleet 
letter No. 3338/6250/20 of 8 December 1921. 
"6ADM 1/8617/229, Director of Operations minute dated 
4 February 1922. 
11' ADM 1/8617/229, 'Narrative of H. M. Tunnel Tug No 2. ' 
"8ADM 1/8604/71, Confidential Office Acquaint M. 
0627/21 dated 5 May 1921. 
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Vincent, Neptune, and Hercules was delayed because such 
support was lent. 119 
Turning to the support provided to colonial 
administrations, the contribution of capital ships is much 
easier to measure. It is difficult to conceive under what 
circumstances a British capital ship would have turned even 
its secondary armament on a domestic disturbance, but such 
a course of action was always a real possibility on a 
colonial station. When after recent disturbances, New 
Zealand, for the benefit of visiting island chiefs, fired 
a 12-inch three-quarter charge off Samoa in October 1919, 
a not so subtle message was being conveyed. 120 A point no 
doubt in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief, North America 
and West Indies Station when he reported to the Admiralty 
that he was retaining the battleship HMS Temeraire, '2' 
recently converted to a cadet training ship, at Port-of- 
Spain, Trinidad 'to discourage any tendency to unrest 
ashore' following labour unrest in that colony. 122 
Still, whilst the presence of a capital ship may have 
made responding to a labour dispute or civil unrest that 
much easier for the local authorities, such employment must 
be viewed as a luxury of chance. At a planning conference 
held prior to the dispatch of the Nile Flotilla previously 
discussed, Centurion's presence was deemed vital to meet 
the manning requirements of the flotilla and to support the 
defence of the Suez Canal. Thus, 
It has been pointed out to the G. 0. C. 123 
119ADM 1/8599/18, Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth signal to 
Admiralty dated 28 June 1921. 
120Diary entry dated 15 Oct 1919, Hammill Papers, IWM 
92/18/1. 
121Commissioned 1909, armed with ten 12-inch guns, and 
of 22,300 tons displacement. 
122ADM 1/8579/13, Commander-in-Chief, North America and 
West Indies Station Letter of Proceedings, No. 64/S. 9 dated 
21 December 1919. 
"'General Officer Commanding. 
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that if a light cruiser relieves 
"Centurion", it is very improbable that she 
would be able to meet these requirements 
even with 2 destroyers. "' 
Centurion was held on station until the crisis had been 
defused and was then relieved by the cruiser Ceres on 21 
January 1922; the Nile Flotilla itself having been 
disbanded on 18 January 1922.125 One may contrast these 
events with the contemporaneous disturbances occurring in 
Hong Kong. When in February, 1922 Chinese seamen went out 
on strike, not only did the episode take on racial 
overtones, but the dispute raised serious security 
implications arising from the need to maintain food imports 
in the colony. The Navy was called upon to provide a wide 
range of support including operation of the customs 
service, manning the harbour tugs, and overseeing the 
transhipment of food. 126 Disruptive as the affair was, the 
China Fleet and its flagship, the cruiser Hawkins, managed 
it all without the presence of a capital ship. 
On balance, in an era when specialised amphibious 
warships had yet to make their appearance, the capital ship 
represented the period's closest equivalent. 
Notwithstanding, Richmond's theoretical arguments over what 
dictated the maximum size of a naval vessel, the practical 
experience of the Service when conducting naval operations 
in support of civil authorities was that a larger vessel 
was inherently more useful. Repulse's early intervention 
in Spain, cited earlier, is testimony of that point. Proof 
yet again was the intervention of the Royal Navy in 
Palestine in August and September 1929. The cruiser HMS 
'24ADM 1/8617/229, Senior Naval Officer, Egypt to 
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean letter No. 54/E/65/E dated 
15 December 1921. 
125ADM 1/8617/229, Director of Operations minute dated 
1 February 1922. 
126'The Hong Kong Strike, February, 1922. ' in 
'Confidential Admiralty Monthly Intelligence Report, No. 
37,15 May 1922, Richmond Papers, NMM/RIC/4/1. 
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Sussex fielded a naval landing party composed of 20 
officers and 297 ratings, whilst Barham was able to land 27 
officers and 403 men. 127 Yet, the balance was shifting. 
Courageous during the same intervention embarked a 
battalion at Malta of the South Staffordshire Regiment 
along with 32 of its limbered wagons, and proceeded to sea 
where: 
it was possible to "fly on" nineteen 
aircraft of three different types in the 
course of one and a half hours, and also, 
before troops were landed, to fly off six 
machines urgently required on arrival at 
Jaffa. 128 
Deterrence and Limited Naval Strikes. During the 
1919-1939 period, the Royal Navy conducted missions of 
deterrence as an outgrowth of its surveillance operations 
during the Spanish Civil War, to protect its interests in 
China, and to forestall Italian offensive operations 
against Egypt at the time of the Abyssinian Crisis. The 
use of heavy ships at the time of the Spanish Civil War was 
recommended by Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake12' as a means 
to deter insurgent attacks against British merchant and 
naval shipping. 110 Cable notes that the use of superior 
ships was a conscious choice by the British and was in 
response to prior incidents where British light forces had 
faced the Nationalist cruiser Almirante Cervera and had 
been forced to yield to what was in effect force majeure. 131 
Beyond a host of minor operations that frequently 
subsided as quickly as they arose, the Royal Navy on two 
"'Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: 
Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1934), p. 
128Ibid. 
, p. 243. 
129Later Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake (1882-1968). Fourth 
Sea Lord (1932-1935); retired (1938). 
130James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political 
Applications of Limited Naval Force (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1971), pp. 101-102. 
131Ibid. 
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occasions found itself engaged in limited naval operations 
that showed every prospect of leading to a general war: 
Turkey from 1919-1923 and the Baltic Sea littoral from 
1919-1920 with the Soviet Union. 132 Both areas found the 
Navy involved in substantial operations that were far 
removed from Jutland and the spectre of a fleet action. 
Yet, for that, capital ships were central to the Royal 
Navy's response to the former, and had the Baltic crisis 
continued, would have been at the fore in the latter. The 
Service's ongoing response to the instability found in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the consequent need to retain 
heavy ships in the area has been commented on previously. 
The use of heavy ship support in these operations was of 
mixed effectiveness. The flexibility they afforded in 
moving substantial ground forces and in supporting 
evacuations and withdrawals was shown time and again, and 
their heavy artillery, on the surface, appeared to provide 
local superiority. Still, the use of heavy ships by 
themselves could not influence events on the ground over 
the long term, whilst the threat of naval gunfire sometimes 
proved of more value than the actual results obtained. 
Such must be the conclusion, if the experience of Ajax 
operating off Odessa in 1920 was at all representative. 
Haggard, her commanding officer, recalled that: 
Such was our gunnery inefficiency at that 
early period of the commission, it was with 
greatest difficulty the guns could be fired 
at all, but in the end we fired three rounds 
of 13.5" shell ... I doubt whether they had 
any useful moral or material effect. 133 
Haggard deemed the state of Ajax's gunnery so deplorable 
that: 
I was asked to bombard the town but 
refused to do so as such firing would be 
132See Bullen, 'The Royal Navy and the Baltic 1918-20, ' 
University of London, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, 1983 
for a recent assessment. 
133'Narrative, Volume V, ' Haggard Papers, IWM/85/21/2, 
p. 45. 
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indiscriminate and dangerous to Whites and 
Reds alike. However, I agreed to fire anti- 
aircraft high explosive shell over the town 
to discourage the sharp shooters on the 
roofs. "" 
A Court of Enquiry was convened and Ajax's poor gunnery 
proficiency was attributed to the design of the mountings. 135 
For missions of deterrence and limited strikes capital 
ships proved useful, but not essential. The deduction must 
be that the one factor that contributed to their use was 
availability and not design. The China Station was the 
scene of constant instability, and the deployment of 
divisional level military forces from the United Kingdom in 
1927 in defence of Shanghai was notable by its absence of 
supporting heavy ships. This is not to say that heavy 
ships were not desired by successive commanders-in-chief in 
response to the growing Japanese threat; they were, but 
with 40% of British naval manpower already serving 
overseas, 136 deployment of heavy ships to the Far East, in 
the absence of mobilisation, could only be done by 
withdrawing personnel from other stations to Home waters. 137 
Moreover, it must be remarked that such was not the case 
when it came to the support provided by aircraft carriers. 
From the earliest days of the interwar period, their use 
was deemed essential in supporting any operation and their 
manning was protected accordingly. When planning for 
operations in the Baltic area the Admiralty advised that: 
134I bid. , p. 46 
135Ibid. 
, p. 62. 
136ADM 1/9181, Director of Plans un-numbered minute 
dated 31 May 1937. The percentage of naval personnel 






137Admiralty letter M. 00509/33 to Commander-in-Chief, 
China dated 8 July 1933, Roskill Papers, ROSK/7/164. 
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An aircraft ("Argus") should also be sent. 
The proximity of Biorko to the enemy base 
renders co-operation by aircraft, both for 
reconnaissance and defence, absolutely 
necessary, and the Air Ministry is being 
approached on this matter. It is considered 
that to send a force unaccompanied by 
aircraft would place it at a very serious 
disadvantage . 
138 
A second conclusion that must be drawn is that finance 
was a strong determinant in the planning of any operation, 
and the Admiralty was sensitive to the cost any contingency 
would make against the Naval Estimates. Thus, when 
contemplating the use of heavy ships in the Baltic Sea 
against the Soviet Union, the Admiralty was instructed not 
to make any permanent increases to the fleet operating in 
the Baltic until the costs were understood and approved by 
the Cabinet . 
139 
Ultimately, the deterrence practiced by the Royal Navy 
achieved limited results, but then British policy had for 
the most part limited objectives. The United Kingdom had 
no desire to square-off with Italy unilaterally over 
Abyssinia, could not mandate Dominion support over Chanak, 
and was not willing to pursue an independent line against 
Russia. Following the establishment of the League of 
Nations in 1924, Britain constrained its policy through a 
process of internationalisation. One could argue that 
where deterrence was most clearly defined as a naval 
mission, the Far East, the Service failed utterly in its 
execution, and that the most visible affirmation of this 
failure, the sinking of Force Z (the battleship Prince of 
Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse) demonstrated that 
when tested, the capital ship proved a poor agent of 
deterrence. The rejoinder is that having opted for war, it 
is debatable whether any measure of deterrence could have 
138ADM 1/8596/68, Admiralty letter M. 01539 to Commander- 
in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet dated 11 May 1920. 
139ADM 116/1775, First Lord memorandum to the Cabinet 
dated 20 May 1920. 
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forestalled Japanese actions by December 1941. Certainly, 
the Battle Divisions of the U. S. Pacific Fleet recently 
moved to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii proved inadequate to the 
task. 14o 
Summary: The Operational Justification of the Capital 
Ship. On balance, when the arguments surrounding the 
capital ship controversy are broadened and encompass an 
examination of its operational role within the interwar 
Royal Navy, it can be seen that the case for its retention 
was very strong. Simply stated, no other warship operated 
by the Navy was blessed with such flexibility across the 
continuum of naval operations. Whether 'showing the flag' 
as an agent of naval presence, operating as a unit of 
surveillance, supporting civil authorities at Home or 
abroad, or acting as a visible deterrent the capital ship 
proved itself a capital asset. Nothing from the Service's 
operational experience (gained admittedly from a limited 
base) forced it to change its belief in the value of heavy 
ships in the face of air and underwater threats. On the 
contrary, the experience on offer confirmed that the 
capital ship was the type most able to operate in the face 
of such risks. 
That said, its running costs were high, its size 
precluded it from operating in all areas, its effectiveness 
was at times limited by material defects, and manning was 
ever a problem. There is a qualitative difference between 
the economy of force and the force of economy. Haggard's 
evidence by itself is only anecdotal, but when viewed in 
conjunction with the material and procedural problems 
discussed previously, a reasonable conclusion drawn must be 
that the operational effectiveness of a capital ship was 
difficult to secure and equally difficult to maintain. How 
'"In April 1940, major units of the United States 
Pacific Fleet were relocated to Hawaii from San Diego, 
California. See Louis Morton, The ý. ý. ihr World War II, 
The War in the Pacific, Strategy and omman : The First Two 
Years (Washington: Center of Military History, 1989), p. 
102. 
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effective battleships and battle cruisers were as 




THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLEET TACTICS AND THE ROLE 





tactician to f3 
furnished. ' 
is the business of the 
the organiser to bring a 
against the enemy at the 
it is the business of the 
. ght with whatever force he is 
Richmond 
The Tactical encounter is the 
culminating act in war and is therefore of 
supreme importance, for though bad strategy 
may be redeemed by successful tactics, there 
is no remedy for defeat in battle. 2 
Dreyer 
Commanders of all squadrons must take full 
advantage of every incident of the action to 
press the enemy, always remembering that the 
destruction of the enemy, particularly his 
battlefleet, is the object that they must 
relentlessly pursue. 3 
'Battle Instructions, ' 1931 
Introduction. Ultimately, resolution of the capital 
ship controversy would be settled by its tactical 
performance. Strategy may point the way to which type of 
ships to be built and what sort of naval war to be waged, 
but success in naval battle would decide the merits of 
retaining heavy ships and their place in fleet doctrine. 
Tactically, the controversy revolved around the merits of 
'Richmond lecture 'Tactics, ' Royal Naval War College, 
Greenwich, Spring Session 1920, Richmond Papers, 
NMM/RIC/10/2, p. 28. 
'ADM 1/8658/69, Dreyer lecture 'Study of War & of the 
Conduct of Naval Operations, ' delivered 23 June 1924, Royal 
Naval College, Greenwich. 
3ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, Battle Instructions, ' p. 59. 
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the capital ship as a weapons' platform and the retention 
of the battlefleet as the core of the main fleet's striking 
arm. In the absence of war, tactical development and unit 
proficiency were difficult to ascertain. Whatever the 
yardstick employed to measure presumed tactical 
effectiveness there remained a margin of doubt as conditions to 
be expected on active service could not be determined or 
created with certainty. Moreover, training evolutions were 
scripted to meet requirements other than expected battle 
conditions. This allowed personnel to gain familiarity 
with equipment and concepts, and permitted the Service to 
game strategic scenarios in restricted waters. Thus, to 
compensate for the smaller training space available on the 
Mediterranean Station compared to the distances to be 
expected in any Far Eastern war, speed restrictions were 
applied to vessels. 4 Unfortunately, though the depth of air 
reconnaissance could be limited, speed restrictions could 
not be enforced upon aircraft, and this made any assessment 
of ship versus aircraft encounters difficult in the 
extreme. ' 
Regardless of the station or the fleet, the ships and 
men of the Royal Navy followed a pattern in their day-to- 
day operations that facilitated the training of individual 
ships and their crews, allowed ships of the same type to be 
worked up collectively to form an effective squadron or 
division, and then saw the union of squadrons and 
divisions, finally, work together as a fleet. For ships in 
Home waters and on the Mediterranean Station, the climax 
was reached during January to March of each year when the 
two major fleets usually operated together in the western 
Mediterranean and in the Atlantic waters near Gibraltar. 
This pattern was, at times, interrupted due to operational 
commitments--particularly, during the Abyssinian crisis and 
4ADM 186/149, 'C. B. 1769/31(1), Exercises & Operations, 
1931, Volume I, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division 
dated April 1932, p. 21. 
5ADM 186/145, 'C. B. 1769/29(1), ' p. 44. 
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the Spanish Civil War. 6 Yet, even without such commitments, 
the pattern became increasingly more difficult to sustain 
as the period progressed, when states began to look askance 
at British warships operating in their territorial waters. 
Where, heretofore, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Italy had 
acquiesced in the periodic, but unannounced use of their 
territorial waters, objections to such practices became the 
norm. 7 In the end, only Greece, of the Mediterranean 
states, continued to offer such unfettered access, though 
even here, the employment of certain weapons had to be 
curtailed. ' 
The pattern was on a grander scale for ships in Home 
waters or on the Mediterranean Station, but a discernible 
pattern existed, nevertheless, for ships in Chinese waters 
or on the Atlantic and West Indies Station. Certainly, the 
weather dictated the pattern of employment to some extent, 
and the need to periodically visit key dominions, colonies, 
or trading partners also played a role. These operational 
requirements and quality of life concerns were juggled with 
the need to follow the strictures of King's Regulations and 
Admiralty Instructions regarding the periodic testing of 
engineering plants, the streaming of paravanes, and the 
necessity of ensuring gunnery and torpedo proficiency. If 
for the heavy ships of the Atlantic/Home and Mediterranean 
Fleets, the culmination of a year's hard work was the 
strategical exercises of the Spring Cruise where Red Fleet 
fought Blue Fleet, this summit was reached only after much 
6ADM 186/349, 'C. B. 3001/38, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 
1938 Edition, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff 
Duties Division dated April 1938, p. 5. 
'ADM 116/2285, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean letter 
No. 2466/561/12 dated 14 December 1925. 
'ADM 186/151, 'C. B. 1769/32(1), Exercises & Operations 
1932, Volume I, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division 
dated January 1933, p. 2. 
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preliminary work had been completed. ' In a very real sense, 
the striving for tactical competency was a never ending 
evolution. Ships were paid off, repaired, and 
recommissioned, while squadrons were rotated between Home 
waters and the distant stations. All the while, new 
weapons and ancillary equipments were added to the fleet, 
tested, and evaluated. Against this backdrop, the doctrine 
of the Service was modified and similarly tested during 
fleet exercises. Thus, the capital ship's role in the 
fleet was subjected to a process of continual validation 
through the exercise programme of the Service. 
The Sources and Development of Tactical Doctrine in 
the Royal Navy. The core of fleet tactical doctrine was 
reflected in two instruments: the 'Manoeuvring Orders"° and 
the 'Battle Instructions. ' 11 The first agent prescribed 
how a fleet positioned itself for battle; the second work 
specified how an engagement, once joined, was to be fought. 
The 'Manouevring Orders' and 'Battle Instructions' codified 
the tactical precepts to be followed during the three 
phases of battle: the approach, the action, and the 
pursuit. l" The antecedents of these publications were the 
Grand Fleet's 'Fighting Instructions' and 'Manoeuvring 
Orders. ' Operating in the context of peacetime, they 
frequently served as a point of departure in fleet 
9This pattern was broken from 1930-1933 when the heavy 
ships of the Atlantic/Home Fleet visited the West Indies, 
restricted their operations to the Atlantic waters of Spain 
and France, and conducted only limited exercises with the 
Mediterranean Fleet. 
"Two series of orders, with amendments, during the 
period were issued: 'C. B. 1716, Manouevring Orders, ' dated 
20 November 1925, ADM 186/636 and 'C. B. 1822, Manouevring 
Orders, ' dated 28 April 1936, ADM 186/637. 
"Two editions, with amendments, of Battle Instructions 
were issued during the period: 'C. B. 01715, Battle 
Instructions, ' dated 1 October 1925, ADM 186/72 and T. B. 
01821, Battle Instructions, ' dated 15 June 1930, ADM 
186/106. 
120r, in the event of defeat, the retreat. 
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exercises to test alternate tactical methods. They were 
the bedrock of fleet tactical doctrine, and, if war arose, 
the combined Mediterranean and Atlantic/Home Fleets would 
operate in accordance with their precepts. 13 That said, the 
'Battle Instructions' were not orders, but guiding 
principles that acted in conjunction with the 'Naval War 
Manual, ' the 'Destroyer Attack Instructions, ' 14 'Torpedo 
Aircraft Attack Instructions, '15 'Naval Tactical Notes, '16 
the Tactical Manual, " the manuals developed for each class 
of warship, and would be supplemented by additional 
instructions on the outbreak of war based on the enemy 
naval power in question. 18 Finally, the 'Battle 
Instructions' were fundamentally the guidance required to 
fight a fleet action on the grandest scale, including the 
participation of any allies; they were not written to cover 
every conceivable naval action. 19 
The 'Manoeuvring Orders' and 'Battle Instructions' 
represented the received wisdom of the Service. As such, 
changes to them were evolutionary in nature, rather than 
revolutionary. Change, when warranted, came after 
experimentation, discussion, analysis, and compromise. 
During the period, the relevant divisions of the Naval 
Staff directed the fleets to investigate specific tactical 
problems relating to gunnery, torpedo work, air operations, 
13ADM 1/8700/121, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to 
First Sea Lord un-numbered letter dated 11 September 1925. 
'4'ADM 186/95, 'C. B. 01721, Destroyer Attack 
Instructions, ' dated 1936. Renamed Destroyer Fighting 
Instructions in 1938. 
15Later reissued as 'C. B. 01916, Aircraft Attack and 
Defence Instructions, ' dated 1933, ADM 186/96. 
16Extracts of 'C. B. 01847' can be found in ADM 1/9387. 
17iC. B. 1601, Tactical Manual, ' was issued in 1921. It 
is not on file at the PRO. 
'8ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' p. 3.. 
19 
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and manoeuvre. Specific issues in these areas were defined 
for each type of warship and tested at the Tactical School 
and in unit, divisional, or fleet evolutions, as 
appropriate. The Naval Staff evaluated the results and 
either made a recommendation based on the findings or 
ordered additional tests, if matters appeared inconclusive. 
Appendix VII documents the specific gunnery problems 
investigated for capital ships during the 1919-1939 period. 
In turn, experimentation within the fleet resulted in 
changes to the 'Battle Instructions' and 'Manoeuvring 
Orders' as the Admiralty accepted the recommendations of 
subordinate commands. One example of such a change was the 
inclusion of 'Forms of Battle, ' originally developed within 
the Mediterranean Fleet, in the 'Battle Instructions. i20 
These codified the tactics to be adopted for each class of 
ship against a particular enemy, and could be executed 
rapidly via signal based on the type of battle to be 
expected. 21 
Gunnery and Torpedo Fire. Tactical proficiency in 
gunnery and torpedo work in heavy ships was obtained by 
practical exercise and instructed course work covering both 
theory and demonstrated application. The latter 
principally being taught at HMS Vernon, and the former at 
Excellent, the gunnery development and training 
establishment, located at Whale Island. Inclination 
exercises, for training control personnel in target ranging 
and course changes, and necessary to guarantee the correct 
calibration of equipment, were an ever frequent occurrence 
in the training programme, whilst a ship's guns themselves 
were calibrated on a measured range such as found at 
20ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), Selected Reports of 
Exercises, Operations and Torpedo Practices in H. M. Fleet, 
Summer and Autumn, 1927, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Torpedo 
Division and Tactical Section dated September 1928, p. 6. 
21ADM 186/106, T. B. 01821, ' p. 61. 
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Shoeburyness, Essex. 22 In addition, attack simulators and 
spotting tables were used to train gunnery and torpedo 
personnel and air observers. These tables provided life- 
like views of ships as they came into view, 23 and Waldron 
while serving in Ramillies had occasion to observe their 
use: 
Went to the Gunnery School .... A "spotting- table" was used. I have never seen one 
before. 
Three model ships were used, and 
splashes were represented by wooden labels-- 
raised by pressing keys at the side. A 
special gearing allows range and deflection 
to be put on the table, and splashes are 
moved to the appropriate relative position. 24 
A somewhat similar arrangement was used to train aerial 
observers and consisted of a table, 
which moved scale model ships on a pseudo 
sea by remotely controlled electro-magnets, 
and simulated fall-of-shot by spots of 
light, where one could run through the whole 
gambit of an approach and fire-distribution 
sequence, and engagement, with... observers 
in moving trolleys pretending to be spotting 
aircraft . 
Zs 
Moreover, by the 1920's training was enhanced by capturing 
the results of fleet exercises on film for future 
analysis . 
"6 
The aim of gunnery and torpedo practice was to foster 
the maximum degree of simultaneous concentration against an 
22ADM 186/88, 'C. B. 3026, Firing Manual, 1933, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division 
dated April 1933, p. 48. 
23'Narrative, Volume VI, ' Haggard Papers, IWM/85/21/2, 
p. 21. 
"Journal entry dated 24 September 1925, Waldron 
Papers, IWM/86/59/1. 
25R. M. Ellis, 'When the rain's before the wind, ' 
unpublished manuscript, Captain Robert Meyric Ellis Papers, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, ELLS/3, p. 2.3. 
26Journal entry 12 December 1924, Madden Papers, 
NMM/MDN/2. 
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enemy naval force by all available warships. 27 Such a 
concentration in gunfire also resulted in a higher rate of 
hitting than when ships fired independently. 28 The first 
practical steps in concentrating the fires of multiple 
ships against a single target had been pursued in February 
1917 by the Fourth Battle Squadron, and, by that year's 
end, a pair-ship concentration was initiating fire at 
24,000 yards. 29 It was at this juncture that the 'Spotting 
Rules' were introduced to control the fire of a heavy 
ship's main armament; in 1921, similar rules were developed 
for controlling the secondary armament. 30 
Gunnery practice was typically carried out with an eye 
to training control and turret personnel in their duties 
whilst minimising Cost, 31 the fatigue placed on a ship's 
guns, and damage to ship superstructure. 32 Consequently, 
27ADM 186/66, 'C. B. 973, ' p. 30. 
"By 1927, it was calculated that the fire effect 
factor for two ships concentrating on a single target was 
roughly 2.5 times greater than for a single ship firing, 
whilst for a four-ship concentration, the fire effect 
factor was between 4.5 and 4.7 times greater than for a 
single ship. Though the supporting data was more 
tentative, a three-ship concentration had a fire effect 
factor 2.9 to 3.0 times greater than for a single ship 
firing independently. Based on the above, it would appear 
that the Navy would have been better served by limiting 
itself to pair-ship concentration. That it did not was 
probably attributable to the theoretical calculations of 
the n-square law effect which posited that a four-ship 
concentration was more effective. See ADM 186/289, 'C. B. 
3001/27, ' p. 51. 
29ADM 186/238, 'C. B. 902, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 
1914-1918, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery and Torpedo 
Division dated July 1919, p. 31. 
3 0ADM 186/339, 'C. B. 3001/1914-36, ' p. 10. 
31For Nelson, the cost of a broadside with service 
shell was £2,000.00 while with practice shell the cost was 
£800.00. See 'Notes on Technical Subjects, ' Barnard 
Papers, IWM/P256, p. 2. 
32V. E. Tarrant, Battleship Warspite (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), p. 11. 
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firing a service shell with a full charge was a seminal 
event in the working up of the ship. More often practice 
of a more limited nature was the norm. Such a drill might 
use a 1.1-inch aiming rifle, be a sub-calibre shoot, where 
a 6-pdr. or 3-pdr. gun was inserted into the naval rifle to 
allow a smaller calibre shell to be fired with a reduced 
charge, or fire a service shell with a reduced charge. 33 
The practice could include both main and secondary armament 
and exercise the differing types of fire control: Master 
Ship Control, Individual Ship Control, Main Armament 
Control, sector firing, director firing, gyro firing, 
firing by directing gun, gunlayers firing, divisional 
firing, firing by quarters, or independent control. 34 
The target in a gunnery shoot could be a consort in 
company with the firing ship, in which case the aim was 
directed off target by a standard variance, typically, of 
6° or 12° . 
35 The object of the shoot might be a high speed 
coastal motor boat, 36 a Pattern VI target measuring 372' in 
length , 
31 a battle practice target which measured 145' in 
length, 38 or from June 1923, onwards, a string of three 
battle practice targets towed by another vessel. 39 A 
measure developed further when, in 1925, the Second Battle 
33ADM 186/88, 'C. B. 3026, ' pp. 17-18 and ADM 186/179, 
'C. B. 1773(3), Armament List, April, 1938. ' 
34ADM 186/88, 'C. B. 3026, ' pp. 17-62. 
35Journal entry dated 1 October 1923, Lambert Papers, 
IWM/90/19/1 and journal entry dated 15 November 1922, King 
Papers, IWM/90/23/1. 
36ADM 186/257, 'C. B. 947, Progress in Naval Gunnery, 
1921, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division dated March 
1922, pp. 8-9. 
37Journal, p. 31, Gotto Papers, IWM/83/55/1. 
"Journal entry dated 3-4 March 1923, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. D. Arnold-Forster, The Ways of the Navy 
(London: Ward, Lock & Co., Limited, 1931), p. 126 gives the 
dimensions of a battle practice target as 200'. 
39ADM 186/261, T. B. 971, ' p. 50. 
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Squadron" and Hood were practising fire distribution 
against seven battle practice targets towed in lineal 
Finally, from 1921 onwards, the object of a fire plan could 
be a dedicated target ship, such as Agamemnon or Centurion, 
controlled remotely by wireless. d2 Elkins captured the 
essence of such a shoot: 
We weighed at 0800 to carry out a 
secondary armament concentration shoot on 
the "Agamemnon" The 5.5" were to be 
controlled by the 1" control.... We used 
special soft nosed shells with no bursting 
charge. 
It was wonderful to see the way 
"Agamemnon" manoeuvred. To all outward 
appearances, she might have been steered by 
an experienced Quartermaster, doing his best 
to avoid the Salvos. 
She was hit time & time again by full 
salvos but no severe damage was done, 
although her upperworks and superstructure 
were riddled. 43 
Each type of practice had its advantages and disadvantages, 
and it was only by recourse to all that proficiency once 
secured was maintained. 
At long range, the gunnery of the fleet would be 
concentrated on a portion of the enemy fleet (e. g., the 
van, centre, or rear), and, ideally, on the enemy's 
flagship. d4 If visibility or distance precluded such a fire 
distribution, then on that portion of the enemy fleet in 
range. To help foster such a fire distribution, smoke 
shell would be fired on a portion of the enemy battlefleet 
to hinder enemy ranging and engagement and to allow the 
British battlefleet to achieve a local superiority in fire 
"Revenge, Royal Oak, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign, and 
Resolution. 
41ADM 186/270, 'C. B. 981, ' p. 3. 
d2ADM 186/251, 'C. B. 1594, ' p. 56. 
63Journal entry dated 11 November 1921, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. 
"ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' pp. 140-142. 
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distribution . 
45 As the range diminished, the degree of fire 
concentration would be lessened as it was essential that 
all enemy ships of the opposing battlefleet were engaged. " 
Still, notwithstanding the Service's understanding of 
the weapons it employed and the precepts to be examined, a 
limiting factor of the greatest sort forestalling tactical 
improvement was the manning policy of the fleet. Turnover 
in ships' companies hindered proficiency, and, in the 
Atlantic Fleet during the 1919-1922 period, the rotation of 
one rating in six every four months made it difficult to 
advance beyond basic gun drill. " This hindrance was 
addressed in 1923 when the afloat personnel of the Atlantic 
Fleet were changed er masse after a commission of two 
years. " Subsequently, the manning policy of the Home Fleet 
was changed yet again, and in 1939 the practice was to 
change a third of the complement during each of the three 
principal leave periods of the year; as a consequence, the 
first month of each cruise period was devoted to developing 
basic gunnery proficiency. 49 A further hindrance was that 
heavy ships were frequently operated with reduced 
complements, or with a complement of boys embarked for 
training purposes. An example of the last point is offered 
by Ramillies which served as a Boys' Training Ship in 1938 
and carried a reduced communications staff. This reduced 
her effectiveness during the several serials associated 
with exercise 'Z. P., ' a combined fleet manoeuvre held in 
45ADM 1/8658/69, 'Tactics, ' Royal Naval Staff College, 
Greenwich, Session 1922-1923. 
46ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' pp. 40-42. 
47ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, ' p. 17. 
48Ibid. 
"Captain M. W. S. L. Searle lecture 'The Organisation 
of the Practices of a Fleet in Peace & War, ' Royal Naval 
Staff College, Greenwich dated 1 July 1948, Roskill Papers, 
ROSK/7/163. 
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March 1938.5° By this time, the expansion programme of the 
Service created manning problems of a different sort which 
hindered proficiency. 51 Writing to Pound, the Commander-in- 
Chief, Mediterranean, the First Sea Lord lamented: 
the training question gets more and more 
difficult. Crowds of boys are coming into 
the Navy and are ready to go to sea, with no 
ships to put them into because we have not 
got enough Artificers and cannot get them 
fast enough. I have refused to use any more 
Battleships for training purposes. 52 
As most exercises conducted were of a very short duration, 
the actual import of a ship's reduced complement was 
masked. When at last, fleet exercises were held over a 
sustained period, the shortfalls in manning were telling, 
and the two departments most affected were the 
communication's establishments in heavy ships and the corps 
of naval air observers. 53 
Finally, during the latter part of the period, it was 
difficult for a ship to work up to a high standard of 
proficiency, if it had just been reconstructed. Royal Oak 
is a case in point. Following its recommission after a 
two-year refit in August 1936, it spent time in Home waters 
serving as a mutinous ship of an unnamed South American 
navy during the filming of 'The Eternal Navy' in October 
1936 before departing for duties in Spanish waters in 
January 1937. It returned to Home waters in June 1937, and 
proceeded to Liverpool where it participated in Coronation 
celebrations. This period of detached service made 
50ADM 186/159, 'C. B. 1769/38, Exercises and operations, 
1938, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated 
February 1939, p. 3. 
51ADM 186/349, 'C. B. 3001/38, ' p. 5. 
"Chatfield letter to Pound dated 5 August 1937, 
Chatfield Papers, NMM/CHT/4/10. 
53ADM 186/157, T. B. 1769/35(1) and (2), ' p. 95. 
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squadron and fleet work impossible. " 
That said, a curious phenomenon of the interwar period 
is that despite technical improvements in fire control 
systems and changes in manning policy, gunnery proficiency 
in heavy ships, as measured in hitting salvos per ship per 
minute, decreased for much of the period. 55 Several 
explanations for this occurrence avail themselves. First, 
the introduction of improved fire control tables and 
ranging equipment involved a learning curve, while 
experience was gained and new procedures were developed. 
As such, gunnery efficiency trailed off until the new means 
were perfected. Secondly, the actual number of practices 
conducted was hamstrung by fiscal policy, and as the 
surplus of ammunition left over from the 1914-1918 war was 
expended, it was not replaced on a one-for-one basis. 56 
Thirdly, the tactical evolutions that the Service attempted 
were of an order of magnitude more complex than hitherto 
had been the case. Thus, the scope for things to go amiss 
increased as attempts at replicating battle conditions were 
pursued. This moved the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean 
to observe: 
"Realism in peace practices is always 
to be aimed at, but in view of the 
necessarily limited amount of full calibre 
ammunition allowed for practice, there is a 
danger that the effort to attain realism may 
result in frustrating their main object, 
namely, to afford practice in hitting an 
54ADM 186/551, 'C. B. 3002/38, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Minesweeping, A/S Measures, and Chemical Warfare 
Defence, 1938 Edition, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical 
Division dated June 1938, p. 15. 
s"The figures for MSC firing based on hitting salvos 
per ship per minute were: 
1921 . 451 ADM 1/8658/69 1924 . 62 ADM 186/263. 1926 . 57 ADM 186/271. In 1927, the criteria of measurement was changed to 
average straddling salvos per ship per minute: 
1927 . 54 ADM 186/289. 
56ADM 186/298, 'C. B. 3001/29, ' p. 5. 
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enemy. 
"Drastic casualties to personnel and 
breakdowns in material, while excellent as 
tests of the fighting organisation, may 
produce such dislocation in the control as 
to cause waste of valuable ammunition. 
Until more full calibre ammunition is 
available for practice, it will remain 
necessary to seize every opportunity to 
practice breakdowns during harbour drills 
and sub-calibre practices so as to leave 
full calibre practices free ... 
11 
The above views were endorsed by the Commander-in- 
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and followed an order issued in 1926 
that restricted key personnel from the wearing of chemical 
defence clothing and equipment during shoots, as the 
effects on gunnery proficiency had become so pronounced. 58 
This difficulty was captured by one midshipman who noted: 
During the forenoon we exercised action 
stations. I again tried my hand at the 
Master Dumaresq, but found I got a bit 
muddled. It seems nearly impossible to 
establish communication with the Spotting 
Top, & the G. C. T., as none of the telephones 
will work, & the part of the gas-phone that 
one presses against one's larynx gets red- 
hot. 
With everyone shouting & with gas masks 
& flash helmets, I should think things would 
get pretty strained. 59 
Finally, the investigation of specific gunnery problems 
noted in Appendix VII was not without penalty, and, in 
1929, these investigations were reduced to a minimum so 
that 'Squadrons may be free to concentrate on achieving 
improved results in normal practices. i6° 
Whilst gunnery exercises were primarily directed at 
securing proficiency for a fleet action, shore bombardments 
57ADM 186/293, 'C. B. 3001/28, ' p. 7. 
58ADM 186/270, 'C. B. 981, ' p. 15. 
"Journal entry dated 8 June 1923, Madden Papers, 
NMM/MDN/1. G. C. T. is Gunnery Control Top. 
60ADM 186/293, T. B. 3001/28, ' p. 4. 
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were also conducted, as support for combined operations was 
a subsidiary task of naval gunfire. These shore 
bombardments included fires by both primary and secondary 
armament conducted at anchor and while steaming. To be 
sure, the number of practices held annually were never many 
and reached nil for all heavy ships in 1931.61 In truth,. 
the period 1929-1933 represented something of a nadir in 
the fleet's gunnery fortunes. In 1934, a renaissance, of 
sorts, began and experiments in long-range firing were 
initiated. Nelson and Rodney began firing at ranges 
between 27,000 and 37,000 yards, whilst Hood attempted to 
engage at ranges between 21,000 and 27,000 yards . 
62 Of the 
33 rounds fired during her shoot, Nelson secured between 
one and three hits. 63 Unfortunately, this pattern was not 
sustained during the following year, 64 and operational 
commitments during the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish 
Civil War precluded advances in gunnery drill meant to 
replicate a surface fleet action. 65 The practice envisioned 
was a consolidated target shoot to be held in 1938 by the 
Battle Cruiser Squadron and the Battle Squadrons of the 
Home and Mediterranean Fleets against two divisions of 
heavy ships represented by Iron Duke and Centurion towing 
four or five targets each, whilst cruisers were to engage 
high speed battle practice targets. 66 
Much of the experimentation in the gunnery and torpedo 
work of British heavy ships was spurred by the steps 
foreign naval powers were pursuing in their practices. 
Firing at several towed battle practice targets was 






3001/31, ' p. 77. 
3001/34, ' p. 6. 
3001/35, ' p. 8. 
3001/36, ' p. 12. 








the United States Navy was conducting, 11 and firing at 
ranges above 30,000 yards was begun after several reports 
were received of long-range shooting by the navies of the 
United States, Germany and Japan. 68 Moreover, though the 
High Sea Fleet had coordinated the firing of the main and 
secondary armaments of its heavy ships against the same 
target during the 1914-1918 war, 69 and the Royal Navy 
practiced much the same as late as March 1930,7° the 
procedure lapsed and was not renewed until late in the 
interwar period. 71 Given the increased ranges that 
secondary armaments were capable of reaching, the failure 
to maintain proficiency in such procedures was the direct 
result of the reduced manning levels in its ships and the 
need for economy. 
In a like manner, steps were pursued to concentrate 
divisional torpedo fire in heavy ships, and the 
simultaneous concentration of torpedo and gunfire was an 
important component of fire tactics. 72 By 1924, both the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets were experimenting with 
long-range divisional control and developing the requisite 
communications procedures. 73 Again, the difficulty of 
controlling fire when encumbered with gas masks was most 
v pronounced. The problem was most acute in the submerged 
flats which had difficulty in passing the required 
67ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, ' pp. 32-33. 
68Ibid., ADM 186/261, 'C. B. 971, ' p. 56, ADM 186/289, 
'C. B. 3001/27, ' p. 75, and ADM 186/328, 'C. B. 3001/35, ' p. 
110. 
69See M. W. Williams, 'The Loss of HMS Queen Mary at 
Jutland, ' David McLean and Antony Preston, eds., Warship 
1996 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1996), p. 121. 
70Journal entry 26 May 1930, Beaufoy-Brown Papers, 
LHCMA. 
71ADM 186/349, 'C. B. 3001/38, ' p. 33. 
72ADM 186/66, 'C. B. 973, ' p. 30. 
73ADM 186/444, 'C. B. 0975, ' p. 7. 
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information to the Torpedo Control Position located in the 
Tactical Plot. 74 The remedy, in this case, was to install 
range and bearing receivers which precluded passing 
information through telephones and voice pipes. 75 
Given its range and speed variables, use of the 
torpedo presented a firing solution problem of a different 
nature than gunnery. Not only was an appreciation required 
of where one's ship and the target were apt to be located 
in 20-30 minutes time, but the bearing and course of 
consorts had to be known at the time of firing and their 
future movements anticipated to preclude fratricide. 
Hence, the importance of the tactical plot. It is now 
appropriate to review the questions surrounding gunnery and 
torpedo concentration and the means of control employed 
during the 1919-1939 era. 
Individual Ship Control ACY . Individual ship 
control, or ACY, allowed multiple ships to concentrate on 
a single target by firing in discrete increments, or 
sectors, of time. During the initial postwar period, two 
methods of individual ship control had arisen. 76 The length 
of time between fires was dictated by the number of units 
firing and each ship controlled its own fire. " For two 
ships concentrating on a single target, the time between 
fires was 30 seconds, while for three ships firing the 
period was 20 seconds. 78 If four ships concentrated on a 
single target, the time between fires was reduced to 15 
seconds. 79 For pair-ship firing, ACY was the prescribed 
74ADM 186/447, 'C. B. 982, Progress in Torpedo, Mining, 
Anti-Submarine, and in Allied Subjects, 1925, ' Admiralty, 
Naval Staff, Torpedo Division dated August 1926, pp. 8-9. 
75Ibid. 
76 ADM 186/257, 'C. B. 947, ' p. 5. 
"ADM 186/88, 'C. B. 3026, ' p. 83. 
78ADM 186/339, 'C. B. 3001/1914-36, ' p. 49. 
79Ibid. 
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method of concentration, though it was also retained as an 
alternate means of concentration for three or more ships 
firing in the event that communications were to fail when 
Master Ship Control was employed. 80 Firing by ACY was the 
primary method of concentration employed by battle cruisers 
and for Nelson and Rodney, the former employing it because 
the Battle Cruiser Squadron was frequently reduced to two 
ships for much of the period. 81 A problem unique to 
concentrating the fires of Nelson and Rodney was that the 
guns of the main armament could initially only be loaded in 
unison, and this limitation reduced theoretical maximum 
rate of fire possible. 82 As ACY shooting relied on timed 
sectors between salvos, a problem encountered when the 
opening range of an engagement grew was that the fall of 
shot could not be observed before the next salvo was due to 
be f ired. 83 Use of a greater time sector allowed the range 
to be increased, but at a cost in the volume of fire. 
Conversely, a shortened time sector allowed a higher volume 
of fire to be developed, but restricted the maximum range 
at which control could be exercised. 84 
Master Ship Control (MSC). MSC, or Master Ship 
Control, was 'the system of control in concentrated fire 
when one ship is detailed as Master Ship, and the fire of 
all ships of the unit is controlled through her by the 
Master Control Officer. i61 MSC firing promised to deliver 
the heaviest weight of fire on a target in the shortest 
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controlling the fires of multiple ships in 1923.86 Two 
prerequisites in its use were the availability of 
uninterrupted wireless communications for passing ranging 
information from the master ship to the other ships in line 
and the availability of spotting aircraft. 8' Although 
wireless had been installed in heavy ships from 1917 for 
fire control purposes, MSC firing was eschewed in favour of 
ACY control until its reliability had advanced. 88 Concern 
that deliberate jamming of the shipboard Type 31 wireless 
set might disrupt MSC firing, and worries that wireless 
signals transmitted between ships could be intercepted by 
enemy direction finding, prompted the Service to experiment 
with very low frequency communications. 89 This required ä 
heavy ship to trail a submerged antenna for signalling. 
Critical as communications were in MSC firing, visual 
signalling procedures were modified to allow control to be 
maintained in the event of a total failure in wireless 
communications. 90 Meanwhile, initial attempts at employing 
MSC procedures with a two-seater aircraft spotting had 
shown that the observer was not capable of performing all 
the duties required. Madden appraised Dreyer, the 
Service's foremost gunnery expert, of the problem: 
In a2 seater the observer also reports fall 
of shot. He can send but he cant (sic) 
receive. Nor can he change wave, or if on 
the wrong target be corrected, or ordered to 
change target. With a single target this is 
not a great inconvenience because he cant 
(sic) well be wrong. But for efficient 
spotting in action the Master Ship must be 
able to talk as well as receive from the 
plane. This is only possible if one man 
devotes his entire attention to W/T hence 
86ADM 186/293, 'C. B. 3001/28, ' p. 91. 
87 ADM 186/257, 'C. B. 947, ' pp. 6-7. 
88ADM 186/339, 'C. B. 3001/1914-36, ' p. 48. 
89ADM 186/257, 'C. B. 947, ' p. 44. 
90ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, ' pp. 2-3. 
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the 3 seater . 
91 
During MSC firing, the master ship, usually the lead 
ship of a division and called the datum ship, passed the 
estimated range to the other ships in line, and a 
correction for position-in-line was applied to compensate 
for each ship's position in the division. 92 By 1930, it 
became the practice to have the second ship in line assume 
the duties of the master ship. This change was based on an 
assumption that an enemy fleet was likely to concentrate 
its fire on the head of the British line, as was Royal Navy 
custom, and that, as a consequence, the lead ship might be 
unable to control divisional fire. 93 As experience was 
gained, it was found necessary for the master ship to 
provide the deflection for the target to her consorts, if 
the maximum rate of fire was to be developed. 94 Despite the 
difficulties of correcting for position-in-line, Master 
Ship Control was found superior to ACY control in both 
accuracy and volume of fire produced. " ACY control was 
retained, however, as it allowed ships to continue firing 
when MSC procedure failed in the controlling ship. When 
MSC procedure had been restored in that vessel or another 
consort, ACY control would be suspended. 96 Such a failure 
in MSC control could be assumed, if W/T transmissions from 
the controlling ship had stopped for 40 seconds, and if the 
91Madden letter to Dreyer dated 21 June 1920, Admiral 
Sir Frederic Charles Dreyer Papers, Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge, DRYR/4/3. Original emphasis. 
92ADM 186/289, 'C. B. 3001/27, ' p. 14. 
93ADM 186/304, 'C. B. 3001/30, Progress in Naval 
Gunnery, 1930, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division 
dated March 1931, p. 16. 
"ADM 186/270, 'C. B. 981, ' p. 6. 
95ADM 186/261, 'C. B. 971, ' p. 8. 
96ADM 186/270, 'C. B. 981, ' pp. 15-16. 
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other consorts were seen to have stopped firing. 97 In such 
circumstances, the second, or if necessary, the third ship 
in line would automatically assume the duties of master 
ship. 98 
A risk when concentrating the fires of several ships 
was that any error introduced in estimating either the 
range or deflection by the master ship would be cascaded to 
the other ships in the division. To minimise such an 
event, consorts passed their estimated ranges and 
deflections to the master ship for plotting. 99 Another 
drawback associated with MSC control was that the direct 
observation of salvo splashes was complicated by the sheer 
volume of fire--upwards of sixteen 15-inch shells landing 
in close order. 1°° 
For its effectiveness, MSC firing depended on the 
presence of observation aircraft for spotting and initial 
practices were devoted to perfecting spotter-to-ship 
coordination procedures. Consequently, these trials 
exhibited a degree of contrivance, and the need to develop 
realistic procedures became evident. Until 1925, it had 
been customary for spotting aircraft to take station above 
the target. 1°' This, whilst suiting the needs of the firing 
ships admirably was far removed from what could be expected 
during war. In 1926, it was established that the spotting 
aircraft should fly as high as possible, but, at a minimum, 
at an altitude which was at least half the range to the 
target. 102 This was later adjusted and by 1937 a height of 
97ADM 186/289, 'C. B. 3001/27, ' pp. 14-15. 
"Ibid. 
99ADM 186/304, 'C. B. 3001/30, ' p. 16. 
... ADM 186/339, 'C. B. 3001/1914-36, ' p. 50. 
"'Ibid., p. 40. 
"'Ibid. 
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8,000 feet was the norm for aircraft observing fire. 103 
Main Armament Control (MAC). A limitation in using a 
target ship such as Agamemnon was that it was not feasible 
to fire a heavy ship's main armament with service 
ammunition without destroying or severely damaging the 
target. Yet a target ship in speed and manouevrability 
afforded a degree of realism not attainable with a towed 
target. The compromise reached, Main Armament Control, 
employed the secondary armament in the shoot. Firing 
specially weighted HE shell, the guns were controlled by 
the ship's primary fire control system. "' Unfortunately, 
whilst a 6-inch shell fired to 11,000 yards approached the 
descent of a shell fired by a 15-inch gun fired to 18,000 
yards, los such a limited range allowed the firing ship to 
observe any 'overs'--something not typically seen in 
battle. The remedy introduced in 1923 was to install smoke 
boxes in Agamemnon. These boxes, controlled via wireless 
by an attending destroyer, masked this phenomenon and 
allowed for a more realistic shoot. 106 
Indirect Firincr. In indirect firing, the object of 
the shoot was not observed by the f iring unit or was only 
observed for the briefest of periods. Though the target 
could be a position ashore, the navy's primary interest in 
indirect fire was aimed at securing a tactical advantage 
during ship-to-ship encounters. During good weather, 
indirect fire, with the benefit of aircraft spotting or 
with a second ship employed for flank marking, would allow 
an engagement to commence beyond the line-of-sight of the 
firing ship. Alternatively, during periods of poor 
visibility, such as was found at Jutland, it would allow 
"'Journal entry 17 October 1937, Rear Admiral Ottoker 
Harold M. St. John Steiner Papers, Imperial War Museum, 
London, IWM/PP/MCR/336. 
lo4ADM 186/257, 'C. B. 947, ' p. 41. 
lo5Ibid. 
106ADM 186/261, 'C. B. 971, ' p. 12. 
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the engagement to continue. 107 The employment of smoke 
screens, whether surface or air delivered, by a fleet 
standing on the defensive made the refinement of indirect 
firing essential. 1°8 That said, practice for such an 
important drill was circumscribed, as the Admiralty report 
for 1926 makes clear, when not a single evolution was 
conducted by heavy ships. 1' A deficiency, of sorts, 
remedied the following year when one indirect fire was 
carried out by heavy ships. "' In March 1919, Valiant began 
trials with the Henderson Director Telescope, a 
gyroscopically stabilised telescope mounted in the director 
tower. The instrument allowed firing to proceed against a 
ship masked by smoke or otherwise obscured, as long as a 
sighting could be made every two or three minutes, " and the 
horizon was clear. llz Battleships and battle cruisers, when 
steaming, were limited to firing at a single target with 
their main armament by indirect fire though they could 
engage another target with their secondary armament by 
direct observation. 113 If at anchor, a heavy ship could 
engage two independent targets with indirect fire. "' 
Torpedo Control. The problem of employing torpedoes 
in heavy ships briefly discussed in Chapter Three was never 
adequately resolved during the period, and to Tennyson- 
D'Eyncourt's concern that they posed a risk to capital ship 
107R. A. R. Drax lecture 'Battle Tactics, ' delivered 1 
November 1929, Malta, Drax Papers, DRAX/2/2, p. 8. 
1°s ADM 186/261, 'C. B. 971, ' p. 10. 
109ADM 186/271, 'C. B. 3001(26), ' p. 10. 
110ADM 186/289, 'C. B. 3001/27, ' p. 10. 
"ADM 186/244, 'C. B. 1561, ' p. 19. 
112 ADM 186/148, 'C. B. 1769/30(2), Exercises & 
Operations, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division 
dated June 1931, p. 79. 
113ADM 186/117, 'C. B. 3042, ' p. 61. 
114Ibid. 
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safety must be added the fact, that offensively, they never 
fulfiled their promise. Such were the conclusions drawn 
from exercises 'N. I. ' and N. K., ' conducted by the 
Mediterranean Fleet in August 1927, which assessed that the 
offensive potential of a battlefleet's torpedo fire was 
doubtful. "' Still, the lesson learned was that much as 
gunnery control required concentration to be effe ctive, no 
less were the requirements of the torpedo arm. To wit, 
In Exercise "N. K., " the flotilla 
attacks of the retiring fleet caused the 
chasing fleet to manoeuvre in such a manner 
as to render any accurate forecast of his 
M. L. A. largely a matter of luck, and the 
promiscuous torpedo fire resulting from 
Individual Control proved of no practical 
value.... the system of torpedo fire from the 
battlefleet has been redesigned with the 
idea of extending the methods of employment. 
The following types of zones with the 
necessary signals have been introduced: - (a) Concentrated Zone. --To obtain a 
torpedo concentration on an enemy whose 
movements are constrained and whose M. L. A. 
and speed can be forecast with moderate 
certainty. 
(b) Parallel Zone. --To obtain a broad 
torpedo zone, for use on an enemy whose 
M. L. A. is known within wider limits and 
where only small alterations from this may 
be expected. 
(c) Split Zone. --To obtain a divergent 
zone to counter a large range of avoiding 
action by the enemy. 
(d) Continuous Zone. --To obtain a 
succession of torpedo zones as a means of 
checking the advance of a chasing fleet by 
causing it to alter course continually if 
torpedoes are to be avoided. 
(e) Placing a zone to counter a 
reversal of course. 116 
The above control procedures were tested by the 
Mediterranean Fleet in August 1928 during exercise 'N. W., ' 
115ADM 186/461, 'C. B. 3002/27, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Anti-Submarine, and Chemical Warfare, 1927, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Torpedo Division dated July 1928, 
p. 9. 
116Ibid. M. L. A. refers to Mean Line of Advance. 
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a repetition of the 'N. K. ' exercise held twelve months 
previously, and resulted in more hits being obtained. "' 
Such advancements in torpedo proficiency proved impossible 
to sustain, in part because of the personnel 
recommendations delivered in 1930 by the committee chaired 
by Admiral Forbes which investigated the communication's 
manning requirements in heavy ships. The Service had 
experimented with radio-telephony to control the fires of 
multiple ships. Yet, with reception poor and interference 
difficult to overcome, wireless was preferred. "' Yet, 
removal of the wireless telegraphy sets dedicated to 
torpedo control based on the findings of the Forbes 
Committee, combined with the elimination of the after 
submerged flats in the Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign- 
classes to allow a greater consignment of H. A. ammunition 
to be embarked, forced the abandonment of control by 'split 
zone' and 'continuous zone., 119 Divisional control of 
torpedo fire by visual signals proved inadequate to the 
task, and, thus, individual control with its inherent 
shortcomings, had to be adopted. 12° The primary problem of 
visual signalling was that it proved difficult to 
distinguish signals meant to control the concentration of 
117 ADM 186/468, 'C. B. 3002/28, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Anti-Submarine and Chemical Warfare, 1928, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated June 1929, 
p. 8. 
118ADM 1/8628/130, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
letter No. 1119/A. H. to Admiralty dated 14 August 1922. 
119ADM 186/481, 'C. B. 3002/30, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Anti-Submarine, and Chemical Warfare, 1930, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated July 1931, 
p. 11. 
120ADM 186/491, 'C. B. 3002/31, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Anti-Submarine, and Chemical Warfare Defence, 
1931, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated 
August 1932, p. 7. 
299 
gunfire from those signals hoisted to control torpedo 
fire. 121 
Still, there remained technical problems associated 
with the torpedoes themselves. Much time and effort were 
expended in trying to overcome the two principal problems 
that plagued heavy ship torpedo evolutions, gyroscopic 
failure and directional errors, but no satisfactory 
solution proved possible for battleships steaming greater 
than 18 knots. 122 Of the two problems noted, gyroscopic 
failure was the more worrisome as it might lead to a hit 
being registered against the next in line heavy ship of a 
column. 123 Problems of a different sort plagued battle 
cruisers, and the inability of Renown and Repulse to fire 
their torpedoes whilst at speed, unlike Hood, was viewed 
with dismay by Vernon as it precluded the Battle Cruiser 
Squadron acting as single tactical entity. 124 In the case 
of Renown, she was restricted from firing her torpedoes 
when steaming above 22 knots, whilst Repulse was restricted 
to a maximum of 20 knots when using the weapon. "' In this 
case, the problems were the roll of the torpedo, the angle 
of deflection present, and the stress placed upon the 
submerged tubes and bars upon firing. '26 
Night-Fichtina. The steady, evolutionary nature of 
the Service's tactical doctrine during the period is most 
clearly demonstrated by the eventual acceptance of a night 
121ADM 186/522, 'C. B. 3002/35, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, A/S Measures, and Chemical Warfare Defence, ' 
Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated September 
1935, pp. 6-7. 
122ADM 189/49, 'C. B. 1770(29), Annual Report of Torpedo 
School, 1929, ' p. 9. 
'23Ibid. 
124ADM 189/44, 'C. B. 1705, Annual Report of Torpedo 
School, 1924, ' p. 83. 
125ADM 186/493, 'C. B. 3019, Torpedo Firing Manual, 
1932, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division dated 
August 1932, p. 5. 
126ADM 189/44, T. B. 1705, ' p. 83. 
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action by heavy ships. Throughout most of the period, the 
navy eschewed the concept of seeking a night encounter 
amongst heavy ships, and this reluctance was confirmed by 
the many tactical exercises conducted. To wit, 
164. Experience gained in night 
practices confirms the general principles 
governing the conduct of heavy ships at 
night as laid down in the Battle 
Instructions. No development has arisen to 
weaken the following conclusions: - 
(i) Night actions between heavy ships 
are usually not desirable. 
(ii) If we cannot count with certainty 
on engaging the enemy at daylight the 
following morning, strategy must decide 
whether the risk involved in fighting at 
night should be accepted for the sake of an 
immediate battle. 
(iii) The risks involved in pursuing 
after dark a beaten and disorganised enemy, 
will probably be slight in comparison with 
the advantages gained by denying him the 
opportunity of reorganising his forces. 
(iv) In the event of a chance 
encounter, a vigorous attack on the enemy 
vessels sighted offers the best chance of 
success. 127 
By 1938, the Service had embraced the idea of engaging 
in a fleet action at night. 12' The acceptance of night- 
fighting by the Service has at times been explained by the 
wartime experience of officers such as Chatfield, Fisher, "Z9 
Godfrey, "' and Drax. 131 With their promotion into the senior 
ranks of the navy, they were able to overcome the 
conservative dogma which held that such encounters were to 
127 ADM 186/143, T. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 26. 
128ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' p. 25. 
129Robert Travers Young, The House that Jack Built: The 
Story of H. M. S. Excellent (Aldershot: Gale & Polden 
Limite(i, 1955), pp. 92-93. 
130Beesly, Verv Special Admiral, p. 82. John Henry 
Godfrey (1888-1971). Commanding Officer, Repulse (1936- 
1939); Director of Naval Intelligence (1939-1942). 
"'Cunningham, Sailor's Odyssey, p. 142. 
301 
be avoided by heavy ships. This is, at best, only a 
partial explanation. The decision to not only accept 
battle at night, but, in fact, to seek it was established 
at long last because British naval supremacy could no 
longer be maintained by numbers alone and night-fighting 
appeared tailor-made for a naval service composed of 
effectively trained long-serving professionals. 132 (This 
last point was more problematic as the number of night- 
firings held was, at times, extremely limited. For 1930, 
the Atlantic Fleet conducted but one. 133) Moreover, the 
rubric that it favoured the weaker naval power at the 
expense of the stronger, as chance played a greater 
determinant, while true, no longer seemed to apply. At 
best, Britain would probably only be equal to an adversary 
in a future war, and could, indeed, be the weaker force. 
This last point was confirmed in a series of fleet 
exercises that sought to develop the necessary tactics to 
allow the British fleet to successfully engage an enemy 
force that enjoyed an advantage in long-range gunnery. 
With only Rodney and Nelson able to engage ships beyond 
30,000 yards, and with American, Japanese, and German ships 
known to enjoy such an advantage in gunnery, the results 
were disquieting to say the least. In April 1933, the 
Mediterranean Fleet tested the hypothesis in exercise 
'R. R. ' Red Fleet, consisting of five battleships, and 
enjoying a slight advantage in speed, but limited to firing 
its main armament to a range of 23,800 yards, engaged Blue 
Fleet, a force of four battleships able to fire to 32,000 
yards. Both fleets were equal in cruiser and destroyer 
forces, and whilst Red was able to dispose of Blue's 
cruiser force in short order, the engagement of the 
opposing battlefleets brought grief to Red. It is worth 
reporting the summary of the action at length: 
11. The two battlefleets came in sight 
132Chatfield, Navy and Defence, p. 240. 
133ADM 186/304, 'C. B. 3001/30, ' p. 6. 
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at 36,000 yards, and at 32,000 yards, Blue 
fired a few rounds. Red cruisers and 
destroyers then attempted to cover their 
battlefleet with smoke, but this did not 
prevent Blue deploying at a range of 29,000 
yards, and bringing a four-ship 
concentration on to the Red Revenge.... 
12. Discounting the effect of Blue 
gunfire under these conditions, Red held his 
course for another twelve minutes, and then 
swung round to close at maximum rate. After 
40 minutes under fire, he was able to open 
his foremost turrets, at 23,700 yards, but 
in this interval Revenge had been destroyed. 
13. With the range down to 22,000 
yards, Red turned to a parallel course to 
open his "A" arcs. Blue promptly turned 
away together to open the range, leaving 
only his after turrets bearing, but Red 
followed at once. By this manoeuvre Blue 
had opened the range 800 yards, but as Red 
was in pursuit, no advantage was to be 
gained by further retirement, and Blue 
turned back determined to close quickly to 
decisive range. 134 
The assessment concluded by advising that: 
15. Unless the fleet with the shorter 
range guns has a large advantage in speed, 
or visibility is limited, the use of smoke 
appears to be essential in order to avoid 
damage, which may be serious, when closing 
a well-handled fleet armed with longer range 
guns. 135 
In the following year, 1934, an expanded exercise, 
'Z. J. ' was conducted by the combined Mediterranean and Home 
Fleets on the question. This time, of its five 
battleships, Red Fleet was allowed two whose maximum range 
exceeded 32,000 yards. They faced an equal number of Blue 
force battleships all enjoying the advantage of long-range 
134ADM 186/154, 'C. B 1769/33(2), Exercises & Operations, 
1933, Volume II, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Division 
dated April 1934, p. 9. 
"'Ibid. 
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gunnery. 136 If anything, the results were even more 
disconcerting. Red Fleet lost two battleships outright, 
two others were disabled to 50% and 25%, respectively, and 
Resolution was damaged but slightly. Blue Fleet's losses 
included the sinking of Nelson and damage of 50% and 25%, 
respectively, to Malaya and Barham. 13' 
Still, in considering whether to accept a night action 
an appreciation of the circumstances at play was required. 
Thus, 
If contact between capital ships has 
not been made during the day, or if the day 
action has been indecisive, the Admiral will 
decide whether or not to seek a night action 
between capital ships. In making the 
decision the main factors to be considered 
are: - 
(a) Danger of losing touch with the 
enemy and being unable to bring him to 
action at daylight. 
(b) Geographical position of the 
forces. 
(c) Visibility and weather 
considerations. 
(d) Relative strength of the opposing 
light forces and their tactical position. 
(e) Enhanced fighting value of light 
craft at night as compared to that of 
capital ships. 
(f) Enhanced value at night of 
readiness and superior training and 
technique. 
(g) Increased liability of chance to 
influence results. 
(h) Possibility of surprise and the 
state of enemy morale as far as it is known 
or inferred. 138 
As visibility and unit recognition were at a premium 
during any night encounter, such engagements were likely to 
be fought at close range, be of limited duration, and be a 
confused affair in the extreme. As such, 
136ADM 186/155, 'C. B. 1769/34(1), Exercises & 
Operations, 1934, Volume I, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated November 1934, p. 19. 
'"Ibid., p. 23. 
138ADM 186/66, 'C. B. 973, ' p. 31. 
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The primary object in any class of ship 
when committed to action by night, is to 
develop the maximum volume of gun and 
torpedo fire before the enemy can do so, and 
all other considerations are of secondary 
importance. It must be accepted that the 
result of night action may depend on the 
first minute or so, and that, if the most 
effective action is not taken immediately, 
it is unlikely that there will be time to 
recover. 139 
The above guidance was encapsulated in the expression, 
IPOMO, or the Instantaneous Production of Maximum Output. 140 
As the target in an engagement was apt to be a light craft, 
an important consideration for capital ships during a night 
encounter was to ensure that the firing of the main 
armament did not interfere with the work of secondary 
batteries. Accordingly, broadside firing for the ship's 
main guns was usually prescribed. " 
The need for early and rapid fire also included the 
use of torpedoes by heavy ships. "' Yet, the combination of 
employing main and secondary armament, typical of firing at 
night, made torpedo control difficult due to the shock 
incurred in the tactical plot. "' That battleships continued 
to retain a torpedo arm was to allow them to prevail in any 
encounter at night or during periods of limited 
visibility. 144 Still, realistic training during such periods 
was infrequent, as such conditions were also likely to 
result in the loss of any torpedoes fired. 145 
With the acceptance of night-fighting, another pillar 
139ADM 186/88, 'C. B. 3026, ' p. 119. Original emphasis. 
140Bacon, ed., Glorious Navy, p. 221. 
141ADM 186/88, 'C. B. 3026, ' p. 130. 
'42ADM 186/447, T. B. 982, ' p. 9. 
143ADM 186/448, 'C. B. 1694(4), ' p. 6. 
144ADM 186/481, 'C. B. 3002/30, ' pp. 11-12. 
'45ADM 186/491, 'C. B. 3002/31, ' p. 7. 
305 
for the retention of the battle cruiser was removed. Their 
lack of armoured protection made them singularly vulnerable 
to the shell fire of an opposing battlefleet, whilst their 
speed advantage was negated by the risk of collision with 
screening vessels. Such was the lesson drawn from 'A. G., ' 
an Atlantic Fleet exercise held on 10-11 September 1930.116 
Meanwhile, experiments with using detached forces to 
illuminate an opposing battlefleet with searchlight for the 
fire of a friendly battlefleet were tested. In the 
Mediterranean Fleet, exercise 'O. X. ' held 29 October 1930, 
and 'B. A., ' an Atlantic Fleet exercise of March 1931, 
investigated the issue; while the illuminating vessels were 
ruled lost in the former exercise, the concept was thought 
worthy of further exploration. 147 In exercise 'P. C., ' 
conducted in August 1931, the Mediterranean Fleet expanded 
the original line of investigation. How brief a night 
encounter might be amongst heavy ships was demonstrated 
during the last named evolution. The cruiser HMS Curacao 
illuminated Queen Elizabeth between 2354-2357 hours which 
allowed Resolution, Royal Sovereign, and Royal Oak to 
independently engage for one minute's firing, whilst HMS 
Calypso managed to illuminate Queen Elizabeth between 0009- 
0017 hours which allowed the same previously named ships to 
engage for a four minute period. "' 
The Service's willingness to accept a night action was 
an attempt to mitigate through tactics her increasing 
strategic naval inferiority. This inferiority only 
worsened as the period progressed as the Service's ships 
could not be built to the dimensions of their rivals 
because of limitations in port facilities and the Suez 
la6ADM 186/148, 'C. B. 1769/30(2), ' p. 4. 
147Ibid. , p. 65. 
148ADM 186/150, 'C. B. 1769/31(2), Exercises & 
Operations, 1931, Volume II, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated August 1932, p. 23. 
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Canal. 149 Given the restricted displacements of the second 
King George V and Lion-classes of battleships and their 
limited ammunition loads of eighty"' and sixty151 rounds per 
gun respectively, an engagement fought at long-range was no 
longer a tactical option for the Royal Navy. The only 
chance that British forces appeared to have was to seek a 
night or restricted visibility engagement and pass as 
quickly as possible through the danger zone. 
Identification and Deception. As British procedures 
and components used during the late" war for warship 
identification had been compromised, an immediate need was 
to develop and deploy a new system. 152 A second requirement 
was to field a system that mitigated the worst aspects of 
existing methods and procedures. Namely, in issuing a 
challenge, the querying ship announced not only its 
presence, but immediately conveyed whether it was a hostile 
or a friendly vessel. A condition most acute when 
visibility was less than the gun range. 153 The Admiralty 
response to the dilemma was to follow the familiar pattern 
of sitting- a committee to investigate the issue in 
question, report on the technology available, and recommend 
the steps to be implemented. In this instance, the 
Committee on Recognition Signals, chaired by Rear Admiral 
"'Joseph A. Maiolo, The Royal Navv and Nazi Germany, 
1933-39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the 
Secon World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 
1998), p. 151. 
150ADM 1/9394, 'Legend of Particulars of Proposed 
Battleship 14 P' dated 28 September 1936. 
151ADM 1/9441, "Legend of Particulars of Proposed 
Battleships of the 'Lion' Class, " dated 6 December 1938. 
152'C. B. 1548, German Navy Tactical Orders, ' dated April 
1920 reproduced German fleet guidance on British 
identification procedures. See Jellicoe Papers, British 
Library, Additional MSS 49,005. 
153ADM 1/8558/135, Captain Astley-Rushton letter to Rear 
Admiral G. H. Baird dated 5 October 1920. 
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G. H. Baird, 154 examined not only the familiar methods based 
on pyrotechnics and mechanical discs, but newer. 
possibilities centred around wireless communications and 
lighting outside the visible spectrum--infra red and ultra 
violet. The latter offered much promise, by allowing ships 
to be fitted with recognition lights, visible through 
special filters, that would only burn when activated by a 
radio signal transmitted by the challenging ship. By 1922, 
a system was installed in Warspite and Barham and one 
observer noted: 
During the last few days we have had an 
expert from the Signal School on board to 
test a new method of making 'Visual' 
Signals, it is more or less the same as a 
normal projector except that it produces 
ultra-violet rays which cannot be . seen by the naked eye, consequently a special sort 
of telescope is used for reading signals & 
the apparatus is apparently successful in 
practice as several signals were exchanged 
between the Warspite & ourselves by means of 
it. 155 
The above routine, rudimentary as it was, can be viewed as 
the progenitor of all future Identification, Friend or Foe 
systems. 
Central to the issue of identification was to minimise 
the possibility of engaging one's own forces. One reason 
why the Service embraced night-fighting reluctantly was 
that existing methods and procedures were inadequate to the 
severe demands of such encounters. Following 'D. H., ' a 
Home Fleet November 1933 exercise, the Commodore, Destroyer 
Flotillas remarked: 
20. After Cairo had been sunk, Blue 
destroyers were searching in the dark for 
Red battlefleet when Versatile gained touch 
with what she thought was Red battlefleet, 
and continued to shadow and report their 
151Sir George Henry Baird (1871-1924). Director of 
Mobilisation Department (1921-1923) and Commander, 
Destroyer Flotillas, Atlantic Fleet (1923-1924). 
"'Journal entry dated 18 November 1922, King Papers, 
IWM/90/23/1. 
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position until the end of the exercise. 
Actually Versatile was shadowing Blue battle 
cruisers, with the result that not only were 
all the remaining Blue destroyers making for 
the reported position but Blue battle 
cruisers also manoeuvred to engage the 
imaginary Red battlefleet. 
21. This confirms my opinion that 
destroyers and capital ships cannot combine, 
in a night attack on enemy capital ships, 
without very serious danger of mistaking 
friend for foe, with possibly disastrous 
consequences. 
It has long been accepted that a 
capital ship is justified in firing on any 
destroyer which is sighted at night in 
waters where enemy can be expected, and 
during a night attack on enemy capital ships 
every Destroyer Commanding Officer of the 
Attacking Force should be able to know that 
any capital ship sighted is an enemy. "' 
A corollary to identification was the desire to 
achieve a tactical advantage by means of deception. In 
exercise 'F. D., ' conducted 1 April 1923 in the Bay of 
Biscay, Blue Force composed, in part, by Hood and Repulse 
escorted a convoy of eighteen ships. 157 Each battle cruiser 
took the recognition signal of the other, and, in addition, 
Conquest, a three-funnel cruiser, disguised her fore funnel 
to appear as a two-funnel 'C' or 'D' class light cruiser. 151 
Deception was facilitated further by using consorts to 
transmit the signals originating from the fleet commander. 
In exercise 'L. A., ' conducted 11-12 January 1928, the 
Commander-in-Chief, Blue Fleet flying his flag in Hood used 
HMS Amazon for such duties. 159 A second means employed to 
hide friendly unit identification from an enemy and to 
1s6ADM 186/154, 'C. B. 1769/33(2), ' p. 4. 
'57Represented by HMS Greenwich, HMS Cyclops, HMS 
Vampire, and Assistance. 
158Journal entry dated 1 April 1923, Elkins Papers, 
NMM/ELK/1. 
'"Journal entry dated 11 January 1928, Haggard Papers, 
IWM/85/21/3. 
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forestall successful plotting was to use false call signs, 
or to use separate call signs, for the reception and 
transmission of wireless traffic. 160 Beyond minimising a 
'Blue-on-Blue' engagement, the aim of identification and 
deception was to provide an advantage in the tactical 
encounter. 
Scouting and Reconnaissance. Through scouting and 
reconnaissance, the enemy fleet was located. All vessels 
and aircraft were to assist in this matter, and once touch 
was gained, it was to be maintained to ensure that the 
British battlefleet secured action with the enemy. Fleet 
experience, such as exercise 'J. D. ' conducted in February 
1926, confirmed that a fleet operating without battle 
cruisers was at a disadvantage when facing a force so 
equipped. 161 A system of group shadowing was perfected which 
allowed light forces, backed up by battle cruisers, to 
shadow a heavier enemy force; 162 a concept proposed by Dreyer 
and known as the 'elastic ring'. 163 Such procedures were 
adopted as a result of the fewer number of cruisers 
available and the increased use of destroyers in 
reconnaissance duties. The reduced number of scouting and 
reconnaissance vessels available also gave rise to tactics 
which merged the independent scouting and striking 
functions of cruiser forces into a single force. 
The ranges over which scouting and reconnaissance were 
conducted increased throughout the period with the 
employment of aircraft. By 1929, given good weather, air 
searches to a range of 120 miles actual, representing 230 
miles simulated, were not atypical, 164 and in the following 
16°ADM 186/149, T. B. 1769/31(1), ' p. 38. 
161ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 47. 
162ADM 186/148, 'C. B. 1769/30(2), ' p. 24. 
163Rear Admiral J. H. F. Crombie letter to Roskill dated 
1 August 1964, Roskill Papers, ROSK/7/163. 
164ADM 186/145, 'C. B. 1769/29(1)' p. 44. 
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year air searches to a depth of a 164 miles actual were 
recorded. 165 This expansion of scouting and reconnaissance 
capabilities was captured in a contemporary report: 
The AK line used to be 5 miles ahead of the 
fleet; now it is 150. A battleship's 
torpedoes have a range of 10 miles; and 
aircraft carrier's torpedoes have at present 
a range of about 100. These are the sort of 
changes which have taken place--not to 
principles but to weapons--but they are 
changes which are by no means unimportant. 
With such an extended AK line, fleets can 
find each other more easily, and with such 
an increased range of torpedoes they can 
attack each other sooner. A slogan (which 
is now becoming well known) is that "there 
are three F's in naval warfare--FIND, FIX, 
and FIGHT. Aircraft do the first two and 
the fleet, assisted by its aircraft, does 
the third. " 166 
Thus, by 1931, the Naval Staff anticipated fleet actions 
beginning when the main forces were some 100 to 200 miles 
apart. To cover such distances effectively, a minimum 
requirement was for the provision of 100 aircraft solely 
for reconnaissance purposes. "' 
Such advances, however, came at a price. Long-range 
navigation over open waters required that a homing beacon 
be transmitted by the carrier or a nearby consort to allow 
returning aircraft to locate the ship. This measure was 
necessitated by the general unreliability of magnetic 
compasses in aeroplanes of all-metal construction. 168 Thus, 
a fleet attempting to locate an opposing force through air 
search had to assume that its own presence would be 
165ADM 186/147, 'C. B. 1769/30(1), Exercises & 
Operations, 1930, Volume I, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated November 1930, p. 3. 
166ADM 223/817, 'Confidential Admiralty Monthly 
Intelligence Report, No. 124, ' dated 15 September 1929, p. 
28. Original emphasis. 
167ADM 1/9330, 'Staff Requirement Aircraft Carriers, ' 
dated March 1931. 
168ADM 186/149, 'C. B. 1769/31(1), ' p. 35. 
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detected by the need to recover its aircraft. Moreover, 
the experienced gained in exercises such as 'Q. S. ' and 
'R. E., ' conducted by the Mediterranean Fleet in June and 
September 1932, respectively, highlighted that protection 
of the carrier force dictated that it must steam in close 
proximity to the battlefleet. '69 Thus, the possibility 
existed that through the use of air reconnaissance, a fleet 
would not only fail to find the enemy, but unintentionally 
announce its presence prematurely. The problem could be 
ameliorated by reducing the depth of the air search to no 
more than 60 miles. Yet, this sacrificed the very 
strengths of an air search--speed and range--over a search 
conducted by the A-K cruiser screen which was typically 
positioned 18 miles ahead and spread across the enemy 
battlefleet's anticipated line of bearing. '70 
While it is the case that scouting and reconnaissance 
were enhanced by the use of aircraft, weather was always a 
limiting factor in air operations, 171 and a noticeable 
feature of the combined fleet exercises of 1934 was that 
adverse weather precluded carrier air operations of any 
sort. 172 Moreover, the conduct of an air search, not unlike 
the use of other reconnaissance forces, could be a wasted 
effort, if an appreciation did not exist of where to 
allocate scarce resources. Hence, an important adjunct to 
the organic scouting and reconnaissance assets of the fleet 
was the fixed-station direction finding capabilities of the 
Admiralty. Their interception of enemy wireless traffic 
169ADM 186/152, 'C. B. 1769/32(2), Exercises & 
Operations, 1932, Volume II, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated July 1933, pp. 12 and 40. 
170ADM 186/637, 'C. B. 1822, ' p. 9. 
171ADM 116/2173, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
letter No. 257/A. H. 1124 dated 27 February 1922, ADM 186/149, 
T. B. 1769/31(1), ' p. 3 and ADM 186/151, 'C. B. 1769/32(1), ' 
p. iii. 
172'Anon, ' 'The Combined Fleet Exercises, 1934, ' Naval 
Review, Volume XXII, p. 226. 
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would allow the fleet to narrow the axis of its search 
patterns. In 'Z. H., ' a combined fleet exercise held in 
March 1934, the importance of direction finding was 
established, and the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet 
recommended that: 
It is considered to be of importance 
that shore D/F stations should be 
established, wherever possible, so as to 
cover the probable area of naval 
hostilities, and that suitable 
intercommunication and plotting facilities 
should be available to enable enemy ships to 
be fixed by cross D/F bearings, and their 
positions signalled to forces at sea. l'3 
By the end of the 1919-1939 period the navy viewed air 
reconnaissance as more than an adjunct to the surface 
scouting; it had become a means to reduce its total 
requirement in cruiser numbers, and with it, the Service 
confirmed the Air Ministry's argument of substitution. 
Manoeuvre. Whether conducted at the unit, divisional, 
or fleet level, manoeuvre facilitated both offensive and 
defensive purposes. Through manoeuvre, individual ships 
took those stationing measures necessary to protect 
themselves while yet conforming to the tactical 
requirements of the squadron. The need for evasive action 
could be the result of telling gunfire, to avoid torpedo 
tracks, to disrupt a bombing attack, or in the case of 
battle cruisers, to present the best defensive inclination 
given their reduced armoured protection during the 
approach. At the fleet level, manoeuvre aimed to place the 
battlefleet at that range which maximised the offensive 
characteristics of British capital ships whilst affording 
the best protection against enemy shellfire. This, of 
necessity, required an assessment of British capital ship 
performance against rival warships. For example, in the 
case of a Queen Elizabeth-class encounter with a Japanese 
ship of the Fuso-class, the ideal range was estimated at 
12,000 to 15,500 yards; the deadliest range for a vessel of 
173ADM 186/155, 'C. B. 1769/34(1), ' p. 18. 
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the Queen Elizabeth-class against a Fuso was deemed to be 
17,000 to 19,500 yards. 174 Thus, the British desire to close 
to a range of 12,000 to 16,000 yards was more than just an 
attempt to secure the greatest chance of hitting. It also 
coincided with the presumed zone of immunity for a certain 
class of British heavy ships against a specific enemy 
threat. 
The Royal Navy was neither enthusiastic nor optimistic 
that a fleet action fought at distances of 27,000 yards and 
beyond was desirable. Hits were likely to be few and not 
worth the expenditure of ammunition required. 175 Probably 
for reasons of space and safety, the navy did not attempt 
to increase the ammunition allowance in its heavy ships; a 
measure the Japanese Navy had done when it began training 
in long-range gunnery when it increased its outfit per gun 
to 150 shells . 
1'6 
It is a shibboleth of the dreadnought era, that the 
ideal tactical encounter was obtained when one fleet 
succeeded in crossing the 'T' of the opposing force. This 
allowed the crossing fleet to apply the maximum fire of its 
gunline by opening up the 'A' arcs whilst facing the 
smallest fire in return. As a theoretical construct this 
is correct. Left unsaid, however, is that such a manoeuvre 
assumed that the heavy ships of both fleets possessed 
offensive and defensive attributes of roughly equal value. 
In fact, this was rarely the case, and the calculation of 
the ideal range to be sought in an engagement could give 
rise to the need, as in the Queen Elizabeth-Fuso example, 
to accept an inferior tactical position during the approach 
in order to achieve the desired range. Thus, the claim 
that the ideal range for the British in any battlefleet 
174ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 20. 
175ADM 1/8658/69, 'Naval Tactics, 1924' Royal Naval 
College, Greenwich lecture delivered by Captain C. V. 
Usborne 27 June 1923, p. 10. 
176ADM 186/338, 'C. B. 3001/36, ' p. 96. 
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action was from 12,000 to 15,500 yards must be tempered 
with an understanding of what ships would be engaged and 
their specified zones of immunity. 
Meanwhile, an unintended benefit of the reduced number 
of heavy ships in service was that it was possible to 
increase the stationing distance between ships from 212 
cables to 32-4 cables. This increased the lateral frontage 
offered to torpedo attack by an opposing force, and, yet, 
did not unduly increase the overall length of the 
battleline. l" Yet, what of the battlefleet? Was a concentrated 
battlefleet- still the preferred tactical formation for 
action purposes? A"criticism was expressed, at times, that 
the Service would be better served by adopting 'divided 
tactics. o178 Such formations, it was argued, would allow the 
flag officers commanding the separate divisions of heavy 
ships more initiative and force the enemy to similarly 
divide to meet such a threat. The British fleet would then 
be able to reunite and crush the divided enemy. 179 Such 
tactics would also deny the enemy the ability to refuse 
battle by turning away from the British fleet. "' 
Officially, the navy never embraced `divided tactics; ' the 
battlefleet remained a single concentrated tactical force during 
the period. pt course, much woula aepend on how an enemy tleet was 
handled and the progress of the battle. Whilst the 'Battle 
Instructions' emphasised the need for flag officers to 
exercise initiative, the need to provide mutual support 
177 ADM 1/8628/130, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
to Admiralty letter No. 1119/A. H. 1120 dated 14 August 1922. 
"'Amongst those who argued for 'divided tactics' were 
the brothers Dewar in their unpublished study of Jutland, 
'C. B. 0938, Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland. ' See 
Additional MSS 49,042, Jellicoe Papers. 
179ADM 1/8658/69, 'Tactics, ' Royal Naval Staff College, 
Greenwich, Session 1922-1923. 
'180 'Development of Tactics in Grand Fleet, ' Royal Naval 
Staff College, Greenwich lecture by Captain H. G. 
Thursfield delivered 7 February 1922, Thursfield Papers, 
NMM/THU/107. 
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between battle squadrons and the requirement to maintain a 
concentrated fire against the enemy battlefleet, meant that 
the scope of freedom which 'divided tactics' required would 
only be present if the enemy fleet had been broken. "' In 
many respects, the problem that the advocates of 'divided 
tactics' sought to correct had been solved through the 
diminished size of the battlefleet. A single concentrated 
formation was not likely to be as unwieldy as in the past, 
whilst division, in itself, might simply result in 
diffusion of effort. Moreover, such a formation would 
necessitate an increase in the screening forces required to 
protect the separated divisions over a battlefleet that 
remained concentrated. 
Turning to the air threat, experience had shown during 
exercises that air attacks developed quickly and that it 
was not always possible to detect the sound of the 
approaching strike. A strong, effective anti-aircraft fire 
was seen as the best defence, and: 
The best defence of the fleet against 
air attack lies in offensive action against 
the enemy's air forces at the earliest 
possible moment. 182 
Screening forces were positioned several miles away from 
heavy ships and carriers to provide an advance warning of 
a pending strike and as an initial defensive barrier. 
Still, given the pace at which an air threat might develop, 
defensive fire might not be possible. A ship at speed and 
under radical helm was in a better posture to meet such a 
strike, but experience had shown that inside of 650 yards 
no amount of defensive manoeuvring would avoid a torpedo, 
whilst beyond 1,400 yards air-launched torpedoes could be 
'81ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' Section VI, clauses 104- 
106. 
182ADM 186/96, 'C. B. 01916, ' p. 20. 
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combed in almost every case. I'll Moreover, the development 
of the magnetic torpedo and the buoyant bomb made the issue 
even graver, 1B4 and a measure of the risk involved for a ship 
was that any manoeuvre to be effective had to be initiated 
about 50 seconds prior to the anticipated bomb attack. 185 
Finally, air strikes were deemed most dangerous at dusk or 
at dawn when the ship was silhouetted against the sky and 
aircraft could approach from out of the dark. 186 
During the 1914-1918 war, the accepted manoeuvre for 
combing a torpedo was the 'turn away. ' Much time was spent 
during the interwar period on whether this represented the 
best course of action. With a surfeit of wartime 
torpedoes, the problem was investigated during exercises 
'N. B. ' and 'N. D. ' conducted by the Mediterranean Fleet 
during June and September 1926.18' These exercises allowed 
flotilla forces to actually develop a large-scale torpedo 
fire while testing the differing types of avoiding action 
tactics available to a battlefleet: individual manoeuvring 
action, the collective 'turn towards, ' and the collective 
'turn away. ' 188 From these evolutions, it became accepted 
practice to turn towards an approaching torpedo strike and 
reduce speed when the angle of bearing was less than 600 on 
1s3 ADM 186/317, 'C. B. 1915, ' Plate No. 1, p. 6. This 
assessment was based on the prospects of avoiding a single 
torpedo. 
... ADM 186/558, 'C. B. 1997 (38) , Report of the Committee 
on Damage Control and Admiralty Decisions on the 
Recommendations, 1938, ' Admiralty, Material Finance Branch, 
p. 3. 
185ADM 186/96, 'C. B. 01916, ' p. 34. 
186 ADM 186/541, 'C. B. 3002/37, Progress in Torpedo, 
Mining, Minesweeping, A/S Measures, and Chemical Warfare 
Defence, 1937 Edition, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical 
Division dated October 1937, p. 16. 
187C B. 1734(2), Selected Reports of Tactical Exercises, 




the bow, and to turn away and increase speed when the angle 
of bearing of the torpedo was greater than 600.189 
For the fleet, manoeuvre served both offensive and 
defensive purposes. It allowed initial touch with the 
enemy to be gained and sought to exploit the advantages of 
wind and light conferred by a favourable tactical position, 
yet the benefits of the latter were not to be pursued at 
the risk of sacrificing the chance of a fleet action. "' 
Once contact had been secured, the supporting forces of the 
battlefleet would endeavour to command the van and rear of 
the enemy fleet to allow British torpedo attacks to develop 
whilst denying the same to an adversary. 191 If the British 
battlefleet were superior to that of the enemy, the battle 
cruisers would assist in this task; if not, they would 
reinforce the battlefleet for the pending gun action. 192 
With this, the doctrinal distinction that the battlefleet 
was formed by the union of battle squadrons only acting in 
concert was abandoned. This practice, in light of the 
experience of the 1914-1918 war, was the direct result of 
the reduced number of heavy ships available. It did not 
represent a fundamental reassessment in the battle cruisers 
offensive merits, and the general rule was that '[b]attle 
cruisers must not come under the gun fire of 
battleships ... 1193 
Finally, the tactical justification of the battlefleet 
was that it concentrated in a single manoeuvre unit the 
fleet's offensive firepower. Yet, such concentration was 
not an end in itself, if an enemy naval force was not 
similarly disposed. 194 For one thing, it violated the 
"'Ibid. 
190ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' p. 62. 
191ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 15. 
192Ibid. 
, p. 18. 
193ADM 186/154, 'C. B. 1769/33(2), ' p. 5. 
19'ADM 186/117, 'C. B. 3042, ' pp. 2-3. 
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principle of economy of force. Thus, whether the British 
battlefleet had a future as a tactical entity was in large 
measure contingent on who the next naval war would be waged 
against and the naval strategy adopted by that power. If 
the enemy in question attempted to pursue either a 'command 
of the sea' or 'fleet-in-being' strategy, the battlefleet 
would be retained; if the naval foe pursued a strategy of 
guerre 'de course, then British heavy ships were likely to 
be dispersed as escorts to convoys. The last requirement 
being necessitated by the general weakness of British 
cruisers compared to their foreign counterparts. 
Previously, when contact between battlefleets had been 
secured, the supporting destroyers of the British force 
assumed station on the disengaged side of the battlefleet. 
From this position, they stood clear from the fire of the 
battlefleet, yet, were ready to pass through the British 
line to repel an attack by the flotilla forces of the enemy 
or to launch their own assault. 195 Given its estimation for 
the range to be sought in a fleet action, and the likely 
advantage in long-range firing its rivals would enjoy, 
British flotilla forces were expected to mask the 
battlefleet's approach through the use of smoke during a 
daylight action. Of necessity, this placed her screening 
forces betwixt the two battlefleets and made any use of the 
torpedo by heavy ships impractical. There were a host of 
reasons why the torpedo arm of battleships lost favour. 
Yet, beyond the pressing need for additional space to be 
allocated for anti-aircraft ammunition storage, the 
difficulty of their use from submerged flats whilst 
steaming at speed, and the difficulty of maintaining an 
effective plot whilst a heavy ship's guns were in action, 
was that given the type of encounter expected, there 
remained little scope for their effective use once the 
decision was confirmed to accept a close-range action 
against the superior ships of an enemy battlefleet. 
195ADM 186/636, 'C. B. 1716, ' p. 51. 
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The Exercise Programme of the Royal Navy. With 
concentration of fire the goal, individual ship evolutions 
could not by themselves secure proficiency in battlefleet 
tactics. Experience was necessary in performing squadron- 
level evolutions. By 1924, the development of MSC firing 
had progressed to the point that the First Division of the 
First Battle Squadron was able to experiment with 
redistributing an ongoing fire plan against an enemy battle 
squadron represented by Tiger towing three battle practice 
targets. 196 In a shoot lasting 43 minutes, the fire plan was 
changed and a new distribution ordered. This resulted in 
a hiatus of over two minutes while the new plan was 
signalled and the ranges passed from the controlling ship. 
From this interruption the principle was laid down: 
"That an enemy should not be permitted 
to remain unfired at for so long as, on the 
average, over two minutes whilst a 
redistribution of the fire of a division is 
being arranged. 
"Whatever methods are in use, fire 
should not be checked on an enemy already 
engaged if she is to be re-engaged by the 
same unit in the new distribution of fire. 197 
During the period, large-scale strategical exercises 
were conducted on a regular basis, though it was not until 
exercise 'Z. D. ' held in March 1931 that the combined 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets actually practised in a 
sustained manner for the first time since the war. 198 Beyond 
allowing the Royal Navy to develop and refine its tactical 
doctrine against a specifically defined threat, these 
evolutions provided a chance to test new tactical concepts 
on a scale that most approximated active service conditions 
in peacetime. Just as specific gunnery problems were 
examined, so the attempt was made to explore broader 
196ADM 186/263, 'C. B. 977, ' pp. 6-7. 
197Ibid. 
198ADM 186/149, 'C. B. 1769/31(1), ' p. 23. 
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tactical problems such as the ideal range to be sought for 
in a fleet engagement, 199 the means of securing the defence 
of aircraft carriers, 20° and the likely 'Forms of Battle' . 
201 
The last mentioned defined a series of set piece encounters 
between opposing battlefleets including: 
Form A. Battle on similar courses. 
Form B. Circling action. 
Form C. Forcing a decision by gunfire. 
Form D. Chase. 
Form E. Retiring tactics. 
Form F. False deployment. 
Form G. Dictating deployment. 202 
Forms 'A' through 'D' were the tactics to be employed when 
the British fleet was the superior force, whilst Forms 'E', 
'F', and 'G' were the tactics to be adopted when the Royal 
Navy was the weaker fleet. 203 If a criticism of the Royal 
Navy's tactical doctrine of the 1914-1918 war was that it 
assumed that fleet action would always conform to an 
engagement fought along parallel lines, then the 
development of 'Forms of Battle' was one means amongst 
several that attempted to redress this failing. 204 
That said, certain investigative themes were de 
199ADM 186/154, T. B. 1769/33(2), ' p. 8. 
200ADM 186/157, 'C. B. 1769/35(1) and (2), ' p. 
"'Unlike the 
specified in Appenc 
have not survived. 
a systematic manner 
to their existence 
Operations. ' 
gunnery problems investigated and 
lix VII, the tactical problems surveyed 
That such problems were dealt with in 
is borne by the passing references made 
in the series 'C. B. 1769, Exercises & 
202'ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 6. n. b., 'C. B. 
01821, Battle Instructions, ' discusses 'Forms of Battle' 
somewhat differently and omits four of the forms which were 
covered under 'Naval Tactical Notes, Volume II. ' As this 
important series has not been located, the above reference 
is preferred. 
203ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 6. 
204'Jutland I, ' lecture delivered in 1932 by Commander 
C. S. Daniel to Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover, 
Tennant Papers, NMM/TEN/41/5. 
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rigueur and formed essential elements in many fleet 
exercises. Amongst such recurring themes were the 
exercising of ships in their war routine, defence against 
chemical attack, and: 
a. the escorting of a slow moving convoy; "' 
b. the defence of trade routes or of a 
commercial focal point; 'O' 
c. the passage of a fleet through narrow 
waters; 207 
d. a single fleet operating in the vicinity 
of two separate enemy forces which 
collectively are the stronger; 208 
e. a fleet with damaged ships attempting to 
retire in the face of a fleet that is not so 
encumbered; 209 
f. a fleet action fought late in the day and 
the steps required to ensure a 
recommencement of the action at first 
light; 210 
g. a battlefleet, screened or unscreened, 
attacked by, aircraft, cruisers and light 
205January 1922 'E. A., ' January 1923 'F. A. and 'F. B., ' 
March 1923 'F. D., ' January 1925 'H. B., ' August 1926 'N. C., ' 
January 1928 'L. A. ' and 'N. P., ' March 1928 'L. C., ' January 
1929 'M. A., ' March 1929 'M. Z., ' June 1929 'O. D., ' June 1931 
'P. A., ' and June 1932 'Q. S. ' 
206May 1928 'L. D., ' March 1931 'Z. D., ' January 1933 
'D. A., ' June 1933 'R. T., ' and March 1935 'Z. L. ' 
"'October 1923 'F. J. 1, ' March 1927 'K. G., ' September 
1927 'N. O., ' September 1929 'M. G., ' January 1933 'R. N., ' 
and March 1933 'Z. E. 5. B. ' 
208February 1922 'E. D. 1, ' March 1922 'E. F., ' March 1927 
'K. F., ' June 1927 'N. H. ' March 1929 'M. Z., ' January 1930 
'A. A., ' March 1930 'O. P., ' and April 1932 'Q. P. ' 
209February 1922 'E. D. 2, ' February 1926 'J. D. ' and 
August 1928 'N. V. ' 
210July 1925 'M. Q., ' 1928 'N. Q., ' March 1930 'Z. C., ' and 
October 1930 'O. X. ' 
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forces; 211 
h. the risk posed by a retiring fleet's 
torpedo fire to a chasing fleet; 212 
i. the defence of a fleet in an unprotected 
anchorage against air attack; 213 
j. the screening of a battlefleet by Asdic 
equipped escorts. 214 
k. a fleet action fought between heavy 
ships that wish to fight at different 
ranges . 
215 
Of the eleven recurring themes listed, (e), (f), (g), 
and (h) above can be viewed as attempting to learn from 
Jutland, but what of the others? Whilst themes (a) and (b) 
have antecedents in the general naval experience of the 
1914-1918 war, topics (c), (d), (i), (j), and (k) were more 
contemporary in nature, and (d) can be viewed as an attempt 
to test the utility of 'divided tactics'. Collectively, 
the themes were an attempt by the Service to address 
operational and doctrinal deficiencies revealed by the 
"'February 1922 'E. D. 3., ' April 1922 'E. M., ' October 
1922 'E. P. 1' and 'E. Q., ' March 1925 'H. G. ' and 'H. H., ' July 
1925 'M. Q., ' January 1926 'J. C., ' March 1926 'J. G. ' and 
'J. H., ' July 1926 'J. K., ' September 1926 'J. L. 1, ' March 
1927 'K. E., ' September 1927 'K. P., ' January 1928 'L. B. 1' 
and 'L. B. 2, ' August 1929 'O. J., ' October 1929 'N. 1, ' 
February 1930 'A. C., ' April 1930 'D. A. ' September 1930 
'A. J., ' October 1930 'A. N., ' February 1931 'D. X. 2, ' January 
1932 'Q. I., ' March 1932 'Q. K. ' and 'Q. M., ' April 1933 
'R. S., ' August 1933 'R. X., ' June 1934 'E. C., ' January 1935 
'S. S. ' and 'D. X. 15, ' and June 1935 'F. C. ' 
"'August 1927 'N. I. ' and 'N. K., ' August 1928 'N. W., ' 
September 1930 'A. H., ' October 1930 'O. V., ' April 1931 
'D., ' and August 1932 'R. C. ' 
2130ctober 1929 'O. L., ' October 1930 'O. Y., ' January 
1931 '0. Z., ' May 1931 'B. B., ' January 1932 'Q. B., ' January 
1933 'R. K., ' January 1935 'S. S., ' and June 1935 'A. D. S. ' 
214Ju1y 1926 'J. K., ' September 1927 'N. O., ' January 1928 
'N. P. ' and 'L. A., ' September 1928 'N. X., ' May 1929 'O. C., ' 
and November 1929 'A. R. ' 
215March 1929 'O. A., ' April 1933 'R. R., ' and March 1934 
'Z. J. ' 
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experience of war while preparing for the next presumed 
conflict--war in the Far East. To that end, a fleet of 
slow moving ships escorting a convoy of tankers and an 
accompanying MNDBO would have to pass through a series of 
constricted waters including the Straits of Gibraltar, the 
Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and, 
thence, through the Straits of Malacca, or the Sunda 
Straits. During passage, it may have sustained damage if 
attacked by air, surface, and submarine forces and require 
temporary repair. Alternatively, it might have to operate 
from an advance anchorage that had been previously 
surveyed, but not readied, whilst Singapore and Hong Kong 
were invested. Hence, the MNDBO would secure the anchorage 
whilst defects were made good and the battlefleet and 
accompanying carriers defended the harbour against a 
potential air attack delivered by bomb, torpedo, and gas. 
At some point, the Main Fleet would seek junction with 
Local Defence Forces and the ships of the China Station and 
attempt to engage the Japanese Fleet. Depending on the 
situation on the ground, it might have to offer battle 
immediately or attempt to disengage from an intact Japanese 
force. Finally, the Main Fleet might have to offer battle 
in the face of a Japanese battlefleet that enjoyed a marked 
superiority in long-range gunnery. 
Variations to the above were practised by combining 
one or more of the themes together. Whilst they were 
developed to prepare for an Anglo-Japanese war (from a 
strategic standpoint, the worst naval case) addressing as 
they did the major naval issues of the era, they had 
validity for any other naval war posited. The experience 
gained from gaming the above themes showed that the carrier 
was a potent offensive weapon that vastly improved the 
scouting and reconnaissance of the fleet and was capable of 
inflicting an early and lethal blow against an enemy naval 
force. They also highlighted that the carrier was, 
herself, extremely vulnerable and prone to being lost early 
in any engagement. This phenomenon was captured by the 
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Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers following exercise 'Z. P. 2, ' 
a combined fleet exercise held in March 1938: 
119. In my opinion the outstanding 
features of the exercise as far as the air 
is concerned are: - 
(a) The early destruction of both 
carriers... 
120. Both carriers were sunk or out of 
action due to air attack within two hours of 
the exercise having commenced, Glorious at 
0808 and Courageous at 0858.216 
This vulnerability dictated that all ships including the 
battlefleet must be prepared to defend the carrier force. 
Moreover, the carrier was not at risk solely from air 
attack from her opposite number. Fleet exercises confirmed 
that the carrier was at risk from cruiser and destroyer 
forces. During 'R. E., ' a Mediterranean Fleet exercise 
conducted in September 1932, the actions of the Blue force 
were limited to defending Glorious from such attacks once 
its carrier had been located. 217 Yet, the carrier had, at 
times, to leave this protective veil to recover her 
aircraft due to prevailing wind conditions. Time and 
again, this manoeuvre resulted in her loss as she was 
exposed to air, surface, and submarine attack. Similarly, 
these evolutions also showed that heavy ships were 
vulnerable too. Yet, the battlefleet did not have to 
conform her movements to the vagaries of, the wind. Damage 
or loss could be sustained by individual heavy ships, and 
yet might not prove catastrophic to the overall 
effectiveness of the battlefleet. The same was unlikely to 
be true in the case of the of an aircraft carrier. 
Until exercise 'K. F. ' in March 1927, no attack against 
a fleet at sea had exceeded 60 miles radius from the 
launching carrier. 218 Definitive analysis is difficult as 
the depth of reconnaissance and strikes were frequently 
216ADM 186/159, 'C. B. 1769/38, ' p. 14. 
217ADM 186/152, 'C. B. 1769/32(2), ' pp. 39-40. 
218ADM 186/143, T. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 24. 
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limited to balance the speed restrictions applied to 
surface ships. Still, set against the steady improvement 
shown by carrier operations stands the combined fleet 
exercises of 1934 when air operations of any sort were 
precluded. 
Summary. The primary objective of Royal Navy tactical 
thinking during the interwar period was to ensure superior 
firepower during any fleet-to-fleet encounter. This goal 
resulted in the development of multiple ship concentration 
firing and the doctrine that all naval forces should direct 
their attention to the primary striking arm of the enemy, 
his battlefleet, and ensure its destruction. The direct 
antecedents for such tactical precepts were the 
inconclusive surface actions of the 1914-1918 war and the 
belief that ship-to-ship encounters weakened the collective 
fire of the fleet and that subsidiary naval forces had 
focused too much of their attention on their defensive 
responsibilities at the expense of their offensive 
potential. 
It is a canard that the Service was consumed with re- 
fighting the Battle of Jutland to the exclusion of more 
relevant topics. Rather, it was committed to rectifying 
known operational deficiencies highlighted during the late 
war whilst preparing for its next encounter. The Service 
possessed a deep appreciation of tactical theory, even if 
its exercises were not always realistic representations of 
naval warfare. It gamed scenarios at the Tactical School 
and made use of its Staff and War Colleges to provide 
independent assessments, prior to testing precepts in fleet 
manoeuvres. Its exercise programme benefited from being 
able to test the major tactical issues concerning the 
capital ship in two major fleets operating in close 
proximity, but under differing oceanographic and 
meteorological conditions. The irony is that from a 
tactical viewpoint, the one encounter the Royal Navy had 
consistently trained to meet was the one she was least 
prepared to deal with when conflict came due to her 
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commitments in Home, Atlantic and Mediterranean waters: war 
with Japan. 
Extrapolating the results of fleet strategical and 
tactical exercises was, of necessity, a leap in the dark. 
Expected battle conditions were difficult to ascertain, 
opposing forces could not actually be engaged, and the need 
for economy forced most scenarios to be tested over an 
extremely limited period. The casualty tables provided in 
'C. B. 3011, War Game Rules, ' were written to reflect the 
assessment of immediate battle damage in tactical 
evolutions and were not necessarily a proper instrument for 
depicting the strategic import of battle damage. A heavy 
ship might expect to lose several knots due to a torpedo 
hit, or lose a certain percentage of offensive striking 
power due to bomb damage, but would it continue to operate 
with the fleet once an immediate encounter was over? The 
rules remained silent. 21' Criticism can be leveled that the 
casualty tables assumed that capital ships had greater 
resilience and staying power than was warranted by the 
experience of the 1914-1918 war. In this there is much 
truth, yet this allowance was probably compensation, in 
turn, for the tendency of aircraft and submarines to 
initiate attacks against heavy ships from ranges that were 
considered wholly unrealistic for the conditions likely to 
be found during wartime. Moreover, any officer playing 
'Blue' could not escape that he was schooled in the ways of 
'Red', and his ships were, at best, British units 
attempting to mirror the capabilities of a foreign navy. "' 
At the tactical level, the Royal Navy made a concerted 
effort to enhance the proficiency of the fleet, in general, 
and its heavy ships, in particular. It accepted the 
principle of night-fighting, integrated the use of the 
naval air arm into its fleet doctrine, and developed 
improved anti-submarine measures, of which Asdic was but 
219ADM 186/157, 'C. B. 1769/35(1) and (2), ' p. 49. 
220ADM 186/78, 'C. B. 3011, ' p. 12. 
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one component. It pursued gunnery and torpedo proficiency 
to the practical limits of the day's technology, and sought 
to compensate for its growing strategic inferiority through 
enhanced tactical prowess. By the end of the period, it 
recognised the inherent weakness of the battle cruiser and 
moved towards the adoption of the fast battleship in its 
place. Its exercise programme, constrained by the needs of 
economy, still managed to investigate the major tactical 
issues that would face the Royal Navy in a future war based 
on a realistic assessment of the likely naval foe. From 
this, it deduced that heavy ships were at risk from air, 
surface, and underwater attack and that the gun was still 
superior to the torpedo. 
The view that the navy had reverted to a nineteenth 
century way of life and suffered from a leadership malaise 
is hard to reconcile at the tactical level. 22' Such a charge 
would have merit, if the Service had been blessed with 
unlimited resources and faced no operational distractions. 
The record, of course, is that it was constrained, and it 
was stretched by its operational commitments. The 
deployment of Argus, the only active carrier in Home 
waters, to the Near East at the time of the Chanak crisis 
curtailed the exercise programme of the Atlantic Fleet, 222 
whilst the scrapping of Agamemnon curtailed gunnery 
proficiency in 1927.223 In 1928, Centurion replaced 
Aaamemnon. 224 Its withdrawal from the Fleet Target Service 
in 1931 again hindered the gunnery practices in both the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. 225 Operating far fewer 
carriers than heavy ships, the investigation of any 
221Walter J. Boyne, Clash Titans: Worl War II at ea 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 24. 
222ADM 186/258, 'C. B. 962, ' p. 22. 
223ADM 186/289, 'C. B. 3001/27, ' p. 3. 
22°ADM 186/293, 'C. B. 3001/28, ' p. 4. 
225ADM 186/309, 'C. B. 3001/31, ' p. 5. 
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tactical problem involving aircraft was hampered by the 
need to respond to emerging operational commitments. it 
was not vision the Service was lacking; it was numbers and 
finance. Pound's plea for the Mediterranean and Atlantic 
Fleets to operate two carriers each was in recognition that 
it was difficult to script a meaningful exercise where only 
one side possessed an air arm. 226 Finally, the admissio n by 
one senior officer that: 
I know nothing, absolutely, of Fleet 
Tactics, or of handling a Fleet. During my 
two years in Princess Royal, 18 months of 
which were during the War, all the Tactics 
called for at sea were practically embraced 
in "Turn together four Points to Port, " and, 
ten minutes later, "Turn together four 
Points to Starboard. p227 
says more about the tactical competency of a single officer 
than it does about the collective ability of the Royal 
Navy. 228 Long before the United States adopted 'aggressor' 
units to enhance tactical realism in ground and air 
training, the Royal Navy had adopted the practice of 
dressing vessels and men in the manner of an opposing naval 
force. 22' 
Fundamentally, training in tactics involves a degree 
of conjecture. Conjecture, not only in how weapons will 
perform, but on the constraints imposed by policy and 
strategy. A navy that assumes submarine warfare will be 
waged in accordance with the restrictions of the London 
Submarine Protocol of 1936 will train differently than one 
226ADM 1/8733/38, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff un- 
numbered minute dated 29 September 1928. 
22'Admiral John Kelly letter to Keyes dated 14 April 
1926 cited in Halpern, ed., Keyes Papers, Volume II, pp. 
177-178. 
228Kelly's general indifference to tactical and 
strategic matters is confirmed in a letter by Admiral Sir 
William M. James to Roskill dated 15 May 1964, ROSK/7/163. 
229See photograph produced in The Times dated 26 March 
1926, Beaufoy-Brown Papers, LHCMA. 
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which expects to face unrestricted submarine warfare. At 
the tactical level, the Royal Navy made two key assumptions 
about the future of naval warfare, subsequently proved 
false, which favoured the retention of the capital ship and 
justified its place within fleet doctrine. First, it 
assumed that the next naval war would be fought in a 
chemical environment, and one of the first measures taken 
at the time of the Abyssinian Crisis was to ship 
decontamination stores from Britain to Malta for use by the 
Mediterranean Fleet and the local dockyard. 230 It trained 
assiduously to meet this threat and confirmation that the 
Italians had employed mustard gas during its Abyssinian 
campaign made this assessment appear more valid than ever. 23' 
Moreover, it recognised that France, Turkey, Germany, 
Russia, Japan, and the United States had an offensive 
chemical weapons capability. 23z 
The second key assumption made was that, 
notwithstanding the importance of the aircraft carrier to 
fleet operations, a fleet action would continue in the 
event of their loss or damage. Such an assumption had 
merit for training purposes when the need to exercise 
ships, aircraft, and personnel in their war routine over a 
prolonged period was an important consideration. However, 
the assumption implied that a foreign naval power would 
continue to seek battle rather than disengage if such loss 
occurred, and unconsciously confirmed that the final 
arbiter in a surface action remained the capital ship. 
Finally, in scripting its fleet exercises contact 
between opposing battlefleets typically followed the 
commencement of the evolution after the briefest of time 
allotted for scouting and reconnaissance. This was the 
230Admiralty letter M. 03317/35 to Commander-in-Chief, 
Portsmouth et al. dated 24 August 1935, Roskill Papers, 
ROSK/7/144. 




result of having the fleets in close proximity to each 
other, itself made necessary by the limited time allowed 
for each exercise due to the need to minimise the steaming 
of ships. This unwittingly benefited the reconnaissance of 
surface forces, lessened the distinctive differences 
between air and surface reconnaissance, and made the 
aircraft carrier appear more vulnerable to surface action 
than it probably was. 
That said, the exercise programme of the interwar 
Royal Navy confirmed the risks that surface naval forces 
faced from the air threat. They also confirmed the risks 
presented by the submarine, the mine, and other surface 
vessels. Against aircraft, ammunition expenditure was 
shown to be prodigious during exercises, manoeuvre of 
limited value, and early warning essential. 233 The place of 
the capital ship, particularly the battleship, in the 
tactical doctrine of the Royal Navy was not due to an ill- 
appreciation of the air threat or a fundamental misreading 
in the capabilities of the fleet's tactical air arm. 
Rather, it stemmed from an appreciation of the risks facing 
all naval warships, the type of encounter to be sought, the 
type of encounter most likely to occur, and the need to 
have general purpose forces capable of sustaining 
operations in differing theatres under various climatic 
conditions. It was also the result of having to make do 
with the forces one had at hand, and here, the disputed and 
divided control of naval aviation played a central part. 
It may be the case that the Air Ministry met the general 
requirements of the navy. 234 Yet, it is surely the case that 
after April 1918 the Service was no longer in a position to 
adequately define its requirements and subject the naval 
air arm to the same degree of tactical examination as the 
traditional branches of naval warfare. Air policy and 
233ADM 186/157, 'C. B. 1769/35(1) and (2), ' p. 110 and 
p. 142. 
234Hezlet, Aircraft and Seapower p. 114. 
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expertise had become the prerogatives of the Royal Air 
Force. 235 The absence of an effective naval staff element 
for most of the interwar period devoted to examining 
aviation matters at the tactical level was the root cause, 236 
and what stands out from the 'Confidential Books' devoted 
to gunnery and torpedo matters is the almost total lack of 
a corresponding series devoted to progress in naval 
aviation. 237 
235Brown, Warship Losses, p. 14. 
236In 1923 a mere two officers formed the Air Section 
of the Naval Staff. See Sir Charles Walker minute 
C. E. 119/27 dated 17 February 1927, Roskill Papers, 
ROSK/7/48. On 1 January 1929, the Naval Air Section was 
reformed as the Naval Air Division. See Office Memorandum 
No. 55, C. E. 4369/28 dated 13 August 1928, Roskill Papers, 
ROSK/7/51. 
237'C. B. 983, Progress in the Fleet Air Arm, ' ADM 
186/560, 'C. B. 3003(26), ' ADM 186/561, 'C. B. 3003/32, 
Progress in the Fleet Air Arm, 1932, ' Admiralty, Naval 
Staff, Naval Air Division, dated June 1933, and ADM 186/562 
'C. B. 3003/34, Progress in the Fleet Air Arm, 1934 
Edition, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, Naval Air Division, dated 
April 1934 represent the sole exceptions to this 
shortcoming. 'C. B. 983, ' has not been located. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CAPITAL SHIP RECONSIDERED: ASSESSMENT 
It is very hard to remember that events now 
long in the past were once in the future. ' 
Maitland 
Emerging from World War One victorious, the Royal Navy 
could not be complacent about its performance during that 
conflict. Its success owed more to force of numbers and 
the contribution of allied armies than to its own tactical 
performance and material readiness. In this, no criticism 
is implied; it merely reflects that when a maritime power 
faces a continental adversary, it must frequently adopt the 
means of the latter if it is to prevail. That said, based 
on its war experience, the Service addressed the immediate 
shortcomings identified in shell performance, took the 
first systematic steps to coordinate gunnery and torpedo 
fire, improved its command and control methods, and 
attempted to capture the vital lessons of the war through 
an extensive historical survey directed by the Naval Staff. 2 
The Navy proved itself open to innovation and embraced 
naval aviation from the earliest days of the 1914-1918 war, 
but experience had shown that the air weapon though 
increasingly essential in supporting naval operations was 
not central. By conflict's end, the capital ship was still 
'Frederic Maitland cited in A. J. P. Taylor, The 
Origins of the Second Worl War (New York: Atheneum, 1983), 
p. 231. 
2Beyond the official history prepared by Julian Corbett 
and Henry Newbolt, this survey was reflected in three major 
series of Admiralty publications: 'C. B. 1515, ' 'C. B. 917, ' 
and 'C. B. 1585. ' The first, a technical history series, 
comprised no less than 51 volumes and addressed such topics 
as the role of convoys, the control of mercantile shipping, 
and technical improvements in gunnery. 'C. B. 917' and 
'C. B. 1585, ' Naval Staff Monographs, ' surveyed such issues 
as the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, Baltic Sea operations, and 
operations in the Atlantic Ocean area. 
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viewed as the final arbiter, of naval power, and the 
battlefleet remained the preferred tactical instrument in 
a fleet action. 
Peace brought retrenchment and reduced the numbers 
borne, but the principle that the heavy ship was the 
keystone of naval power was generally accepted within the 
Service, though much discussion centred around the size 
required to perform its strategic function. The corporate 
position reached during the Post-War Questions Committee 
was that it must be the equal of its main rivals, and this 
view was codified in the Washington Naval Agreement, the 
London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the London Naval 
Agreement of 1936. During the 1919-1939 period finance was 
the determinant of British naval power. The Naval 
Estimates dictated the number of officers and ratings 
carried by the Service, determined the number of ships held 
in commission in the active fleet, influenced the scale of 
naval operations planned and conducted, established the 
pace and degree of ship alterations and modernisations, and 
affected the level and complexity of tactical training. 
The Service's finances also dictated that the arms control 
process was pursued as much for economic reasons as for any 
political or strategic rationale, and the true import of 
finance is revealed by the telling statistic that prior to 
any naval agreement, the Royal Navy retained only sixteen 
heavy ships in full commission. ' 
Within this context, British naval strategy followed 
a 'command of the seas' approach in Home and Mediterranean 
waters whilst pursuing 'fleet-in-being' and 'guerre dg 
course' approaches in subsidiary theatres. In support of 
such a strategy, British naval forces were organised into 
Local Defence Forces, Detached Forces and the Main Fleet 
centred upon the two principal fleets: the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean operating in unison. Capital ships were the 
backbone of the Main Fleet and stood ready to reinforce any 
3ADM 1/8616/218, Plans Division unnumbered minute dated 
December 1921. 
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station. Flexibility and adequate intelligence were vital 
as Britain could not afford to follow a 'command of the 
seas' strategy on a global basis. If necessary, operations 
would be conducted sequentially in separate theatres by the 
Main Fleet to meet multiple threats arising simultaneously. 
Given her estimate of the various naval threats and the 
types of forces held by the differing powers, the strategy 
adopted was a realistic approach that satisfied the defence 
of empire within tight fiscal limits. 
At the operational level of naval warfare, the capital 
ship proved itself a most valuable unit. Whether 'showing 
the flag, ' conducting missions of surveillance, providing 
support to Home or Colonial policing efforts, or as a 
visible symbol of deterrence, battleships and battle 
cruisers were adept at meeting a broad range of operational 
commitments in a manner not available to any other type of 
warship. Still, the Service's employment of heavy ships 
was never dogmatic. It seriously considered reducing the 
numbers operated in the active fleet to offset the costs of 
reintroducing sail training, and its willingness to 
decommission units to meet more pressing operational 
deficiencies in areas such as mine and anti-air warfare are 
evidence of such flexibility in thought. Moreover, the 
Royal Navy's use of capital ships frequently owed more to 
availability than to necessity, and the threat faced by 
heavy ships during operations of such a limited nature, not 
likely to be representative in scale and duration of what 
might be expected in general war, masked the import of 
operational experience. Sometimes, limited experience may 
be worse than no experience. 
Finally, from 1935 onwards the Navy's operational 
commitments during the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish 
Civil War came at the expense of its tactical training 
programme. The actual import these crises had on heavy 
ship divisional training is difficult to measure. Still, 
that they did exact a price can be inferred from 
contemporary Admiralty reports on exercises and operations 
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which increasingly covered the evolutions of the America 
and West Indies and China Stations where previously the 
Mediterranean and Home Fleets had featured so prominently. 4 
At the tactical level, the Royal Navy sought to 
enhance the fighting skills of its ships, aircraft, and 
submarines by correcting deficiencies highlighted in the 
war while testing new methods and procedures. Central to 
the Service's tactical thinking was the concentration of 
all arms operating in mutual support against the main 
striking arm of the enemy: the battlefleet. For heavy 
ships, such concentration was provided by gun and torpedo 
fire. In the prospect of having to face capital ships 
which enjoyed an advantage in long-range gunnery, the 
Navy's remedy was to opt for battle at night or during 
periods of reduced visibility. Its tactical exercise 
programme showed carriers and submarines to be formidable 
weapons. It also showed them to be weapons with severe 
limitations and, in the case of the carrier, highly 
vulnerable and prone to early loss in any naval engagement. 
A strong contributing factor to the retention of the heavy 
ship was the belief that the next fleet action would be 
fought in a chemical warfare environment where the aircraft 
carrier was singularly vulnerable to the effects of such an 
attack. 
Constrained as it was by finance and its diverse 
operational commitments, the exercise programme of the 
Royal Navy was still able to address the major tactical 
issues in extant relating to the capital ship. It 
discounted the value of 'divided tactics, ' accepted the 
superiority of the gun over the torpedo, and recognised the 
general weakness of the battle cruiser in the face of the 
battleship. 5 It is ironic that the navy which commissioned 
Dreadnought, the first large all-calibre warship which made 
'See in particular ADM 186/157, 'C. B. 1769/35(1) and 
(2) .ý 
'ADM 186/154, 'C. B. 1769/33(2), ' p. 5. 
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long-range firing possible, discounted such tactics by the 
end of the interwar period. That it did, confirms that of 
the major naval powers, the Royal Navy was probably the least 
committed to the capital ship concept by the end of the interwar 
period due to the necessity of having to operate on a 
global basis and the costs of building such ships. Still, 
its willingness to accept severe limits on the- size of 
capital ships has to be viewed in the context of an overall 
desire for arms control, and the period is notable for such 
British proposals as the elimination of the submarine, the 
constraints placed on cruiser and carrier forces, and the 
anticipated abolition of military and naval air forces. 6 
On balance, the capital ship controversy operated at 
several different levels. Beyond the inter-Service 
arguments over substitution, the relative costs of 
competing weapons, and the risks posed by air, surface, and 
underwater threats, the Service's view of the capital ship 
was framed by its operational experience, its tactical 
doctrine, and the strategic environment. Its conclusion 
that the capital ship remained the arbiter of naval power 
was a reasonable assessment given the capabilities of 
competing alternatives and the need to prepare for war 
against navies of differing capabilities. Finally, it is 
well to remember that a navy goes to war with the fleet 
that it has and not with the fleet that it wished it had. 
Seapower does not come cheap, and any navy is the product 
of previous investment; the Royal Navy's plight of the late 
interwar period was the harvest of under-investment. Drax 
addressing the assembled officers of the Mediterranean 
Fleet at Malta in 1929 sensed something of this--that the 
twilight of the Royal Navy was at hand, and that its call 
on the nation's resources could no longer be taken for 
granted: 
The public feel, quite wrongly, that the 
idea of making the enemy's coastline our 
6Clive Wigram minute dated 11 June 1932, Roskill 
Papers, ROSK/7/122. 
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maritime frontier is now no longer feasible. 
It is very desirable to show, to them and to 
our enemies, that the same spirit and the 
same possibilities exist to-day as in the 
days when Nelson's fleets so well 
exemplified that fine old maxim "the trident 
of Neptune is the sceptre of the world". We 
all recollect how, according to the poet, 
"The Assyrian came down like a wolf on the 
fold". In just the same manner one would 
like to see the British fleets and squadrons 
going out to war when the call comes. This 
is all the more desirable because it would 
be very fitting to have a really fine finish 
to the great days of our Naval history. ' 
Implicit in Drax's plea is the understanding that, unlike 
the late war, the Service must perfect the instruments that 
it has and not assume that new means will be provided. The 
capital ship was one such instrument--indeed, the primary 
naval instrument, and it is to the Service's credit that it 
perfected its use during the 1919-1939 era within the 
limits afforded by treasury and treaty. 
7R. A. R. Drax lecture 'Battle Tactics, ' delivered 1 
November 1929, Malta, Drax Papers, DRAX/2/2. 
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APPENDIX I 
FILES NOT HELD AT THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 
RELATING TO THE CAPITAL SHIP CONTROVERSY 
Donald Cameron Watt assessing the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement some ten years removed from the Second World War 
wrote a perceptive piece offering an interim judgement. ' 
This writer, in surveying the interwar capital ship 
controversy, is reminded that all history is revision and 
that definitive conclusions must be tempered with 
reservation. A question not asked received no answer. To 
that extent, history is merely the progress of successive 
interim judgements. The one question this work has 
attempted to address is, 'Notwithstanding financial and 
treaty limitations, to what degree was the Royal Navy 
committed to the capital ship based on its operational 
experience and interwar tactical development? ' The answer 
provided by this work is primarily based on a review of the 
official files surviving supplemented by personal journals, 
diaries, and correspondence. Yet, gaps exist in the 
official record, and, of the many files missing, the 
following are the more salient: 
'Naval Tactical Notes, Volume II' 
'C. B. 906, Gunnery Subjects, ' 
'C. B. 934, Naval War Manual, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 937, Action Plotting, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 974, Naval Bombardment, ' 
'C. B. 999, Naval Intelligence, ' 
'C. B. 999A, Naval Intelligence, Appendix, ' 
'C. B. 1540, Ordnance Committee Report, 1919, ' 
'C. B. 1541, Ordnance Committee Report, 1920, ' 
T. B. 1546, Mediterranean Naval Operations, 1920, ' 
'C. B. 1551, Gunnery, Volume III, ' 
'C. B. 1560, Ordnance Committee Report, 1920, ' 
'C. B. 1564, Battleship Gunnery Practices, 1920, ' 
'C. B. 1570, Ordnance Committee Report, 1920, ' 
T. B. 1574, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1920, ' 
'C. B. 1575, Summary of Torpedo Exercises, 1921, ' 
1D. C. Watt, 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: 
An Interim Judgement, ' The Journal of Modern History, 28, 
1956, pp. 155-175. 
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'C. B. 1579, Battleship Gunnery Practices, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 1582, Summary of Bombardment Practices, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 1587, Summary of Torpedo Practices, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 1591, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 1593, Ordnance Committee Report, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 1601, Tactical Manual, 1921, ' 
'C. B. 1609, Battleship Gunnery Practices, 1922, ' 
'C. B. 1621, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1922, ' 
'C. B. 1633, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1923, ' 
'C. B. 1646, Commodity Chart Japan, 1924, ' 
'C. B. 1650, Gunnery Practice in Capital Ships, 1924, ' 
'C. B. 1656, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1924, ' 
'C. B. 01661, Annual Report of Chemical Warfare, 1924, ' 
'C. B. 1663, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1923, ' 
'C. B. 1684, Commodity Chart France, ' 
'C. B. 01685, Ordnance Committee Report, 1923, ' 
'C. B. 1687, Report of Bombarding Practices, 1923, ' 
'C. B. 1690, Gunnery Practice in Capital Ships, 1925, ' 
'C. B. 1693, Summary of Tactical Exercises, 1925, ' 
'C. B. 1843, Gunfire Communications, ' 
'C. B. 3016, Progress in Tactics, ' 
As the above records have not been found, it is difficult 
to rank their relative importance to a fuller appreciation 
of the capital ship controversy. Still, given its citation 
in the 'Battle Instructions, i2 that it addresses in detail 
'Forms of Battle, E through G, ' and the partial contents 
that have survived in the Admiralty Secretariat series, ' 
'Naval Tactical Notes' must be deemed one of the most 
important of the missing files. 
In addition to the above known records, one can 
surmise based on an appreciation of British naval 
procedures that other files were most likely produced but 
have failed to survive. Included in this series would be 
the Admiralty letters of instruction issued to the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the major fleets specifying the 
strategical setting of an exercise--in short, what power 
was being represented by 'Blue Fleet, ' where was the action 
occurring, in what year was the action occurring, and what 
specific ships of 'Blue Fleet' were being portrayed. 
Moreover, annual reports should have been produced by the 
2ADM 186/106, 'C. B. 01821, ' p. 3. 
3ADM 1/9387. 
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Tactical School summarising the issues investigated based 
on questions forwarded by the Admiralty and the fleets, and 
the Air Section of the Naval Staff should have produced a 
summary of yearly tactical progress in naval aviation. ' 
Beyond the gunnery issues investigated and specified in 
Appendix VII, a series of tactical issues were investigated 
during the period by the fleets and probably also by the 
Tactical School. The nature and number cannot be 
determined but it is known that the following specific 
issues were addressed: 
a. How best to gain and maintain the range 
at which it is desired to fight. ' 
b. Protection of aircraft carriers from 
attacks by surface ships. (Issue was 
withdrawn in 1935). 
c. Protection of aircraft carriers when 
operating with a detached force. (Issue 
identified in 1937). 
Additionally, investigation of the following issues can be 
inferred based on their reference in the Confidential Book 
series summarising the Service's exercise programme: 
a. How best to escort a composite force 
(including battleships) which is exposed to 
attack by battle cruisers and light forces. ' 
b. The effects produced by destroyers, 
submarines, and torpedo aircraft in a 
daylight pursuit. ' 
c. To test the organisation of a destroyer 
force before contact is made at night. ' 
4It is know that no summary was produced in 1933 and at 
least one 'Progress in Naval Aviation' was prepared as a 
staff memorandum in March 1921. See Roskill Papers, 
ROSK/7/46. 
5ADM 186/154, 'C. B. 1769/33(2), ' p. 8. 
6ADM 186/143, 'C. B. 1769/27(2), ' p. 44. 
7Ibid. 
'Ibid., p. 46. 
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d. How to cover the retreat of a damaged 
battle cruiser in the face of a superior 
fleet. ' 
e. To investigate the best form of screen 
to be adopted at night against a force of 
cruisers and destroyers aware of the 
approximate position of the battlefleet. lo 
f. To investigate the possibilities of 
shore bombardment by a raider. " 
g. To investigate the use of cruisers with 
a large torpedo armament. "Z 
h. How to screen a fleet from submarine 
attack by surface craft and aeroplanes 
acting in unison. " 
i. To investigate the refueling of 
aircraft by submarines at sea. 14 
D. How several aircraft carriers should 
operate together. is 
k. A surface action between two fleets one 
composed of battleships and battle cruisers 
and the other composed of battleships. " 
1. The tactical use of anti-submarine 
vessels against submarines of the proposed 
i-class. 17 
m. An investigation into the danger of 










torpedo fire from a retiring fleet. 18 
n. The tactics of attacking a heavily 
defended convoy. 19 
o. How to retain touch with an enemy when 
an action has been joined late in the day. 20 
p. The tactics of a fleet superior in 
light craft but weaker in gun power covering 
the retreat of damaged vessels. 21 
q. How to defend a fleet in harbour 
against air attack. 22 
r. The use of divisional formation in a 
destroyer night attack. 23 
Finally, while the periodic reports of the Naval Staff 
recount in a distilled manner the significant findings of 
the era's exercises, what is largely missing is the 
analysis and comments that each commanding officer would 
have provided to his immediate superior for consideration 
and inclusion in squadron or divisional reports to the 
fleet commander. 
18ADM 186/146, 'C. B. 1769/29(2), Exercises & 
Operations, 1929, Volume II, ' Admiralty, Naval Staff, 
Tactical Division dated June 1930, p. 5. 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
21Ibid. , p. 6. 
21Ibid. , p. 10. 
























































































































































































NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
(continued) 
1935 64,806,000 Gibbs 70,184,898 
1936 81,289,100 Roskill 87,548,360 
1936 81,092,000 Gibbs 87,336,084 
1937 78,065,000 Roskill 82,280,510 
1937 77,950,000 Gibbs 82,159,300 
1938 96,117,500 Roskill 103,518,540 
1938 95,945,000 Gibbs 103,332,760 
1939 99,429,000 Roskill 
1939 97,960,312 Gibbs 
The figures for Adjusted Budget are derived from John Stevenson 
British. Society 1919-45 (Middlesex: Penquin, 1984). The 
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OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE 
IN THE ROYAL NAVY 
Whilst no direct evidence exists that the Royal Navy 
deployed chemical shells as an offensive weapon during the 
1919-1939 period, it developed such means, if for no other 
reason than to possess, a retaliatory capability in the 
event of its use by another naval power. With this in 
mind, the Admiralty advised the fleet in 1931 that: 
All Service schools and commands are 
authorised to study the offensive use of 
gas, since this is necessary to the study 
of protection against gas, and also that we 
may be in a position to retaliate 
immediately should the use of gas be forced 
upon us by our opponents. ' 
During the 1914-1918 war, the Royal Navy manufactured 
chemical weapons as a response to the enemy's submarine 
campaign. However, they were never fielded operationally 
and were disposed of at the end of the conflict. 2 Word that 
the United States Navy was continuing in its efforts to 
develop an offensive chemical weapons capability prompted 
Beatty to bring the matter to the Cabinet's attention where 
he argued that the development of such weapons for naval 
purposes had become a vital matter. 3 Confirmation of the 
continued American interest in chemical weapons was 
received when Chatfield was shown film of the recent Army 
Air Service strikes against former German warships at the 
time of the Washington Naval Conference. 4 
'ADM 186/82, 'C. B. 3021, ' p. 2. 
'ADM 116/1775, First Sea Lord un-numbered minute dated 
7 May 1920 to Cabinet. 
3Ibid. 
4ADM 1/8615/207, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff 
statement to British Empire Delegation dated 9 December 
1921. 
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A limited capability was retained for defensive 
training purposes and manufactured at the Poison Gas 
Factory, Sutton Oak and by the British Dye-stuffs 
Corporation located at Dalton, Huddersfield. ' Beyond the 
periodic training of personnel in defensive measures at the 
ashore gas schools located at Portsmouth, Devonport, and 
Chatham, personnel were trained aboard a vessel dedicated 
to chemical warfare: HMS Boadicea. 6 In May 1927, a full 
scale demonstration on the effects of chlorine gas was 
conducted at sea against i er whilst,? offensively, the 
Admiralty made available a quantity of 4-inch to 18-inch 
obsolescent shells to the Chemical Warfare Committee. ' 
Most powers were signatories to the 1925 protocol 
which prohibited the use of chemical weapons. Still, the 
British government intended to seek an understanding from 
any state which was not a party to the agreement, if it 
found itself at war with that country. 9 Confirmation that 
Italian forces had used mustard gas in Ethiopia gave the 
issue fresh impetus, and in 1937, the Government concluded 
that it must be prepared to wage offensive chemical warfare 
and directed each of the Services to consider the use of 
chemical weapons. lo 
Notwithstanding Beatty's argument that the development 
of an offensive chemical weapons capability was deemed 
vital, the Service deprecated its place in naval artillery 
except for use in support of shore bombardments by a heavy 
'ADM 116/2393, ' Committee of Imperial Defence, un- 
numbered minute dated 18 January 1929, Appendix No. 5, pp. 
1-2. 
6ADM 1/8618/1, undated and unnumbered memorandum 
regarding Anti-Gas Training in the Navy. 
7ADM 189/47, 'C. B. 1770(27), ' p. 97. 
8ADM 186/251, 'C. B. 1594, ' p. 54. 
9ADM 186/117, 'C. B. 3042, ' p. xii. 
'°ADM 186/551, 'C. B. 3002/38, ' p. 45. 
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ship's secondary armament. " This view was sustained by the 
premise that the aim of a fleet action was destruction, and 
not incapacitation, of the 'enemy. Better value was 
provided in filling an armour-piercing shell with high 
explosives than with a persistent or non-persistent agent 
which took time to take effect. "Z 
That said, the Royal Navy did develop an airborne 
capability to deliver a chemical attack. The equipment 
necessary was much the same as that required to deliver a 
smoke screen from the air, of which, the Service practiced 
on a regular basis. Exercises such as 'Q. B., ' conducted by 
the Mediterranean Fleet in January 1932 tested the defences 
of heavy ships in harbour against an simulated airborne 
chemical attack delivered by aircraft launched from 
Courageous and Glorious. A spray composed of flour and sea 
water was dropped from a height of 100-200 feet against the 
anchored ships, and the conclusion reached was that: 
177. The gas attacks fulfilled their 
purpose in bringing home to the personnel to 
some extent the nature of a mustard gas 
attack, and the defensive measure that are 
necessary. 
178. The anti-gas organisation appears 
to be developing along sound lines. It is 
evident that a gas attack will not have a 
serious effect on a ship that is prepared to 
meet it, and it would probably be 
uneconomical to use aircraft for this 
purpose against a trained fleet. 13 
The chemical weapons ultimately developed included 
phosgene, a lethal choking agent, and mustard gas, a 
blistering agent deadly in high doses. Phosgene, as a non- 
persistent agent allowed for the rapid occupation of any 
area attacked, whilst mustard gas, a persistent, would be 
employed to deny an area to enemy personnel or preclude the 
"ADM 186/82, 'C. B. 3021, ' p. 14. 
"Ibid. 
13ADM 186/151, 'C. B. 1769/32(1), ' pp. 3-17. 
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operation of equipment. Other agents developed included 
diphenylamine chlorarsine, or Adamsite, and diphenyl 
chloroarsine. These instruments, though not usually lethal, 
debilitated personnel through vomiting making it impossible 
for personnel to wear a protective mask, and, thus, allowed 
other agents to take effect. In addition, a family of 
riot control agents including ethyl iodoaetate and 
chloroacetophenone were developed. 14 Given the several 
agents produced and their differing purposes, one can 
conclude that the Royal Navy had evolved at least a 
rudimentary doctrine for the employment of chemical weapons 
by the close of the interwar period. 
Finally, during the Second World War, the question 
returned from whence it began for the Royal Navy--the use 
of gas as an anti-submarine measure. Whether representing 
a statement of truth, or merely an idle threat to be used 
to deter sabotaging a submarine disabled on the surface, 
the orders of the Second Support Group contained the 
warning: 'Ween sis mich widerstehen, so lose ich Giftgas in 
den komandoturn. i15 
"ADM 186/82, 'C. B. 3021, ' pp. 15-16. 
15'Any trouble and I will put poison gas down the 
conning tower! ', Second Support Group, Operation 'Haggis' 
Glossary, p. 11, Vice Admiral Sir Peter Cazalet Papers, 
Imperial War Museum, IWM/P432. 
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APPENDIX VII 
BATTLESHIP AND BATTLE CRUISER GUNNERY PROBLEMS 
INVESTIGATED IN THE 1919-1939 PERIOD' 
BA. Procedure to adopted by a division when in Master Ship 
Control if all communications from the master ship 
fail. 
BE. Procedure to be adopted by a consort in Master Ship 
Control, if the ship fails to receive any information 
from the master ship. 
BC. Increase in Output in Concentration Using the 
Individual Ship Control Method. 
BD. Time taken to change degree of concentration. 
BE. Pair Ship Firing by Master Ship Control. 
BH. Concentration on an enemy 'turning point. ' 
BI. Cooperation of a division during night action. 
BK. Number and nature of guns required for star shell 
illumination. 
BL. Maximum effective range of star shell from different 
natures of gun. 
BM. The possibilities of the adjustment of the gyro firing 
gear on the flashes of star shell guns. 
BN. Suitability of the suggested modifications to the 
secondary armament spotting rules. 
BO. Use of secondary armaments against low flying aircraft 
at long range. 
BP. To investigate the effect of cross fire by two ships 
widely separated firing at one target. 
BQ. To investigate the effect on own ship's fire when 
frequent and large alterations of course have to be 
made, and to discover the best methods of compensating 
for own ship's movements with Dreyer fire control 
tables. 
B1. Method of obtaining consistent spreads and good rate 
of fire in MSC concentration in which no breakdowns 
are introduced. 




B2. The best method of compensating for own movements 
during alterations of course. 
B3. The effects of illuminants in silhouetting ships using 
them. 
B4. Illumination procedure with searchlights and 4-inch 
H. A. guns, assuming that secondary armament is not 
available for star shell. 
B5. Use of inclinometers for 'Inc. Rate' plotting. 
B6. Value of a proposed modification to the Aircraft 
Spotting Rules. 
B7. Correction to allow for lag of rangefinder ranges, 
etc., with secondary armaments. 
B8. Use of Eversheds at night in later ships. 
B9. Deflection finding and amended rules. 
B10. The suitability of Cruiser Spotting Rules for capital 
ships when in MSC. 
B11. Suitability of proposed modification to the Aircraft 
Spotting Rules. 
B12. Line Spotting Rules for indirect fire, and need for a 
Line Spotting Officer. 
B13. The number of aircraft observers required for 
efficient observation of fire and if enemy movements 
in indirect fire. 
B14. The suitability of the proposed modification to the 
single-step Spotting Rules for secondary armaments. 
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